Volume 198 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Sendra Beauregard, appealed her conviction on one count of second-degree murder and one count of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial justice erred in relying on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), in admitting the physical evidence police obtained as a result of statements the defendant gave to police during interviews that were in violation of Miranda. Moreover, defendant averred that her statements to police were involuntary and the product of coercion. Finally, defendant contended that the police lacked probable cause to seize her vehicle and therefore the trial justice erred in admitting the evidence seized from it. The Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's holding in Patane and determined that the physical evidence obtained through unwarned but voluntary statements is admissible. The Court also determined that the trial justice properly found that defendant's statements were voluntary and therefore the physical evidence that her statements led police to was admissible. Lastly, the Court concluded that police possessed sufficient probable cause to seize defendant's vehicle and that the evidence seized from the vehicle was similarly admissible. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her complaint against her former employer, the defendant, Rhode Island Hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's termination of her employment was in violation of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (RICRA), and the Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA). The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the commission) was allowed to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing justice of the Superior Court granted the defendant's and the commission's motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiff had not initiated her RICRA claim before the statute of limitations expired and because the plaintiff had not timely requested the required right-to-sue letter from the commission for her FEPA claim. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the dismissal of her FEPA claim was in error because she had timely requested the letter from the commission, and, ultimately, the commission issued the right-to-sue letter. The Supreme Court held that, because the hearing justice considered documents outside the four corners of the complaint when she decided to dismiss the claims, the hearing justice erred by not converting the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment pursuant to the mandate contained in Rule 12(b). The Supreme Court also held that, even though the plaintiff had not submitted the commission's preferred form for requesting the right-to-sue letter, there was no dispute that the plaintiff complied with the formal requirements—set forth in § 28-5-24.1 and Rule 17 of the commission's Rules and Regulations—for commencing a FEPA violation action in Superior Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The defendant, George Tabora, appealed from a judgment of conviction on two counts of second-degree child molestation sexual assault. The defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial, asserting that he had overlooked and misconceived material evidence. According to the defendant, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and failed to serve the interests of justice. After a thorough examination of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial the Court concluded that he did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence and that the record supported the trial justice's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for first degree child abuse in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-9-5.3. The defendant argued that the trial justice erred by requiring a licensed clinical social worker to testify about statements that defendant had made during a psychiatric examination. She contended that these statements were privileged "health care communications" under the Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 37.3 of title 5. The state argued that (1) this argument was waived because defendant's counsel stated her acquiescence to the trial justice's ruling on a motion in limine to allow the admission of the statement, and (2) any claim of privilege was abrogated by G.L. 1956 § 40-11-11, which nullifies certain privileges in judicial proceedings related to child abuse and neglect. The Supreme Court held that defendant's argument with regard to privilege was not waived for the purpose of this review because, although defendant's counsel signaled acquiescence to the trial justice's ruling on the motion in limine, she again objected to the admission of the social worker's testimony before that testimony was presented at trial. Nevertheless, any privilege that defendant might have claimed was abrogated by the sweeping language of § 40-11-11. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

The defendant, Jose Colon, appealed from a judgment of conviction of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. The defendant argued that the Superior Court justice erred by: (1) allowing testimony concerning other incidents of sexual assault in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence (2) limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness and (3) allowing hearsay testimony into evidence, which, defendant argues, amounted to improper bolstering. After a thorough examination of the record, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the defendant's argument regarding the introduction of evidence at trial relating to other incidents of sexual assault was not preserved (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness, because the defendant failed to make an offer of proof that the testimony he intended to elicit would lead to relevant evidence and (3) the defendant's general objection regarding the admissibility of testimony was insufficient to preserve his hearsay argument for appeal. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.