Volume 187 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiffs' predecessors in title acquired by deed an easement over the defendants' property to access the adjacent body of water. A disagreement later arose as to the plaintiffs' and the defendants' respective property rights, and litigation ensued. Eventually, after lengthy and painstaking negotiations, a settlement was reached that resulted in easements in favor of the plaintiffs. A justice of the Superior Court entered a consent order embodying the terms of their agreement. However, yet another lawsuit was spawned after the defendants fenced the fifteen-foot-wide confines of the "Launching and Retrieval Easement," which the plaintiffs claimed stymied their ability to tow boats to and from their dock and thereby frustrated the purpose of the consent order and the easement. According to the plaintiffs, due to the existence of the defendants' fence, they could no longer (1) navigate the "elbow" of the right-of-way or (2) execute a three-point turn at the water's edge. Thus the plaintiffs initiated litigation anew to reinstate what they considered to be the intended purpose of the consent order: to "pass and re-pass by vehicles for the purpose of hauling, launching, or retrieving boats ." The plaintiffs also sought favorable declarations as to the meaning of other terms in the consent order. A nonjury trial was held in the Superior Court, and the trial justice denied the plaintiffs' claims in whole, actually finding the plaintiffs themselves to be in breach of the consent order. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were bound by the fifteen-foot-width term contained in the consent order because the language of the consent order, including the easement-width term, was clear and unambiguous. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the purpose of the consent order was for the plaintiffs to be able to launch and retrieve boats by vehicle and that that purpose trumped the conflicting width provision, the Court concluded that the parties' overarching intent in entering into the consent order was actually to resolve all property-rights disputes and settle the previous lawsuit. The Court determined that the Launching and Retrieval Easement was but one part of the whole agreement, and it could not be isolated therefrom. The Court further determined that there was no latent ambiguity in the consent order, giving deference to the trial justice's finding of fact that the plaintiffs knew when they negotiated and entered into the consent order that fifteen feet was insufficient to execute a three-point turn, but that they agreed to the term anyway based on the erroneous presumption that they would be allowed to go beyond the specific confines of the easement. The Court also concluded that the other terms disputed by the plaintiffs were clear and unambiguous and therefore had to be enforced as written. Finally, the Court perceived no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's decision to deny the defendants an award of attorneys' fees. In sum, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects.

Angel Navarro appealed from a postconviction-relief judgment in favor of the State of Rhode Island. In his application for postconviction relief, Navarro challenged the trial justice's acceptance of his nolo contendere plea on a second-degree murder charge. His plea was "capped" at sixty years, with forty years to serve and twenty years suspended with probation following his release and the maximum sentence was imposed. He argued that, during the plea proceedings, he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel and judicial error. The postconviction-relief justice concluded that Navarro entered the plea agreement "with knowledge, consent, voluntarily, understanding what was happening, the nature of the plea, [and] the consequences of it" and that Navarro did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, she denied Navarro's application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court agreed and determined that the postconviction-relief justice conducted a thorough and independent review of the record in support of her denial of Navarro's postconviction-relief application. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that, in making her determination, the postconviction-relief justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence, nor did she clearly err in her denial of Navarro's postconviction-relief application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment denying Navarro's application for postconviction relief.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on three counts of first-degree sexual assault, one count of sex trafficking of a minor, and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The defendant's appeal centered on whether the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss the counts charging him with sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-67-6, and conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The Supreme Court concluded that those two counts should have been dismissed, holding that § 11-67-6 failed to state a crime. The defendant also raised two evidentiary issues, but the Court determined that one was without merit and the other had been waived. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction with respect to the count charging the defendant with committing sex trafficking of a minor and the count charging him with conspiring to do so, and it affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects.

On June 9, 2014, Ira Lukens was thrown from his bicycle as a result of a pothole on a road in Roger Williams Park. The plaintiff, Tara J. Cancel, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ira Lukens, brought an action against the City of Providence, and various other employees and officials of the city, alleging that Lukens, who passed away prior to the commencement of this action by causes unrelated to the accident at issue in this case, had suffered serious personal injuries as a result of the city's negligence in maintaining the park. Cancel appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Cancel asserted that there remained genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the city knew of the dangerous condition of a pothole on a street in the park and whether it willfully and/or maliciously failed to warn of the pothole, which would have stripped the city of the protection against liability afforded under G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32, the Recreational Use Statute. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Supreme Court ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the city's knowledge of the dangerous condition or discovery of the user's peril. The Court expressed that there was no evidence that the city had actual knowledge of the pothole, had received complaints regarding the condition of the roadway, or had notice of any past incidents resulting from the condition of the roadway. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Bruce Moten, was before the Supreme Court on appeal from a Superior Court judgment of conviction on eight counts and the denial of his motion for a new trial in connection with the murder of Terry Robinson. The defendant received consecutive life sentences of life imprisonment for murder and for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, death resulting consecutive sentences of twenty years to serve for felony assault and for discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence and consecutive sentences of ten years to serve for felony assault, discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and conspiracy. The defendant also received a suspended sentence of ten years, with probation, for carrying a pistol without a license. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by allowing Detective Theodore Michael to offer a lay opinion regarding the location of a particular cell phone at a particular time and also by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court considered the arguments of both the defendant and the state, and concluded that the defendant's argument with respect to Det. Michael's testimony was waived on appeal because the defendant did not preserve that issue by specific objection at trial. The Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the Superior Court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, the Rhode Island Troopers Association, from a judgment granting declaratory and equitable relief in favor of the plaintiff, the State of Rhode Island. The Superior Court declared that the Governmental Tort Liability Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 31 of title 9, vests the Attorney General with the nondelegable, nontransferable legal duty to determine whether the state should provide a defense and indemnification in a civil action brought against a state employee. The Superior Court also permanently enjoined arbitration of issues related to the Attorney General's decision to decline to provide a defense and indemnification for Rhode Island State Trooper James Donnelly-Taylor in a pending federal civil rights action brought against him in his individual capacity. After narrowing the issues on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the trial justice's decision to permanently enjoin the arbitration proceedings, because the issues raised in this case are not arbitrable within the collective bargaining process. The Supreme Court also held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act vests the Attorney General with the authority to determine whether a state employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment and is therefore entitled to representation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed six of the eight declarations and vacated the two remaining declarations in the judgment of the Superior Court.

A skeletal survey revealed that Luke, a four-month-old infant, had suffered fourteen fractures, for which there was no obvious explanation. Luke's mother, Kimberly Warrington, appealed from a Family Court decree declaring that she neglected and abused her two children. On appeal, Kimberly's primary challenge was to the trial justice's declaration that sufficient evidence supported an inference that she abused and neglected Luke. The Supreme Court concluded, after a thorough review of the record, that legally competent evidence existed to support the trial justice's findings. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court.