Volume 185 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Kevin Gaugler, appealed from a Providence County Family Court judgment granting the request of the plaintiff, Angela Luis, for a divorce. Angela alleged that she and Kevin, although not formally wed, were married at common law based on their intentions and conduct over the course of their twenty-three-year relationship. The trial justice agreed, and concluded that Angela presented clear and convincing evidence that she and Kevin were married by common law. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in determining that the proffered evidence satisfied the standard of clear and convincing to support the conclusion that Angela and Kevin were married at common law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial justice's judgment.

The defendant, Andre Marizan, was convicted of first-degree sexual assault in a Providence County Superior Court jury trial. On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor in her closing argument improperly commented on the defendant's failure to testify, violating his Fifth Amendment rights. In addition, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in admitting the defendant's booking photograph into evidence and also erred in denying his motion for new trial. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's comment in her closing argument was not of such a nature that a jury would interpret it as a remark on the defendant's failure to testify at trial, and, accordingly, the trial justice did not clearly err in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Additionally, the Court concluded that the admission of the defendant's "mug shot" was not reversible error, if error at all, because of other evidence of guilt admitted at trial, as well as a timely cautionary instruction given by the trial justice. Finally, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial because the trial justice adequately articulated his reasons for denying the motion, and he sufficiently assessed the credibility of all the witnesses. As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

A senseless compulsion for revenge resulted in the tragic and unintended death of George Holland, Jr. and the conviction of four conspirators. Ashner Alexis appealed to the Supreme Court from a judgment of conviction for murder (count 1) conspiracy to commit murder (count 2) and discharging a weapon while committing a crime of violence (count 3). He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms of imprisonment on counts 1 and 3, and ten years to serve on count 2, also to be served consecutively. He sought to have his convictions reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the trial justice abused his discretion in denying Alexis's motions for a mistrial and to pass and in overruling Alexis's objection to photographic evidence, and because the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying Alexis's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court declared that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Alexis's motions to pass and for a mistrial or in admitting the photographic evidence. The Supreme Court further declared that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in denying Alexis's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Prospect CharterCARE, LLC (PCC), appealed from an order of the Superior Court denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award and confirming the award in favor of the defendant, Michael E. Conklin, Jr. On appeal, PCC contended that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by: (1) relying on a "concededly erroneous" factual assumption and thereby manifestly disregarding the applicable law (2) manifestly disregarding the clear and unambiguous contractual language that should have precluded any award in favor of the defendant and (3) ordering PCC to pay the defendant extended severance benefits when the defendant failed to prove that PCC had assumed liability for the employment contracts entered into between the defendant and his previous employer—PCC's predecessor entity. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator neither manifestly disregarded the law nor manifestly disregarded a contractual provision, because the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement and was sufficiently grounded in the contract to be within the scope of his authority as an arbitrator. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded that PCC had waived its argument with respect to assumption of liability under the employment contract. For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the order and the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Russell G. Gross, was before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Steven M. Pare, William Trinque, and James J. Lombardi. The plaintiff was transferred from the department of communications in the Providence Fire Department to the division of training and was demoted from lieutenant to firefighter after he allegedly allowed one of his dispatchers to be sprawled in his chair while on duty. The plaintiff filed an action in Superior Court against the defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff requested that the hearing justice treat the defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 instead because the plaintiff attached documents outside of the four corners of his complaint to his objection to the defendants' motion. At a hearing, the hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The plaintiff timely appealed. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that all of the plaintiff's claims were unmeritorious. The Court held that: (1) nothing in the record was suggestive of any extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of any defendant (2) the plaintiff was neither in the zone of danger nor a bystander to a traumatic event and (3) the defendants did not publish any false or fictitious fact about the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts of the plaintiff's complaint.

The plaintiffs appeal from the Superior Court's dismissal of their second amended complaint with prejudice, which complaint included two claims: (1) a claim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory system for appointing magistrates to the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal and (2) a claim for unjust enrichment alleging that defendants illegally levied fines against plaintiffs when they appeared as litigants before the Traffic Tribunal. The hearing justice concluded that the second amended complaint did not plead sufficient facts to support either of plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the hearing justice erred by dismissing their case because, in their view, their complaint provides defendants with adequate notice of their causes of action and claims for relief. The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had waived their constitutional claim because the second amended complaint did not allege any facts specifying that plaintiffs had brought their constitutional challenges to the attention of the pertinent magistrates in the Traffic Tribunal when they appeared before that body. With respect to plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment, the Court held that the second amended complaint did not allege the facts necessary to support the essential elements of such a claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.