Volume 186 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on one count of felony assault following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court. The defendant argued that the trial justice overlooked material evidence and that the state had not rebutted defendant's evidence of self-defense. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not overlook material evidence and that there was sufficient evidence on the record to support the trial justice's decision. Accordingly, the Court concluded that there was no error in defendant's trial, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

The defendant, The Bard Group, LLC, appeals from a final judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Epic Enterprises LLC, Donna R. Morvillo, Kurt Rauschenbach, and Kristin Rauschenbach. The dispute concerns a thirteen-unit condominium complex known as "10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condominium" located near Thames Street in Newport, Rhode Island. The defendant owns nine of the thirteen condominium units and is the majority owner with 70.8 percent of the voting share. The plaintiffs own the remaining four units and have 29.2 percent of the voting share. The original declaration permitted only "Retail/Office," "Office," or "Residential" uses in the condominium.

The defendants, Craig J. DiPetrillo and Rebecca M. DiPetrillo, were before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, William Coscina and Cheryl L. Bailey Coscina. This case arose from a boundary dispute between the parties. The plaintiffs brought an action requesting to be adjudged as the rightful owners of two parcels of land on the defendants' property that plaintiffs claim they adversely possessed. The hearing justice granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs successfully proved that they adversely possessed the contested property however, the hearing justice was displeased with the fact that the survey of the property submitted by the plaintiffs did not contain a metes and bounds description of the disputed back parcel. The hearing justice decided to conduct an evidentiary hearing, after granting summary judgment on the adverse possession claim, in order to determine the exact boundary line of the disputed back parcel. The hearing justice adopted the plaintiffs' expert witness's testimony with respect to the boundary lines of both disputed parcels. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs because issues of material fact remained with respect to the boundary lines of both parcels. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice erred by not addressing the essential elements of an adverse possession claim in his decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court. Justice Flaherty did not participate.

In 2008, William C. McLaughlin built a garage on his Tiverton property in violation of the setback requirements of the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance. In 2013, a justice of the Superior Court entered judgment affirming the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review's decision to deny McLaughlin's request for relief from those setback requirements. After McLaughlin appealed to the Supreme Court—an appeal that was dismissed as procedurally improper—the zoning board filed a "Motion for Order to Comply," which was heard by the same hearing justice who had entered judgment on McLaughlin's zoning appeal. The hearing justice granted that motion, and he entered an order on April 7, 2014, requiring McLaughlin to move or remove his garage. On the very next day, McLaughlin filed a motion to vacate/reconsider, which the hearing justice denied. In the years subsequent, a number of other court orders were entered (including one that adjudged him in contempt and imposed $69,300 in fines), all of which were based on the April 7, 2014 order. At the end of March 2016, the Town of Tiverton removed McLaughlin's garage. In May 2016, McLaughlin filed a motion to vacate the April 7, 2014 order. He argued that the order should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure because it was void and that it should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(6) because it was unjust. A justice of the Superior Court denied that motion. On appeal, McLaughlin maintained that the order was void under Rule 60(b)(4) however, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-24-62, the Superior Court possessed the jurisdiction to order the removal of McLaughlin's garage. McLaughlin also argued to the Supreme Court that the order should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(6) because the Town of Tiverton had not complied with § 45-24-62. On this point, the Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court held that, to comply with that statute, the Town of Tiverton, not the zoning board, needed to have filed a separate action, not merely a motion filed by the zoning board in the context of a zoning appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order denying McLaughlin's 2016 motion to vacate.

The plaintiff, Moises Pineda, appeals from a Superior Court judgment granting the motion of the defendant, Chase Bank USA, N.A., for summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted by Pineda against Chase. It was undisputed that an attorney, Pasquale Scavitti III, who was involved in refinance proceedings for Pineda's two properties, defalcated funds disbursed by Chase that were intended to satisfy earlier promissory notes secured by mortgages on the properties. Pineda named both Scavitti and Chase in his action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, civil liability for a crime, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. In response, Chase moved for summary judgment and contended that it could not be held liable for Scavitti's defalcation under a theory of respondeat superior. The hearing justice found that, although a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Scavitti was acting as an agent of Chase when he absconded with the loan funds, summary judgment was nevertheless appropriate. Specifically, he determined that, even if Scavitti were Chase's agent, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Scavitti's conduct was within the scope of the alleged agency relationship. The Supreme Court concurred with the hearing justice that, even though a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Scavitti was an agent of Pineda or Chase, summary judgment was proper because Pineda failed to put forth any evidence showing that Scavitti's malfeasance was within the scope of any purported agency relationship with Chase. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Chase.

The plaintiff, SMS Financial XXV, LLC, appealed from the Superior Court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and grant of the cross-motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants, David Corsetti and 385 South Main Street, LLC. This case concerned a promissory note issued by the defendants to Sovereign Bank. Sovereign Bank lost the note, but nevertheless subsequently assigned its interest in the lost note to the plaintiff. The plaintiff later brought suit against the defendants to recover on the unsatisfied note. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the hearing justice granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because, under Rhode Island's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the lost note because the plaintiff was not in possession of the note when the loss occurred. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because he failed to consider a provision of the note that required the defendants to issue a replacement note upon receiving a lost note affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The Court held that, pursuant to the relevant Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code provision, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the note, including the note's provision that mandated the defendants to issue a replacement note upon receiving a lost note affidavit.

The defendant, the Town of Coventry, appealed from the Superior Court's February 4, 2016 declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Peter E. Ucci and John S. Ucci, which followed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The Superior Court concluded that the narrow strip of land at issue had not been dedicated for public use because, even if there had been an incipient dedication or offer to dedicate, there had been no acceptance thereof by the Town. On appeal, the Town contended that the hearing justice erred by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs because, in its view: (1) the hearing justice inappropriately focused only on the acceptance of the disputed strip of land by the Town and (2) plaintiffs had failed to join the abutting landowners as indispensable parties, requiring the dismissal of the case. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not err in awarding summary judgment and entering declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiffs because, regardless of whether there had been an offer of dedication, the Town conceded that it had never accepted the purported offer. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Lauren Daley Ainsworth, appealed from an order of the Family Court denying her motion to relocate with the parties' four minor children from Rhode Island to Australia. On appeal, Lauren contended: (1) that the justice of the Family Court who passed upon her motion erred and abused his discretion in weighing the evidence (2) that the hearing justice overlooked material evidence by failing to specifically reference the testimony of a school nurse and (3) that, in determining whether relocation would serve the best interests of the children, the hearing justice failed to properly apply the criteria set forth in two prior opinions of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. After thoroughly reviewing the testimony and evidence adduced at trial as well as the hearing justice's analysis of the relevant factors, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying Lauren's motion to relocate with the minor children to Australia, nor were his factual findings otherwise clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court denying the motion to relocate.