Volume 207 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The pro se defendant, Andrew Smith, appealed from decisions of the Family Court granting an absolute divorce to the defendant and his former wife, the plaintiff, and ordering an equitable distribution of their marital assets. On appeal, the defendant argued that: (1) the Family Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff's complaint for divorce, as well as his counterclaim for divorce, because doing so would violate his religious right to the sacrament of marriage (2) the Family Court justice erred in the equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1 and (3) the Family Court justice's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was improper. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court had jurisdiction over the proceeding because, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3(a), the Family Court is vested with statutorily-conferred authority to oversee proceedings stemming from divorce actions. Next, the Court held that the Family Court justice did not abuse her discretion in distributing the marital assets, because she had properly considered the requisite factors set forth in § 15-5-16.1. Lastly, the Court held that the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was not an abuse of discretion in light of the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Family Court.

The respondent, Heather B., appealed from a decree entered in the Family Court that terminated her parental rights with respect to her son, Joziah B. The Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) filed a petition in Family Court to terminate the respondent's parental rights with respect to the child and informed the court that the respondent's address was "unknown." The Family Court ordered that a notice of advertisement be placed in the local newspaper that alerted the respondent of the date of the hearing on the petition. The respondent failed to appear at that hearing. After hearing testimony from a casework supervisor at DCYF, the trial justice found that the respondent had abandoned her child after she failed to have contact with the child for more than six months and that it was unlikely that the child could be returned to the respondent's care within a reasonable period of time. The trial justice therefore determined that the respondent was unfit to parent she ordered that the respondent's parental rights be terminated and that DCYF would have the exclusive right to place the child for adoption. On appeal, the respondent contended that she was not aware of the hearing date for the petition for termination of her parental rights. The Supreme Court held that DCYF was required, under statutory authority, to file an affidavit with the Family Court stating that the respondent could not be found and to report its last contacts with the respondent as well as any other information that would have been pertinent in determining the respondent's whereabouts. Importantly, the Court held that the affidavit must have been filed in advance of the court order of notice by publication. The record did not reflect that such an affidavit had been filed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decree and remanded to the Family Court for a hearing with appropriate notice in accordance with the statute.

The defendant, Jamal Rogers, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury finding of guilty on five counts of second-degree sexual assault, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-37-4. The defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial and that the verdict failed to serve the interests of justice. After a thorough examination of the record, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial the Court concluded that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence and that he articulated adequate grounds for denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

In this foreclosure action, the defendants, Michele Perretta and Anna M. Perretta, appeal from a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Note Capital Group, Inc. First, the Perrettas argued that an appeal from the Superior Court's interlocutory order was appropriate because the grant of partial summary judgment had an element of finality, as that order allowed Note Capital to foreclose on the Perrettas' property. Second, the Perrettas contended that Note Capital was not entitled to enforce the note because the chain of title of the note was tainted by an improper transfer. Third, the Perrettas proffered that, due to the existence of several versions of the lost note, the hearing justice had erred in granting summary judgment. Fourth, the Perrettas averred that Note Capital was not entitled to enforce the note evidencing a debt owed on their property because the note had been lost by the previous holder of the note, American Residential Equities, LIX, LLC, prior to its assignment to Note Capital. The Supreme Court first held that the Perrettas' interlocutory appeal was proper because it fell into the exception permitting appeals from interlocutory orders regarding a sale of real or personal property. Second, the Court held that the Perrettas lacked standing to contest the allegedly tainted transfer because the doctrine of estoppel by deed rendered that transfer voidable and not void. Finally, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the hearing justice had made an impermissible factual determination regarding the validity of the lost note, in light of the fact that several versions of the note had been entered into the record below. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case, with instructions that the Superior Court may consider, inter alia, the Supreme Court's opinion in SMS Financial XXV, LLC v. Corsetti, 186 A.3d 1060 (R.I. 2018).

This appeal stems from a contract dispute between the plaintiff, Chariho Regional School District, and the state defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Education, the Rhode Island Department of Administration, the Rhode Island Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, and former Commissioner of Education Kenneth Wagner. The plaintiff appealed from a May 9, 2017 order of the Superior Court dismissing its amended complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging a breach of contract. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred by (1) allowing the Westerly School Committee and Narragansett School Committee to intervene in the action and (2) granting the state defendants' motion to dismiss after determining that there had been no breach of the contract based on its plain language and concluding that termination of the contract was the plaintiff's exclusive remedy in the event of a breach. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's challenge to the order allowing intervention by the Westerly and Narragansett school committees was not properly before the Court because there has been no final judgment in the case. Next, the Court held that the hearing justice erred by granting the state defendants' motion to dismiss because an ambiguity existed in the language of the contract. Lastly, the Court held that the language of the remedies provision in the contract did not indicate an intent to provide for termination of the contract as the exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court.