Volume 199 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The State of Rhode Island appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court granting the plaintiff's application for postconviction relief. On appeal, the state argued that the hearing justice below erred when she held that the plaintiff's trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient representation because they did not request a jury instruction in line with Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), for the aiding-and-abetting charges against him. The state also argued that the hearing justice erred when she held that trial counsels' performance was deficient for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of an aiding-and-abetting conviction. The Supreme Court ruled that Rosemond had no impact on this case because it only applied to the federal aiding-and-abetting statute and the underlying offense with which the defendant in Rosemond was charged, and the plaintiff here was charged under state law crimes and the state's aiding-and-abetting statute. The Court further held that Rosemond was not retroactive to cases on collateral review such as this one. Moreover, the Court held that, even if Rosemond was applicable to this case and retroactive to cases on collateral review, the plaintiff's reliance on a jury instruction based on Rosemond would be misplaced due to the specific facts of this case. Lastly, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to convict the plaintiff under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the Superior Court judgment granting postconviction relief and reinstated the plaintiff's convictions with respect to the aiding-and-abetting counts.

The plaintiff, Hexagon Holdings, Inc. appealed from a final judgment of the Superior Court in favor of defendant McKenna Roofing and Construction, Inc. Hexagon argued that the motion justice erred in: (1) granting summary judgment with respect to Hexagon's third-party beneficiary assertions and (2) applying the economic loss doctrine to bar Hexagon's negligence claim in the absence of privity of contract. The Supreme Court held that, with respect to Hexagon's contractual claims, Hexagon had not provided enough evidence in its objection to the motion for summary judgment to create a genuine issue of material fact as to McKenna's intent to benefit Hexagon through the subcontract, where Hexagon merely relied on McKenna's undisputed statement of facts, without introducing any affidavits or other discovery of its own. With respect to Hexagon's negligence claim, the Court held that Hexagon was barred from asserting a lack of privity to avoid application of the economic loss doctrine in this case, where Hexagon deliberately sued the subcontractor instead of the general contractor, with which Hexagon was in privity of contract. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Jody Johnson, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery, and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling house with intent to commit robbery for his participation in a home robbery at gunpoint. The trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the defendant argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial because, according to the defendant, the complaining witness's in-court identification testimony was unreliable and the weight of the evidence did not indicate that an operable firearm was used during the incident. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice applied the proper standard for evaluating the defendant's motion for new trial and did not err in his assessment of the weight to which the complaining witness's testimony was entitled because there was no indication that he had overlooked or misconceived the evidence presented at trial when he concluded that her testimony was consistent and credible. The Supreme Court also held that the complaining witness's testimony about the actions and statements of the defendant and his accomplices during the robbery led to a reasonable inference that the gun used was operable and that the trial justice had not overlooked or misconceived any evidence by so concluding. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.