Volume 211 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The petitioners, Robin Brindle, Kathleen Brown, Sandra Carter, Marcie LaPorte, and Kelvin Ramirez, filed petitions for writ of certiorari to this Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-35-16, seeking review of a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training that denied the petitioners' wage and hour claims against Delta Airlines, Inc. The petition was granted, and, before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the Superior Court erred in affirming DLT's finding that G.L. 1956 § 25-3-3 is preempted by federal law, specifically, 49 U.S.C § 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act (the ADA). The Supreme Court held that requiring airlines such as Delta to provide one-and-one-half-times the normal rate of pay for work on Sundays and holidays does in fact relate to the services provided by Delta, and, thus, the logical effect of § 25-3-3 on Delta's delivery of services is sufficient to bring the statute within the preemptive scope of the ADA. Specifically, the Court determined that the sworn testimony offered by Delta before the DLT demonstrated that forcing Delta to comply with the requirements of § 25-3-3 could significantly impact the services that Delta and other airlines provide on Sundays and holidays. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the Superior Court to conclude that DLT's decision was supported by adequate and legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Joel Najera, appealed from a judgment of conviction in the Superior Court after a jury found him guilty of one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a machete, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2, and one count of malicious injury to property, to wit, a car window and basement window, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-44-1. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice clearly erred when he denied the defendant's motion for a new trial because, according to the defendant, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice independently assessed the credibility of each witness, weighed the evidence before him, assessed it in light of the jury charge, and determined that he would have reached the same conclusion as the jury. Specifically, the Court found that the trial justice noted the shortcomings and inconsistencies of certain witnesses, passed upon the credibility of the state's witnesses, and found those witnesses to be quite credible, and found defendant and his witnesses to be lacking in credibility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.