Volume 175 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, John Rainey, appeals his conviction of two counts of first-degree child molestation and one count of second-degree child molestation. The defendant primarily argued that the trial justice erred in allowing, under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, testimony from the defendant's biological daughter as to an unconvicted assault he allegedly committed against her. Moreover, the defendant argued that, even if the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b), it was inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In addition, the defendant asserted that the state's late disclosure of the Rule 404(b) witness's testimony constituted a violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the trial justice's remedy of delaying the witness's testimony for three days so that defense counsel could prepare for it constituted an abuse of discretion. Lastly, the defendant alleged the trial justice erred in denying both his motion for new trial and motion for judgment of acquittal. The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing the Rule 404(b) testimony, nor did he do so in determining that the evidence was permissible under Rule 403. The Court similarly held that, while the state did violate Rule 16 in its late disclosure of the Rule 404(b) witness's testimony, the trial justice's remedy of requiring the state to wait three days before calling the witness was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the Court upheld the trial justice's decision denying the defendant's motion for new trial and motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The defendant, Benjamin D. Minior, appeals a Superior Court justice's denial of his motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel. Before a Superior Court magistrate, the defendant sought to dismiss his criminal charges stemming from a motor vehicle accident, arguing that a Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal magistrate had already determined that he was not operating the vehicle and thus collateral estoppel precluded the issue from being relitigated. The Superior Court magistrate granted the motion to dismiss, and the state appealed his decision pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-11.1(d) to a Superior Court justice, who then reversed the dismissal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on collateral estoppel. On appeal, the Court held that collateral estoppel did not apply. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the elements of collateral estoppel were met. Nevertheless, basing its decision on the principle that collateral estoppel is not a mandatory doctrine, the Court concluded that it would be inequitable to apply collateral estoppel to Traffic Tribunal proceedings, based largely on their informal nature. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court justice's decision. Justice Robinson did not participate.