Volume 209 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Hasim Munir, appealed from a July 6, 2017 judgment of conviction entered against him in Providence County Superior Court following a jury trial. Mr. Munir was charged by indictment with and convicted of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2. On appeal, he raised the following issues: (1) "whether the trial justice committed clear error by refusing to suppress defendant's statement to the police where evidence that defendant's confession was knowing, intelligent and voluntary was less than clear and convincing" and (2) "whether the trial justice committed clear error in admitting defendant's confession into evidence despite his invocation of his right to remain silent[.]" The Supreme Court held that Mr. Munir knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights that were recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court also held that Mr. Muir did not invoke his right to remain silent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial justice's denial of Mr. Munir's motion to suppress his statements to the police.

The plaintiff, Dolores Voccola, appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC and Xpress Sweeping, Inc. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was black ice in the area of the parking lot of Stop & Shop where the plaintiff slipped and fell. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the plaintiff had satisfied her burden of producing competent evidence that established the existence of a disputed issue of material fact, such that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the cause of the plaintiff's fall was, in fact, black ice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, Management Capital, L.L.C. (Management), initiated this litigation after defendant, F.A.F., Inc. (FAF), maintained that a common stock warrant held by Management had no value. A Superior Court justice, sitting without a jury at a trial held over six days, found in favor of Management. On appeal, FAF contends that the trial justice erred when he: (1) reformed certain dates in a stock warrant which were a result of mutual mistake (2) determined that "funded debt" was an unambiguous term meaning "long-term debt" (3) found that FAF repudiated its obligations under the stock warrant (4) found that Management properly preserved its post-repudiation rights (5) determined that Management proved its damages with reasonable certainty (6) determined that prejudgment interest would accrue from October 13, 2008 onward and (7) did not rule on FAF's counterclaims. The Supreme Court first held that the trial justice, after finding that the evidence clearly demonstrated a mutual mistake, was correct in reforming the stock warrant. Next, the Supreme Court held that the stock warrant was unambiguous and, therefore, "funded debt" means "long-term debt," the plain and ordinary meaning of funded debt. The Supreme Court also found that FAF had repudiated its obligations under the warrant and that Management properly preserved its post-repudiation rights. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that Management had proven its damages with reasonably certainty and the date from which prejudgment interest was to accrue was properly determined. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when he did not rule on FAF's counterclaims.

The appellant, Amet Chelo, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his probate appeal after finding that, because the appellant was under guardianship, he lacked the capacity to retain legal counsel and file an appeal in his own name. Before this Court, the appellant argued that the Superior Court erred in dismissing his probate appeal because, according to the appellant, he was only under a limited guardianship and, thus, was entitled to pursue the probate appeal on his own. The Supreme Court found that, because the certificate of appointment did not "clearly state" that the appointment was a "limited guardianship," and because the December 15, 2015 Probate Court order did not "clearly indicate the scope of the powers and duties of the limited guardian," there was no compliance with G.L. 1956 § 33-15-4(a)(1), and, thus, the appellant was under a full guardianship pursuant to a superseding order of the Probate Court. Next, because the Supreme Court found that the appellant was under a full guardianship, the Court concluded that the appellant lacked the capacity to bring and maintain an action in his own name. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Justice Andrade, was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and carrying a firearm without a license. On appeal, the defendant (1) argued that the admission of the statements he gave to the police when he voluntarily turned himself into their custody a few days after Ty-Shon Perry was killed was a violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights (2) asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated because, he contended, his trial counsel maintained an actual conflict of interest throughout her representation of him (3) challenged the admission of testimonial and photographic evidence suggesting his affiliation with known Providence gangs and (4) challenged specific portions of the jury instructions given to the jurors prior to their deliberation as well as the trial justice's decision not to include two specific instructions defendant had requested. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err when he denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to the police after turning himself into their custody because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated until formal criminal prosecution begins and there was no indication of a Fifth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was not violated by his trial counsel's representation of another defendant in an unrelated incident despite the personal connection between this other defendant and one of the state's eyewitnesses. With respect to the admission of testimonial and photographic evidence of gang affiliation, the Court held that the defendant's arguments were waived for failure to preserve the challenge to this evidence during the trial. Finally, the Court held that the defendant's respective arguments regarding the jury instructions were also waived because the defendant had not preserved the argument for appellate review and because the defendant simply stated the issue for review without providing any meaningful argument thereon. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Steven Robinson, appealed from an order of the Superior Court that denied his motion to confirm an arbitration award issued in his favor in court-annexed arbitration. Although the plaintiff, Gerald Richard, filed a timely rejection of the arbitration award, his initial electronically submitted filing was rejected because he had used an incorrect filing code. When the statutory period for filing a rejection expired, the defendant filed a motion to confirm the award. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff corrected his initial filing. The Superior Court denied defendant's motion to confirm the arbitration award. On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that an improper code is not a sufficient reason for rejecting an electronic filing in an arbitration case, but noted that plaintiff had not challenged the procedures used to reject his filing in this case. The Court held that Article X, Rule 5(c) of the Supreme Court Rules Governing Electronic Filing directs that, if an electronically submitted filing is rejected, a corrected filing will relate back to the date of the original filing if made "promptly." The Court further held that a determination of whether a correction was made promptly is within the sound discretion of the trial justice, and the Court's review of such a determination is limited to whether the trial justice abused his or her discretion. The Court discerned no abuse of discretion in this case and affirmed the order of the Superior Court.