Volume 184 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Joshua Rathbun, was before the Supreme Court on appeal from a Superior Court conviction on two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault involving his biological daughter. The defendant received two concurrent forty-year sentences with twenty-five years to serve and the remainder suspended with probation. The defendant timely appealed. The Supreme Court considered the arguments of both the defendant and the state, and concluded that the trial justice properly admitted the remainder of the expert testimony after striking one prejudicial statement and giving a cautionary instruction to the jury. The Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice properly denied defendant's motion to pass the case because: (1) there is no requirement of corroboration in sexual offense cases and (2) whether or not the expert testimony had probative value is a determination for the jury. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, because the purported new evidence would not have impacted the verdict. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's denial of the defendant's motion to strike, motion to pass the case, and motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant-union, CCRI Educational Support Professional Association/NEARI, appealed to the Supreme Court after a justice of the Superior Court vacated an arbitration award that had reinstated the grievant, Michael Crenshaw, to his position as a Campus Police Officer for the plaintiff, the Community College of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers by deciding a grievance that was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court concluded that Crenshaw was not eligible to become a permanent police officer because he had neither completed the statutorily required police training academy nor received a waiver from having to do so, and thus the arbitrator lacked the authority to reinstate Crenshaw to a position that he could not legally hold

The Dunn's Corners Fire District (Dunn's Corners) filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it was not obligated to provide fire protection services to property formerly owned by the Bradford Dyeing Association Inc. in the village of Bradford in Westerly, Rhode Island (the property). The current owner of the property, BPF Realty, LLC (BPF), appealed from a judgment granting Dunn's Corners' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, BPF raised two arguments without further elucidation: (1) "[w]hether the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over [count 3 of Dunn's Corners' complaint], where the declaratory judgment neither terminated all controversies nor bound all entities having an interest in the dispute[,]" and (2) "[w]hether there is a genuine issue of material fact that the BPF property is in the Bradford Fire District." After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that there existed no genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Karen Dent, is before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, PRRC, Inc. d/b/a Price Rite. The plaintiff suffered an injury when she fell on a liquid substance on the floor of an aisle in the defendant's grocery store. The plaintiff then filed a five-count amended complaint in Superior Court alleging: negligence breach of contract mode of operation failure to warn and breach of warranties. At a hearing, the trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant with respect to the plaintiff's negligence claim, and dismissed the remainder of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff timely appealed. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that the trial justice engaged in weighing and evaluating the evidence presented to him, which is an impermissible function at the summary-judgment stage. However, the Supreme Court also concluded that the remainder of the plaintiff's claims are without merit, and declined to adopt the theory of "mode of operation" as a cause of action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment on the negligence count in favor of the defendant, and affirmed the judgment dismissing the remainder of the plaintiff's claims.

The plaintiff, George T. Hawes, appealed from the April 29, 2015 final judgment entered in the Newport County Superior Court. That judgment was entered to reflect an April 27, 2015 written decision, in which the hearing justice quashed an execution previously issued by the Superior Court on a State of Utah District Court judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's petition to enforce the Utah judgment, on the ground that Utah did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Daniel P. Reilly. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the hearing justice erred in refusing to grant full faith and credit to the order of the state District Court in Utah with respect to personal jurisdiction. He further averred that the hearing justice erred in determining that Utah did not have personal jurisdiction over Daniel Reilly. Lastly, he posited that Daniel Reilly had "forfeited the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction." The Supreme Court held that the order of the State of Utah District Court at issue was not entitled to full faith and credit because the issue of personal jurisdiction was not fully and fairly litigated or finally decided in Utah. The Court further held that Utah did not have personal jurisdiction over Daniel Reilly. Lastly, the Supreme Court determined that Daniel Reilly had not forfeited his defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In these consolidated matters, the plaintiffs appeal a Superior Court justice's approval of a class action for settlement purposes only. The plaintiffs, all state and municipal employees, alleged that the settlement violated their constitutional rights in denying them their retirement benefits. They contended that the trial justice's certification of the class was improper and that the settlement was not fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Supreme Court first held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in certifying the class in accordance with Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, because the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation were all met. Next, the Court determined that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in certifying the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), because the plaintiffs sought mainly equitable relief, and any money damages would be merely incidental. The Court also held that the trial justice's division of the class into subclasses was not improper. Finally, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding that the settlement was procedurally fair. In addition, the Court affirmed the trial justice's determination that the settlement was substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate, acknowledging that the trial justice conducted an exhaustive review of the factors necessary to ascertain the fairness of the settlement and did not overlook any of the objectors' concerns. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Christopher G. Rein, appealed from a Superior Court order granting a motion to dismiss his action, which was brought by the defendants, ESS Group, Inc., Charles J. Natale, Jr., and the Charles J. Natale, Jr. 2003 Trust u/d/t January 23, 2003, as amended. Rein argued that the Superior Court justice erred in finding that Rein's complaint failed to state a claim under the Rhode Island Business Corporations Act (BCA) because ESS is incorporated in Delaware and Rhode Island does not have the authority to regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, such as ESS. Rein also asserted that the hearing justice erred in dismissing his claim brought under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) after finding that the WPA claim was premised on a violation of the BCA, to which the hearing justice had found ESS not subject. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the hearing justice's decision in part and affirmed it in part. Specifically, the Court concluded that the BCA count was properly dismissed because the defendants' alleged violations of the BCA constitute "internal affairs," which Rhode Island has no authority to regulate. The Court held, however, that Rein's complaint sufficiently pled a WPA claim because, under the WPA, he need not prove that an actual violation of a law occurred, only that he reasonably believed that a violation occurred. The Court concluded that Rein's belief that the defendants were subject to and violated the BCA may well have been reasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the hearing justice to dismiss the BCA count of Rein's complaint, and it reversed the dismissal of the WPA count.

The plaintiff in a slip-and-fall action appealed from a Providence County Superior Court hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of one defendant, Rite Aid, and he also appealed from the trial justice's denial of his motion for a new trial in favor of the other two defendants, Riverside and Venditelli. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that Rite Aid owed a duty to him based on his status as an invitee, that the trial justice erred in granting the defendants' motion in limine as to the admission of certain photographs, and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant, Rite Aid, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, based on the terms of the relevant lease agreement. Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding the photographs at issue. Finally, the Court determined that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on the application of the Connecticut Rule regarding snow removal because the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence of any unusual circumstances. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff in a slip-and-fall action appealed from a Providence County Superior Court hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of one defendant, Rite Aid, and he also appealed from the trial justice's denial of his motion for a new trial in favor of the other two defendants, Riverside and Venditelli. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that Rite Aid owed a duty to him based on his status as an invitee, that the trial justice erred in granting the defendants' motion in limine as to the admission of certain photographs, and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant, Rite Aid, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, based on the terms of the relevant lease agreement. Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding the photographs at issue. Finally, the Court determined that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial based on the application of the Connecticut Rule regarding snow removal because the plaintiff failed to put forth evidence of any unusual circumstances. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and judgment of the Superior Court.

The petitioner, Leonard Jefferson, appealed from the June 2, 2015 denial of his application for postconviction relief in Providence County Superior Court. He contended before the Supreme Court that the hearing justice erred in denying his application for postconviction relief because, in his view, his parole was revoked and he was denied the possibility of parole in the future pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 13-8-14(b) in violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. He further averred that the separation of powers doctrine and his right to be free from double jeopardy were also violated when he was denied the possibility of parole and he argued that his due process rights were violated when his parole was revoked. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Jefferson was entitled to a new parole revocation hearing with the representation of counsel prior to the revocation of his parole and that he did not receive such a hearing in the instant case. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions that it remand the case to the Parole Board to conduct a new parole revocation hearing which complies with the requirements of due process and the right to counsel.

The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) and the State of Rhode Island appeal from a decision of a trial justice in the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Vincent Coccoli, doing business as Millville Associates, Inc., and Patrick Conley, as Trustee of the Pearl Trust (collectively defendants). The DEM also appeals from the denial of its motion to file a second amended complaint. In 2002, DEM concluded that defendants were responsible for the remediation of excessive chlorinated volatile organic compounds detected in the groundwater of an abutting property. After defendants' alleged failure to remediate the contamination, DEM issued a notice of violation against defendants and assessed an administrative penalty. The DEM then commenced an action against defendants seeking injunctive relief to require defendants to remediate. The DEM also sought enforcement of the administrative penalty and argued that its authority to do so arose from G.L. 1956 § 42-17.1-2(21)(v). On February 17, 2016, fourteen years after DEM became involved in defendants' property, the trial justice issued a bench decision finding that DEM could not enforce an administrative penalty in the context of an action for injunctive relief. The DEM filed a timely notice of appeal. The Supreme Court held that DEM's appeal was not properly before the Court because, pursuant to § 42-17.1-2(21)(vii), an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court brought under § 42-17.1-2(21) must proceed by a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court concluded that DEM's failure to comply with this statute was fatal to the appeal.

The pro se plaintiff, Vincent Coccoli, is before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Town of Scituate Town Council et al. The plaintiff, a member of Hope Mill Village Associates, LLC, fruitlessly attempted to develop the Hope Mill Property located in Scituate, Rhode Island. The plaintiff was granted conditional approval for dimensional relief from the Scituate Zoning Board of Review, contingent upon receiving approval from the Scituate Town Council for a municipal sewer line. At a regular meeting, the town council voted to approve the plaintiff's sewer line pending receipt of a Memorandum of Understanding from the plaintiff, which was thereafter executed, signed by the town council president, adorned with an official town seal, and recorded in the land evidence records. The property subsequently went into receivership and was sold to New England Development R.I., LLC, in spite of the plaintiff's multiple attempts at purchasing the property from the receiver. The plaintiff then filed a four-count complaint in Superior Court against the town, alleging breach of contract, federal Privacy Act violations, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and fraudulent misrepresentation. At a hearing, the trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all counts. The plaintiff timely appealed. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that the Memorandum of Understanding constituted a binding contract between the plaintiff and the town because it was signed by the town council president and recorded in the land evidence records, and plaintiff performed subsequent acts in furtherance of the contract. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the remainder of the plaintiff's claims are without merit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment on Count I of the plaintiff's complaint, and it affirmed the judgment dismissing the remainder of the plaintiff's claims.

The plaintiff, Richard Goodrow, appealed a Newport County Superior Court order granting the motions to dismiss of the defendants, Bank of America, N.A., and EverBank Mortgage. The plaintiff asserted that the Superior Court justice erred in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata prevented him from asserting his claims against the defendants in state court. The defendants rebutted that the plaintiff's action was in fact barred on res judicata grounds based on an action filed and dismissed in federal court. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice properly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss because res judicata prohibited the plaintiff from relitigating his claims against the defendants. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.