Volume 208 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant appealed a judgment of the Family Court ordering the plaintiff, her former husband, to pay child support for their minor child. The defendant argued that the trial justice erred when he did not order the plaintiff to pay interim and retroactive child support while their divorce proceeding was ongoing. The defendant also contended that the trial justice erred in determining the plaintiff's gross income for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation because he did not include 2015 net income and distributions from an "S" corporation of which he was the sole shareholder. According to the defendant, the 2015 distributions from the corporation to the plaintiff were used to pay for income taxes, the plaintiff's sole ownership in the corporation, and personal expenses, including a personal life insurance premium. The Supreme Court first held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying interim child support at the beginning of the divorce trial because there was evidence presented to the trial justice that the defendant had access to ample funds during that time. The Court also held that the defendant waived her argument that such an award should have been granted at a subsequent hearing, because the defendant had failed to raise that argument at that hearing. The Court additionally noted that the parties had agreed to interim child support while the divorce proceeding was pending. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial justice ruled within the bounds of his discretion when he found that the corporation's 2015 net income, which had been retained within the corporation, should not have been included in the plaintiff's gross income calculation. According to the Court, this was so because, although the net income was reported on the plaintiff's tax returns due to the corporation's structure as an S corporation for income tax purposes, the net income had been retained for a legitimate business purpose because the corporation was required to meet a minimum equity retention requirement with its bonding company. Related to this holding, the Court agreed with the trial justice and held that the 2015 distribution to the plaintiff that had been used to pay for taxes on the income legitimately retained by the corporation did not inure to the plaintiff's benefit. However, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in determining that the 2015 distribution used to pay for the plaintiff's obligations in acquiring sole ownership of the corporation should have been excluded from his gross income calculation. The Court reasoned that there was testimony and evidence indicating that the payments were the plaintiff's personal obligations, but the plaintiff used corporate funds to satisfy those obligations. Moreover, with respect to the 2015 distribution used to pay for the plaintiff's personal life insurance premium, the Court similarly held that that distribution should have been included in the plaintiff's gross income calculation because the distribution was used to pay for a personal expense. The Court also determined that the defendant's claim as to distributions that were used to pay for other personal expenses had been waived because such an argument was never raised at the child support hearing in the Family Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Family Court.

The plaintiff, Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee, initiated litigation against the defendants—the City of Cranston, Mayor Allan Fung, and the members of the Cranston City Council—following the passage of two 2013 city ordinances promulgating a ten-year suspension of a cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) benefit for retirees of the Cranston Police and Fire Departments enrolled in the city's pension system. The plaintiff alleged a litany of claims ranging from constitutional violations to statutory infringements. Ultimately, after disposing some of the plaintiff's claims at the pretrial stage and holding a six-day nonjury trial on the remaining claims, the trial justice found in favor of the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged several of the trial justice's pretrial decisions, some of the trial justice's findings and conclusions after trial, and the posttrial award of costs in favor of the city. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred by: (1) finding that the 2013 ordinances did not violate the Contract Clause of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions and misapplying the burden of proof in her analysis (2) misconceiving and misapplying expert testimony (3) granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the Takings Clause claim, res judicata, G.L. 1956 chapter 46 of title 42 (the Open Meetings Act), and in favor of the non-city defendants based on legislative immunity (4) granting the defendants' motion for a protective order as to the deposition of a Cranston city council member (5) granting the city's motion to amend shortly before trial and (6) summarily dismissing the plaintiff's motion to stay and granting in part the city's motion for costs. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in determining and applying the correct burden of proof or in reaching her ultimate conclusion that the 2013 ordinances did not violate the Contract Clause of the United States or Rhode Island Constitutions. Further, the Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion with regard to expert testimony presented at trial. Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims relating to: (1) the Takings Clause of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions, (2) res judicata, (3) the Open Meetings Act, and (4) the non-city defendants. The Court also held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in granting the defendants' motion for a protective order concerning the deposition of a councilmember based on legislative immunity, granting the city's motion to amend its answer prior to trial, and awarding a portion of the costs requested by the city. As to the trial justice's denial of the plaintiff's motion to stay prior to considering the bill of costs, the Court found that the plaintiff had waived this issue for failure to adequately develop its argument for review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The Court also affirmed the orders of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motion for a protective order, granting the city's motion to amend its answer, and granting the city's motion for costs and denying the plaintiff's motion for a stay.

The plaintiff, Bacon Construction Co., Inc., appealed from the Superior Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Arbella Protection Insurance Company, Inc., in this declaratory-judgment action involving the question of whether Arbella is contractually obligated to provide insurance coverage to Bacon, which is listed as an additional insured on the insurance policy at issue. On appeal, Bacon argued that the Superior Court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and granting Arbella's cross-motion for summary judgment. According to Bacon, the hearing justice erred by: (1) ruling that Bacon is not afforded coverage under a plain-language reading of the additional insured endorsement (2) ruling that the additional insured endorsement includes a negligence trigger (3) conflating the Arbella policy and subcontract analyses and (4) ruling that Arbella does not have a duty to defend Bacon. The Supreme Court held that Bacon is not entitled to additional insured coverage because (1) the additional insured endorsement includes a negligence trigger and, thus, restricts Bacon's entitlement to coverage to only those situations where liability is caused by the named insured's negligence and (2) Bacon's voluntary dismissal of all claims against the named insured and its settlement with the complainant in the underlying action preclude any finding of the named insured's negligence so as to trigger this contractual obligation. Next, the Court held that the subcontract is irrelevant to this analysis and thus need not be addressed. Lastly, the Court, applying the "pleadings test," held that Arbella has no duty to defend Bacon because the underlying complaint is devoid of any allegations that bring the underlying case within or potentially within the risk covered by the Arbella policy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff, John Broccoli, a pro se litigant, was before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, attorney Walter Manning. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Superior Court erred in applying a three-year statute of limitations to his "breach of contract with fraud" claim. The Supreme Court first concluded that the plaintiff's arguments were waived under the Court's "raise-or-waive" rule for failure to meaningfully develop or discuss what error was allegedly committed on the part of the hearing justice in the case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court addressed the issue on appeal and held that the plaintiff's "breach of contract with fraud" claim, which centered on the defendant's attempt to obtain a mortgage-modification agreement for the plaintiff, arose from a professional relationship, and, thus, was subject to the three-year statute of limitations. The Court also deemed the plaintiff's breach of contract argument meritless because the record was devoid of any evidence that a contract, express or implied, existed between the parties. Finally, the Court held that the hearing justice correctly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff's complaint, filed on July 1, 2016, was barred by the statute of limitations, which ran on March 15, 2016. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In these actions challenging the assessment of real estate taxes, the plaintiff, Gary M. Morse, appeals from judgments entered in favor of the defendants, various officials of the Town of Barrington, Rhode Island, Sweetbriar, LP, and East Bay Community Development Corporation, based on the plaintiff's lack of standing. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he had standing to bring his claims because he has been forced to pay a higher amount on his taxes because of Sweetbriar's favorable tax treatment under G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-12 and 44-5-13.11. He also argued that the trial justice erred in declining to address the merits of his claims. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's declaratory-judgment action did not set forth a cognizable claim because the taxing statutes provide the exclusive relief to any person aggrieved by an assessment of taxes. The Court next held that, as to the plaintiff's tax appeal action, his appeal was not properly before the Court because it was not timely filed. The Court added that, even if the appeal had been timely filed, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claim because he had not suffered an injury distinct from other residents of the Town of Barrington. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in the declaratory-judgment action and denied and dismissed the appeal in the tax appeal action.

This appeal arose out of litigation over whether the owner-lessor of a motor vehicle was vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of the driver-lessee in a roadway collision resulting in injuries to plaintiff Jason Puerini. A hearing justice of the Superior Court granted the owner-lessor's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the owner-lessor of the motor vehicle was not entitled to summary judgment because it did not qualify for protection from the federal Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106. The Supreme Court first addressed a question of first impression in this jurisdiction—whether the Graves Amendment preempts our state laws allowing a party injured in a motor vehicle accident to recover from the title owner of the vehicle through the owner's vicarious liability for the negligence of the driver. The Supreme Court held that the Graves Amendment conflicts with G.L. 1956 § 31-34-4 and therefore preempts application of this state statute authorizing vicarious liability for the title owner of a motor vehicle when the vehicle operator's negligence causes injury. The Supreme Court also addressed G.L. 1956 § 31-33-6, holding that, to the extent that this statute makes business entities potentially vicariously liable for failure to comply with financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements, this statute is not preempted because it specifically falls within the § 30106(b)(2) savings clause of the Graves Amendment. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the Motor Vehicle Reparation Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 47 of title 31, is not preempted by the Graves Amendment because the consequences for automobile dealers for failure to comply with the requirements of this statute do not include vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of automobile drivers. The Supreme Court also engaged in a de novo review of the evidence HLT submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment, as well as the evidence plaintiffs submitted in objection thereto, and held that the record showed no genuine issue of material fact that HLT is engaged in the general business of leasing motor vehicles. The Supreme Court held that HLT was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims that it is vicariously liable for their injuries, and therefore the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs, the estate of a seven-year-old decedent and his parents and sister, sought review of an order entered by the Superior Court that restricted a deposition to written questions in accordance with the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants after the decedent, a seven-year-old boy, drowned in the defendants' swimming pool while he was attending a party at the defendants' home. During discovery, the plaintiffs sought to depose M.Y., the defendants' minor daughter and an alleged material witness to the drowning. The defendants filed a motion to quash the deposition and attached a letter from M.Y.'s psychotherapist indicating that M.Y. had been in treatment for generalized anxiety for several years, that her symptoms had exacerbated since the decedent's death, and that exposing M.Y. to a deposition would certainly worsen her mental health and might have a negative and lasting consequence to her condition. The Superior Court entered an order that quashed an oral deposition of M.Y., allowed a deposition on written questions "in accord with the rules of civil procedure[,]" and required defense counsel to submit, every six months from the date of the order until the case was resolved, a statement from a mental-health professional indicating whether M.Y. was fit to be deposed. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the hearing justice erred because, instead of prohibiting the oral deposition outright, he should have allowed the oral deposition to continue under reasonable restrictions that would limit any potential harm to M.Y. while still preserving the plaintiffs' right to relevant discovery. The Supreme Court agreed and held that good cause had not been demonstrated to a sufficient degree to impose such a restriction on M.Y.'s deposition. The Court observed that oral depositions have inherent advantages over written depositions, and reasoned that the mental-health professional's letter was conclusory with respect to the potential harm that could result if M.Y. were to be deposed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case to that court so that plaintiffs could conduct an oral deposition of M.Y. The Supreme Court also noted that the hearing justice may impose reasonable restrictions on the oral deposition, such as setting a time limit on the deposition, allowing frequent recesses, and/or permitting a parent of M.Y. to be present during the deposition.

The respondent, Austin B., appealed from a Family Court order and judgment finding him delinquent for possession of child pornography. On appeal, respondent argued that: (1) the Family Court magistrate erred in denying his request for a Franks hearing (2) the Family Court justice erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause to support the search warrant (3) even if there was probable cause, the Family Court justice erred in deciding that the police properly executed the warrant (4) the Family Court justice erred in failing to suppress respondent's statements made to an officer at the residence. The Supreme Court affirmed on all grounds that were properly preserved below. The Court held that the Family Court magistrate properly denied respondent's request for a Franks hearing because there was no evidence that the detective included a knowing or intelligent false statement in the affidavit. Moreover, the Court determined that the Family Court justice properly denied respondent's motion to suppress because there was enough evidence in the warrant and affidavit to establish probable cause and the officers lawfully executed the warrant. Finally, the Court held that respondent waived any argument regarding the statements he made while at the residence because he failed to raise that argument below. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of delinquency.