Volume 176 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiffs, the Gerald P. Zarrella Trust et al., appealed a Superior Court judgment denying their request for declaratory relief. The thrust of the plaintiffs' lawsuit was that an injunction prohibiting them from hosting commercial events on Zarrella's Exeter farmland had been superseded by an amendment to G.L. 1956 § 2-23-4(a), a section of Rhode Island's Right to Farm Act. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that hosting commercial events, such as weddings for a fee, was an "agricultural operation" as defined by § 2-23-4(a), and, as such, the town was preempted from prohibiting it. The defendants, the Town of Exeter and members of its town council, argued that the language the plaintiffs relied on was merely a statement of policy, which did not expand the definition of "agricultural operations" or supersede the injunction prohibiting the plaintiffs from hosting commercial events. After considering the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendants, holding that even if hosting commercial events, like weddings for a fee, fell within the ambit of the amended language, that language did not expand the definition of "agricultural operations" for purposes of the Right to Farm Act. Rather, the Supreme Court concluded, the amended language was an expression of policy preference, listing encouraged uses of land. Therefore, because the amendment to § 2-23-4(a) did not supersede the injunction, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

he plaintiff, Paul E. Pontarelli, appealed from a Superior Court order granting the motion to dismiss of the defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE) and Ken Wagner, in his capacity as the commissioner of RIDE. Pontarelli sought access to records in RIDE's possession pursuant to the Access to Public Records Act (APRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 2 of title 38. The catch, however, was that those purportedly public records were not related to the statutory mission of RIDE, but to the "private law practice" of one of RIDE's employees. The agency rejected Pontarelli's request, prompting him to seek declaratory relief in the Superior Court. That relief was denied. The Supreme Court held that it was not erroneous for the motion justice to consider Pontarelli's public-records request in ruling on RIDE's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Based on the plain language of the request, this Court held that Pontarelli had not sought "public records" as that term is defined in APRA therefore, his complaint was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The petitioner sought review of a decision of the respondent denying the petitioner's application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-47-11. The petitioner argued, among other things, that the respondent's decision letter denying his application ran afoul of this Court's holding in Gadomski v. Tavares, 113 A.3d 387 (R.I. 2015). The Supreme Court agreed that the respondent's decision letter fell short of the standard articulated in Gadomski, and it ordered the respondent to issue a new decision, consistent with Gadomski, especially in light of the information revealed by documents later obtained by the respondent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the respondent's decision denying the petitioner's application for a concealed-carry permit.

The plaintiff, Bruce Zarembka, appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial in favor of the defendants, Kali Whelan and John Whelan. This case arose from an automobile accident between Zarembka and Kali. Zarembka brought suit and alleged that Kali negligently operated her vehicle. After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants, Zarembka moved for a new trial. A Superior Court justice denied his motion, and Zarembka appealed. On appeal, Zarembka argued that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence when deciding the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly conducted the analysis for the motion for a new trial and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision to deny the plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

This matter arises out of administrative proceedings adjudging student allegations of inappropriate behavior by high school teacher James Viner. Following a full evidentiary hearing before the North Kingstown School Committee resulting in a decision to suspend Viner without pay for the 2015-2016 the school year and terminate his employment immediately thereafter "for good and just cause," Viner appealed that decision to the commissioner of elementary and secondary education within the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE). The RIDE hearing officer granted Viner's subpoena requests for documents and the testimony of two attorneys acting as legal counsel for the North Kingstown School Committee. In response, the school committee filed a miscellaneous petition to quash the subpoenas in the Superior Court. The hearing justice granted in part and denied in part the school committee's petition to quash three subpoenas. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Viner challenged the hearing justice's grant of the school committee's petition to quash the subpoenas compelling the testimony of the attorneys. He contended that the hearing justice applied the attorney-client privilege to the attorneys' anticipated testimony in an overly broad manner when he failed to make question-by-question privilege determinations. The Supreme Court held that to ensure that the attorney-client privilege remains strictly confined, the question of attorney-client privilege should be remanded to the Superior Court in order for the attorneys to testify either in person or by deposition and the school committee to assert a claim of privilege on a question-by-question basis. Following the hearing justice's privilege determination, any party in interest may request the RIDE hearing officer to reopen the evidence to receive any testimony from the attorneys that has been deemed to be nonprivileged by the hearing justice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court judgment granting the school committee's motion to quash the attorneys' subpoenas, affirmed the judgment in all other respects, and remanded this case to the Superior Court the question of attorney-client privilege.

Kenneth Jolicoeur, a part-time faculty member at the University of Rhode Island (URI) and a member of the American Association of University Professors, Part-Time Faculty United union (the union), was assigned two courses and a "Special Programs Contract" for the fall 2013 semester. URI then informed Jolicoeur that he could not perform all three assignments. Jolicoeur opted to teach the two classes and filed a grievance with URI protesting the limitation on assignments, but a resolution could not be reached through the grievance process. The union then filed a demand for arbitration on Jolicoeur's behalf. The arbitrator deemed the dispute arbitrable, found that URI's limitation on Jolicoeur's assignments violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and ordered URI to pay Jolicoeur $6,500 in salary for the rescinded "Special Programs Contract" and to cease and desist from unilaterally imposing a two-course limit. URI moved in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award and to stay the implementation of the award, to which the union objected and moved to confirm the award. The hearing justice denied URI's motion to vacate the arbitration award and granted the union's motion to confirm the award. On appeal to the Supreme Court, URI challenged the hearing justice's decision on three grounds: (1) the dispute was not substantively arbitrable (2) URI's imposition of a limitation did not violate the CBA and (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing a cease-and-desist order. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the dispute was arbitrable because its resolution required interpretation of the CBA (2) the arbitrator's conclusion that URI violated the CBA was based on a passably plausible interpretation of the CBA and (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by imposing the cease-and-desist order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the cease-and-desist order and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all other respects. Justice Indeglia did not participate.