This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 40
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM BISSET DEBROK,
Appellant.
No. 20240075
Heard May 14, 2025
Filed September 25, 2025
On Certification from the Court of Appeals
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 231909068
Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Erin Middleton, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for appellee
Nathalie Skibine, Elise Lockwood, Salt Lake City, for appellant
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 William Debrok pled guilty to two third-degree felonies
for engaging in a recurring scheme in which he and a friend stole
merchandise from Walmart. As part of his plea agreement, Debrok
admitted that Walmart had incurred over $10,000 in damages as a
result of this criminal conduct. When the district court addressed
restitution, Debrok asked the court to apportion the damages
equally between him and his codefendant based on principles of
STATE v. DEBROK
Opinion of the Court
comparative fault. In other words, Debrok asserted that because he
and his codefendant were equally at fault for Walmart’s losses, the
restitution amount should be divided equally between them. But
the district court concluded that precedent from the court of
appeals prevented it from doing so. The district court had already
ordered Debrok’s codefendant to pay the entire amount of
damages. And it ordered the same of Debrok, holding both
defendants jointly and severally liable for the full restitution
amount until it was paid in full.
¶2 The question before us is whether, in a situation like this,
a district court can apportion a restitution amount between
criminal codefendants based on principles of comparative fault, or
whether each defendant must be held jointly and severally liable
for the damages the defendant proximately caused. The answer to
this question is found in the language of the Crime Victims
Restitution Act (Restitution Act or Act), which governs criminal
restitution orders. The Restitution Act states that “the court shall
order a defendant . . . to pay restitution to all victims . . . for the
entire amount of pecuniary damages that are proximately caused
to each victim by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” UTAH
CODE § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(ii).
¶3 We conclude that this provision of the Act requires each
defendant to pay restitution for all of the damages the defendant
proximately caused, even if those damages overlap with amounts
owed by codefendants. It conflicts with comparative fault
apportionment and requires joint and several liability when two or
more defendants proximately cause the same damages.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s restitution order, which
makes Debrok and his codefendant jointly and severally liable for
the entire amount of damages until the amount is paid in full.1
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1 We emphasize that this does not mean that Walmart will be
repaid twice. The law generally disfavors double recovery. See
Hexcel Corp. v. Lab. Comm’n, 2022 UT App 52, ¶ 39,
510 P.3d 310 (“As
our supreme court once colorfully pointed out, a plaintiff who
prevails against a defendant on a claim of wrongful possession of a
cow may not recover both the cow and the reasonable value of the
cow.” (cleaned up)). The defendants are jointly and severally liable
only until Walmart receives the total amount of damages owed.
Joint and several liability simply ensures that the at-fault parties—
not the victim—bear the risk of insolvency.
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Opinion of the Court
BACKGROUND
¶4 Debrok and his codefendant were arrested for a scheme to
steal property from Walmart. Working together, Debrok or his
codefendant would purchase items from Walmart and place them
in a car. While one of the men waited in the car, the other would
immediately walk back into the store, grab items identical to the
ones they had just bought, and leave without paying for them. If
stopped by a Walmart employee, they would simply show the
receipt from the earlier transaction as “proof” of purchase. After
securing the stolen items in the car, either Debrok or his
codefendant would return the stolen items to a different Walmart
location for cash or gift cards. The pair pulled off this scheme
several times.
¶5 But they were eventually caught and arrested. Debrok
pled guilty to two counts of unauthorized possession of property,
both third-degree felonies. In the plea agreement, Debrok “agreed
to pay restitution, splitting the amount with his codefendant.” The
parties also agreed that the losses caused by this scheme, and
therefore the amount of pecuniary damages owed to Walmart
under the Restitution Act, totaled $10,061.32. See UTAH CODE § 77-
38b-102(19)(a) (defining “[p]ecuniary damages” as “all
demonstrable economic injury, losses, and expenses”).
¶6 At sentencing, Debrok did not contest the amount of
damages or that his participation in the scheme had proximately
caused all of the pecuniary damages Walmart had sustained.
Rather, he asked that instead of ordering him jointly and severally
liable for the full restitution amount, the court split the amount
evenly between him and his codefendant according to comparative
fault principles. In comparative fault liability, also referred to as
comparative negligence, the fact finder allocates the percentage of
fault attributable to each defendant and each person seeking
recovery, among others, and each defendant is liable for an amount
no greater than “the proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant.”2 UTAH CODE § 78B-5-818(3), (4). In contrast, joint and
several liability renders “each liable party . . . individually
responsible for the entire obligation” no matter their level of
blameworthiness. Joint and Several Liability, BLACK’S LAW
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2 Comparative negligence may also preclude recovery for a civil
plaintiff if the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the fault of others. See UTAH
CODE § 78B-5-818(2). But that is not at issue here.
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Opinion of the Court
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Debrok suggested to the court that his
codefendant had been more at fault because he “tended to be the
primary actor with a lot of the[] transactions.” But because they had
worked together the entire time, Debrok assumed half of the fault
and asked that he be required to pay only half of the damages.
¶7 The district court rejected Debrok’s request and ordered
that he be held jointly and severally liable for the entire restitution
amount along with his codefendant. In its order, the district court
reasoned that it was bound to apply State v. McBride, a case in
which the court of appeals rejected a criminal defendant’s request
to reduce a restitution order according to principles of comparative
fault because at the time, comparative negligence was not available
in civil actions involving intentional torts. 940 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ogden,
2018 UT
8,
416 P.3d 1132. The district court noted that much of McBride’s
reasoning had been undermined by Graves v. North Eastern Services,
Inc., a subsequent civil case interpreting the Liability Reform Act
(LRA)—which expanded the scope of Utah’s comparative
negligence regime—to provide for comparative fault
apportionment of intentional tort damages.
2015 UT 28, ¶ 46,
345
P.3d 619. However, the district court concluded it was bound to
follow McBride’s holding because the case had not been overturned.
¶8 Debrok timely appealed the district court’s order. After
preliminary briefing, the court of appeals certified the case to us.
We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 The question before us is whether the Restitution Act
mandates joint and several liability among codefendants for
damages to a victim that both defendants proximately caused, or
whether a sentencing court is free to apply principles of
comparative fault in restitution orders. “We review questions of
statutory interpretation for correctness.” State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8,
¶ 24,
416 P.3d 1132.
ANALYSIS
¶10 When ordering restitution in this case, the district court
rejected Debrok’s request that it apportion damages between him
and his codefendant, and it held them both jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of damages to Walmart. The court
concluded that a court of appeals case, State v. McBride, required
this outcome. (Citing 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).)
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Opinion of the Court
¶11 Debrok argues that the district court’s analysis was wrong.
He asserts that McBride should not prevent apportionment of the
damages here, because that case was effectively abrogated when
Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28,
345 P.3d 619,
recognized that the LRA permitted apportionment of damages
based on fault in intentional tort cases. With McBride out of the way,
Debrok asserts that the language of the Restitution Act does not
explicitly address how damages in a criminal case should be
apportioned. And he argues that we should look to the LRA’s
comparative fault framework for that answer. See UTAH CODE
§ 78B-5-818(4)(a) (“The fact finder may . . . allocate the percentage
or proportion of fault attributable . . . to each defendant . . . for
whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault.”).
¶12 The State contends that the LRA is irrelevant to
determining restitution in a criminal case under the current version
of the Restitution Act. It argues that the Restitution Act’s plain
language is all we need to consider, and that it clearly “makes
[Debrok] jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the
victim’s damages he proximately caused.”
¶13 We first discuss the historical connection between criminal
restitution and civil damages in Utah law, and we explain that the
holding in McBride has been abrogated by changes in the law. Then,
we interpret the relevant provisions of the Restitution Act in effect
at the time of Debrok’s sentencing,3 and we address whether the
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3 As a general rule, “we apply the law as it exists at the time of
the event regulated by the law in question.” State v. Clark, 2011 UT
23, ¶ 13,
251 P.3d 829. With respect to matters of substance, “the
parties’ primary rights and duties are dictated by the law in effect
at the time of their underlying primary conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. With
respect to procedural matters, however, “the relevant underlying
conduct is different: the relevant occurrence for such purposes is
the underlying procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an
appeal).” Id.
When it comes to criminal restitution, generally the version of
the Restitution Act in effect at the time of sentencing applies. See
State v. Blake, 2025 UT 21, ¶ 8 n.2, __P.3d __ (citing Clark,
2011 UT
23, ¶¶ 12–14); see also State v. Garcia,
2023 UT App 143, ¶ 10 n.3,
540
P.3d 1158 (citing Clark,
2011 UT 23, ¶ 13). This is because the district
court orders restitution “as part of the sentence imposed,” UTAH
CODE § 77-38b-205(1)(a), even though, in some cases, the exact
(continued . . .)
5
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Opinion of the Court
Act leaves room to incorporate comparative fault principles from
the LRA into criminal restitution orders.
¶14 We ultimately conclude that it does not. As we will
explain, unless the parties stipulate otherwise in a plea agreement,
the Act requires each defendant to be responsible for the entire
amount of damages the defendant’s criminal conduct proximately
caused a victim. We interpret this provision to preclude
comparative fault apportionment of criminal restitution. And we
affirm the district court’s restitution order on this alternative basis.
I. MCBRIDE AND SUBSEQUENT PRECEDENT
¶15 This case requires us to examine the intersection of
criminal restitution and civil damages. The district court concluded
that McBride’s holding that comparative fault apportionment is not
available in criminal restitution orders prevented it from granting
Debrok’s request that it apportion fault here. See State v. McBride,
940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Ogden,
2018 UT 8,
416 P.3d 1132. Debrok argues that the court
was wrong because McBride’s holding is no longer good law. To
address the state of this precedent, we discuss the historic
connection in Utah between criminal restitution and civil damages,
and how that has changed in recent years.
¶16 For many years, criminal restitution in Utah was
statutorily tied to the amount of damages “a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.” UTAH CODE
§ 76–3–201(4)(b) (1979); id. § 76–3–201(1)(c) (1996) (same); id. § 77-
38a-102(6) (2017) (substantively the same). Thus, under earlier
__________________________________________________________
restitution amount may be determined after sentencing, id. § 77-
38b-205(7). However, we acknowledge that we said otherwise in
State v. Sevastopoulos, and we applied the Restitution Act in effect at
the time of the underlying conduct. 2021 UT 70, ¶ 8 n.2,
502 P.3d
290. In light of this inconsistency, we clarify that as a general
matter, the Restitution Act in effect at the time of sentencing
controls. However, we do not rule out the possibility that in a
future case, a party might argue that a particular provision of the
Act should be treated differently.
Debrok was sentenced in January 2024. Since that time, the
Restitution Act has been amended. Because the recent amendments
involved no changes material to our decision, we cite the current
version of this statute.
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Opinion of the Court
versions of the Restitution Act, this court and the court of appeals
applied principles from the civil damages context to criminal
restitution, because the Act explicitly connected the two. See, e.g.,
State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶¶ 31–40, (interpreting the Restitution
Act as requiring “that the same causation standard [i.e. proximate
cause] apply in a restitution hearing that would apply in a parallel
civil action”); State v. Grant,
2021 UT App 104, ¶ 29,
499 P.3d 176
(stating that “the same proximate cause standard ordinarily
applied in civil cases is applied in the restitution context” (cleaned
up)).
¶17 In McBride, the court of appeals concluded that the
criminal restitution order in that case could not be apportioned
based on comparative negligence principles. 940 P.2d at 545. At the
time, Utah’s comparative negligence statute allowed a defendant to
reduce the damages owed proportionally, according to the
percentage of fault attributed to others, including the victim.
Id. at
544. But up to that point, the defense of comparative negligence had
been allowed only when a civil defendant acted negligently.
Id. at
544–45. In analyzing the restitution order in that case with reference
to civil damages, the court of appeals concluded that because “Utah
courts have declined to extend the defense[] of . . . comparative
negligence in the context of other intentional torts,”
id. at 545, it
followed that the damages caused by intentional criminal conduct
were also not subject to comparative fault apportionment,
id.
(“[W]e hold that comparative negligence would not be available to
appellant in a civil conversion action resulting from his intentional
criminal act. Thus, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay
restitution for the full value of the vehicle . . . .”). Here, the district
court reasoned it was “bound to follow [McBride’s] holding until it
is reversed.”
¶18 In a subsequent case, Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc.,
this court abrogated McBride’s underlying premise when we
interpreted the LRA to “provide[] for allocation of responsibility
for intentionally tortious conduct.” 2015 UT 28, ¶¶ 45–46,
345 P.3d
619. Graves was a civil case that did not involve criminal restitution.
One of the questions before this court was whether the LRA’s
“comparative negligence regime” applied to intentional torts.
Id. In
answering this question, we discussed the establishment and
expansion of comparative negligence in Utah statutory law.
Id.
¶¶ 44–45. We observed that in 1973, the legislature had replaced
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Opinion of the Court
the common law defense of contributory negligence4 with a
“comparative negligence regime.” Id. ¶ 44 (citing Utah
Comparative Negligence Act, 1973 Utah Laws 710–12). This statute
was “subsequently revised and extended by the Liability Reform
Act of 1986, which maintained the comparative liability regime
while extending its scope.”
Id. (citing Liability Reform Act,
1986
Utah Laws 470). We explained, “Although the governing statutory
regime has been in place for decades, this court has not yet had
occasion to make a definitive pronouncement on the question
presented by this case—whether our comparative negligence
regime provides for allocation of responsibility for intentionally
tortious conduct.” Id. ¶ 45. We answered that question in the
affirmative, reasoning that “the broad, categorical terms of the
Liability Reform Act, as informed by the history and evolution of
our statutory scheme,” compelled that conclusion. Id. ¶ 46.
¶19 Although Graves was interpreting the LRA and did not
mention the Restitution Act, it undermined the premise of the court
of appeals’ holding in McBride. Graves made clear that comparative
fault apportionment was available in intentional torts. So, in
calculating a restitution order in a criminal case according to the
amount “a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action,” it was no longer clear that a court could not apportion fault
because it could not do so in an intentional tort action. UTAH CODE
§ 76–3–201(1)(c) (1996) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we agree
with Debrok that Graves abrogated McBride. So McBride does not
impact the outcome here.
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4 Under the common law defense of contributory negligence, a
plaintiff was barred from recovery if “the plaintiff committed a
negligent act or omission and . . . such negligent act proximately
contributed to causing the injury.” Johnson v. Lewis, 240 P.2d 498,
501 (Utah 1952); see also Contributory Negligence in Negligence,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “contributory
negligence” as “[a] plaintiff’s own negligence that played a part in
causing the plaintiff’s injury and that is significant enough (in a few
jurisdictions) to bar the plaintiff from recovering damages”).
Nearly all states, including Utah, have now statutorily displaced
the common law defense of contributory negligence with some
form of comparative negligence, in which a plaintiff may recover
as long as the plaintiff’s fault does not exceed the fault of others. See
UTAH CODE § 78B-5-818(2). Utah’s current comparative negligence
regime is outlined in the LRA. See generally id. §§ 78B-5-817 to -821.
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Opinion of the Court
¶20 However, the landscape of criminal restitution and its
relation to civil liability has changed significantly since Graves. In
the last few years, the legislature has made changes to the Act that
appear to have disconnected criminal restitution, at least to some
degree, from the civil damages framework.
¶21 In 2021, the legislature removed from the Restitution Act
the language that had historically connected criminal restitution to
civil damages. Where prior versions of the Act had defined the
damages available to a victim in a criminal case by referencing civil
damages, see, e.g., UTAH CODE § 76-3-201(4)(b) (1979); id. § 76-3-
201(1)(c) (1996); id. § 77-38a-102(6) (2017), the 2021 amendment
defined pecuniary damages as “all demonstrable economic injury,
losses, and expenses regardless of whether the economic injury,
losses, and expenses have yet been incurred,” Criminal Justice
Modifications, H.B. 260 § 90, 2021 Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2021) (available at https://le.utah.gov/~2021/bills/static/
HB0260.html); UTAH CODE § 77-38b-102(19)(a).
¶22 At the same time, the legislature made other amendments
to the Act to require that criminal defendants be held liable for the
entire amount of damages they had proximately caused. UTAH
CODE § 77-38b-205(1)(a). Before 2021, the Act required courts to
determine “complete restitution,” which was the restitution
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the
defendant. State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶¶ 20, 23,
214 P.3d 104; see
also UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(2) (2020). But the Act did not require
courts “to order a defendant to pay complete restitution as part of
the criminal sentence.” Laycock,
2009 UT 53, ¶ 23. Instead, in setting
what the Act referred to as “court-ordered restitution,” courts
could order that something less than complete restitution be paid,
taking into consideration “the defendant’s financial resources,
other obligations, the rehabilitative effect, and other
circumstances.” Ogden,
2018 UT 8, ¶ 28 (cleaned up); see also UTAH
CODE § 77-38a-302(5)(c) (2020).
¶23 Since 2021, the distinction between complete and court-ordered restitution, along with the provisions requiring a
sentencing court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay and
other circumstances relevant to restitution, have been removed. See
generally UTAH CODE § 77-38b-205. These changes were made
before Debrok’s sentencing. And they remain in the current version
of the Restitution Act. See id. §§ 77-38b-101 to -402.
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Opinion of the Court
¶24 Despite these changes to the law since McBride, in its order
requiring that Debrok be jointly and severally liable, the district
court reasoned that it was bound to apply McBride’s ultimate
outcome because the case had not been explicitly overturned. We
take this opportunity to observe that the district court had more
freedom to interpret the law than it may have realized. While a
district court is bound by appellate precedent, it is free to conclude
that appellate precedent no longer applies where the relevant
statutes have changed. See State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶ 24,
540
P.3d 614 (noting that because of the substantive changes to the
governing rule, appellate caselaw interpreting a prior version of the
rule “does not govern”). Such is the case here.
¶25 There have been two material changes to the law since
McBride. First, Graves recognized that the LRA had abrogated the
rule that comparative fault did not apply to intentional torts. See
supra ¶¶ 18–19. Accordingly, for a period of time it was an open
question whether comparative fault was available in criminal
restitution. See State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 43,
427 P.3d 495
(“The question of whether concepts of comparative fault apply in
the restitution context—and whether the civil law’s abolition of
joint and several liability should be imported into the restitution
arena—is an interesting and multifaceted one that has not yet been
answered by Utah’s appellate courts.”); Ogden,
2018 UT 8, ¶ 32 n.7
(“We do not decide whether the Liability Reform Act has any place
in restitution proceedings because Ogden did not preserve the
argument below.”); Grant,
2021 UT App 104, ¶ 27 (“We accept the
parties’ agreement, and thus we assume, without deciding, that
comparative fault principles apply to restitution proceedings.”);
State v. Calata,
2022 UT App 127, ¶ 31,
521 P.3d 920 (applying the
pre-2021 Restitution Act and noting that “Utah appellate courts
have not addressed whether the causation language in the
Restitution Act should be interpreted to allow apportioning fault
or whether the LRA applies in this context”).
¶26 But then, the Restitution Act was amended to no longer
reference civil damages, and to require that a defendant
compensate a victim for the entire amount of damages proximately
caused by the defendant’s conduct. See supra ¶¶ 22–23.
Considering these substantive changes to the Act, a district court
would not violate the doctrine of stare decisis by recognizing that
McBride no longer applies because it does not speak to the current
version of the Act.
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¶27 However, we do not mean to say that every significant
change to the Restitution Act in 2021 necessarily abrogates all
appellate precedent related to criminal restitution. Whether a
particular precedent applies must be determined by considering
the basis for the precedent and comparing the respective versions
of the Act. In this case, we conclude that McBride has been
abrogated by changes in the law. We now turn to the relevant
provisions of the Restitution Act in effect at the time of Debrok’s
sentencing.
II. THE RESTITUTION ACT
¶28 Despite the Act’s recent disconnection from civil damages,
Debrok argues that sentencing courts should, or at least can, apply
comparative fault principles when crafting restitution orders in
multi-defendant cases. He first posits that the Restitution Act itself
does not speak to whether restitution can be apportioned. And
because the Act is silent with respect to apportionment, he reasons
that the LRA should be applied to fill the gap.
¶29 As we have discussed, the LRA establishes an extensive
“comparative liability regime” in the tort context. Graves v. N. E.
Servs., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 44,
345 P.3d 619. But Debrok argues that
it should also apply to criminal restitution because criminal
defendants who cause pecuniary damages to victims fit within the
scope of the LRA. The LRA states that “No defendant is liable to
any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant” by the fact finder.
UTAH CODE § 78B-5-818(3).
¶30 And it defines “defendant” and “fault” broadly.
“Defendant” is defined as “a person . . . who is claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking recovery.” Id. § 78B-5-817(1).
And “fault” is defined as “any actionable breach of legal duty, act,
or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or
damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including
negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption
of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a
product, products liability, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a
product.” Id. § 78B-5-817(2).
¶31 Debrok argues that he and his conduct fall within these
broad definitions of the LRA. He contends that the LRA’s definition
of “fault” includes his criminal conduct because it was a “breach of
legal duty” that caused damages to Walmart. Id. And he argues that
he is a “defendant” for purposes of the LRA because he is a person
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Opinion of the Court
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to Walmart. Id. § 78B-5-
817(1). Consequently, he reasons that the comparative fault
framework outlined in the LRA should apply to his restitution
order and he should be responsible for only half of the damages he
and his codefendant proximately caused Walmart.
¶32 But Debrok’s argument stumbles because his premise is
incorrect. The Restitution Act is not silent as to how damages
should be apportioned. True, it does not contain any provision that
expressly discusses apportionment. But that is likely because it
does not contemplate it. The Act states in relevant part:
(1)(a) If a defendant is convicted, . . . the court shall
order a defendant . . . to pay restitution to all victims:
(i) in accordance with the terms of any plea
agreement in the case;5 or
(ii) for the entire amount of pecuniary damages that are
proximately caused to each victim by the criminal
conduct of the defendant.
Id. § 77-38b-205(1)(a) (emphasis added).
¶33 “When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature.” McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT
48, ¶ 19,
496 P.3d 147 (cleaned up). “Because the best evidence of
the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself, we
look first to the statutory text.”
Id. (cleaned up). Two canons of
interpretation are particularly useful in this context.
¶34 First, it is a “settled rule of statutory construction” that “a
more specific statute governs instead of a more general statute.”6
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 336 (Utah 1997) (cleaned up).
And so, when it comes to deciding how to apportion damages in
criminal restitution orders, the Restitution Act—which was
specifically designed by the legislature to govern criminal
__________________________________________________________
5 Neither party has argued that subsection 205(1)(a)(i) impacts
the restitution order in this case, so we do not address it.
6 The “specific over the general” canon comes in at least two
forms: (1) a specific provision controls over a general provision, Hall
v. Utah State Dep’t of Corr.,
2001 UT 34, ¶ 15,
24 P.3d 958, and (2) a
more specific statute controls over a general statute, Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc.,
944 P.2d 327, 336 (Utah 1997). Here, the latter applies.
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restitution orders—is a closer fit than the LRA—which is “all about
tort law.” Graves, 2015 UT 28, ¶ 71 n.10.
¶35 Second, when looking at the statute’s plain language we
“presume that the legislature used each word advisedly.” State v.
Hatfield, 2020 UT 1, ¶ 16,
462 P.3d 330 (cleaned up). The term “entire
amount” is not defined in the Restitution Act. See generally UTAH
CODE §§ 77-38b-101 to -402. But its plain meaning is
straightforward. “Entire” means “whole” or “having no element or
part left out.” Entire, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entire (last visited Aug. 27, 2025). Used in
this context, the plain meaning of the phrase “entire amount”
indicates that the legislature intended criminal defendants to pay
restitution for the whole or complete amount of damages that their
criminal conduct proximately caused.
¶36 And although the Act does not specifically address
apportionment, the only viable reading of the language requiring a
defendant to pay the “entire amount of pecuniary damages that are
proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of the
defendant,” UTAH CODE § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(ii) (emphases added), is
that codefendants responsible for the same pecuniary damages
must both be held liable for the full amount. Allowing Debrok to
split the amount of pecuniary damages with his codefendant
would run contrary to the text of the Restitution Act because then
Debrok would not be responsible for the “entire amount of
pecuniary damages . . . proximately caused . . . by [his] criminal
conduct.” Id.
¶37 Our confidence in this reading of section 205(1)(a) is
strengthened when viewed in light of other portions of the
Restitution Act. Later in the Act, the legislature directed that when
“determining the amount of pecuniary damages . . . the court shall
consider all relevant facts to establish an amount that fully
compensates a victim for all pecuniary damages proximately caused
by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” Id. § 77-38b-205(2)(a)
(emphasis added). Reading section 205(1)(a) of the Restitution Act
to require joint and several liability is consistent with the
legislature’s express goal of “fully compensat[ing]” crime victims
because it places the risk that a particular criminal defendant is
insolvent on the codefendants rather than on the crime victim. See
id.
13
STATE v. DEBROK
Opinion of the Court
¶38 Thus, we conclude that the language of the Restitution Act
itself answers in the negative the question of whether criminal
restitution can be apportioned among codefendants.7
CONCLUSION
¶39 The Restitution Act requires that defendants pay the
“entire amount of pecuniary damages that are proximately caused
. . . by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” UTAH CODE § 77-38b-
205(1)(a). This language requires joint and several liability among
codefendants who have each proximately caused the same
damages to a victim. Accordingly, we affirm on this alternative
basis the district court’s order that Debrok be “jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount of restitution with his codefendant.”
__________________________________________________________
7 We recognize that the district court rested its decision on stare
decisis grounds—not on the text of the Restitution Act. However,
an appellate court can affirm a judgment on any ground apparent
on the record. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18,
29 P.3d 1225
(noting that an appellate court may affirm a judgment “if it is
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action”(cleaned up)).
14
