Volume 29 — Federal Cases

This petition for a writ of habeas corpus set out that the petitioner [William A. Walker], was arrested on mesne process at the suit of a creditor, in January last, and became bankrupt on the first day of February, but was still held in custody by the sheriff, and prayed for his discharge under section 20 of the act.

<p>[Id the matter of John C. Walker, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,062.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Oath op Allegiance.</p> <p>The oath of allegiance annexed to the debt- or’s petition may be taken before a register.</p>

<p>[This was an action by Walker & Brothers against Adair & Anderson. Heard on a motion to dismiss an attachment.]</p>

The complainant [Eliza Walker] was the widow of William J. Walker, of Newport, in the state of Rhode Island, and the respondents [Joseph S. Beal and others] were the executors of the last will and testament of the deceased, as duly constituted under the laws of this commonwealth.

<p>[This was an action by Joseph H. Walker and others against John II. Byrnes and others.]</p>

<p>This was an action of trespass for an assault aud battery and false imprisonment, originally brought returnable to the county court for the county of Chittenden and state of Vermont, by writ dated August 23d. 18(14. which being returned and entered in said court at the September term thereof, in 18(14. the defendant [Cyrus It. Crane] tiled his petition for the removal of the cause to this court, under section 5 of the act of March 3d. 18U3 (12 Stal. 70(1), and the cause was removed into this court, and at the October term, in IStió. of this court, came on for trial before SMAULJ01', District Judge, and a jury, on tire defendant’s plea of not guilty.</p> <p>On the trial, the plaintiff [Hiram Walker] gave evidence tending to show, that he was. on and before the 2d of August. 18G4, a manufacturer in Burlington, Vermont, and had. at that time, a man in his employ named Dike, who was liable to military duty, and whose home was in the town of Starksbnrongli. Vermont; that the town of Stnrksborougli was then offering to pay to any person who would put into the United States service a substitute who should be credited to the quota of that town, the stun of $!)()<> as a bounty: that Dike applied to the plaintiff to assist him in obtaining a substitute, to be credited to Starksbor-ougli, so as to relieve himself from liability to draft, and to avail liiuiself, in so doing, of the. bounty offered by that town, and proposed to pay the plaintiff for his services in obtaining such substitute; that the plaintiff declined to accept any compensation, but agreed to assist Dike in obtaining the substitute: that, soon afterwards, the plaintiff was called on. at Burlington, by one Norton, of Champlain. _N. 1’., with whom ho had no previous acquaintance, hut who had been informed that the plaintiff: desired to procure a substitute; that .Norton was then on his way to Rutland, with three Frenchmen from Canada, with whom he had contracted that they should enlist in the United States sendee, and had had some corres-pcndence with the selectmen of Rutland, relative to furnishing three men upon the quota of that town; that the plaintiff and Norton concluded an agreement that one of the men should be enlisted as a substitute for Dike, and credited to the town of Stnrksborougli. and that the plaintiff should pay Norton therefor the sum of 8900 when the man should be enlisted and sworn in: that, on the next day after the making of this agreement, the plaintiff accompanied Norton and the men to Rut-land. for the purpose of getting tlie substitute for Dike enlisted and credited; that, on their arrival, some considerable discussion and negotiation took place between Norton and the authorities of Rutland, in which the plaintiff took no part, relative to a bargain for furnishing the other two men upon the quota of Rutland; [that, while this was going on, the plaintiff was called on by one N. P. Simonds, who was then engaged in and about the defendant’s office (the defendant being provost marshal), and passing freely in and out. and who said he was a United States recruiting agent, and offered to put the substitute in for the plaintiff for 81 (it), and said he was the only man in Rut-land who could put a substitute in through that office, and that lie intended to make 8100 per head off: of the men; and that plaintiff declined tliis proposition, but subsequently, after watching the proceedings there for some time, offered Simonds 823 to get his man enlisted as a substitute for Dike, which offer Simonds accepted.] So much of the foregoing evidence as is included in brackets was objected to by the defendant and admitted by tlie court, to which tlie defendant excepted. The plaintiff further gave evidence tending to show, that, soon afterwards, the men brought by Norton were taken in for examination, and. two of tliem having passed and been accepted. Simonds spoke to tlie plaintiff and told bim it was all riglit, and to go up-stairs to tlie provost marshal's office and pay off bis man: that the plaintiff thereujxai started with tlie man to ascend the stairs in the United States post office building, which stairs led from the public room in the post office to the rooms in the second story occupied by the provost marshal’s office, and. when be got up some distance, was met by tlie defendant, whom lie did not then know, who took hold of his arm and asked liim where he was going; that tlie plaintiff replied, that he was going up-stairs with those men; that the defendant then said: “Go downstairs; you are a substitute broker:'’ and shoved him down three or four steps: that tile plaintiff replied: “I am not a substitute broker; my name is 'Walker, from Burlington, and I came to put in a substitute for a man named Dike, from Stnrksborougli;” that tlx* defendant still insisted he was a substitufe broker, aud shoved him down stairs again twice, three or four steps each time, till lit* reached the bottom; that the plaintiff then said to him: “If you will come out of doors I will show you sometliiug;” that tlie defendant asked: “What will you show me?” that tlie plaintiff replied: “I will show you how a gentleman defends himself when he is assailed;-’ that tlx* defendant thereupon called one Briggs, who stood near, aud ordered liim to take the plaintiff to jail; that (lie plaintiff enquired what be was taken to jail for. and the defendant said: “For violating tlie provisions of the enrolment act, and resisting the provost marshal in the discharge of liis duty:” that Briggs took the plaintiff to tlie county jail in Rutland, and imprisoned him there in the common prison, then occupied by a uumbei of criminals and vagrants, where he remained about ten minutes; that, while on the way to the jail, the plaintiff offered to tlie officer to furnish bail in any amount for his appearance at any time, which the officer declined to receive; that, when the plaintiff had been in jail about ten minutes, the defendant sent a couple of soldier’s for him, who brought him back to the post office building. and, by direction of the defendant, took him into the cellar of the building, where there were cells used for United States prisoners; that the defendant went below and had a long ■conversation with the plaintiff, charging him with being a bounty broker, and with having lied to the defendant, and making other remarks of a similar character, and demanding that he should make an apology; that, on the plaintiff's stating what his business was with the provost marshal, and that Simonds had requested him to go up-stairs, the defendant said that would make a difference, and sent for Simonds and enquired of him as to that fact, to which Simonds replied that he did not remember whether he had asked the plaintiff to go up-stairs or not; that the defendant finally discharged the plaintiff from custody, saying that he did so on account of tire respect he entertained for the plaintiff's father; that the man agreed for by the 'plaintiff, as aforesaid, was afterwards, on the same day. enlisted as a substitute for Dike; and that the plaintiff was sent for by the defendant to come to his office and pay the man, which he did. and also that lie paid Simonds $20 for his sendees. The plaintiff further testified, that he had never, in any instance, had anything whatever to do with procuring substitutes, or obtaining men for enlistment, except on this single occasion, and never had any interest or share in any such business, directly or indirectly; and that ho did not know Norton until applied to by him, as above stated, and had nothing to do with him or his recruits except to obtain the substitute for Dike, as above stated, and no interest or share othenvise in the disposal of the men, or in the money received therefor.</p> <p>The defendant introduced in evidence the following documents:</p> <p>(1) His commission as provost marshal, dated April 24th. TSt>:¡: “War Department. Washington. April 24th. 1S(‘>3. .Sir: You are hereby informed that the president of the United States lias appointed you provost marshal for the. I-’irst district of the state of Vermont, with rank of captain of cavalry, in the service of the United States, to rank as such from the 24th day of April, I'd;.'!. Immediately on receipt hereof, please to communicate to this department. through the provost marshal general of the United States, your acceptance or non-acceptance of said appointment, and, with your letter of acceptance, return the oath herewith enclosed, properly filled up, subscribed and attested, and report your age. birthplace, and the state of which you are a permanent resident. Ton will immediately report, by letter, to the provost marshal general, and will proceed without delay to establish your headquarters at Rutland. Vermont, and enter upon your duties in accordance with such special instructions as you may receive from the provost marshal general. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. To Capt. Cyrus R. Crane, Provost Marshal First District Vermont.”</p> <p>(2) Special order of the war department, No. 221. detailing Gen. Thomas G. Pitcher as assistant to the provost marshal general for the state of Vermont, dated May ISth, 18(58: “War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington. May 18th, IStio. Special Orders, No. 221. (Extract.) * * * Brigadier General Thomas G. riteher, U. S. volunteers, will liroceed without delay to Montpelier, Vermont, and enter upon the duties of assistant to the provost marshal general of the United States, for the state of Vermont. * * * By order of the secretary of war. E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General.”</p> <p>(.'!) Revised regulations issued by the war department. May 1st, 1SG4, for the government of the bureau of the provost marshal general, particularly sections 1, 2. 10, 22, 24. 27 and 82: “Sec. 1. The officer detailed in each state or division to aid the war department in securing uniformity in the execution of the en-rolment act, shall keep himself well informed as to the condition of the department throughout the state or division. Hi1 shall, under the provost marshal general of the United States, exercise supervision over the provost marshals and their subordinates, for the congressional districts of that state or division, and shall see. by personal inspection, or by his inspectors. that boards of enrolment, and persons acting under them, attend faithfully and diligently to their duties. Pec. 2. He shall communicate to them the orders and instructions of the provost marshal general, and see that they are promptly and efficiently executed, and shall, from time to time, give or transmit such instructions, in accordance with these regulations. as hereinafter prescribed, as may be required to facilitate and enforce obedience to them. Sec. 1!). Immediately upon entering upon his duties, each provost marshal shall report. by lei ter. to the provost marshal general of the United States, and the acting assistant provost marshal general of his state. Sec. 22. (Section 7 of the act for enrolling and calling out file national forces, approved March 8d. 18(i8--that it shall be the duty of the provost marshals to obey all lawful orders and regulations of the provost marshal general, and such as may be prescribed by law, concerning the enrolment and calling into service of the national forces.) Sec. 24. It shall he the duty of the provost marshal in each district to call together, when required, the board of enrolment, to preside at its sessions, announce such of its decisions or directions as it may be necessary to make public, enforce its orders, see that a fair record is made of its proceedings, in a book kept for that purpose by the recorder, and to transmit to the provost marshal general the enrolment lists, as consolidated by the board, and such other communications as the board may deem it necessary to lay before the provost marshal general. Sec. 27. He shall arrest and forthwith deliver to the proper civil authorities, to wit, the marshal of the United States within and for the district in which the arrest is made, with written charges in the case, all persons who shall have violated section 12 of the act amendatory of the enrolment act, or any part of the same. Sec. 32. To enable provost marshals to discharge their duties efficiently, they are authorized to call upon the nearest available military force, or on citizens, as a posse comitatus, or on United States marshals and deputy marshals; and these and all other persons are hereby enjoined to aid the provost marshal in the execution of his lawful duties, when called on so to do.”</p> <p>(4) Regulations from the war department, dated September 29th, 1SG3, particularly section III: “HI. Persons deputized as aforesaid, to arrest deserters and procure recruits, presenting to your board a man acceptable as a recruit, according to the present ruling of acceptability, as applied by this bureau, shall receive premiums as follows, to wit: for an accepted recruit who may be shown to the board to have served at least nine months as a soldier, and been honorably discharged (for other cause than disability), a premium of $25; for an accepted recruit without the military qualifications above specified, a premium of $10. The premiums herein provided will be paid to the persons who shall have presented the accepted recruit, as soon as said recruit shall have been delivereu at the general rendezvous at -. The payment of the premium will be made by-in the-, whenever the person who furnished the recruit shall' present to him a certificate from your board that the recruits named, and for whom he claims premiums, were accepted and regularly enlisted, and a certificate from the commanding officer at the general rendezvous at -, that the said recruits have actually been received at bis rendezvous. You are authorized and required, notwithstanding anything else herein contained, to decline all business, in the matter of recruits, with any person or persons who may at any time practice, or attempt to practice, fraud or imposition, either upon the government oi the person presented as a recruit, or who shall extort, claim, or receive any other fee, perquisite, or compensation from the government, or the recruit, than the premium herein authorized and provided, and such persons shall forfeit their appointments, and all right to any premiums or payments, and be reported to the provost marshal general, to be dealt with summarily by a military commission. You are required to facilitate the procuration of recruits in the manner herein prescribed, by early examination of them, prompt preparation of certificates upon which the payments of premiums depend, and by everything else properly devolving on you, calculated to assist the persons presenting recruits in securing their premiums without unnecessary delay. You will immediately nominate, through the acting assistant provost marshal general of the state, one or more persons whom you deem best suited for recruiting agents for your district, that they may be deputized for that purpose.”</p> <p>(5) Circular No. 2-t dated June 10th, 1803, from the office of the provost marshal general: “War Department, Provost Marshal General’s Office, Wasnington, D. 0. June 10th, 1S03. (Circular No. 2S.) The following opinion of Hon. William Whiting, solicitor of the war department, has been ordered to be published by the secretary of war: Opinion. It is made the duty of the provost marshals to obey all lawful orders and regulations of the provost marshal general, and such as may be prescribed by law, concerning the enrolment and calling into service of the national forces. Act March 3d. 18(13, § 7. The 25th section of the same act provides, that, if any person shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act into the service of the United States, or shall counsel or aid any person to resist any such draft, or. shall assault or obstruct any officer in making such draft, or in the performance of any service in relation thereto, or shall counsel any person to assault or obstruct any such officer, or shall counsel any drafted men not to appear at the place of rendezvous, or wilfully dissuade them from the performance of military duty as required by law. such person shall be subject to summary ax-rest by the provost marshal, and shall be forthwith delivered to the civil authorities, and, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by both of said punishments. To do any act which will prevent or impede the enrolment of the national forces (which enrolment is preliminary and essential to the draft), is to prevent or impede the draft itself. The enrolment is a •service to be performed by the provost mai--shal in relation to the draft.’ It is not the act of drawing ballots out of a ballot box itself, but it is ‘in relation to it,’ and is the first step that must by law be taken preparatory to draft. It is, therefore, clearly within the duty of the provost marshal to subject all persons who obstruct the enrolment, the meeting of the board, or any other proceeding which is preliminary and essential to the draft, to summary arrest, according to the provision of section 25. There are many ways of obstructing officers in the performance of their ‘services ox-duty in malting, or in relation to, the draft,’ without employing physical force. The neglect or refusal to do an act required by law to be done, may itself be such an ‘obstruction’ as to subject the offender to arrest. Suppose a pei-son be found standing in a passage through which the drafting officers were required to enter into a place designated by law as the place for draft, and suppose that his standing in that place would prevent access by these officers to the place of di-aft. If they request him to move away, and he neglects ox-refuses so to do, for the purpose of preventing the draft, the non-performance of the act of removal would be itself an ‘obstruction of the draft, or of an officer in the pi rfonnance of his duty in relation to it.’ Standing mute in civil courts, is, under certain circumstances, a punishable offense; and so, if a person, with intent to prevent the draft, refuses to give his true name when lawfully requested so to do by an officer whose legal duty is to ascertain and enrol it, it is an obstruction of-that officer in the performance of one of his duties in relation to the draft. Sc, also, of the giving of false names with the same illegal intent, and the offender will, in either case, be subject to summary arrest by the provost marshal. William Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department. James B. Fry, Provost Marshal General.” This paper was objected to by the plaintiff, and was received by the court subject to the objection.</p> <p>(6) The call of the president for 500,(XX) men, dated July 18th, 1SG4: “War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, July 19th, 1804. For Five Hundred Thousand Volunteers. By the President of the United States of America — A Proclamation. Whereas, by the act approved July 4th, 1864, entitled, ‘An act further to regulate and provide for the enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,’ it is provided, that the president of the United States may, ‘at his discretion, at any time hereafter, call for any number of men, • as volunteers, for the respective terms of one, two, and three years, for military service,’ and ‘that, in case the quota, of (or) any part thereof, of any town, township, ward of a city, precinct, or election district, or of a county not so subdivided, shall not be filled within the space of fifty days after such call, then the president shall immediately order a draft for one year, to fill such quota, or any part thereof, which may be unfilled;’ and whereas the new enrolment heretofore ordered is so far completed as that the aforementioned act of congress may now be put in operation, for recruiting and keeping up the strength of the armies in the field, for garrisons, and such military operations as may be required for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion, and restoring the authority of the United States government in the insurgent states: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, president of the United States, do issue this my call for five hundred thousand volunteers for the military service, provided, nevertheless, that this call shall be reduced by all credits which may be established under section eight of the aforesaid act, on account of persons who have entered the naval service during the present rebellion, and by credits for men furnished to the military service in excess of calls heretofore made. Volunteers will be accepted under this call for one, two. or three'years, as they may elect, and will be entitled to the bounty provided by the law for the period of service for which they enlist. And I hereby proclaim, order, and direct, that, immediately after the 5th day of September, 1864, being fifty days from the date of this call, a draft for troops to serve one year shall be had in every town, township, ward of a city, precinct, or election district, or county not so subdivided, to fill the quota which shall be assigned to it under this call, or any part thereof which may be unfilled by volunteers on the said 5th day of September, 1864. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this eighteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-ninth. (L. S.) Abraham Lincoln. By the President, William H. Seward, Secretary of State. By order of the secretary of war, E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant General.”</p> <p>(8) Proclamation of the president suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, dated September 15th, 1863: “War Department, Provost Marshal General’s Office, Washington, D. C., September 17th, 1863. The secretary of war orders that the following act of congress, and proclamation of the president based upon the same, be published for the information of all concerned, and that the special instructions hereinafter contained for persons in the military service of the United States, be strictly observed. ‘An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases, approved March 3d, 1863. Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, that, during the present rebellion, the president of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof; and, whenever and wherever the said privilege shall be suspended, as aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by authority of the president; but, upon the certificate, under oath, of the officer having charge of any one so detained, that such person is detained by him as a prisoner under authority of the president, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended by the judge or court having issued the said writ, so long as said suspension by the president shall remain in force, and said rebellion continue.’ ‘By the President of .the United States. — A Proclamation. Whereas, the constitution of the United States has ordained that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; and whereas, a rebellion was existing on the third day of March, 1863, which rebellion is still existing; and whereas, by a statute, which was approved on that day, it was enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States in congress assembled, that, during the present insurrection, the president of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case, throughout the United States, or any part thereof; and whereas, in the judgment of the president, the public safety does require that the privilege of the said writ shall now be suspended throughout the United States, in the case when, by the authority of the president of the United States, military, naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of them, hold persons under their command, or in their‘custody, either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled, drafted, or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles' of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval services by authority of the president of the United States, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offence against the military or naval service: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, president of the United States, do hereby proclaim and make known to all whom it may concern, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended throughout the United States, in the several eases before mentioned, and that this suspension will continue throughout the duration of the said rebellion, or until, this proclamation shall, by a subsequent one to be issued by the president of the United States, be modified or revoked. And I do hereby require all magistrates, attorneys, and other civil officers within the United States, and all officers and others in tlie military and naval service of the United States, to take distinct notice of this suspension, and to give it full effect, and all citizens of the United States to' conduct and govern themselves accordingly, and in conformity with the constitution of the United States and the laws of congress in such case made and provided. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed, this 15th day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-eighth. (L. S.) Abraham Lincoln. By the ] ¡resident, William H. Seward, Secretary of State.’ The attention of every officer in the military service of the United States is called to the above proclamation of the president, issued on the 15th day of September, 1803, by which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. If, therefore, a writ of habeas corpus should, in violation of the aforesaid proclamation, be sued out and served upon any officer in the military service of the United States, commanding him to produce before any court or judge any person in his custody by authority of the president of the United States, belonging to any one of the classes specified in the president’s proclamation, It shall be the duty of such officer to make known by his certificate, under oath, to whomsoever may issue or serve such writ of habeas corpus, that the person named in said writ ‘is detained by him as a prisoner under authority of the president of the United States.’ Such return having been made, if any person serving, or attempting to serve, such writ, either by the command of any court or judge, or otherwise, and with or without process of law, shall attempt to arrest the officer making such return, and holding in custody such person, the said officer is hereby commanded to refuse submission and obedience to such arrest, and if there should be any attempt to take such person from the custody of such officer, or arrest such officer, he shall resist such attempt, calling to his aid any force that may be necessary to maintain the authority of the United States, and render such resistance effectual. James B. Fry, Provost Marshal General.”</p> <p>(9) Letter from the provost marshal general to the defendant, approving N. P. Si-monds’ appointment by the defendant as recruiting agent: “War Department, Provost Marshal General’s Office, Washington, D. C., October 13th, 1803. Captain C. R. Crane, Provost Marshal, 1st District of Vermont, Rut-land, Vt. Captain: 1 am directed by the provost marshal general to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 1st inst., nominating N. P. Simonds and George Hopkins as recruiting agents, and to say, in reply, that their nomination is approved. I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Henry Stone, Ass’t Adj’t General.”</p> <p>The defendant further gave evidence tending to show that General Pitcher had acted under his said appointment as assistant provost marshal general for Vermont, from the date thereof, and had received and communicated to the defendant officially, as instructions, papers 3, 4 and 5, above mentioned; that the defendant had received a verbal order from General Pitcher, to exclude from his office all bounty brokers and other persons not having proper business with the office, and to arrest them in ease of threats or refusal to obey orders; that the defendant had acted as provost marshal, under his said appointment, from the date thereof, having his office at Rutland, in the building belonging to the United States, and occupied as a United States court house and post office, under a cession of the state of Vermont, under an act entitled “An act ceding to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over a site for a court house and post office in the towns of Rutland and Windsor,” approved November ISth, 1856; that he occupied two rooms therein, one below for the examination of recruits, and one in the second story for the general business of the office, the communication between which was the staircase before mentioned, leading from the public room in the post office; that it was necessary for him frequently to pass up and down between the two rooms; that there were usually a good many people there having business with his office; that such was the case on the day of the transaction in •question; and that he was then engaged in correcting the enrolment and. receiving recruits. The defendant testified further, that, after the men above referred to had been examined and passed, and had gone up stairs to be sworn in, he overtook the plaintiff on the stairs, going up; that he asked the plaintiff if he had any business at the office, and he replied that he hadnot; that the defendant then told him the officewasverymuch crowded, and they were very busy, and he wanted him to go down stairs; that the plaintiff did not move to go, and the defendant said: ■“You are a substitute broker, and my orders are not to allow one in or about my office, and I want you to go down these stairs, and now;” that the plaintiff replied: “I am Hiram Walker, of Burlington;” to which the defendant replied: “I know who you are, and have known you before,” and then shoved the plaintiff down stairs, two or three stairs at a time, the plaintiff stopping and clinging to the railing; that the plaintiff then said: “If you will come out here, Capt. Crane, I will settle this with you;” that defendant asked him what he would do. and he replied that he would defend himself; that the defendant then arrested him, and, to his Inquiry what he was arrested for, replied, for threatening the defendant in the discharge of his official duties; and that the •defendant called on Levi Briggs, a .deputy sheriff, to take the plaintiff to jail, and, on the plaintiff’s inquiry by what authority, the defendant said, by virtue of the enrolment act and his instructions to arrest those who threatened him in the performance of his •duties. The defendant further testified, that he understood the above language of the plaintiff to convey a threat, and feared the plaintiff would assault him when he should afterwards be passing up and down in the course of his business. He further testified, and gave evidence tending to show, that the plaintiff had been pointed out to him as a bounty broker, and as the one who had come with the three men above named, and that, at the time of the assault, he supposed the plaintiff was a bounty broker. In this connection he offered to prove that there was a brother of the plaintiff who was a bounty broker, and that he supposed this to be the man. This offer was objected to by the plaintiff, and excluded by the court, to which the defendant excepted. The defendant, also, introduced the said Simonds as a witness, who testified, that,the plaintiff did, in fact, attempt to negotiate with the authorities of Rutland for furnishing the other men brought by Norton, to be applied on the quota of that town, and professed to have an interest in the disposition of the men. Said Simonds, also, denied that he told the plaintiff that he was the only man who could put in a recruit through that office, or offered to put the man in for $100, and testified, that he told the plaintiff he could go and put the man in himself, and he would be well received, but that the plaintiff declined to do so, and offered him $25 to do the business. He further testified, that he was appointed a United States recruiting agent in 1863, receiving a premium under the regulations of the war department, of September 29th, 1803, which premium was taken away in July, 1SG4, but that his appointment was not revoked until September, 1864, and that he continued, up to that time, to act as recruiting agent, and acted in connection with the provost marshal’s office, and was employed by the town of Rutland to assist in filling its quota. On cross-examination of Simonds, the plaintiff sought to prove by him, that he was himself, both before and after the 3d of August, 1864, largely engaged in business at that office, as a bounty and substitute broker, and engaged in procuring and furnishing recruits for towns and individuals, under contract, by which he received one sum for the recruit furnished, and paid the recruit a less sum; that he, in some instances, received from the towns the bounties voted by them for recruits, and then obtained the recruits as cheap as he could; that he made from $50 to $250 each, on the men he so furnished, by receiving as their bounties that amount more than he paid the recruits; that he had proposed to various persons, namely, to one William Walker, and one Artemas Powers, to go into partnership with them in the business of substitute and bounty brokers, at that office; that he had been in partnership with one Shute, of Boston, in the business of furnishing naval recruits at the defendant’s office, for which he received $1,000 each, and paid Shute $900; that he was, also, in the habit of receiving from towns and individuals liable to furnish recruits and substitutes, and bringing suitable men there to be enlisted for that purpose, from $25 to $100 per man for his services in getting them accepted and enlisted, and had received these fees in many instances, and received $50 from Norton for his services in getting accepted the other men brought by him on this occasion, who were enlisted; that, during all this time, he had free access to, and intimate communication with, the defendant’s office; that, in one or two instances, where parties bringing men had refused to pay him, their men had been rejected on the ground that enough of the bounty to be received was not to be paid to the recruit; and that it was known to the defendant that Simonds was so acting as a substitute and bounty broker, as aforesaid, and receiving premiums and compensations, as aforesaid, during the time he was so acting. To these inquiries, and to the offer to prove these facts, the defendant objected, but the inquiries were permitted by the court,- and the defendant excepted, and the answers and the testimony of the witness tended to prove the foregoing facts. But the witness denied, as did, also, the defendant, that the defendant received any share of the money so derived; and Simonds further stated, that the difference between himself and a bounty broker was, that his proceedings were approved by the department. The defendant, on his cross-examination, stated that he considered a bounty broker to be one who was engaged in obtaining and furnishing recruits at a. profit, and who was not vouched for to him; if vouched for, he should not regard him as a bounty broker; and if vouched for by Simonds, it would be sufficient. Gen. Pitcher, upon his cross-examination, testified, that, after the call for 500,000 men above referred to was made, the recruiting agents received nothing from the government; that he (Gen. Pitcher) never authorized them, after that, to receive anything from individuals or from towns; that, after the order of July 19th, 1804, they were forbidden to receive any such payments; that he knew nothing of Simonds, except that he was a recruiting agent; and that anything he did after the 19th of July, 1804, by which he received pay of towns or others, was a matter entirely between him and them.</p> <p>The plaintiff, in reply, introduced further evidence tending to corroborate his statement of the conversation that took place between him and the defendant on the stairway, at the time of the assault, and to contradict the statement of that conversation given by the defendant, and also denied, and gave evidence tending to disprove, the statement of Simonds, both as to the conversation between hint and the plaintiff, and as to the plaintiff’s taking any part in the disposition of the other men brought by Norton, and claiming to have any interest in, or connection with, them; and also denied, and gave evidence tending to disprove, the statement that he knew the defendant, or called him by name, at the time of the assault.</p> <p>The defendant claimed as the law of the case, and requested the court to instruct the jury (1) that the defendant was protected by the provisions of section 4 of the act of congress, approved March 3d, 1803. entitled “An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases” (12 Stat. 756), and that the court should direct a verdict for the defendant; (2) that, upon the evidence, and the law applicable to the case, the justification of the defendant was made out, and that the jury be instructed to return a verdict for the defendant; (3) that, if the jury should find that the defendant, in the making of the assault, and in the arrest and imprisonment, acted in good faith and without malice, and in the performance of the duties of his office, in obedience to superior orders, as then understood by him. and then publicly proclaimed, the jury should return a verdict for the defendant; (4) that if the jury should find | as in point 3, the plaintiff could not recover on the first count of his declaration; (5) that, if the jury should find that the defendant had good reason to believe, from the conduct of the plaintiff, and from the information which had been communicated to the defendant, that the plaintiff was a bounty broker, and that the defendant did so believe, the defendant, under his orders, was not liable to the plaintiff, in this action, for treating him as a bounty broker and excluding him from the approaches to the defendant’s office; (6) that it was not necessary to the defendant’s justification of the assault upon the stairs, that he should have announced to the plaintiff who he was, or his authority for ejecting the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s counsel having remarked to the jury, in the opening, that the case was one of great public importance, involving the vindication of the private rights and liberty of the citizens against arbitrary military power, in comparison with which the plaintiff’s individual injury became insignificant, and that, in the assessment of damages, this consideration should be attended to, and contribute to enhance them, the defendant further requested the court to instruct the jury, that this consideration was not an element which they should regard -as going to increase the damages.</p>

This was a bill in equity by John J. Walker, executor, and others, legatees of A. F. Hopkins, late of Mobile, Alabama, deceased, against William M. Derby, S. H. Kerfoot, Isaac F. Pierson, and other grantees, to set aside a conveyance made by the complainant Walker to the defendant Derby in March, 1867, of 32 acres of land, near the southern limits of the city of Chicago.

In the matter of the interference between William H. Walker, applicant for a patent, and Elias Forbes, patentee, for improvements in the capstans to drain ploughs.

Case [by Nathaniel Walker] to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while employed upon one of defendant’s trains, by a collision caused by the defendant’s negligence. The ease was tried upon the general issue, and the plaintiff had a verdict in his favor, whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial because the verdict was against law and evidence.

This was an action, founded on the 5th section of the act of August 29, 1842 (5 Stat. 544), to recover a penalty for marking an unpatented article with a mark indicating that it was patented, for the purpose of deceiving the public. The defendant [Jotham W. Hawxhurst] had a verdict, and the plaintiff [Sylvanus Walker] now moved for a new trial.

Assumpsit [by Joseph Walker against Joseph Johnson] on a promissory note, given in consideration of the assignment of the time of an apprentice. contended that the assignment, being unlawful, was not a sufficient consideration to support the action upon the note. contended, that although the assignment was void, yet the defendant had enjoyed the services of the apprentice, and was bound in conscience to pay the note.

Amended declaration, filed in vacation, more than twenty days before the first day of the term, and notice given to defendant’s counsel, but no rule taken on the rule docket, and when defendant's counsel, a few days before commencement of the term, called at the clerk’s office to examine the declaration, it was not in the office, having been taken out by the plaintiff’s counsel; it was returned to the office before the first day of the term, of which, however, the…

Bill in equity filed by the assignee of the State Insurance Company of Missouri, a for•eign insolvent corporation, against its Pennsylvania general agents, setting forth an ac.count stated by them, and praying that they •should be decreed to pay the balance due thereon; or, if they denied the correctness •of their account stated, make discovery and account. [A demurrer to the bill was heretofore overruled.

<p>Case Wo. 17,078.</p> <p>Mexican Land Grants — Ai.caddb Grants — Tide Lands.</p> <p>1. The alcaldes of San B'raneisco had no power to grant lands below low-water mark, covered by the navigable waters of the bay.</p> <p>2. The term “tide lands,” as used in the act of May 14, 1801, means lands covered and uncovered by the tides, and does not. include lands lying below low-tide mark, and permanently covered by the navigable waters of the bay or ocean.</p> <p>[Cited in Andrus v. Knott, 12 Or. 501, 8 Pac. 763.]</p> <p>3.The act of May 14, 1801, does not confirm the grants made by T. M. Leavenworth; alcalde, of lands lying in the Bay of San Francisco, below low-water mark, and permanently covered by the navigable waters of the bay.</p> <p>[The above judgment was affirmed by tbe supreme court, where tlio cause was carried by writ of error. 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 650.]</p>

Action by James M. Walker and others against the Mississippi Valley & Western Railway Company and others.

Ejectment for lots 1, 2, and '3, in block 2, Kittle Kock. The defendants are the general •owners of the property. The plaintiff claims under the tax deed hereinafter mentioned, made to him by the county clerk under authority conferred upon this officer by the laws of the state. Acts 1869. § 144.

This was a bill in chancery, filed by Walker, to compel the defendants who, together with E. K. Le Bar, deceased, were the trustees of the Chicago Land Company, to issue to him a certificate for one hundred and sixty-six shares of stock in said company, which the defendants claimed had been forfeited to the other stockholders for non-payment of assessment.

[This is a bill in equity by Joseph H. Walker against Daniel G. Rawson and others to restrain an infringement of certain letters patent granted to complainant.]

[This was a suit in equity by Joseph H. Walker and others against W. B. Reid and others to enjoin the alleged infringement of a trade-mark.]

[This was a bill by William R. Walker, as-signee in bankruptcy of Morris H. Fitzgibbon, to restrain the defendants, Seigel & Bobb, from prosecuting a suit in a state court.]

In equity. This bill was brought [by John .M. Walker] to obtain an injunction to prevent the issuing of certain script to Jonathan B. H. Smith, the defendant, by the land office, and to have cancelled the assignment under which Smith had been adjudged by the officers of the government entitled to the script.

The plaintiffs, merchants in London, haying been applied to by a Mr. Brown of Philadelphia, for a parcel of goods, and doubting his solidity, were introduced by the mutual friend of the plaintiff and defendant, to the defendant [Robert Smith]; and on this introduction, they sent the goods to him, and in a letter, stating their apprehensions of Brown, requested him to receive the goods, but not to deliver them to Brown, without payment for the amount being received, or such…

Rule for a new trial; the jury having found, ■contrary to the charge of the court, which laid down, as the rule for estimating the damages. the loss which the plaintiff had sustained, by the misconduct of the defendant, in violating his orders. [See Case No. 17,086.] The jury have given only the principal sum due, without interest; have allowed the defendant his commissions, though he claimed none; and have rated the exchange at par, when it was higher.

Plaintiff [A. W. Walker] owns a distillery on the corner of Harm el and St. Peter streets, in New Orleans. Defendant [S. A. Stoekdale], who is an internal revenue collector of the United States, seized upon the distillery and implements and advertised them for sale for the payment of the government tax. An injunction was issued on the 26th of October, 1869, from the Sixth district court, restraining defendant from selling the property.

This is an action brought to recover $3,500, as the balance due by defendant upon a subscription by him to the capital stock of the North Missouri Insurance Company, of which the plaintiff is the assignee in bankruptcy.

The bill states that the defendant Wanton, being indebted to the plaintiffs, agreed to assign to the plaintiff Walker, in trust for himself and the other plaintiffs, so much of his merchandise, as the plaintiff Walker should judge sufficient to satisfy the several claims of the plaintiffs. That it was understood, at the time, that the goods were to be charged to the plaintiffs at the invoice price, with costs and charges thereon.

<p>Case No. 17,091.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies.</p> <p>1. Where supplies were furnished, in the port of New York, to a vessel which hailed from a British port, carried the British flag, and was intending to proceed to a foreign port to be sold as a British vessel, the supplies being furnished on the order of the owner, but on the credit of the vessel, and being charged to her; Held, that her owner could not be permitted to claim that she was a domestic vessel, even though it had been proved that her owner resided in New York.</p> <p>[Cited in The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 386.]</p> <p>2. The vessel was liable for the supplies.</p> <p>[Cited in The George T. Kemp, Case No. 5,-341; The Alice Tainter, Id. 195; The Rapid Transit, 11 Fed. 330; The Scotia, 35 Fed. 909.]</p> <p>[The case was taken to the circuit court on appeal, where the decree of this court was affirmed. Case No. 17,092.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from tlie district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Libel in admiralty in a cause of wages. Petition for an interlocutory order of sale.</p>

This was a petition by certain of the creditors of a voluntary bankrupt [John B. Wallace] for an injunction to restrain other creditors from selling the property of the bankrupt on execution.

Assumpsit. The principal - circumstances were as follows: The defendants [Thomas Agry and others], who are citizens of Maine, were owners of the brig Diana, of which William Heddean was master. She arrived at Havana in the Island of Cuba, and was consigned to the plaintiff [William B. Wallace], a citizen of Connecticut, but a resident merchant at Havana, by the master, to procure freight on a freighting voyage.

<p>Case No. 17,095.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Partnerships.</p> <p>Where there have been distinct firms of A & B and A & C, the three persons cannot be joined in one proceeding in bankruptcy, though the latter firm may have undertaken to pay the debts of the former.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Jewett, Case No. 7,306.]</p>

This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note, the plaintiff [William Wallace] being called a citizen of New Hampshire, and the defendant [William E. Clark] a citizen of Massachusetts, and this court, therefore, having on the face of the record, jurisdiction of the ease. No pleas had been filed on the 5th ■of November, the term having commenced on the 15th of October.

This cause was again tried by the jury at this term. In addition to the testimony formerly in the case [Case No. 17.090], there was evidence, that in Boston and elsewhere in America, the usage and understanding among merchants was, that upon foreign bills of exchange payable after sight, the holder was under no obligation to present them for acceptance at any particular time. He was at liberty to consult his own discretion.

2 [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. [Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 49,984], for an “improvement in lamps.” granted to Michael H. Collins, September 19, 1865, and assigned to complainants. [The facts of the case and the claims of the patent are set forth in the opinion, and will be understood by reference to the accompanying drawing, in which A represents the lamp, B the wick-tube, E the chimney, D the chimney-rest and F the cone or deflector, provided around…

<p>Case No. 17,099.</p> <p>Deed bt Town Trustees — Evidence or Authority — Acknowledgment.</p> <p>1. Where a deed purports to have been executed by the trustees of a tow», there must be evidence that the persons who signed it were trustees, and that they had power to make the conveyance.</p> <p>2. An acknowledgment of a deed before a clerk of the court, in Kentucky, is not good without evidence that the person taking the acknowledgment was clerk.</p>

<p>[This was a libel by John Wallace against B. A. Munford and others to recover wages.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by the Wallamet Falls Canal & Lock Company against Jonathan Kit-tredge 'to recover damages. ' Heard on demurrer to defendant’s plea. See Case No. 17,100.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,103.</p> <p>Equitt Pleading — Amendments.</p> <p>A material amendment of a bill, after answer, must be on payment of all costs, including the solicitor’s fee.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,105.</p> <p>Dissolution op Corporation — Suspension op Business — Dissolution—Winding up.</p> <p>1. The corporation act of Oregon, § 16 (Laws Or. p. 528), declares that if any corporation shall neglect and cease to carry on its business for any period of six months, its corporate powers shall cease. Held, that such neglect did not terminate the existence of the corporation as by lapse of time, but that it was a cause of forfeiture of the corporate privileges of which no one but the state could complain or take advantage.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Brooklyn El. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 441, 26 N. E. 475.]</p> <p>2. The corporation act aforesaid (section 19) provides that a majority of the stockholders may authorize the dissolution of a corporation. Held, that a vote of the stockholders, authorizing a dissolution, did not. of itself dissolve the corporation, nor compel the directors to do so, and that the act of dissolution must proceed from the directors, who alone can exercise the corporate powers.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Wells v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 15 Fed. 565. Cited in Powell v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 38 Fed. 189.]</p> <p>[Cited in Strong v. McCagg, 55 Wis. 629, 13 N. W. 898.]</p> <p>3. Section 19 of the corporation act of Oregon (Laws Or. p. 538) empowers the majority of the stockholders to authorize the dissolution of the corporation “and the settling of its business and disposition of its property and dividing of its capital stock in any manner it may see proper.” Held: (1) That the authority to the directors to dissolve the corporation carried with it the incidental power to collect and distribute its assets and wind up its affairs: and (2) that a vote of the directors declaring the corporation dissolved only operates to prevent it from engaging in new business, but the corporation continues to exist, notwithstanding the declaration of dissolution, for the purpose of collecting and distributing its assets and winding up its affairs.</p> <p>[Subsequently the plaintiff demurred to an amended plea, which demurrer was sustained. See Case No. 17,104.]</p>

<p>In admiralty'.</p>

Action of debt on a prison bounds bon.d [brought by Abraham B. Waller, to the use of John F. Webb, for the use of Tounley Mun-roe and Tounley Munroe, Jr., against James Adams].

<p>Libel for freight on coal. Plea to the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

The plaintiff, George W. Wallis, filed his bill against the defendants, stating, that in a suit brought by the same plaintiff against the representatives of Samuel Adams, deceased, this court, in December, 1825, decreed, that unless the defendants, on or before the 15th day of January, 1S2G, paid $S017.2G, with interest, to the plaintiff, the marshal should proceed to sell on a credit of twelve months, or such farther time as the plaintiff’s counsel should direct, a tract of…

[This was an appeal by John O. Walsh from a decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant nim a patent for an improved gas humor.]

<p>Case No. 17,113.</p> <p>Libei, j.n Rem — Agency of Mate.</p> <p>1. The owners of a freighting vessel are not liable for the loss of iloating stages which were towed by the vessel under an agreement by tlie mate that he would take care of them.</p> <p>2. Such an agreement is beyond the scope of the employment of the mate, and even of the master. If the owners are not liable, the vessel itself is not liable.</p>

[This was a libel by A. Al. Walsh against the steamboat H. AI. Wright to recover the value of certain property stolen from her while a passenger on the steamboat.]

This was a writ of error, brought to reverse a judgment rendered in the district court for Massachusetts in September, 1846.

<p>Case No. 17,118.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Validity of Composition — Purchase of Claims by Relative— Practice — References.</p> <p>1. A purchase by the brother of a bankrupt and the transfer to him of a large part of the claims against the bankrupt, and the satisfaction at a large discount of other claims by the bankrupt himself for the purpose of assuring the acceptance of a composition proposed by tho bankrupt, constitute no reason why the composition should not be confirmed by the court, when it was made to appear that excluding the brother and the claims held by him more than two-tliirds in number, and a majority in value of the creditors had assented thereto, and that the evidence of these transactions of the bankrupt and his brother was open and accessible to the assenting creditors.</p> <p>2. A court of bankruptcy has all the powers of a court of chancery, and proceeds summarily untrammeled by the ordinary rules of procedure. A court of chancery may refer a matter for inquiry as to the facts at any stage of the cause, even on final hearing; therefore:</p> <p>3. After a motion to confirm a compromise had been brought on for final hearing before the bankrupt court, the judge had the power to refer the ma'tter back to the register to report all the facts of the case touching the proposed compromise.</p> <p>4. The presence and vote of a creditor who is not lawfully to be accounted such, in favor of a composition, should not nullify the proceedings unless the absence of his vote would change the result.</p>

[This was a libel by James Walter againsl the steamship Kamchatker (George Schuyler, claimant) to recover wages.] The libellant entered into a contract with the proprietors of the steamship Kamchatker to work on board her, in putting in and completing her machinery, at the rate of $15 per month, or 00/ioo per day, with the condition that after her completion, if he should engage to go in her on her voyage to Russia as fireman, and should sign the regular shipping agreement…

<p>Case lío. 17,120.</p> <p>Salvage — Compensation' — Florida Coast — Admiralty Jurisdiction — Survey and Condemnation.</p> <p>[1. Salvage services rendered by professional wreckers, who constantly maintain outfits suit-for the purpose, in places (suc-li as the Florida coast) where the interests of commerce require it. are to be more liberally rewarded than like services would be if rendered in other places, and by persons and vessels pursuing other avocations.]</p> <p>[2. One-fourth, being $10.178. allowed to professional wreckers for getting a ship and cargo of cotton off the Florida reef, by transferring cargo to their vessels; the ship being considerably damaged and in some danger, the services lasting about 10 hours, and being without danger or risk to the salvors.] j</p> <p>[3. Admiralty courts have jurisdiction to or- j der a survey and decree a condemnation and ! sale of the ship: but. before doing so, the judge I should be satisfied that the application is made ! in perfect good faith towards all parties inter- i ested. and that the vessel is so damaged that no prudent man would think of repairing her.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,122.</p> <p>Sale — Stoppage in Transitu — Indorsement op Bill op Lading — Factors—Authoritt to Bind Principal.</p> <p>1. A summary of the law relative to stoppage in transitu.</p> <p>[Cited in Rulil v. Corner, 63 Md. 185.]</p> <p>2. The endorsement and delivery of a bill of lading, or the delivery of the bill without endorsement, if the cargo is. by the terms of it, to he delivered to a particular person, amounts to a transfer of the property, subject to the right of the vendor, if the consideration be not paid, to reclaim the property before it shall pet into the actual possession of the vendee.</p> <p>[Cited in Wiener v. The Rafael Arroya, Case Nu. 17,021; The Thames, 14 Wall. (81 Ü. S.) 100.]</p> <p>3. If a factor sell, bona fide, the poods of his principal for a valuable consideration, by assigning over the bill of lading, the sale is valid against the principal. Hut such a sale is not valid, unless the bill of lading for the goods has been received by the factor.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Davenport Nat. Bank v. Homeyer, 45 Mo. 147. Cited in First Nat. Bank v. Northern R. R., 58 N. H. 204. Cited in brief in Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. St. 338.]</p> <p>4. The principal may follow the money in the hands of the purchaser, and if not paid to the factor, he may recover it.</p> <p>5. Goods sold, bona fide, while at sea, by assignment of the bill of lading, the right of the principal to stop in transitu ceases.</p> <p>6. A factor has no property or interest in the goods beyond his commissions, and cannot control the right of the principal over them.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,123.</p> <p>Shipping — Fastening Vessels in Slip — Lahge Vessel Ckcshing Small One.</p> <p>[A large vessel which places herself outside a small one. in a slip, has no right to remain there, or to refuse to let the small one out, when the weather becomes such as to cause danger of crushing the latter, there being plenty of room for a safe berth further along the pier. Nor can the large vessel excuse herself on the ground that, in order to slack her lines to let the small one out, it would be necessary to run a line across the slip temporarily, which is forbidden by ordinance; for the spirit of the ordinance would not be violated in such an emergency.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,124.</p> <p>Collision — Measure op Damages — Costs—Offers of Settlement — Pleading.</p> <p>1. The owner of a yacht kept for his own use may recover, in a collision cause, as damages for the loss of her use while repairing, the price at which he could readily have let her for pleasure parties.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lagonda, 44 Ped. 368.]</p> <p>2. When each party to a collision cause had made an offer of a settlement, costs were decreed to the libellant though he recovered much less than he had demanded, which was more than lie was offered.</p> <p>3. It seems, that if a tender or offer of payment is relied on to bar costs in a collision cause, it should be set up in the pleadings, and should be a continuing offer.</p> <p>[Cited in The Rossend Castle, 30 Fed. 464.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel for salvage by William H. Bethel and others against the cargo and materials of the bark Waltham.]</p>

The register certified that on the 16th day of December. 1S73, a deposition, entitled “In the matter of Alphonse AValther, a Bankrupt,” .was offered to prove a debt alleged to be owing by Alphonse AValther, one of the above-named bankrupts, to William Resor & Co., of Cincinnati, Ohio. There being no such cause pending before him as that in which the deposition offered was entitled, he declined to accept it as satisfactory.

Application to be naturalized. Affidavit that “he has resided within the United States upwards of six years, that during that period he was absent a short time upon business, but left his family in the United States.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. For a prior proceeding in this suit, see Case No. 17,128.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. For prior proceedings, see Cases Nos. 17,128 aud 17,12!!.] Objections by the assignee, Joseph Bachman, to the proof of debts by Allen & Lewis and Henry Failing. The objections being similar and depending upon the same facts they were heard together. M?. Register HILL, to whom the matter was referred, found the following conclusions of fact and law: 1.

The property of the bankrupts [Fred B. Walton and others] consisted of the stock and fixtures of a drug store in a building rented from J. E. Barrow, trustee, &c. This stock had been conveyed by the bankrupts, and their conveyance had been declared fraudulent, and the grantee enjoined from interfering with the property in any way.

<p>Case No. 17,132.</p> <p>Evidence — Proof or Ancient Documents — Specific Performance— Mutuality of Conthact — Limitations — Thusts — Equity — Decrees against Infants.</p> <p>1. An instrument of writing more than forty years old, is not required to be proved with the same strictness as one of modern date, unless there are facts and circumstances proved, which create doubts as to its genuineness. But if these facts and circumstances are explained and refuted by the evidence, then the instrument must be considered as coming under the rule which does not require strict proof of its execution.</p> <p>2. The relation of vendor and vendee must exist, or the court cannot decree a specific execution of the contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Fogg v. I’ricc, 145 Mass. 51G, 14 N. E. 743.]</p> <p>3. "Where the obligor has an election, the election may be shown by circumstances.</p> <p>4. Mutuality is essential to the validity of a contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Tufts v. Tufts, Case No. 14,233.]</p> <p>5. The statute of limitations does not operate in cases of trust.</p> <p>6. The rule that chancery will not decree where doubt exists, refers to the intention of the parties from the face of the contract, and not where some doubt may exist as to a certain fact in the cause, however important it may be.</p> <p>7. Where the relation of trustee and cestui que trust exists on the death of the trustee nothing but the mere legal estate goes to his heirs.</p> <p>8. A claim to land is not barred by lapse of time, where the right has been asserted at various times and on different occasions, and possession has been taken of a part of the land.</p> <p>[Cited in Tufts v. Tufts, Case No. 14.233.]</p> <p>9.A court of chancery will not decree against infants without full proof, though their guardian ad litem confess the ground of action.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Le Bourgeoise v. McNamara, 82 Mo. 190; Ralston v. Lahee, 8 Iowa, 26.]</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction, founded upon a bill and an affidavit of the plaintiff [Henry Walton]. It was opposed upon an affidavit of the-defendant [Robert Crowley], without any answer.

<p>Case No. 17,134.</p> <p>JuiusmcTioN or Pedeual Courts — Suits between Aliens.</p> <p>[Nowhere more fully reported; opinion not now accessible.]</p> <p>[NOTE. — See, also, Fields v. Taylor, Case No. 4.777. In Mason v. The Blnireau, Id. 9,-23U, Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal courts have jurisdiction of actions between aliens where no objection is raised; and in Montalet v. Murray, 4 Oranch (8 U. S.) 46, that, when both parties to an action are aliens, the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction. In the absence of treaty stipulations, which should be faithfully observed (The El-wine Kreplin, Case No. 4,426, reversing Id. 4,-427; Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. [81 U. S.] 152), Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the supreme court, said in The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. S60: "Circumstances often exist which render it inexpedient for the court to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners in eases not arising in the country of the forum; as, where they arc governed by the laws of the country 1o which the parties belong, and there is no difficulty in a resort to its courts, or where they have agreed to resort to no other tribunals. The eases of foreign seamen suing for wages or because of -ill treatment are often in this category: and the consent of their consul or minister is frequently required before the court will proceed to entertain jurisdiction, — not on the ground that it has not jurisdiction, but that, from motives of convenience or international comity, it will use its discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or not; and where the voyage is ended, or the seamen have been dismissed or treated with great cruelty, it will entertain jurisdiction even against the protest of the consul. * * * In other cases, also, where the subjects of a particular nation invoke the aid of our tribunals to adjudicate between them and their fellow-subjects as to matters of contract or tort solely affecting themselves, and determinable by their own laws, such tribunals will exercise their discretion whether to take cognizance of such matters or not.” It was also held that, where controversies are communis juris, — that is. where they arise under the common law of nations, — special grounds should appear to induce the court to deny its aid to a foreign suitor when it has jurisdiction of the ship or party charged. 114 U. S. 355. 5 Sup. Ot. 860. In Hinckley v. Byrne. Case No. 6,510, it was held that, where both plaintiff and defendant are aliens, the judicial power of the United States does not extend to the case, on account of the parties thereto; citing Massman v. Hig-ginson. 4 Dali. (4 U. S.) 12: Piquignot v. Pennsylvania By. Go., 16 How. (57 U: S.) 104. This decision seems to have been based upon the decision in Jackson v. Twentyman, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 13(5, ‘‘that, by Hie constitution, the judicial power was not extended to private suits in whieh an alien is a party, unless a citizen be the adverse party.” See Const. U. S. art. 3, § 2; 1 Stat. 78, § 11; liev. St. 629.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,135.</p> <p>Seamen's Wages — Death Abuoao — Sickness Resulting fiion Seaman’s Fault.</p> <p>1. The seamen shipped for the whole voyage of the Neptune, and died before her return to Philadelphia. Their administrators claimed wages until the return of the ship, whieh were allowed by the court.</p> <p>[Cited in note to Scott v. Greenwich, Case No. 12,531.]</p> <p>2. In the shipping articles used in the United States, though wages are designated by the month, yet the contract is entire for the voyage.</p> <p>3. Freight is always the rule of wages.</p> <p>4. Hiring a seaman in place of the one dead has no influence on the general principle.</p> <p>5. Capture interrupt, or wreck destroy, the voyage.</p> <p>6. What is meant by full wages.</p> <p>7. If sickness arose from the fault or vice of the mariner, no wages would be allowed.</p> <p>[Cited in Writer v. The Richmond, Case No. 18,101; The Bon Flint, Id. 1.299; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 395.]</p> <p>8. Full wages allowed at common law although the disability be by accident.</p> <p>[9. Cited in U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Case No. 15,867, to the point that the laws of Oleron are yet in force, except as to some of their harsh punishments for crimes and offenses, which are out of use.]</p> <p>[10. By act of congress, the ship is bound to furnish medicines or pay the physician’s hill; but the sailor, when the ship is properly furnished, must pay for surgical or medical advice and assistance. If left or put on shore, his reasonable board wages must be paid by the ship.J</p> <p>[Cited in Harden v. Gordin. Case No. 6,047; Freeman v. Baker, Id. 5,084; Holmes v. Hutchinson, Id. 0,639; The Forest, Id. 4,930; Richardson v. The Juillette, Id. 11,-784; The Ben Flint, Id. 1,299.]</p>

In equity. Rule to show cause why injunction should not issue, returnable on the 25th. Counsel for complainant [James J. Walworth] contend that such is not a rule to show cause on or before the day set: that the rule day ought not to be anticipated.

<p>Case No. 17,137.</p> <p>Practice — Decree at Sami: Teu.m of Default Entered.</p> <p>It is not competent for the court to enter a final decree in ease of default and decree pro confesso during the term when the default was taken; but it seems that where the default or decree pro confesso is taken in open court, under any special order made by the court and after the intervention of a rule day, an absolute decree may be taken at the same term of court.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,138.</p> <p>Collision off Barnegat — Pilot Boat at Anchor —Lights—Anchor Watch.</p> <p>1. A pilot boat, at anchor, is not required to show a white light at her masthead, and a fiare-up light every fifteen minutes, as required by the 8th article of the rules for preventing collisions (13 Stat. 5S), but must show the white light in a globular lantern, provided for by the 7th article.</p> <p>2. A pilot boat was at anchor off Barnegat, showing a proper light, but having no wateli on deck. She was run into by a schooner which was running in. under shortened sail, to anchor, the wind being so violent that the schooner was unable to keep her own side lights burning. Hchl, that the schooner was in fault in n®t keeping a vigilant lookout, and that the absence of an anchor watch on the pilot boat, under the circumstances, was not a fault contributing to the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lady Franklin, Case No. 7,-984.]</p> <p>[Affirmed by the circuit court, on appeal. Case unreported. Decree of circuit court affirmed by supreme court. 95 U. S. 600.]</p>

This was a libel of information, by the district attorney, in behalf of the United States, claiming a forfeiture under the second section… Held: sold, or otherwise disposed of as slaves or to be held to service or labor; and if any ship or vessel shall be so built, fitted out, equipped, laden, or otherwise prepared, for the purpose aforesaid, every such ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, and lading shall be forfeited.” made the following points: 1st. That the…

<p>Case No. 17,140.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Captured Coin —Property op Neuthal Master.</p> <p>1. Coin taken in a vessel which was captured in the act of breaking blockade, is liable to condemnation, though belonging to a neutral, and not intended to be used in trade.</p> <p>2. Nor will such coin be exempted from this rule by being the property of the neutral master; at least, if his conduct as master and as a •witness is open to just animadversion.</p> <p>3. An amount of money sufficient for the master's necessary expenses, while detained here, will be allowed him out of such coin.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,141.</p> <p>IXTEitNAL R.EVEXUE— WllOI.ESALE DEALERS.</p> <p>In the section of the act of April 10, 1869 [16 Stat. 41], defining what constitutes a wholesale dealer, the words "five gallons’’ refer to "wine” gallons, and not to "proof" gallons.</p>

This was an action against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties and a penalty. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff [Edward Warburg], subject to the opinion of the court on a case.

In bankruptcy. On petition to charge Mrs. Margaret Holst as a partner in the firm of J. O. Ward & Co. and to adjudicate her a bankrupt. She claims that the facts only show that she lent her money on a contract to receive one-fourth of the profits as interest on the loan. The creditors insist that she was a partner in fact, and certainly so as to creditors.

<p>[This was a suit by Warburton and King against Aken and Little. Heard on a motion for continuance.]</p>

On the petition of James McDonnell, Charles P. Burrell and Henry Gallagher, comprising ¡ the firm of McDonnell. Burrell & Co., attaching creditors, for the allowance of the costs and expenses of their attachment proceedings.

This was a bill in equity to enforce the trusts of the will of Mrs. Sarah W. Sullivan. The bill was filed by [Olivia B. Ward and others] three married daughters, and one unmarried daughter, of the testatrix, (the former suing by their next friends, their husbands being also complainants,) the two surviving sons of the testatrix, (one son.

<p>Case No. 17,147.</p> <p>Collision — Steamek Entering Harbor at Night —Excessive Speeii.</p> <p>1. A steamer, in entering the harbor of Chicago in the night, at a speed of three and a half to four miles an hour, while another steamer was in the act of turning, just above a bend in the river, came in collision with the latter, at that moment lying across the river. The former was in fault, and was liable for the damages done. The river was full of craft, and the «peed of the steamer was too great under the circumstances.</p> <p>[Cited in The Blaokstone. Case No. 1.473; The Free State. Id. 5.090; The Nacoochee, 2S Fed. 467.]_</p> <p>2. If a steamer, owing to any cause, cannot sec its way clear before it, in entering a harbor in the night, it is its duty to stop.</p> <p>[Cited in Illinois River Packet Co. v. Peoria Bridge Ass'n, 38 Ill. 476.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,148.</p> <p>Jurisdiction or Federal Courts — Diverse Cit-izexshif — Nominal Parties — Removal of Causes — Appearance.</p> <p>1. The circuit courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction, where it arises from the citizenship or alienage of parties, by the joining of a mere nominal party, who does not possess the requisite character. But where, in equity, a decree against such party is essential to the relief sought, he is not a mere nominal party.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Riñes, Case No. 13.100: Heriot v. Davis, Id. 6.404; Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 16 How. (57 Ü. S.) 340: Adams v. Douglas Co., Case No. 52; Fields v. Uamb, Id. 4.775: Hatch v. Chicago, R. I. & P R. Co., Id. 6,204; Sands y. Smith, Id. 12,305: Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Florence Sewing-Mach Co., IS Wall. (85 U. S.) 580. 5S0; Brigham v. Eudd'ngton, Case No. 1,874.]</p> <p>2. Where there are several defendants entitled on appearance, to remove a cause from the state court into a circuit court, some of whom have appeared and others not, those who have appeared cannot alone remove the cause. But this rule is confined to cases, where from the subject matter of the suit, the judgment or decree must he joint.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Riñes, Case No. 13.100; Nesmith v. Calvert. Id. 10.123: Field v. Downsdale. Id. 4.769: Gard v. Durant, Id. 5,216; Sands v. Smith, Id. 12.305; Florence Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co.. Id. 4,883; Smith v. McICay, 4 Fed. 354; Prid v. Sebley, 7 Fed. 137.J</p> <p>[Cited in Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 192. Cited in brief in Cooke v. State Nat. Bank of Boston, 52 N. Y. 112. Cited in Gordon v. Green. 113 Mass. 261; Hadley v. Dunlap. 10 Ohio St. 5.]</p> <p>3. Defendants can remove the cause or appear in the circuit court at different times, where their appearance is entered at different times in the state court.</p> <p>4. Where some of the defendants have removed the cause regularly into a circuit court, the others cannot enter an original appearance in such court.</p> <p>5. The circuit cotirt can remand the cause in case the defendants do not all eventually appear.</p> <p>[Cited in Field v. Downsdale. Case No. 4,769; Pond v. Sebley, 7 Fed. 137.]</p> <p>6. A state court cannot cause an appearance to be entered nunc pro tunc, so as to entertain a motion for removal.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United Stares for the Southern district of Ohio. [This was a libel filed in the district court by Bben B. Ward and others, owners of the steamboat Atlantic, against the propeller Og-densburgh. and also in personam against her owners, Philo Chamberlain and others. The cause was heard in the district court upon the merits, and at the same time upon an exception to the libel for misjoinder of a suit in rem and a suit in personam.

<p>Case No. 17,149.</p> <p>Towage Lien.</p> <p>[Towage services constitute a lien upon the vessel.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Williams, Case No. 17,710.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,152.</p> <p>Admiralty Decrees — Mode of Execution — Levy ox Chattels — Execution against Land— Couiit Rules — Bill fob Discovery.</p> <p>1. Decrees in the admiralty can only be enforced in the courts of the United States, in the mode and by the process properly ordained by acts of congress and rules of court for their execution.</p> <p>2. The character and effect of such decrees in admiralty, and their inodes of execution, are within the province of congress to determine.</p> <p>3. Under the existing acts of congress and rules of court, the libellant in admiralty may have an attachment or a capias against the person of the defendant, or a fieri facias against his goods and chattels: and these are the only writs and the only mode prescribed, whereby an admiralty decree can be lawfully executed in the circuit and district courts.</p> <p>4. The court of admiralty has no power to issue an execution against the lands of a defendant, to collect the amount due on a decree in admiralty, for the payment of money.</p> <p>5. The supreme court of the United States has power to regulate the practice of the courts of admiralty, and to frame rules in relation to executions and other process to be used therein.</p> <p>6. An admiralty decree is not a lien on land, and has never been treated as a lien on land in either England or this country.</p> <p>7. A court of equity will grant a discovery and general relief in a case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy cannot be had at law; hence, when an execution had been issued, and no property found on which to levy, a judgment creditor may file his bill for relief, and is entitled to the aid of the court, to discover and apply the debtor's property to the payment of the judgment.</p> <p>[The ease was afterwards taken to the supreme court, upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges. See 2 Black (67 U. S.) 430.]</p>

[This was a libel by Samuel Ward, Eben B. Ward, and Thomas G. Butliu against the schooner M. Dousman to recover damages for injuries sustained by a collision.]

[This was a libel by E. B. Ward and S. Ward, owners of the steamboat Pacific, against the brig Fashion to recover damages sustained by a collision.] 1. In the case of the Woodrop Sims [2 Dod. 82], cited in Abb.

In admiralty. The opinion of the judge in deciding this case upon the merits, is fully reported [in Case No. 17,154]. After this suit had been commenced in this court, the owners of the brig Fashion filed their libel in the district court of the United States, for the district of Ohio, against the steamboat Pacific. The steamer was seized, bonded, and the Wards as claimants appeared in the Ohio district court, and filed their answer.

This was an action of trespass and ejectment to recover possession of a tract of land situated in the southerly part of the city of Providence. Special pleas were filed’ by the corporation defendants, setting up title in themselves. To each of these pleas the plaintiffs [Andrew H. Ward and wife and others] filed a replication traversing the matters of fact set forth in the pleas, and tendering an issue to the country.

3 [This was a libel for collision, brought by the owners of the steamboat Atlantic, a large, first class passenger steamboat, running between Buffalo and Detroit, against the propeller Ogdensburgh, a freight boat running from Cleveland through the Welland Canal to Og-denslrargh, and against the owners of the boat; the libel being in personam and in rem.

The plaintiff having filed a bill of discovery on the equity side of the court, in relation to a •certain lot of ground, foi the recovery of which an ejectment is now depending in this court, at the suit of the lessee of Seabring; the solicitor of the plaintiff in equity moved the court for an order, that service of the subpoena on the attorney of the plaintiff at law, should be considered as good service.

This was a libel in personam, promoted by Eber B. Ward, as survivor of himself and Samuel Ward, deceased.

Seabry brought an ejectment in this court against Ward, and is also plaintiff in an injunction bill to stay waste. The counsel for Ward, after stating that a bill of discovery was intended to be filed in ‘reference to the land in controversy, moved that service of the subpoena upon the solicitor of Seabry, who resides in the state of New York, should be deemed sufficient.

This case is submitted to the court for final decree, on the bill and amended bill, the answers, replication, and evidence. The allegations of the plaintiff’s bill, about which there is really no dispute, are that, on or about the 16th day of July, 1868, he and Cyrus O. God-frey entered into a contract, in writing, with the Union Pacific Railroad Company, concerning the mining of coal in the lands of that company.

<p>Case No. 17,165.</p> <p>Salvage — Derelict — Abandonment — Who mat Abandon — Compensation—Deviation.</p> <p>[1. The cases of dereliction, in which the doctrine that things abandoned become the property of the first occupant is founded, generally run on the principle of a voluntary abandonment by the owner with his free consent, and not on such a relinquishment as force, necessity, or danger compel.]</p> <p>[2. The owner alone can make such an abandonment. The master cannot do so, even by an express consent to give the goods to the sal-vors.]</p> <p>[3. The promises of the master in respect to the quantum of salvage arc not to be regarded, when made in time of distress, but the reward must be measured according to circumstances.] [4. Ships forsaken through fear of enemies or loss of life are not legally derelict, so as to warrant full right by occupancy.]</p> <p>[5. Delays for saving ships, goods, or mariners. producing uncommon risks, are deviations which are not excused, under policies of insurance as generally made, and the increased risk incurred by the owner is to be considered in determining the question of salvage.]</p> <p>[0. The principle of salvage compensation is not confined to mere quantum meruit, as to the persons saving, but is expanded so as to comprehend a reward for the risks of life and property, labor and danger, as well as a premium operating as an inducement to similar exertions.]</p> <p>[Cited in Clayton v. The Harmony, Case No. 2.871; Brevoor t. The Fair American, Id. 1.8-17; Coulon y. The Neptune, Id. 3,273. Approved in Bond v. The Cora. Id. 1.021; Hand v. The Elvira, Id. 0,U15. Cited in The Dupuy do Lome, 55 Bod. 95.]</p> <p>[7. Salvage also varies according to the description aind value of articles saved. On plate, jewels, and money, it is the least, and on other articles according to circumstances.]</p> <p>|S. The ship Amiable encountered the French ship La Belle Creole at sea. in a perishing and hopeless condition, and remained by her at some risk, and with considerable delay; taking out the officers and crew, part of the ship's furniture, wares, and merchandise, and also some plate and money. Motil, that the salvors should be awarded one-third the gross proceeds of the goods, wares, and merchandise, and one-eighth of the appraised value of the plate aud money.]</p> <p>[Followed in Taylor v. The Cato. Case No. 13,780. Cited in Markham v. Simpson, 22 Fed. 745.]</p> <p>NOTE. The libel states that, on the 10th day of November. 1702, the Amiable being on a voyage from Charleston. South Carolina, for Philadelphia, a ship was discovered in distress; upon which the Amiable shortened sail, changed her course, and found said ship to be La Belle Creole, commanded by Davor, bound to Bordeaux. La Belle Creole was declared to be sinking, and the master of the Amiable requested to remain by her, which was done by making light sai) on board the Amiable. The distress of La Belle Creole continued; the weather was tempestuous, and on the 12th. after repeated solicitations from the master and crow of La Belie Creole, they were received on board the Amiable; and, before they left La Belle Creole, a proposition was made by them to burn her. On the master and crew of La Belle Creoie leaving their ship, they declared they relinquished and abandoned her, and every thing on board of her. La Belle Creole was left without a living person on board of her. On the following morning she was again boarded by the master and crew of the Amiable, and a large quantity of merchandise taken from her. On the evening of the same day, at the request of Captain Davor, she was set on fire. The-Amiable afterwards arrived in Philadelphia. The libel prays a reasonable salvage may be allowed.</p> <p>A supplementary libel was afterwards filed, in which the goods are claimed by the owners, master, and crew of the Amiable, as wholly belonging to them "as goods derelict and abandoned,” and their delivery to the owners, &e. is prayed.</p> <p>The claim and answer of Captain Davor, master of La Belle Creole, state..that his ship was in great distress, and in danger of perishing; and that he, together with his crew, were taken on board the Amiable on the loth day of November. That on that day. and before and afterwards, the mate of the Amiable, and some mariners belonging to her. together with the crew of La Belle Creole, saved the goods and materials libelled and claimed. Captain Davor denies the abandonment of the ship and cargo, but declares an intention was entertained by him to repossess the same, should he at any time after be able so to do: and particularly denies the surrender of La Belie Creoie. &c. to the master and crew of the Amiable: and asserts. that the said master and crew of the Amiable, at the period aforesaid, declared that all they 'saved was for the master and crew of La Belle Creole. The claim and answer further state, that the master of La Belle Creole-could not abandon the goods. <X:c. as they did not belong to him. hut to persons in France: and that, even had they so abandoned them, the same being done under the impression of fear and danger, and from extreme necessity, could have no effect. It is also stated Hint, as the respondents were always in sight, or within reach of the property, and assisted in saving them, by the civil and maritime law they cannot be considered as derelict. The respondents say they are willing to allow the libellants ‘*a reasonable salvage, proportionate to their trouble and exertions.” Captain Davor states that the articles found in his trunks, not being merchandise, but money, furniture. Ac. belonging only to himself, and the mariners of La Belle Creole, are not by the maritime law and custom liable to salvage; he therefore prays, that tlie marshall lie ordered to return the same-to him, free of salvage and all charges. By the depositions of the witnesses produced on the part of Warder and others, the principal facts, as stated in The libel, are established; and it is further stated, that at the time the master and crew of-La Belle Creole were taken on board the Amiable, and before the greater part of the goods were saved, Captain Davor ordered the ship to be burned, and this was only prevented by the interference of the master of the Amiable. It is further stated, that after the master and crew of La Belle Creole were received on board the Amiable, they lost sight of the said vessel, and, supposing she had gone down, tho master of the Amiable determined to proceed to America. When the sun rose the next day La Belle Creole was discovered, boarded, and the greater part of the articles saved were taken on board the Amiable. She had. at this time, eleven feet of water in the hold, and the water was up to the cabin floor: on leaving her she was set on fire. It is also admitted in the depositions of these witnesses, that the crew of La Belle Creole assisted in saving the goods. &c. After the arrival of the Amiable in Philadelphia, an attempt was made, by the officers of La Belle Creole, to bribe the mate, and one of the seamen of the Amiable, to assist in smuggling some of the articles saved. In the depositions of the witnesses produced on the part of the respondents, some of the circumstances stated in the claim and answer are detailed; but no proof was offered in support of the assertion in the claim and answer, that Captain Davor entertained any expectation, or intention, that he would, at any time, regain possession of the ship, goods, &c. One half of the cargo of La Belle Creole had been thrown overboard before the Amiable was spoken; and, but for her assistance, all would have perished.</p>

This was an action of trespass and false imprisonment. Plea, the general issue. The- cause was tried before Ware, the district judge, at the October term, 1836. The plaintiff, to prove the issue on his part, produced Jos. H. Hill, the deputy jailer for Somerset county, by whom it was proved, that the plaintiff was committed to jail, February 19, 1S35, on a warrant from the defendants. He was liberated the same day, on giving the usual bond for the jail liberties.

<p>[This was an action for damages by John H. Ware against Henry T. Brown. Heard on demurrer to the declaration.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,171.</p> <p>Militant Land Warrants — Patent to Assignee —Equitt JuRismcTioN — Assignment bt Exec-tjtor — Limitations — Locator’s Impkove-MENTS.</p> <p>1. As between the heirs at law and the as-signee of a military land warrant, a court of chancery will go behind the patent and investigate the assignment of the warrant, or of the certificate of right, given by the council of Virginia, on which a warrant and afterwards a patent issued.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Scott v. Evans. Case No. 12.529.]</p> <p>[Cited in Rogers v. Brent, 5 Gil. 580.]</p> <p>2. An executor, having no specific power given in the will, cannot assign a military warrant or a ■ certificate on which a warrant was obtained. And where such an assignment is made by an executor, which appears on the face of the warrant and is copied into the patent, it is notice to the assignee of the warrant or the patentee.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Wiseman v. Hutchinson. 20 lnd. 43; Bonner v. Ware, 10 Uliio, 468. Cited in Bell v. Duncan. 11 Ohio, 190.J</p> <p>3. Lapse of time does not operate against minors, especially where they reside in a different state, and had no knowledge of their rights.</p> <p>4. The locator, having made the entry claiming the land entered upon it, and made improvements, may claim, from heirs at law, under the circumstances of this case, the part of the land usually given to a locator.</p> <p>[Affirmed in 15 Pet. (40 U. S.) 93.]</p>

The plaintiff [Edward B. Ware] was thrown from his buggy and injured, while driving upon a street, in which the defendant, through a contractor, was blasting, and using a steam drill for making trenches for pipes. He claims that the injury was the result of negligence on the' part of the defendant. The issue was tried before a jury.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Wisconsin.] In admiralty. This was a petition originally presented to the district court by the Nortli-western Union Packet Company, owner of the steamer Wrar Eagle, praying for limitation under the act of congress of March 3. 1851, of then- liability for loss by reason of the destruction of said steamer and its cargo by fire.

Bill to quiet title. On exceptions to master’s report. The plaintiff is the assignee of William F. Noble, a bankrupt. Rachael Noble. one of the defendants, is the wife of the bankrupt. Among the assets of the bankrupt that passed to his assignee was a parcel of real estate that had formerly constituted a portion of the common-school lands of the state.

<p>Case No. 17,176.</p> <p>Bankiicptcy — Avoidance of Genehai. Assignment — Effect—Inti:evening Levies —Unlawful Fkefehence.</p> <p>[1. Upon the avoidance of a general assignment as in violation of tlie bankrupt law. the title of the assignee in bankruptcy dates back to the time of such voluntary assignment, so as to avoid an intermediate levy of execution.]</p> <p>[2. If the property received by a creditor on an exchange between him and the bankrupt is of much greater value than that surrendered by him, the transaction is to be deemed a preference, if an original transaction would, under the circumstances, be so treated.]</p> <p>[S. A creditor of the bankrupt, who had been in business with him, and knew the condition of his affairs, surrendered notes of the bankrupt held by him, and secured by chattel mortgage, and took a new note for the same amount, payable on demand. Payment was demanded the same day, and, this being refused, suit was immediately commenced. No defense was made, and judgment was entered for the creditor, who immediately issued execution; and a levy was made on all the property of the bankrupt, including a large stock of goods not covered by the mortgage. These goods had been purchased immediately after the change of securities, and the amount of the purchase was much larger than required by the condition of the business, and the levy was made immediately after the purchase. Held, that the change of securities was evidently a fraudulent preference.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of S. P. Warner and others, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of J. H. Warner and others, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No! 17,179.</p> <p>Construction of Wills — Admissibility of Ex-thinsicEvidence — Instructions to Solicitor.</p> <p>[1. Instructions giren to a solicitor for the preparation of a will are in no case admissible to control or contradict the plain words of the will as afterwards executed, or to supply an omission, unless there is something on the face of the instrument which shows a mistake or omission by pointing or referring to something which the instructions will explain. In such ease the instructions are considered as connected with the will by the reference, so as to bring the case within the rule, “Id certum est quod certum reddi potest.”]</p> <p>[2. When a will is ambiguous in its words, and contains no reference to anything which can make it certain, or on its face admits of uo construction, it is Yoid.]</p> <p>[3. Where a will duly and validly executed in all respects, and containing a clause revoking in absolute and unqualified terms all previous wills, wholly omitted to make any disposition of certain lands belonging to [the testator, and there was no ambiguity on the face of the instrument, held, that the will could not be aided by admitting in evidence a clause in the instructions given by the testator to his solicitor, which contained directions for the disposal of this property, but to which no reference was made by the will, and which could not be connected with it by any construction; nor was such evidence rendered admissible by a recital in the introductory clause of the will, indicating an in-tentiou on the part of the testator to dispose of all of his property. In such case the testator must be held to have died intestate as' to the land in question.]</p>

<p>This action comes into this court by removal from the circuit court of Outagamie county.</p> <p>The complaint sets forth the following state of facts: That on tbe 11th of June, 1859, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in the circuit court of Outagamie county, to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of alleged frauds practiced by defendant upon plaintiff in the sale of certain lands; that the action and the right of the plaintiff to recover therein were founded solely upon the said frauds: that issue was joined in that action by the parties thereto, trial by jury had, and verdict and judgment ■were rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $1258.87, damages and costs; that this judgment has never been appealed from, reversed or set aside, and has not been paid. The complaint then alleges, that after the rendition of this judgment, the defendant procured from tbe United States district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, his discharge in bankruptcy, and that the defendant claims that by this discharge his liability to the plaintiff, upon the debt represented by the judgment, is discharged. The complaint next alleges, that tbe debt represented by the judgment was created solely by the fraud of the judgment debtor, and that the debt is not canceled by the discharge in bankruptcy; and closes with the allegation that this action was commenced upon such judgment by leave of the circuit court of Outagamie county, and judgment is demanded for the amount alleged to be due upon said former judgment, with interest. The defendant answers this complaint and says, that after the rendition of the judgment mentioned in the complaint, the parties to that judgment entered into a written stipulation, by which the plaintiff waived his right to an execution against the body of defendant upon the judgment, and expressly agreed that no execution should ever be issued against the body of the defendant in that action; and by which stipulation the defendant, on his part, waived all errors in entering said judgment, and in all orders prior to the entry thereof, and further agreed that he would not take any appeal from the judgment or any of said orders. It was further stipulated between the parties, that said judgment should be and remain in all respects binding upon the real and personal property of the defendant, and that no other or further right of the plaintiff than that of execution against defendant’s body, was relinquished by the stipulation. To this answer the plaintiff interposed a demurrer, and the question is, docs the stipulation set forth in the answer constitute a defense to this actionV Annexed to the complaint is a certified copy of the judgment record in the original action, from which it appears that that action was founded upon certain alleged false and fraudulent representations made by defendant to plaintiff in an exchange of property between the parties. The gravamen of the complaint in that action, and the gist of the action, was fraud. The judgment rendered was in terms and form a simple money judgment, no reference to the ground of action being mentioned therein.</p>

This was a bill in equity. It alleged that on the 19th of November, 1S36, the complainant [Samuel Warner] was seized of a farm in Wrentham, in this state, worth $6000; that [Adams] Daniels and [Josephe.] Fales then held what purported to be certificates of shares in the Cleft Ledge Granite Company in New Hampshire, valued at $6000. the company having a capital paid in of $200.000; that they proposed to purchase said farm of the complainant for a valuable consideration, find…

<p>This was an action originally brought against the postmaster of the United States for the city of New York, in the supreme court of the state of New York, for an alleged wrongful refusal to deliver certain letters to the plaintiff [James W. Warner], The defendant [Isaac Y. Fowler] set up that, in so refusing, he was acting under color of the laws of the United States in relation to the post-office department, and took the proper steps, under section 3 of the act of congress of March 2, 1S33 (4 Stat. 633), to remove the cause into this court, claiming that the act for which he was sued was done by him under the revenue laws of the United States, and under color thereof, and in pursuance of a right given to him by those laws. It is provided by said 3d section, that when a suit or prosecution shall be commenced in a court of any state, against any officer of the United States or other person, for or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under color thereof, or for or on account of any right, authority, or title set up or claimed by such officer or other person, under any such law of the United States, it shall be lawful for the defendant, at any time before trial, upon a petition to the circuit court of the United States in and for the district in which the defendant shall have been served with process, setting forth the nature of the suit, and verifying the petition by affidavit, together with a certificate, signed by an attorney or counsellor at law of some court of record of the state in which the suit shall have been commenced, or of the United States, setting forth that, as counsel for the petitioner, he has examined the proceedings against him, and has carefully inquired into the matters set forth in the petition, and that he believes the same to be true, and, upon presenting the same to the said circuit court, if in session, and, if not. to the clerk thereof, at his office, the said cause shall thereupon be entered on the docket of said circuit court, and be thereafter proceeded in as a cause originally commenced in that court. And it is made the duty of the clerk of such circuit court, if the suit was commenced in the state court by summons, to issue a writ of certiorari to the state court, requiring such court to send to the circuit court the record and proceedings in the cause, and, if it was commenced by capias, the clerk is directed to issue a habeas corpus cum causa, a duplicate of which shall be delivered to the clerk of the state court, or left at his office by the marshal, or by some person duly authorized; and, thereupon it is made the duty of the state court to stay all further proceedings in such cause, and the said suit, upon delivery of such process to the clerk of the state court, or leaving the same at his office, shall be deemed and taken to be removed to the circuit court, and further proceedings in the state court shall be wholly null and void. The plaintiff now moved to have the cause remanded to the state court, and to have all the proceedings for its removal into this court vacated, on the ground that the post-office laws of the United States were not revenue' laws of the United States, within the meaning of those terms, as used in said 3d section.</p>

[This was an appeal by Solomon C. Warner from a decision of the commissioner of patents in interference proceedings, awarding a patent to Charles Goodyear for a machine for manufacturing corrugated or shirred India rubber goods.]

Samuel Howell, by will, devised as follows: — “I give and bequeath to my granddaughter Elizabeth Douglass, the sum of £4000 Pennsylvania currency, to be placed out and kept at interest by my executors, on good real security, and the interest to be paid her annually till her marriage, when she is to receive the principal sum; and, in case of her death, she shall have the right by will, to bequeath the said sum unto whichever of my grandchildren she shall think proper, but…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania. 1 The facts appeared as follows: In March, 1S7T, sixteen bales of dry Servian goat skins were bought for the libellant in London, and being marked “W. B. T.,” and numbered from 4015 to 4030 inclusive, were delivered at Liverpool to the agent of the steamship Illinois, on board of which vessel they were received on May 1, 1S77, under a bill of lading, and carried to Philadelphia,…

<p>Case No. 17,185.</p> <p>Salí; of Tobacco — Defective Condition.</p>

<p>Case Mb. 17,186.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Cases not wirnix Original Jurisdiction — Time of Removal.</p> <p>1. A suit in a state court, which falls within the description of suits removable into this court, may be removed, although it could not originally have been brought in "this court.</p> <p>[Cited in Erwin v. Walsh, 27 Fed. 580.]</p> <p>2. That principle is not changed by the provision of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 472), which provides for the dismissal or remanding by this court of suits not really and substantially involving a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of this court.</p> <p>3. Under section 3 of said act of 1875, which provides that a suit cannot be removed unless the application for removal is made before or at the term at which the cause could be first tried, if the term at which the cause could otherwise be first tried is one which occurs during the time a trial of the cause is stayed by an order of the state court, it is not such a term as is meant by the Btalute.</p> <p>[Cited in Wheeler v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 8 Fed. 198; Dwight v. Central V. R. Co., 9 Fed. 792.]</p> <p>[Cited in First Nat. Bank of Wausau v. Conway, 67 Wis. 218, 30 X. W. 218.]</p>

In equity. Heard upon motion to continue receiver and injunction.

<p>Case No. 17,187.</p> <p>Admiralty — Notice of Filing Answers.</p> <p>[If libelant's proctor negotiates the postponement of the trial, he cannot thereafter allege ignorance of the fact that the answer was on trial.]</p>

In this case, the bankrupt petitioned both as an individual and as a partner in the late firm of Warren & Brown. ■ The firm and both partners were insolvent.

[This was an action on the ease toy H. H. Warner against Frank Roehr to recover $25,-000 damages for counterfeiting trade-marks. The defendant had bought from old junk dealers genuine bottles that had contained Warner’s Safe Kidney and Liver Cure, and, filling them with some concoction <5t his own, affixed a counterfeit label. .

A • decree had heretofore been rendered in this case in favor of the libellant [Sylvanus Warner] for damages occasioned by collision of the steamboat against his sloop, and a reference made to a commissioner to ascertain and report the amount of damages.

<p>Case No. 17,192.</p> <p>Collision — Pleading—Costs.</p> <p>Where a libel for a collision failed to convey any idea of the manner in which the collision took place, but was not excepted to, and on the hearing a decree was made dismissing it: Eeld, that no costs would be given, because the libel should have been excepted to and dismissed.</p> <p>[See The Albemarle, Case No. 135.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,193.</p> <p>Extha Pilotage — Disabled Vessel. •</p> <p>The ship Warren had lost her rudder, bowsprit, foretop-gallant mast, maintop-gallant-mast, and had rigged temporary substitutes. A pilot took charge of her 60 miles outside Sandy Hook, bearing E. S. E„ and navigated her to within 15 miles of the Hook, when a steamboat took her in tow. The ship had on board some sixty passengers. Held, that the pilot was entitled to $100 over and above the regular offshore pilotage, on account of superadded responsibility, hazard and risk, resulting from the disabled condition of the vessel.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,194.</p> <p>Baxkhcptct — Bill by Assignee to Avoid Piiacd-ulent Judgments — Costs.</p> <p>An assignee in bankruptcy filed a bill in equity against a creditor of the bankrupt for the purpose of obtaimng a decree that several judgments in favor of that creditor and against the bankrupt, and the executions issued thereon were fraudulent and void as against the said as-signee. Held, that under the proofs in the case and the authorities cited, the assignee’s right to the decree was undoubted; that the judgments in question were obtained when the bankrupt was insolvent, such creditor having reasonable cause to believe his debtor was insolvent at the time such actions were brought: that the credit- or having fought this case to the bitter end to maintain his preference, the assignee must have costs.</p> <p>NOTE. It was not necessary in this case, o'r in the case of Toof v. Martin [supra] to decide the question whether acts done in contravention of the general purposes and policy of the bankrupt act, and which directly lend to defeat such policy and purpose, by securing a. preference of one creditor over other creditors of a known insolvent debtor, can be held invalid and be set aside when the case cannot, ho brought within any of the express provisions of the act declaring fraudulent and void certain specified acts by which it is attempted to secure such preferences. See Shawhan v. Wherrit, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 627; Bell v. Leggett, 3 Seld. [7 N. Y.] 176, Beattie v. Gardner [Case No. 1,195], and cases cited.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,195.</p> <p>Negotiable Instkuments — Tkansfek in Tkcst— Defences.</p> <p>1. A transfer of a negotiable note and mortgage to the plaintiff, to indemnify him. he agreeing to retransfer them if indemnified, held, not a legal mortgage, but a conveyance in trust.</p> <p>2. The maker of the note, having acquired the equitable interest of the assignor, may use it in his defence to an action at law on the note.</p>

The first count in the declaration was as follows: “And thereupon the said plaintiffs [E. J. Warren and others] say that heretofore, to wit, on the 23d day of September, 1873, the said Mutual Building Fund and Dollar Savings Bank suspended payment, and has not since said day resumed payment; that : said Mutual Building Fund and Dollar Sav- j ings Bank was adjudicated a bankrupt by the ; •district court of the United States for the ¡ Eastern district of Virginia, on the 26th…

<p>Case No. 17,197.</p> <p>Rkuovai, op Causes — Injunction' Pending Motion to Remand.</p> <p>If a cause has been removed from a state to the federal court and an objection be raised to the jurisdiction of the latter court in the given case, the federal court will protect the rights of all parties during the interval and prior to the decision of that question; and if land be the subject of the controversy will, if necessary, award an injunction restraining waste.</p>

[This was an action by George AY. AVarren and others against Charles H. Peaslee, collector of the port of Boston, to recover back duties paid under protest.]

This action is brought [by George B. Warren] to forever restrain the city of St. Paul from allowing, recognizing, or paying eight thousand four hundred and ninety-five dollars and fifty-one cents ($S,495.51), or any part thereof, claimed by the defendants. McCarthy, Butler, and Eaton, on account of the grading of lower Third street in said city.

[This was an action by Warren & Howard against C. M. Robertson for damages. Ver-diet for plaintiffs. Defendant moves for a new trial.]

[This was a suit in equity by Richard Warren and others, assignees of Edward P. Sanger and Walter Scott, bankrupts, against the Tenth National Bank of the City of New York and Matthew T. Brennan, sheriff. For a petition to review an interlocutory order refusing a trial by jury, see Case No. 17.201.]

This was a suit in equity [by Richard War-Ten and Edward Rowe, assignees in bankruptcy] brought in the district court, to set aside nn alleged preference, which it was averred had been obtained by the defendants the Tenth National Bank, in violation of the bankruptcy net, by means of a judgment and an execution .against the bankrupts. The defendants moved, in the district court, for an order directing ® trial by a jury of issues to be framed in the suit.

<p>Case No. 17,202.</p> <p>Preference by Bankrupt — Validity — Knowledge of Insolvency.</p> <p>I. Knowledge of the non-payment of the commercial paper of a merchant, at maturity, furnishes reasonable cause to believe that he is insolvent.</p> <p>2. Inability to pay commercial paper, in the ■due course of business, is, in the case of a merchant, insolvency.</p> <p>3. A creditor holding the commercial paper of his debtor, in respect to which the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, by suffering it to remain unpaid in the hands of such creditor, for more than two months after its maturity, must be held to know' that the debtor is insolvent and has committed an act of bankruptcy, if such creditor, instead of putting the debtor into bankruptcy for such act, proceeds to take measures to secure a preference over- other creditors.</p> <p>4. What constitutes insolvency in a debtor, and knowledge by him of his insolvency, considered.</p> <p>5.If a debtor suffers a creditor to do acts which will secure a preference, and knows the consequences of such acts, he intends such consequences, because he can prevent them, by using the means provided to effect an equal distribution of his jiroperty among his creditors.</p> <p>0. What constitutes, on the part of a credit- or. reasonable cause to believe that he is obtaining a preference.</p> <p>7. Where a debtor has committed no act of bankruptcy, and will not voluntarily petition, a creditor may sue him. so as to force him to commit an act of bankruptcy, and then himself proceed against him, for such act, in involuntary bankruptcy.</p> <p>8. Motive and intent distinguished. To do an act, with knowledge of its consequences, is to intend the consequences.</p> <p>9. Where a preference is obtained through a judgment, and a levy of execution, an assignee in bankruptcy may proceed, by a suit in equity, to set aside the lien, and may make the sheriff, as well as the creditor, a party, if the proceeds of the execution be still in the hands of the sheriff.</p> <p>10. On awarding such proceeds to the assignee in bankruptcy, the sheriff was allowed his legal fees, and his costs of suit, and such costs were, with the costs of the assignee, charged on the creditor.</p> <p>[Upon an appeal to the supreme court, the decree of this court was reversed, and that of the court below, dismissing the bill, with costs, affirmed. 96 U. B. 539.]</p>

<p>[This was a suit by Andrew AVarren, Jr., against the Wisconsin A'alley Railroad Company.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,305.</p> <p>Railroad Aid Bonds — Defenses—Consolidation of Raii.hoads — Validity.</p> <p>[1. In a suit brought on coupons issued by a county for interest on railroad bonds issued by it to aid in the construction of a railroad, the defense interposed was that after the county had voted the bonds, but before actual delivers", the company had consolidated its stocks and franchises with the stock of another railroad corporation, and that said consolidation was invalid because not assented to in writing by all the resident stockholders of the former coin-pany, and also because such company had no road constructed, or in process of construction, at the time the latter company was chartered. field, that the county could not set up this defense in this collateral proceeding, as it had allowed the consolidation, in some form, to take effect, and had allowed the consolidated company to put the bonds in circulation.]</p> <p>[2. The fact that the right of one company to consolidate under its charter was limited did not deprive it of the right to consolidate under the general laws of the state.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,206.</p> <p>Judgment of State Court— Conclusivexess in other States — Fraud — Necessity of Personal Service.</p> <p>1. Prior to the adoption of the confederation and the constitution of the United States, the several states were considered entirely independent of eaeh other, and judgments recovered in their respective courts were foreign judgments in every respect, as in any separate and independent government; and whatever changes now exist in this respect, must be sought for in the constitution and laws of the United States.</p> <p>2. Conflict of opinion as to the construction of the constitution and act of congress relative to the force and effect of judgments rendered in the several states.</p> <p>3. Under the constitution of the United States and act of congress of 1790 [1 Stat. 123] the judgment of a state court has the same credit, validity and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it has in the state where it was rendered: and whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none other, could he pleaded in any other court in the United States.</p> <p>4. It would be competent to show that the judgment was obtained by fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Ivinnier v. ICinnier, 45 N. X. 03(1.]</p> <p>5. Under the constitution and act of congress, the question of jurisdiction remains open as at .common law. It may therefore be shown by proper evidence, that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction; and the pleadings may be so shaped as to admit such evidence.</p> <p>6. In order to sustain the judgment, the court must have had jurisdiction of the parties, as well as of the subject-matter.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Sevier v. Roddie, 51 Mo. 584.]</p> <p>7. Except in proceedings under the statute process of foreign attachment, which is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, in order to give the court jurisdiction of the person, due notice of the suit or service of the process must be shown, or the judgment is a nullity. And even in case of attachment, if the goods attached are insufficient to satisfy the attachment, no suit can be sustained upon the judgment for the de-ficir-ncy. because the defendant is not personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Blyler v. Kline. 04 Pa. St. 131.]</p> <p>8. A judgment obtained without notice to the defendant, or his appearing in any manner to answer to the suit, can have no validity or binding effect.</p> <p>9. The provision in the constitution of the United States, that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, does not apply to corporations; and bodies corporate have no right to establish themselves or transact business in a state otherwise than according to the laws of that state regulating tlicir conduct.</p> <p>[Cited in Earnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co.. S3 Cal. 201. 23 Pac. 873.]</p> <p>10. Statutes ought not to have a retrospective effect. As a general rule, when no time is fixed, they take effect from date. They cannot, by any fiction or relation, have any effect before they are actually passed.</p> <p>LCited in Ellis v. Connecticut Hut. Life Ins. Co.. 8 Fed. 85.J</p> <p>[Cited in brief in City of St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo. 460.]</p> <p>11. Where, therefore, the law under which a suit was brought on a policy of insurance, was passed in March. 1S35; the loss for which judgment was obtained occurred in January, IS34; the policy expired in October of the same year, and the suit was commenced in April. 1835; it was held, that the law in its application to the proceedings and judgment was retrospective, and therefore a nullity.</p>

In admiralty. This was an action in rem, for wages. The libel set forth the voyage agreed upon, and averred that it had been performed, and charged that no shipping ar-tides for the voyage were signed by the libel-lant, and that the master agreed to pay him wages at the rate of $12 per month.

<p>Case No. 17,207.</p> <p>Ban'kkvptcy Phoceebisg-Fmixo List of (Jkeditoks.</p> <p>Where an involuntary petition was filed since December 1. 1873, and the alleged bankrupt has made denial of the acts of bankruptcy and demanded a jury trial, he will, under section 39, as amended June 22, 1874 [IS Stat. 178], be required to file a list of his creditors, and the amount of their claims.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Albin Warth against William C. Browning and others to re- j strain the alleged infringement of certain let- ■ ters-patent.]

The defendant in this case was attached for contempt, of court, in disobeying an order requiring him to bring into court, or give security for the forthcoming of, a sum of money, admitted, by his answer to a bill in equity, to be in his hands. Heard on application to be discharged from the attachment.

The petitioners asked that the assignees might be required to pay them the rent of certain premises in Causeway street, Boston. The evidence tended to show that the bankrupt had a lease of these rooms, and used them for storage, and for a blacksmith’s shop, in connection with an adjoining lumber mill, which he hired of another person. By leave of court, the assignees had carried on business in the mill.

<p>[These were actions at law by C. C. Wash-burn against the Artisans’ Insurance Company and the Pennsylvania Insurance Company.]</p>

Action [by William B. Washburn] on bonds. The material facts are as follows: On the 19th day of July, 1870, a petition, signed by twenty-five tax-payers and residents of the municipal township of Polk, in Cass county, was presented to the county court of that county, setting forth the desire of the petitioners to vote a township subscription of $15,000 to the capital stock of the Pleasant Hill Division of the Lexington, Chillieothe & Gulf Railroad Company, and requesting the…

This was an action on the case [by William Washburn and others against James Gould] for the infringement of a patent right for “a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tonguing, grooving, and cutting into mould-ings, or either, plank, boards, or any other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness; and also for facing and dressing brick, and cutting mouldings, or facing metallic, mineral or other substances,” and described in the…

<p>Case No. 17,216.</p> <p>Pire Insurance— Cosstkvctjox of Policy — Explosion of Flock Dost.</p> <p>1. The policy insured the building and machinery of a flouring mill in Minnesota, which was destroyed through the force of an explosion in connection with fire. It was alleged by the defendant that the explosion resulted from flour dust fired by a spark or flame from a lamp, and that the fire was caused by the explosion, while the plaintiff insisted that a fire preceded and caused the explosion. The policy contained the following condition: “The company shall not be liable for fire caused by invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion, or military or usurped power; nor for loss by lightning unless fire ensue, and then for loss by fire only; nor for loss by fire or otherwise resulting from the explosion of steam boilers, or gunpowder or other explosive substances; nor for loss of any kind consequent upon the fall of a building herein insured, or containing property covered (except the same be a result of fire); and all insurance under this policy on it or its contents shall, in such cases, immediately cease and determine.” Reid, that if the explosion was caused by a fire, although the explosion contributed in a large degree to the destruction, fire was the proximate cause and the policy was liable, but if the explosion resulted from a spark or lamp and caused the destruction in whole or in part, and the fire resulted from the explosion, the policy was exempt.</p> <p>2. Any specially inflammable or hazardous condition due to the presence of flour dust must be presumed to be known to the insurers if an accident of the business.</p>

<p>In equity. Bill for injunction.</p>

This was a bill for injunction; the case being as follows: Goodyear was the patentee of what is known as vulcanized India rubber; an invention of undoubted originality, and which had been applied by him to a vast number of useful purposes.

<p>Case No. 17,218.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court by the owners of the steamboat Peter Crary against the steamboat Washington, to recover damages for a collision which occurred in the North river opposite pier No. 6. After a decree in the district court in favor of the libellants [Case No. 17,223], the claimant appealed to this court.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.) This was a libel of information, filed in rem, by the United States, in the… Held: that the court had jurisdiction, and overruled the exceptions, giving leave to the claimants to answer. An answer was put in, denying the facts alleged in the libel as ground of forfeiture, and also insisting that the court had no jurisdiction of the case. To this answer there was a replication.

<p>Case Wo. 17,222.</p> <p>Revenue Laws — Demurrer to Libel — Forfeiture of Vessel for Smuggling — Nbces-srTF of Prior Seizure.</p> <p>1. To authorize any district court of the United States to adjudicate upon a cause of forfeiture of a ship, such ship must be within the .jurisdictional limits of the court which is called upon to act, and subject to, and within the reach and under the control of, the process of such court. And such -ship must be taken possession of, or seized by the process of the court. And to give such court jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the cause of forfeiture, the first seizure or taking possession, by some one having -legal authority, must be made within the limits of the district iu which the court is established, before such court can adjudicate upon such cause of forfeiture, unless the first seizure is made upon the high seas, in which case the ship must be brought within such limits.</p> <p>2. By "seizure.” in the 9th section of the act of congress of 1799 (1 Stat. 7G), is meant any taking possession of the thing forfeited by virtue of a warrant, or other legal authority, for the purpose of enabling the proper court to inquire into, and to adjudicate upon, the cause of forfeiture.</p> <p>3. It is necessary that there should he a seizure before the court can adjudicate upon the cause of forfeiture. And a seizure by the marshal, upon a warrant issued by the court, is sufficient to enable the court so to adjudicate, unless there has been a prior legal seizure in some other district, or a seizure on the high seas, and the property brought into some other district. A seizure by a custom-house officer is not an essential prerequisite to give the court authority judicially to inquire into the cause of forfeiture. A. seizure by the marshal, under his warrant of seizure, is sufficient. Sed vide The Silver Spring [Case No. 12,858],</p> <p>4. Where some of the counts in a libel for a forfeiture under the 50th section of the act of 1799 (1 Stat. 665) alleged the value of the goods unladen to be less than four hundred dollars, such counts were held, insufficient. [The case was subsequently taken on appeal to the circuit court, where the decree was affirmed. Case No. 17,221.]</p>

<p>Tho steamboat Peter Crary, owned by the libellants, came in collision in the harbor of New York, on the evening of Oct. 17th, 1S53, about 200 feet outside of piers Nos. 5 and 6, in the North river, with the steamboat Washington, by which the Crary was seriously injured, and, to recover the damages occasioned to her thereby, this suit was brought. The weather was calm and pleasant, with a gentle breeze, and the tide was flood; the evening was clear and moon light, and the channel unobstructed. The Crary was bound up the river to her berth, and the Washington was going round into the East river. Both vessels were tow-boats. The li-bellants were, one of them the pilot, and the other the engineer, of the Peter Crary, and were both experienced in their business. The pilot of the Washington had never taken charge of a boat as pilot until about a week before the collision, having been previously a cooper, but for some months had occasionally taken the wheel under the superintendence of the pilot. The engineer of the Washington was also of questionable competency; the engine, however, was not in his charge at the time' of the collision. The libellants allege that after rounding the battery, the Crary took a straight course up the river about 150 feet outside of the piers, and that the "Washington was further out, or at least as far. That the Crary steered to the' right according to the law-, but that the "Washington steered in to the left, and struck the Crary on the larboard side, about six feet aft of the stem. The claimants averred that the Crary was coming up the river outside of the Washington, and suddenly turned in towards the piers across the Washington’s bows, and that after that nothing could have been done on the part of the Washington to avoid the collision. The engine of the "Washington was stopped, but not reversed, while that of the Crary was both stopped and reversed.</p>

Attachment for contempt. In this case John T. Wright was summoned to attend before justice of the peace John D. Clark and disobeyed the summons, whereupon the justice issued an attachment against Wright on the day of trial. It was issued under Act Md. 1791, c. 68, § 8,2 returnable before the circuit court now in session.

<p>[This was a libel by the owners of the pilot boat "Washington against the ship Saluda to recover salvage.]</p>

This was an amicable suit brought by certain residuary legatees [Lawrence A. Washington and others] under the will of General George Washington of Mount Vernon, to enable the executors to settle the estate. There was also a cross-bill filed by the executors against some of those residuary legatees who had purchased at the sales of the property, or had otherwise received more than the value of their respective legacies.

<p>Appeal from the judgment of William Thornton, a justice of the peace, in an action of debt for penalty of the by-law, for running hacks without license, contrary to the by-law (chapter 9).</p>

On motion to remand cause to the state court. This was a proceeding by mandamus brought in the state court pursuant to the state statutes (Gen. St. Kan. c. 80, p. 706). The object was to compel the defendant company to register the transfer of certain certificates of shares therein of which the plaintiff corporation alleges itself to be the owner; and the plaintiff also prays damages for the wrongful refusal of the defendant to make or allow such registration.

<p>[This was a libel by John Burge against the steamboat Washington Irving.]</p>

This was a libel in rem, by Joseph Odell, owner of the schooner Superior, against the steamboat Washington Irving, to recover damages for a collision between the two vessels.

<p>Case No. 17,244.</p> <p>Lies — Foreign- Vessel —Delay of Payment — Credit of Owner — Payment by Draft.</p> <p>1. The fact, that a vessel which is repaired or supplied, is not in her home port, in the absence of other circumstances, makes a case of apparent necessity for the credit of the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in Harney v. The Sydney L. Wright, Id. 6,082a.]</p> <p>2. This apparent necessity may be dispelled by proof of other circumstances, showing that the necessity for the credit did not exist, and did not appear to the material man to exist, at the time of his employment.</p> <p>[Cited in Berwind v. Schultz, 25 Fed. 917.]</p> <p>3. An agreement for delay of payment, _ in most eases, is additional evidence of the existence of an apparent necessity for the credit of the vessel.</p> <p>4. An agreement to do the work on the personal credit of an agent of the vessel, would be sufficient to defeat the claim of the material man against the vessel.</p> <p>5. The existence of such an agreement is a fact which must be-clearly proved.</p> <p>6. Where the agent of a vessel, some months after repairs were done on her, and after part payment, gave a draft on a third party for the remainder, which was never paid or accepted, and was surrendered on the trial, held, that that did not amount to payment, nor did it go to show that the agreement for the work looked to the personal credit of the agent alone.</p>

This was a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy against The Washington Marine Insurance Company, a corporation, incorporated under the laws of the state of New York. On the 26th of October, 1867, upon the petition of' the attorney general of the state of New York, the supreme court of the state of New York, for the city and county of New York, made an order dissolving the company, and appointed Cornelius Iv.

<p>This- is an action for supplies furnished by Bentley C. Bibb, the libellant, to the steamboat Washington Irving. The libel alleged that the supplies were necessary for the vessel; that they were furnished at the request of the owner in Baltimore, to which port the vessel was foreign, and that they were furnished upon the credit of the vessel. The answer admitted that the vessel was a foreign vessel, and denied that the supplies were furnished upon the request of the owner, or upon the credit of the vessel; it also averred that the owner was a person in good credit in Baltimore.</p>

This was an action against [Thomas Russell] the collector of Boston to recover certain duties exacted by him on imported wools, and paid by the plaintiff under protest. The case was heard by the court on an agreed statement of facts.

<p>Case No. 17,246a.</p> <p>In-fhinoemext of Trade-Mark.</p> <p>[Cited in 2 Morgan, Lit. p. 252, to the propositions that “the principle which governs all cases of trade-marks, undoubtedly is that no one is permitted to appropriate the benefit of another's reputation,” and that “a trade-mark * * * has come to signify anything that has become in time adopted as the prima facie means of detecting the goods, wares, or properties of certain proprietors.”]</p>

<p>Case No. 17.248.</p> <p>Validity of Deposition — Names of Parties.</p> <p>1. In a deposition taken under the act of congress of 1789 [1 Stat. 88], if the names of any of the parties do not appear in the caption or some part of the deposition, it is a fatal objection to it. The names of all the parties must appear.</p> <p>2. Cases as to depositions cited in note.</p> <p>NOTE. If the name of one of the defendants be omitted in the caption of the deposition, it cannot be read in evidence in the cause. Smith v. Coleman [Case No. 13.029]: Brown v. Piatt rid. 2,026]. In the caption of a deposition, all parties, both plaintiffs and defendants, must bp individually and correctly named. Has-kins v. Smith, 17 Vt. 263. The caption of a deposition taken by a plaintiff must state the names of all the defendants. Swift v. Cobb, 10 Vt. 282. The caption should be correct in naming the suit; but where from the facts there can be no uncertainty as to the case, the deposition should be admitted. Buckingham v. Burgess [Case No. 2.0SS]. In Allen v. Blunt [Id. 217], it was said to be doubtful whether a caption is not insufficient, by describing the action as against one, when it was against two, and so entered and defended, though with service since only on one. A mistake in the name of the plaintiff or defendant, referring to him as plaintiff or defendant, the name being truly stated in the title, is no ground for rejecting a deposition. Voce v. Lawrence [Id. 16.979]. The authority to take testimony under the act of congress has always been construed strictly, and therefore it is necessary to establish that all the requisitions of the law have been complied with before such testimony is admissible. Bell v. Morrison. 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 351; Harris v. Wall, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 704, 705; The Thomas v. U. S. [Case No. 13.919J. The authority conferred on the magistrate by the act is special, and the facts calling for the exorcise of it should appear upon the face of the instrument, and not be left to parol proof. Harris v. Wall. 7 How. [48 U. S.] 705. The certificate of the magistrate is good evidence of the facts stated therein, so as to entitle the deposition to be read, 'if all the necessary facts are there sufficiently disclosed. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. [26 U. S.] 355: Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Southgate. 5 Pet. [30 U. S.] 617. A deposition cannot be rejected because it does not appear that the commissioner had been sworn. Commissioners are officers appointed by the courts of the United States, and their official acts are prima facie valid. Hoyt v. Hammeken, 14 How. [55 U. S.] 349, 350. Prima facie the officer is to be presumed de facto and de jure, such as he. by his official act. describes himself to be. This is according to universal practice in taking depositions authorized by statute, unless the statute itself indicates the evidence, that shall accompany the act showing its authority. The act of 1789 requires no such authentication; and if upon the face of the certificate it appears that .the person before whom the deposition was taken, was an officer authorized by the act of congress to take the same, it is all that can be required in the first instance. Buggies v. Bucknor [Case No. 12.115]; Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How. [52 U. S.] 375. The officer' taking the deposition is presumed to know the residence of the party entitled to notice, and if he certifies that the adverse party or attorney is not within one hundred miles, that is prima facie sufficient to dispense with notice. But the certificate may be controverted by parol proof with regard to stated facts, of which the magistrate is not supposed to have official knowledge; and therefore if it be proved that the adverse party or attorney, did actually live within one hundred miles, or was temporarily within that distance to the knowledge of the magistrate, and might have been served with notice, the-effeet would be to set aside the deposition. Dick v. Bunnels, 5 How. [46 U. S.] 9. A notice left at the residence of either would be good. Id. The judge of the probate court of Mississippi, the same being a court of record and having a seal, is the judge of a county court, within the meaning of the act of 1789, and one of the officers authorized to take depositions. Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How. L52 U. S.] 393. A judge of a county court having power to administer oaths, may do so in any county in the state. Voce v. Lawrence [supra]. As to requisites of act of congress, see Harris v. Wall, 7 How. [48 U. S.] 704, 705. As the deposition must be reduced to writing by the magistrate or the deponent in his presence, it is almost superfluous to observe that it will be a fatal objection if the depositions be written by a party to the suit or his agent, counsel, or attorney. The law for wise and obvious reasons forbids it: because to allow it, would be to place it in the power of an adroit counsel, to give a coloring and effect to the statement of a witness not intended by the witness himself, and which he may not be able to discover at the time. As to depositions under act of congress, see Bussell v. Ashley [Case No. 12.150]: Merrill v. Dawson [Id. 9,-409]; Bainer v. Haynes [Id. 11,536]; Marstin v. McBea [Id. 9,141].</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel against the brig Wasp, Foxwell Cutts and others, claimants. The case was brought in the district court for the violation of the act of congress of June '2S, 1S09, and the vessel was condemned. Case unreported.]

On exceptions to the libel of the Frankfort. Iron Company for general average. October 23d, 1S71, libellant shipped on board the schooner Watchful, at Frankfort, Michigan, 160 tons of iron ore for Detroit. By the bill of lading it was provided that twenty-five tons of the ore should be carried on the deck.

The material facts in this case are, that on the 15th of July, 1829, Tobias Lord was owner of one third part of the brig Watchman, and being then in insolvent circumstances, made an assignment of all his property, including his share in this brig, to Francis Watts and S. O. Pray, in trust, to sell and dispose of the same, and to pay such of his creditors as should become parties to the deed in the third part, in the order in ■which they are named in a schedule annexed to the…

<p>Case No. 17.252.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Assigxmext to Nonkesí-t>ext.</p> <p>Where a contract between citizens of the same state — even though the contract is neither a promissory note, negotiable by the same merchant, nor a bill of exchange — has been assigned by one of the parties to the same to a citizen of another state, who has brought suit thereon in a court of the state of which the defendant is a citizen, the suit may be removed to the United States circuit court of the proper district by virtue of the act of March 3, 1S75 (IS Stat. 470).</p> <p>[Cited in Rosenblatt v. Reliance Lumber Co., 18 Fed. 707.]</p>

This was a libel both in rem and in per-sonam. It alleged that the schooner Abigail, of which the libellant was sole owner, sailed from New-York on the 5th of December, 182G, bound for Tuxpan, in Mexico, with a cargo of goods on board, belonging in part to the libellant [Ebenezer Waterbury] and in part to others, and arrived there in the latter part of the same month; that the respondent [James Myrick] was master of the Abigail, and also consignee of her entire cargo, part…

2 [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought Lagainst Edward Miller & Co. and Edward Miller] upon letters patent for “improvement in machine for making brass kettles,” granted to Hiram W. Hayden, December 16, 1851; extended for seven years, from December 1C. 1865; reissued February 13. 18CC; and reissued again, in two divisions, May 24. 1S70 — one for an “improvement in machine for making brass kettles,” and the other for an “improvement in brass kettles.” A former…

This was an action on the case, tried before Judge Ingersoll and a jury, to recover damages for the alleged infringement of letters patent [No. 8,589] for “machinery for making kettles and articles of like character, from discs of metal,” granted to Hiram W. Hayden, December 16, 1851 [reissued May 24, 1870 (Nos. 3,995, 3,996)], and assigned to plaintiffs.

The ship Waterloo, of London, was discovered, on the 27th of August, 1828, by the brig Merced, in latitude 34° N., longitude 75° W., abandoned at sea. The Merced was bound from Havana to Cadiz, but, leaving her course, she, with great difficulty and danger. towed the Waterloo into the harbor of New-York, where they arrived on the 12th of September.

<p>Case No. 17,258.</p> <p>Ecjuitv — Ambjcumknt of Axswsh — Mistake.</p> <p>[The court will not allow the theory of defense set up by the original answer to be changed in several important particulars merely on the ground that defendant filed the answer under a mistake, when no new facts are alleged, and there is no request to have a single fact in the bill changed.]</p> <p>[This case was originally published in 2 Abb. U. S. 478, as a note to Hoover v. Reilly, Case No. 6,677.]</p>

This was an action on the ease [by Henry Waterman against William S. Thomson and Charles H. Thomson], Tried by Judge SHIP-MAN and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 21,286], for an “improvement in tempering wire and steel,” granted to plaintiff, August 24. 1858. [Reissued Peb. 14, 1865, No. 1,874.] The claim of this patent was as follows: “The process of hardening steel wire, or thin steel, in long sections, being kept under a longitudinal…

<p>Case No. 17,259.</p> <p>Admiralty Decree — Exceptions to Commissioner’s Report.</p> <p>[The decree cannot be attacked by exceptions to the commissioner’s report thereunder.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,261.</p> <p>Assignment of Patent — Extension of Term — Effect — Construction of Deed — DecLARATIONS OF GRANTEE.</p> <p>1. An assignment recited the granting of a patent to H.. the assignor, and its reissue, and that K. “is desirous of acquiring all my right, title and interest therein, in accordance with the terms and conditions of a certain deed of trust executed by him,” and then conveyed to II., in trust, "all my right, title and interest of, in and to the aforesaid reissued letters patent and the invention thereby secured.” Afterwards, II. gave a license to W., which recited that both of the patents, and the invention secured thereby. had been assigned, in trust, to. II., “for and during the unexpired term for which the same have been granted, and for and during any and all terms to which they or either of them may be extended.” and then granted to W. a license under both of the patents, "the same to be exercised during the unexpired terms for which the said patents are granted, and may be hereafter extended.” Afterwards, the patent was extended: Held, that the license to W. expired with the original term of the patent.</p> <p>2. II. obtained, by the assignment to him, only the interest of H. for the original term.</p> <p>3. An assignment of “the invention,” after a patent has been issued, without any other language to indicate the intention of the parties, does not import a conveyance of the right to an extended term.</p> <p>4. The written declaration of a trustee, in a conveyance to a third person, of property which had been previously conveyed to the trustee by his cestui que trust, cannot be used against the latter, to determine the intent of both parties in making the original conveyance, and to show the extent of the interest which the cestui que trust intended to convey thereby.</p> <p>[Por another «case involving this patent, see Waterman v. Thomson, Case No. 17,260.]</p>

This was an action [by Hugh Waters against James B. Campbell] for false imprisonment. It was commenced on June 27, 1876, in the state circuit court for the county of Clatsop, and subsequently, upon the petition of the defendant, removed to this court.

This action was brought to recover damages for the alleged false imprisonment of the plaintiff [Hugh Waters] by the defendant [James B. Campbell] in Alaska, for the period of one hundred… Held: after able argument and full consideration of the premises, that the defendant, who had arrested the plaintiff upon a similar charge and detained him more than five days before removal, because he had no sufficient means wherewith to do otherwise, was liable for false imprisonment.

<p>Case No. 17,266.</p> <p>■Fire Insurance — Policy on Vessel — Negligence of Officers — Barratry.</p> <p>1. Where fire is one of the enumerated risks in a policy on a steamboat, &c. a loss by fire will charge the underwriters, though occasioned by the negligence of the officers or crew.</p> <p>[Cited in National Ins. Co. v. Webster, 83 Ill. 472.]</p> <p>2. If tlie negligence be so gross as to authorize the presumption of fraud, which would constitute barratry, the underwriters are not liable, unless the policy expressly insures against bar-ratry.</p> <p>3. A policy against fire on land, will, in the event of loss, hold the underwriters liable, though the fire was the result of negligence by servants and others.</p> <p>4. And the same rule of construction should be applied to marine policies.</p> <p>5. The rule of construction is of general interest, as it refers as well to our foreign, as our Internal commerce, and it should be uniform.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,267.</p> <p>New Tkial — Weight of Evidence.</p> <p>A mere difference of opinion as to the weight and effect of the evidence is not sufficient to justify the court in setting aside a verdict.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,268.</p> <p>Violation’ of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

[In the matter of Martin Watrous, Albert W. Watrous, and Chauneey L. Watrous, bankrupts.] The register certified that Mr. John Ward appeared and offered to prove, by his own oath, a secured claim against said estate, in favor of Miss Mary E. Barnard, of Springfield, Vermont. It is not claimed that Miss Barnard is absent from the United States, nor that she is prevented from testifying.

Watson was adjudged bankrupt. December 19th, 186S, and William Waterman duly appointed assignee on the 15th of January, 1869. On the 9th of March, 1869, the said assignee set off to the bankrupt as a homestead to which he was entitled under the laws of the state of Ohio, certain real estate situate in the town of Berea, Cuyahoga county, Ohio. One of the creditors of said bankrupt, Henry Car-man, excepted to the homestead exemption as allowed by the assignee.

<p>Case No. 17,272.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Proceedings — Jurisdiction — Residence of Debtor.</p> <p>1. The debtor, being a resident of St. Louis with his family, bought a stock of goods in Montana in July, 1S69; went to Montana in August, 1869, leaving his family in St. Louis; remained in Montana, except a few weeks, when on a business trip to St. Louis, until June, 1870; a petition in bankruptcy was filed against him in the Eastern district of Missouri, July Sth. 1870. Hr (1. that Montana was his place of residence within the meaning of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)], during the six months preceding the filing of the petition; the word “residence” in section 11 not being synonymous with the word “domicile.”</p> <p>[Cited in Ward v. Blake Manuf’g Co., 56 Ifed. 440.]</p> <p>TSee In re Belcher, Case No. 1,237.]</p> <p>2. Petition dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Ward v. Blake Manuf’g Co., 56 Fed. 440.]</p>

Petition for review. The petitioners were adjudged bankrupts in February, 1872. No application for discharge was made until October, 1874. The bankrupts had been unable to obtain the assent of a majority in number and value of their creditors, and their assets did not amount to 50 per cent, of their indebtedness.

This was an action for the infringement of a patent granted to E. Treadwell, for an improvement in forming and piercing bread, called by him “a cracker or biscuit finisher.” The specification describes the different parts of the machine, amongst which are the circular cutters, the piercers, and the clearers, which cut, pierce, and clear the biscuit at one operation.

In equity. Heard upon motion to dissolve injunction. The case was commenced in the district court for the parish of Tensas, and was removed to this court under the act of March 3, 1875, being the “Act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the removal of causes from state courts and for other purposes.” 18 Stat: 470. The case belonged to-the equity side of the court.

In bankruptcy. The summons and complaint of John L. Watson, the affidavit thereto, the order of State Judge Carpenter, and the proof of service of said papers, all bear date November 22d, 1873.

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Mark W. Watson, John McM. King, and John H. McKelvey, partners as William MeCully & Co.] to restrain the defendants [W. Cunningham, D. Ihmsen, R. Cunningham, and D. O. Cunningham, partners as Cunninghams & Ihmsen], from infringing letters patent for “improvement in fruit jars,” granted to D. Irving Holcomb. December 14, 1869, and assigned to complainants.

Action [by Watson & Hudson] on two policies, one on the Anna Maria, at and from Cadiz to Antwerp, valued at 12,000 dollars; and the other on the freight of said vessel, on the same voyage, valued at 0,000 dollars.

This case was again tried (see Watson v. Insurance Co. of North America [Case No. 17,284]), and turned upon the question of seaworthiness. Upon the opening, the plaintiffs’ counsel read the survey and condemnation at Gibraltar, after stating to the jury that he did so merely to show that a survey and condemnation had taken place, but not as evidence of any fact stated in it.

The only question reserved by the jury for the opinion of the court, was, whether the amount of a bottomry bond, executed by the captain, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, beyond sea, a few days before this policy was made, is to be deducted from the 12,000 dollars, the agreed value in the policy, or from the 15,000 dollars, the real value found by the jury? [For prior proceedings, see Cases Nos. 17,284 and 17,285.]

In bankruptcy. Watson, Crews & Co. filed their petition, claiming that Lemar & Addy. should be declared bankrupts, and on the next day Mordecai Cohen distrained the goods of Lemar A Addy for rent due him.

The libellant [James Watson], being a citizen of the United States, and one of the crew of .an American vessel, was impressed by a British cruizer; aDd the ship permitted to proceed on her voyage. The case was opened with a view to obtain wages for the voyage, under principles settled in this court, relating to mariners taken and carried off by force, out of vessels taken and retaken and proceeding to their ports of destination, and earning freight.

<p>Case No. 17,289.</p> <p>Appearance-Bail — Effect op Discharge.</p> <p>A discharge of the appearance-bail, arrested upon a joint ca. sa. against him and his principal, does not release the principal.</p>

Trover for two hundred and three hogsheads of rum. The plaintiff [Robert- Watt}, a merchant of Jamaica, in March, 1819, shipped under a charter party on board of the British brig Fame, of Liverpool (James Handy, master), a large quantity of rum, on a voyage to Quebec, in Canada, consigned to Messrs. Ervin, M’Knight & Co. of that place, for sale. The brig, by the charter party, was to go from Jamaica to Quebec, and thence to return to Jamaica.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was an action by the United States against James S. Watt to recover certain duties on imported goods. The judgment in the district court was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs (ease unreported), and the defendant brought error.]

In this case, during the examination of the bankrupt [Henry H. Watts] before the register, evidence was given of a lease, of which it appeared that he was the owner, and which had not been mentioned in the schedules attached to the bankrupt’s petition. The bankrupt thereupon applied to the register, on a petition excusing the omission, for leave to amend his schedules, by inserting the lease as a part of his assets.

<p>Case No. 17,294.</p> <p>Life Insurance — Issue of Paid-up Policy — Form — Action by Insured-Damages.</p> <p>1. A policy issued by a mutual life insurance company insured, in consideration of ten annual premiums to be paid, the life of W., in the sum of $1.000, to be paid to him at the age of 40, or to his mother and sister, equally, if he should die before arriving at that age. The policy provided, that, if, after the payment of two premiums, the policy should cease because of the nonpayment of premiums, the company would, on the surrender to it of the policy, issue a new policy for the value acquired under the old one, subject to any notes given for premiums, without subjecting the assured to any subsequent charge, except annual interest, in advance, on all premium notes remaining unpaid. W. paid the premium for nine years, in cash. For the rest he gave four notes, still outstanding, on which he had paid the interest annually. He wishing to surrender the policy and take a new one for the value acquired under the old one, the company tendered to him a new policy, which he refused. Subsequently, he tendered to the company, for signature, a written policy, differing in form from the printed form used by the company, but the same, in legal effect, as the policy which he had refused. The company refused to sign the written policy, because it was not its regular printed form. W. had, before tendering the written policy, applied to the company, without success, for a printed form. W. then, before attaining the age of 40, sued the company, seeking to recover, as damages for not issuing the new policy, the premiums for the nine years: Held, that the defendant had no right to object to signing the written policy because it was not its printed blank, unless it tendered a policy made by using such blank.</p> <p>2. Held, also, that the plaintiff could recover more than nominal damages only in an action in which his mother and sister were co-plaintiffs; that the contract was not rescinded; that proof of the amount paid in premiums was no proof of damage; and that the recovery could be only for nominal damages.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,295.</p> <p>Contract to Convey Land —Time of Performance — Pending Litigation — Specific Performance— Parties to Decree — Deed by Commissioner-Effect.</p> <p>1. A contract to convey a certain tract of land so soon as a suit then pending for the title shall be decided, gives to the party that agrees to convey all the time neeessary to close the litigation in all the forms it may assume.</p> <p>2. Unforeseen circumstances and embarrassments may excuse the performance, at the day, if the party act in good faith.</p> <p>3. The husbands of femes covert, where the title is sought through the wife, must be made parties, or the title decreed will be defective.</p> <p>4. And so where there is a dower interest outstanding.</p> <p>5. The decree of title in one state to lands in another state cannot operate so as to vest the legal title.</p> <p>[Cited in Lindley v. O’Reilly, 50 N. J. Law, 642, 15 Atl. 382.]</p> <p>6. The court will never compel a party, under a contract for a good and operative title, to receive one that is defective.</p> <p>[Cited in Tiffin v. Shawhan, 43 Ohio St. 184, 1 N. E. 083.]</p> <p>7. The statute which gives effect to a deed executed without the state, if made in pursuance of the law of the country, refers to deeds of the party.</p> <p>S. A decree in Kentucky, for the conveyance of land in Ohio, though executed by a commissioner, under the statute, in pursuance of the decree can give no title.</p> <p>[Cited in Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. 47.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,296.</p> <p>Owners of Vessel — Limitation of Liability— Contract of Affreightment — Destruction of Vessel — Payment of Insurance.</p> <p>1. The 2d section of the act of congress of March 3, 1851 [9 Stat. 635], “To limit the liability of ship-owners, &c.,’’ does not make the absenee-of the “note in writing,” required by tbe statute, a discharge of the ship-owner's liability on a contract of "affreightment, where the true character and value of the enumerated articles have been fairly and clearly set down in the bill of lading, whether before or after the actual shipment; nor, it seems, where such character and value were in fact unknown to the parties.</p> <p>2. Under the 3d section of this act, the personal liability of the ship-owners on a contract of affreightment ceases upon a total destruction of the vessel and loss of freight, before the completion of her voyage, though the actual damage to or loss of the goods to be carried, as in the ease of theft, has taken place prior to the time of the destruction of the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. (SO U. S.) 127.]</p> <p>[Disapproved in Walker v. Boston & H. Ins. Co., 14 Gray, 305.]</p> <p>3. The limitation of liability' of the ship-owner, by this section, is not affected by the fact that the vessel has been insured, and the insurance has been paid or become payable.</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel for salvage, filed by the owners and crew of the pilot-boat Gazette, against the schooner Wave. The facts were these: The Wave left her moorings at the wharf in New-York on the 2d of February, 1831, with intent to go to sea.

<p>Case No. 17,298.</p> <p>Condemnation of Puize — Procedure.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy properry, and for a violation of the blockade.</p> <p>2. The rules of practice in admiralty are the basis of practice in prize in our national courts.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,299.</p> <p>Prize Proceeding — Condemnation of Cargo— Discharge op Vessel.</p> <p>1. The vessel w’as, after her capture, appropriated to the use of the United States, and was not sent into port. Her cargo was sent in by another vessel, and was arrested in this suit. None of her company W’ere sent in as witnesses. A person present at the capture was, by order of the court, examined as a witness.</p> <p>2. Cargo condemned for a violation of the blockade.</p> <p>3. Vessel discharged for want of legal arrest and prosecution.</p>

<p>This case came up on appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. It was argued at the May term of this court, and lay over for advisement until the October term. The respondents libelled the Wave, in the court below, for salvage. They were all at the time of the services rendered the Wave, either branch or deputy pilots of the port of New York, duly commissioned under the laws of the state, and, as such, jointly owned the pilot-boat Gazette, for whose services, and those of her crew, the libel to obtain salvage was filed. The Wave sailed from New York on the 2d of February, 1831, bound for Brazos, in Mexico. Previous to this time, the piers and slips had for several days been so blocked up with ice as to prevent vessels from putting to sea, unless by watching a favorable moment. On the 2d, the Wave, having had signals standing the day previously and that day for a pilot, and not being able to get one, although one had been on board of her and promised to return, took advantage of an opening in the ice, got into the stream, and had every prospect of getting safely to sea without one; but when nearly opposite the Quarantine Ground, she ran into a field of ice, and struck a cake which cut. a hole in the bottom of the vessel: and when near Sandy Hook, she was water-logged and in a sinking condition, the crew exerting themselves greatly to keep her above water. They fired guns and made signals for a pilot, and Afterwards signals of distress, in consequence of which the pilot-boat Gazette, under the command of John Hyer, which was about two miles distant, coming into port, made for the Wave, and soon reached her. Capt. Hyer and his men (one of whom was the pilot who had that morning been on board the Wave while lying at the wharf, and promised to return and pilot her out, but who did not return) immediately rendered all the assistance in their power to free the vessel and stop her leak, in which they were successful. They also, with the assistance of the crew of the Wave, transferred a part of the cargo of the latter to the pilot boat, and in this condition both vessels returned to the city — the pilot boab directly — but the Wave, with Capt. Hyer on board, having to encounter rough and cold weather, and delay, not reaching the city until the 5th of February. The assistance rendered by the pilots was probably the means of preventing the Wave from sinking or being run on shore, as there was no appearance of any other relief. Capt Hyer, soon after going on board the Wave, obtained from Capt. Harriman, her master, a document purporting to resign her into the former’s charge, and which, it was insisted by the libellants, showed that he did not take charge of her in his character of pilot. The court below decreed the sum of $1,103.78 as salvage, with costs and counsel fees to the libellants. [Case No. 17.297.]</p> <p>On appeal from this decree, W. Slosson on the part of the owners of the cargo, and E. Paine and A. W. Dodge for the owners of the vessel, contended for the following positions, in opposition to the principles of the decree:</p> <p>1. That the district court had no jurisdiction of the case, the same having been given, by the laws of the state, exclusively to the wardens of the port of New York, who were to determine the compensation to be allowed to pilots for extraordinary services rendered to vessels in distress (Act Feb. 19th, 1819; 5 Sess. Laws, art. 11, § 19); and that it was impolitic to interfere with the regulations of the state on this subject, which had adopted a complete system for the government and compensation of its pilots, placing them under the control of the board of wardens, which was created principally to have charge of them. That such a supervision was peculiarly necessary over a body of men brought and kept together by law, entrusted with duties so important to commerce and humanity, enjoying certain exclusive privileges, and exposed to the temptation, and having the opportunity of abusing their trust; and that this supervision, given to the wardens, ought to be left entire, and not be interfered with.</p> <p>2. That congress, under its constitutional power to regulate commerce, had passed a law leaving the regulation of their pilots in port to the several states. That congress could lawfully do this, and was not obliged by the constitution to vest in the courts of the United States jurisdiction over cases which were, by the pilot laws of the state, vested in its own tribunals, although such eases might otherwise have belonged to the admiralty jurisdiction; and that as this law was passed by the same congress as that which passed the judiciary act, giving the district court its admiralty jurisdiction, and only a few weeks before the passage of the judiciary act, it was clear congress did not intend to give that court jurisdiction over pilots, where it was already vested by the state, in its own courts.</p> <p>3. That the pilots in this case had done no more than they were required to do by law-no more than their duty; and that it was an invariable principle that no one could entitle himself to salvage by performing his duty. And that, besides, they were not entitled to compensation on salvage principles, and of course could not sue as salvors.</p> <p>4. That if this was to be deemed a case of pilotage, however extraordinary the compensation to which the pilots might be entitled, a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction over it, as it occurred within the body of a county; and, being a common law case, the common law courts have exclusive jurisdiction of it.</p> <p>5. That the libellants, being out in th nr boat in discharge of their official duties at the time they boarded the Wave, could not, by any agreement with her captain, divest themselves of their official character; and that the attempt to do it was a fraud upon the law. 1 Caines, 104. That the act of the state requires pilots, on boarding a vessel, to exhibit their printed instructions from the wardens, under a penalty of ten dollars; and that this provision was obviously designed to prevent thnir assuming to act in any other capacity. Section 18.</p> <p>A. Burr and W. Q. Morton, on behalf of the libellants, controverted these positions, and supported the decree.</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel for seaman’s wages. The libel alleged that about the 5th day of October, 1876, the steamer Waverly was lying at the port of Cleveland, bound on a voyage to Chicago, and thence back to Buffalo; that the master hired libellant to serve on board the steamer as a seaman, at stipulated monthly wages; that libellant signed shipping articles, and in pursuance thereof went on board and entered into the service of the steamer.

This was an action on the case [by Joseph W. Wayne against James B. Holmes.] tried by Judge Leavitt and a jury, to recover damages for the alleged infringement of letters-patent for an improvement in wash-boards, granted to Orin Rice, October 30, 1849, and assigned to plaintiff, January 15, 1851.

<p>Case No. 17,304.</p> <p>Patents — Proof of Date of Application — Patent-Office Records.</p> <p>1. Parol evidence is not admissible to show . at what time a patent was applied for.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Scott, 25 Fed. 473.]</p> <p>2. The patent-office contains written evidence ■of the fact, and it must be proved by such evidence.</p> <p>[For another case involving this patent, see Wayne v. Holmes, Case No. 17,303.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,305.</p> <p>Collision on Hudson River — Steamboat and Schooner — Beating- out Tack — Holding Vessel in Stays.</p> <p>1. A steamboat with two barges in tow, one on each side, and a schooner, were both bound down the Hudson river. The schooner was ahead of the steamer, and was beating down, the wind being about ahead, and the tide ebb. Just below the dock at West Camp, the steamer was on the west side of the river, but nearer the middle than the west shore, and the schooner was a short distance below, going to the westward, on her port tack. The steamer star-boarded, so as to go under the stern of the schooner: but the schooner, when she had gone but a "short distance beyond the line of the course of the steamboat, and without running as far to the west as she could have done, came about. The steamboat immediately stopped and reversed, but without being able to prevent a collision, by which the schooner was sunk: Me d, that it was the duty of the steamboat to avoid the schooner, and of the schooner to col-tinue her westward tack as far as was reasonably safe.</p> <p>[Cited in The Servia, 30 Fed. 507; The Uam-husdoon, Id. 710: The A. W. Thompson, 39 Fed. 116. Cited in brief in The Coe F. Young, 49 Fed. 168.]</p> <p>2. The schooner did not so continue her tack.</p> <p>3. Even if she did, she was in fault, under the 20th article of the rules for avoiding collisions, in that she was not held in stays long enough to allow the steamboat to pass.</p> <p>[Cited in The Renovator, 30 Fed. 195.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem for salvage service in saving a wreck. The owners appeared and claimed their property, and by answer disputed the amount claimed in the libel.

<p>[In the matter of Christopher Weaver, a bankrupt.]</p>

In equity. Heard for final decree upon pleadings and evidence. Held: as one of the mortgagees, came within the meaning of the term owner, decreed that the tax sale should be annulled and vacated. Alter then as holder of the notes secured by mortgage, obtained judgment and caused the mortgaged property to be seized under an execution, by the sheriff of the parish of St. Charles aud sold.

<p>[This was a libel by James H. Weaver against Hector McLellan to recover half pilot-age fees.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] The ship S. G. Owens was registered in… Held: by the district court of the United States (section 9), provides, nevertheless, that if the payment of her debts prior to the time of sale, shall be decreed by the said court, “the lien shall continue until the payment thereof shall be enforced by the process of such court.” A complete system of enforcing the lien is provided by the…

In this case, the register, Flamen Ball, Esq., made the following report: In pursuance of an order of reference, to me directed and issued by the court on the petition of Drausin Wulsin, Esq., assignee of said bankrupts, in the matter of th'e claim of Leonard A. Harris, collector of internal revenue of the United States, for the First district of Ohio, after notifying said collector, I sat at my office in Cincinnati, on the 22d day of March, and on the 1st day of April,…

LAppeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] The district court having given a decree in admiralty, [case unreported,] the libellee, who had been cast, appealed to this court.

The bankrupt held n lease from Gustavus Schurman’s estate, now in the hands of Robert Cochran, as receiver, by order of the Louisville chancery court, at an annual rental of two-thousand seven hundred dollars, which lease expires on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-two. J. C.

[In the matter of Watson T. Webb, a bankrupt.] Webb, at the time he was adjudged a bankrupt, was a member of the firm of Webb & Mallard. At the first meeting of his creditors the register permitted both joint creditors of Webb & Mallard and separate creditors of Webb to prove their debts and vote for as-signee. But two votes were cast for assignee, one by a joint creditor for James Hood, and one by a separate creditor for A. H. Ricketts.

In admiralty. The libel in this case was filed by the late Judge Glenn, on the 20th of November, 1851, while at the bar, but being appointed district judge, during the pendency of the cause, it was, under the act of congress, transferred to the circuit judge (TANEY, Chief Judge), to be tried before him.

<p>Case No. 17,319.</p> <p>Costs ox Ikjuxctiox fok Infringement of Copyright.</p> <p>Where an injunction is refused, but the plaintiff still has a right to proceed at law, if the plaintiff stipulate not to proceed at law, costs will not be awarded to either party.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,320.</p> <p>Shippixg — Charter by Master — Owxer Pro Hac Vice — Liability for Supplies.</p> <p>Where a master hires a vessel “on shares.” under an agreement to victual and man the vessel, and employ her in such voyages as he thinks best, having thereby the entire possession, command, and navigation of the vessel, and the relation of principal and agent not existing be- ■ tween the master and owners, the master thereby becomes the owner, pro hac vice, during such time as the contract exists: and he. and not the general owner, is responsible for necessary supplies.</p> <p>[Cited in Mayo v. Snow, Case No. 9.336: The Larch. Id. 8,OSÓ: The Freeman v. Buckingham, IS How. (59 TJ. S.) 190: Thomas v. Osborn, 19 How. (60 U. S.l SO: The Caroline Casey, Case No. 2.421a: Donahoe v. Kettell. Id. 3.980. Explained in Flaherty v. Doane, Id. 4.849. Cited in Thorp v. Hammond, 12 Wall. (79 U. H.l 416; Fox v. Holt, Case No. 5.012: The Montauk, Id. 9,717; Mott v. Ruckman, Id. 9.SS1: The India. 16 Fed. 263; Scull v. Raymond, 18 Fed. 550; The International, 30 Fed. 377; The L. L. Lamí). 31 Fed. 33: Douse v. Sargent. 48 Fed. 095. Approved in The Alvira. 03 Fed. 154.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Sims v. Howard. 40 Me. 277. Cited in Somes v. White. 65 Me. 546; Durando v. New York & N. Steam Boat Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 387.]</p>

This was a libel in personam, promoted by Messrs. Webb & Low, of Boston, ship-chandlers, to recover payment for stores furnished to the brig Antoinette, owned by the respondents, who lived in Belfast, Maine. At the time the stores were furnished, 'the brig was lying in Boston, and they were ordered by one Richards, the master, and nothing was said on either side, as to the party to whom credit should be given.

Bill in equity for an injunction by the plaintiff to prevent the defendant from diverting a watercourse from the plaintiff’s mill, and for further relief.

This was a bill in equity, filed February 7. 1S45. It alleged that, in March. 1832. Marsh & Co. published a book, called ‘‘Flora's Interpreter,” prepared by Mrs. S. J. Hale. who. for a satisfactory consideration, agreed that Marsh & Co. should be the exclusive proprietors of the book, and take out a copyright for the same in their own names.

2 [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. [Suit brought (by William H. Webb and Charles W.' S. Heaton against George W. -Quintard) on letters patent for an “improved ■defensive armor for ships and other batteries,” granted to complainant Charles W. S. Heaton, April 14, 1863. [The nature of the invention is set forth in the opinion, and will be readily understood by reference to the accompanying engraving, in which B represents the ordinary outer, planking of a ship; C,…

Action for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff [G. A. Webb] under section 35 of the bankrupt act — section 512S of the Revised Statutes.

<p>Case No. 17,326.</p> <p>Removal or Causes — What is a Suit at Law oír ix Equity?</p> <p>A motion, under the Missouri statute as to corporations, for execution against a stockholder cannot be removed to the federal court. It is not a “suit at law or in equity.” within the meaning of these words as used in the statutes giving the right of removal of causes from state to federal courts.</p> <p>[Cited in Petters v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.. Case No. 11.048; Buford v. Strother. 10 Fed. 40S; Pratt v. Albright, 9 Fed. 037; Filer v. Levy, 17 Fed. 613; Wol-cott v. Aspen Mining & Smelting Co., 34 Fed. 823; Lackawanna Coal & Iron Co. v. Bates, 56 Fed. 738.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Wilson v. St. Louis & S. F. By. Co., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 288, 291.]</p>

<p>[Claim' of Charles M. Weber, to the ranch of Campo de los Francesca, including the site of the city of Stockton.]</p>

<p>Surrey of the Stockton claim.</p>

On May 17th, 1S73, thirteen creditors of the company filed their petition, setting forth certain acts of bankruptcy, and praying that the company might be adjudged a bankrupt. Held: the Detroit Chair Company, a creditor of the Weber Company, filed with the register the following objections to the composition: First.

This was a petition in review to reverse the judgment of the district court refusing to record a resolution of compromise. [See Case No. 17.330.] The record is voluminous, and in order to develop all the points discussed on the argument, the facts would be extensive. There was a wide discrepancy between the compromise offered, and the apparent value of the property.

<p>Case No. 17,332.</p> <p>Customs Frauds — Compromise of Criminal Prosecution- — Authority of Secretary of Treasury —Rights of Informers — Judgment in Friendly Suit — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>1. Frauds upon the customs revenue were discovered, and criminal proceedings instituted against the offenders, and action commenced to recover the duties estimated to be due. Upon negotiation, the secretary of the treasury, acting under section 10 of the act of March 3, 1863 [12 Stat. 740], authorized a compromise, — that all said civil and criminal proceedings should be discontinued, and the offenders should pay to the United States $59,-722 in gold, on account of said duties, and $32,-000 in currency, on account of penalties incurred, and thereupon be relieved from all liabilities. All said proceedings were accordingly stopped, and the sums mentioned paid into the registry of the court, but only after confession of judgment in a friendly action of debt for the several amounts as penalties, instituted by the district attorney. The United States claimed the entire gold fund as duties. The customs officers claimed one-fourth as their legal share of the fund as penalties, and two sets of informers claimed shares of the fund as penalties. against the United States, and as between each other. Hold, that the compromise was without legal or binding effect, and invalid, in not having been made in accordance with the said section, and the secretary of the treasury had no power, under any law, to compromise criminal proceedings in such a case. Notwithstanding the invalidity of the compromise, the entire gold fund adjudged upon the admission of the offenders in the negotiations which led to it, and upon other uncontradicted evidence, to belong wholly to the government as duties.</p> <p>2. The record in the said friendly action of debt tvas not conclusive evidence of the rights of the parties and the character of the fund.</p> <p>3. As between two sets of informers, where the first information of the frauds, which led to the eventual recovery of the penalties, was given by one set. and the other rendered valuable service in collecting evidence and testimony, and expended money therefor, without which it was doubtful whether any considerable sum would have been realised, held, that the first set, that gave the information which induced the prosecution, was entitled to the informer's share.</p>

Writ of entry, dated the 15th of February, 1838. Held: that the limitation to tile remainder-man upon these contingencies must be construed as a general remainder over. And we contend, that the remainder over in the present case should be construed in the same way, since estates for life are usually determined by the death of the tenant for life.

Suit for specific performance of contract for the sale of lands, commenced in the state court by publication against the defendant, a non-resident. By the published notice or summons the defendant was required to answer on the 16 th day of May, 1870, that being the first day of the May term.

Rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered on the bail-bond, the defendant having been discharged under the insolvent laws of Pennsylvania, passed in 1790 and 1798. This law only discharges the person from imprisonment or arrest, in any of the cases of creditors, returned as such by the debtor. Mr. M’Shane, in favour of the rule, read the following cases: 2 Strange, 733; 1 Atk. 255; Cooke, Bankr.

<p>Case No. 17,337.</p> <p>Infringement of Patents — Combinations—Omission of Element — Mechanical Equivalents —Looms for Weaving Pile Fabrics.</p> <p>1. Where a patent has been granted for a combination of old mechanical elements, it is an infringement to use all of the elements but one, and for the one not used, substitute another old element, which, at the time of the invention, was known as its mechanical equivalent, performing substantially the same functions.</p> <p>[Cited in Welling v. Rubber-Coated Harness-Trimming Co., Case No. 17,382; Putnam v. Hutchinson, 12 Fed. 134.]</p> <p>2. In order to avoid the charge of infringement in such cases, the substituted element must be a new one, or must perform a substantially different function, or must be unknown at the date of the patent as a proper substitute for the one omitted from the patented combination.</p> <p>[Cited in Welling v. Rubber-Coated Harness-Trimming Co., Case No. 17,382.]</p> <p>3. The patent granted to William Webster, August 27th, 1872, for “a new and useful im'provement in looms for weaving pile fabrics,” described and claimed the invention to be a combination of mechanical elements, one of which was a wire bar. or trough mounted on a vertical shaft, pivoted at the outer end, with the end nearest to the loom oscillating to the extent required to transport the wire into the shed. The defendant used a loom containing all of the elements of Webster’s patent, except that last mentioned, for which was substituted a wire bar or trough mounted upon a horizontal rock shaft, supported by two arms, and reciprocating equally throughout its whole length. It was shown by the evidence that the latter method of supporting the trough was old in the art at the date of Webster’s invention, and that it performed no different function from the Webster method. Held, that the defendant’s loom infringed the patent of Webster.</p> <p>[Distinguished in WTebster Loom Co. v. Higgins, Case No. 17,342.]</p> <p>NOTE [from 5 O. G. 522], This cause having been brought on to be finally heard on the pleadings and proofs, and Air. C. A. Seward and Mr. B. R. Curtis having been heard on behalf of the plaintiffs, and Mr. Richard Wayne Parker on the behalf of the defendant, and due deliberation having been thereupon had, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, and this court, by virtue of the power and authority therein vested, doth order, adjudge, and decree: I. That the letters patent set forth in the bill herein issued to William Webster on the 27th day of August, 1872, for a new and useful improvement in looms for weaving pile fabrics, numbered 130,-961, are valid in law. II. That the plaintiffs are 'the sole and exclusive owners of all the rights created or conferred by said letters patent. III. That the defendant has infringed and violated said letters patent by using within the city. of New Brunswick, and within the jurisdiction of this court, carpet-looms containing the improvements described in said letters patent and recited in the fifth claim thereof. IV. That the said defendant do account to the said plaintiffs both for the damages sustained by them and for the profits made by the said defendant in consequence of such infringement. V. That an account of the said damages and of the said profits be taken and stated by S. D. Oliphant, Esq., a counselor-at-law, and the clerk of this court as master of this court, pro hac vice; and that the defendant, its attorneys, agents, servants, and employes, attend before the said master, from time to time, on notification from him. and under his direction; and that the plaintiffs may examine the said defendant, its officers, employes, attorneys, agents, and servants under oath, as to the several matters pending on the said reference; and that the said defendant produce before the said master on oath all such deeds, contracts, specifications, papers, and writings, as the said master shall direct, in their custody, or under their control, or subject to their order, relating to said matters which shall be pending before said master; and that the said master have all the authority and power conferred upon masters in like cases, by the 77th rule prescribed by the supreme court of the United States, as rules of practice for the courts of equity of the United States. VI. That a perpetual injunction issue out of and under the seal of this court, against the said defendant, commanding it, its attorneys, agents, servants, workmen, officers, and employes, to desist and refrain from making, using, or vending any looms for carpets containing or embodying any of the inventions or improvements described in said original letters patent to the said William Webster, and recited in the claims thereof; and from in any manner infringing upon or violating any of the rights or privileges granted or secured by said letters patent. VII. That the said plaintiffs recover of the said defendant, as well the damages as the profits, which shall be reported by the said master hereunder; and that upon the confirmation of his report, a decree be entered against the defendant therefor, and also for .the costs of the plaintiffs in this suit in this court, and that the plaintiffs have execution therefor, and for the compensation of the said master, to be fixed on the coming in and confirmation of his report. VIII. That the parties and master may apply, upon due notice to this court upon the foot of this decree, for such other and further order, instructions, and directions as may be necessary. [The cause was subsequently heard on exceptions to the master’s report. See Case No. 17,-338.] [For other cases involving this patent, see note to Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, Case No. 17,-342.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,338.</p> <p>Infringement of Patents — Accounting—Bukdex ■ of Proof — Ascertainment of Profits— Patented Improvements.</p> <p>1. In taking an account under a decree for the infringement of a patent, where the profits and damages are to be estimated upon the extent of the use of the infringing machines in manufacturing an article, it is incumbent on the complainants to show affirmatively the number of yards produced by the use of such machines.</p> <p>2. Where a witness stated that a certain number of yards were manufactured, but did not state in precise terms that it was the entire quantity produced, and gave other evidence of the capacity of the infringing machines, which tended to show that a much larger quantity might have been manufactured, and the master inferred that the witness did not mean to indicate the whole production, and for want of more sufficient data reported in favor of the amount which an average of the number of the machines used, under favorable conditions of operation, were capable of producing within a specified time: Ecld, that the master was in error, as the question is not what could be, but what was produced by the use of the complainants’ invention.</p> <p>3. The master should have made liis estimate of the profits for which the defendaut is chargeable. upon the actual production by the use of the instrumentalities employed, and not upon the capacity of such instrumentalities.</p> <p>4. Where the complainants’ invention is an improvement upon an existing . machine by which its productive capacity is increased, the measure of the complainants’ profits is to be ascertained from the consideration of the advantage which has resulted to the defendant by his unauthorized use of the complainants’ invention, and would be the amount produced over and above what would have been produced by the machines if the complainants’ improvement had not been used.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 43 Fed. 674.]</p> <p>5. Profits are in the nature of damages which up to the date of the final decree are unliquidat-ed, and interest should not be allowed before that time.</p> <p>[For other eases involving this patent, see note to Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, Case No. 17,-342.]</p>

This is an action of covenant, upon an agreement under seal, executed by both parties, whereby the plaintiff agrees, for three years, to play and perform upon the Philadelphia and Baltimore theatres, under the management of the defendant, such parts and characters as should be allotted to him by the managers, to attend the rehearsals at the times appointed, and to pay, or permit the manager to retain, such forfeits as he, Webster, may incur, according to a table of forfeits…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] On the 9th day of May, 1872, John M. Wool-bridge obtained a judgment in the Pettis county circuit court against Powhatan Wool-bridge for $6,269.08 on which an execution was issued, tested May 21, 1872, directed to the sheriff of St. Louis county, returnable at the September term, 1872. of the Pettis county circuit court.

<p>Case No. 17,341.</p> <p>Patent Infringement Suits — Amendments to Answer — New Defenses.</p> <p>In a suit in equity on a patent, the defendant, more than one year after the plaintiff's proofs were closed, moved to amend the sworn answer, by averring, on information and belief, that the patented invention was in public use for more than two years before the patent was applied for, and that it was described in a prior patent granted by the United States. The only excuse offered for not inserting the first defence in the original answer was. that the counsel who prepared such answer was under the impression that the suit was subject to the law as it stood prior to the patent act of July 8. 1S70 [16 Stat. 198]. As to the second defence, the excuse was, that such counsel had no¡ knowledge or information of any description in any patent prior to the plaintiff’s, of a certain device: Held, that the motion must be denied.</p> <p>[Cited in De Florez v. Raynolds, Case No. 3,-743; Page v. Holmes Burglar-Alarm. Tel. Co., 2 Fed. 333; Spill v. Celluloid Manuf’g Co., 22 Fed. 97; Witters v. Sowles, 31 Fed. 10; Rice y. Bge, 42 Fed. 660.]</p> <p>[For other eases involving this patent, see note to Webster Loom Oo. v. Higgins, Case No. 17,-342.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,342.</p> <p>Patents — Sufficiency op Specifications — Combination Claims — Agshegations—Prior Use— Shifting Borden of Proof — Pile Fabric Looms.</p> <p>1. The letters patent issued August 27th, 1S72. to William Webster, for an improvement in looms for weaving pile fabrics, are invalid.</p> <p>2. In respect to the fifth claim of said patent, namely. ‘Tn combination, the lay and its rigid shuttle box, the pivoted vibrating wire trough, the reciprocating driving slide, and the latch moving thereon, the latter being operated by the wire box, the combination being and operating substantially as described.” the descriptive part of the specification is insufficient.</p> <p>3. The combination set forth in said fifth claim is not a patentable combination, but a mere aggregation of devices.</p> <p>4. When a defendant has shown prior knowledge and use, the burden of showing prior invention is on the plaintiff.</p> <p>[Cited in Washburn & Moen Manuf’g Co. v. Haish, 4 Fed. 904: Thayer v. Hart. 20 Fed. 694; Kittle v. Hall, 29 Fed. 514; Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Julien Electric Co., 38 Fed. 127.]</p> <p>5. Webster was not the first inventor of the invention sought to be covered by said fifth claim.</p>

The Webster Loom Company, a corporation created under tbe laws of tbe state of New York, filed its bill for an infringement of a patent. It made á New Jersey corporation and two of its directors and trustees defendants.

<p>Case No. 17,344.</p> <p>Tug-boat and Tow — Delay in Voyage — Storm— Burden or Proof.</p> <p>1. On the 6th of November. 1S71, a tug-boat took iu tow a barge, at Elizabethport, Ñ. J., to tow her to Brooklyn. She reached Tort Johnson, in the Kills, that day, and left the barge there, coming on to New York herself that night. The next morning she took a tow back to Elizabethport, and there took in tow •other boats, which she brought to Port Johnson. and there picked up the barge and started ■on with her. In towing the barge across New York Bay, the latter was sunk in consequence of a storm. The tug-boat alleged that she left the barge at Port Johnson because the weather was such that it was unsafe to tow her through, and that the storm by which she was sunk, on the 7th, was an unexpected squall: Held, that the tug was bound to have towed the barge from Elizabethport to Brooklyn, without leaving her at Port Johnson, unless there was good reason for doing so.</p> <p>[Cited in The King Kalakau, 43 Fed. 172.]</p> <p>2. If it were shown that there was good reason for having left the barge at Port Johnson, the burden of proof was on the tug to show that there was no time, before she did take the barge in tow again, when she could have proceeded with her so as to have avoided the sudden squall.</p> <p>3. She had not shown this, and was liable for the loss of the barge and her cargo.</p> <p>[Cited in The E. D. Holton, 55 Fed. 1013.]</p>

<p>'Case No. 17,345.</p> <p>Depositions — Presence op Witness — Confessions.</p> <p>1. The deposition of a witness, who is at the place where the court is held, if objected to, cannot he read if the witness be able to attend the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Whitford v. Countv of Clark. 119 U. S. 525, 7 Sup. Ct. 30S.)</p> <p>2. The confessions of a silent partner, not known in the proceedings, may be given in evidence.</p>

<p>[This was an action by N. Weed & Co. against Asa Miller on a promissory note.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,347.</p> <p>Pakol Evidence — Receipts — Patmext — Giving Note — Baxic Notes — Yaliditt.</p> <p>1.A receipt is only evidence of payment, and may be explained or contradicted by parol.</p> <p>[Cited in The Cayuga, 8 C. C. A. 190, 59 Fed._4S5.]_</p> <p>2. A note is not payment unless it be expressly received as such.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Moore v. The Newbury, Case No. 9,772. See Allen v. King, Case No. 226.]</p> <p>3. The safety fund law. which prohibited all banks subsequently established, from issuing notes except they are payable on demand and without interest, applies to a bank charter granted on the same day.</p> <p>4. And where notes are issued in violation of such law, they are void.</p> <p>[Cited in Davis v. Bank of River Raisin, Case No. 3,626.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in McMurray v. St. Louis Oil Manuf’g Co., 33 Mo. 382.]</p> <p>[5. Cited in U. S. v. Chong Sam, 47 Fed. 883, to the point that an act takes effect from the day of its approval by the executive, and includes that day, unless its operation is postponed by its own terms.]</p>

On demurrer to the petition. The plaintiff’ is the Weed Sewing Machine Company, which the petition alleges to be created by the laws of the state of Connecticut and a citizen thereof. The petition states that the defendants are citizens of Missouri and residents in the Western district thereof.

[In the matter of George S. Weeks, a bankrupt.] 2 [I, the undersigned register in charge of the above entitled matter, to whom it was referred by a special order of this court, bearing date April 17, 1875, to inquire on testimony, and report whether the petitioner referred to in said order be entitled to the dividend heretofore declared on the amount proved by said petitioner herein, or, if not, to what amount the said claim should be reduced, do hereby certify and report…

On the 25th of October, 1869, Eldridge recovered a judgment in the superior court of Chicago, against Charles R. Weeks, upon which an execution was on the same day duly issued and delivered to the sheriff of Cook county.

<p>Case No. 17,351.</p> <p>Salvage Compensation — Cargo Saved from Wreck — Seamen’s Wages in Cases of Wreok.</p> <p>[1. One third part awarded as salvage in a case where the vessel was lost and part of the cargo saved, and where the salvage was not attended with extraordinary hazard or diffieulty.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hand v. The Elvira, Case No. 6,-015; Smith v. The Joseph Steward, Id. 13,-070.]</p> <p>[2. The general rule that if a ship perishes the mariner loses his wages does not apply when any part of the cargo is saved. He is entitled to his wages out of the goods saved, at least for the cime served before loss, and so long thereafter as his attention and services are needed in caring for the goods saved.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Two Catherines, Case No. 14,- • 288; Lewis v. The Elizabeth & Jane, Id. 8,321; Poland v. The Spartan, Id. 11,246; The Dawn, Id. 3,666.]</p>

The demurrers in these cases were argued and submitted together. The actions were brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs in the sale of their respective shares of stock of the Oregon Steam Navigation Company, a corporation formed and existing under the laws of Oregon, for the purpose of navigating the 'Columbia river and its tx-ibutaries.

<p>Case No. 17.353.</p> <p>Authority of Insurance Agents — Preliminary Parol Contract — Enforcement — Waiver of Conditions.</p> <p>1. Where ■ an insurance agent is furnished with blank policies which he is authorized to fill up and deliver and make binding until can-celled, his authority to make this larger completed contract includes an authority to make a preliminary executory contract to enter into it.</p> <p>2. A parol agreement for insurance must include the subject of insurance, the time, amount, and premium.</p> <p>3. Where under the circumstances the policy would have been binding, if one had issued, the agreement to insure will be binding.</p> <p>4. "Where a policy should have issued, pursuant to agreement, but was refused, such refusal is a waiver of the conditions in such policies requiring proof of loss within a certain time.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by John S. Weeks and others against the steamer New Orleans to recover damages for a collision.] Pacts Pound by the Court.

This was an appeal by the libellant from a decree of the district court, in a suit in rem, in admiralty, dismissing the libel. [Case unreported.] This court found the following facts: “The Eastern Transportation Line, having its office in the city of New York, was engaged in the business of towing boats and vessels for hire, between New York and ports on Long Island Sound, and elsewhere.

<p>On motion to remand.</p>

On the nineteenth of November, 1790, a libel was filed in this court by Mr. Banltson. one of the proctors of the court, in behalf of Er-riek Weiberg and Nicholas Casterius, two mariners belonging to the brig St. Oloff. a Swedish vessel under the command of Jonas Holm-stedt.

Action on fire insurance policy. The policy contained the usual condition as to the duty of the-assured to give notice of the fire, and to render a particular account of the loss, signed and sworn to by the assured, and to produce a certificate of a magistrate as to the loss, and his opinion as to' its bona fides.

<p>Case No. 17,360.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Slipper Patents — Embroidery —Bead Ornaments — Manufactures of Paper — Printed Matter.</p> <p>[1. Slipper patterns made of cotton canvas embroidered with worsted, and designed to be filled with more embroideries, are dutiable as embroidered manufactures of cotton, and not as manufactures of worsted.]</p> <p>[2. Slipper eases consisting of cotton canvas embroidered with beads are dutiable as embroidered manufactures of cotton, and not as bead ornaments.]</p> <p>[3. Perforated cardboard, on which are printed sentences or mottoes to be filled in with embroidery, are manufactures of paper, and not printed matter.]</p> <p>[4. Cardboard, on which is imprinted in colors an ornamental design or patent for the purpose of showing the method of embroidering the patent upon canvas, is a manufacture of paper.]</p> <p>[5. Pattern books consisting of sheets of paper stitched or folded together, upon which designs or patterns are printed in colors, are dutiable as printed matter.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,361.</p> <p>Acts op Bankruptcy — Suspending Payment op Commercial Paper — Partnership.</p> <p>Firm dissolved, with written agreement, that one member should assume and pay its obligations, including outstanding commercial paper. Payment thereof was suspended, and was not resumed in fourteen days. Held, that such suspension was an act of bankruptcy, and the firm must be adjudicated bankrupts. It is unnecessary to allege or prove fraud in such suspension, where payment is not resumed within a period of fourteen days. In re Wells [Case No. 17,-387],</p> <p>[Cited in Baldwin v. Wilder, Case No. 806; Re Hercules Mut. Life Assur. Co., Id. 6,-402.]</p> <p>[See Re Ballard, Case No. 816.]</p> <p>[Cited in klarble v. Janesville Manuf’g Co., 163 Mass. 180, 39 N. E. 1002.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,362.</p> <p>Effect of Pardon — Otijer Offenses — Forfeitures UNDER REVENDE LAWS.</p> <p>1. The recital of a specific, distinct offense in a pardon by the president limits its operation to that offense, and such pardon does not embrace any other offense for which separate penalties and punishments are prescribed.</p> <p>2. A pardon from sentence for conspiracy to defraud the revenue, does not entitle the defendant to demand cancellation of a judgment of forfeiture for fraud upon the revenue.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,363.</p> <p>1. To sustain the allegations of the declaration in this suit, which is for aiding or abetting in the escape of slaves, under the fugitive slave act of 1850, it must appear that the alleged fugitives were slaves who had escaped from service, and had been arrested by the owner or his agent; and that the defendant, with knowledge of these facts, aided and abetted their escape.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Buck, Case No. 14.680.]</p> <p>[Cited in TI. S. v. Weld, 1 Kan. 597.]</p> <p>2. The statute authorizes an arrest, either by the owner or his agent, with or without warrant; but, when made by an agent, he must be authorized by a written power of attorney, executed and authenticated as required by the statute.</p> <p>3. To make the defendant liable, it must appear that he had notice or knowledge that tile slaves were fugitives, and were, at the time of the alleged unlawful interference, in custody under an arrest: but this notice or knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.</p> <p>4. The test of the legality of an arrest is the law, and not the opinion of the defendant.</p> <p>5. Any words or actions tending to effect an escape, and which lead to that result, are sufficient to implicate the defendant in the charge of aiding or abetting the escape.</p> <p>6. An intention to effect an escape must appear, but such intention may be inferred from the facts. Every one is presumed to have intended the result necessarily and legitimately flowing from his acts.</p> <p>7. A party acting as counsel for a fugitive slave, is protected from the consequences of his acts, so far only as they are within the proper limits of his professional duty.</p>

This was an involuntary petition, and-on the return day of the order to show cause, the respondent appeared by his guardian, and filed an answer, stating that at the time of filing the petition he was insane, and under guardianship from the county court of Crawford county, and also, that he was insane at the time the several acts of bankruptcy are charged to have been committed.

<p>[In the matter of William Welch, a bankrupt.]</p> <p>The register in this ease certified to the court, that the assignee had been requested by the. bankrupt to set apart to him such property as he was entitled to, under the provisions for exempt property in the bankruptcy act; that the property mainly consisted of “dry and fancy goods;” that, thereupon, the assignee set apart two suits of clothes, three shirts and a cook stove, valued at $16.50, but declined to set apart any of said dry and fancy goods; that the assignee then sold all “the property of the bankrupt not so exempt,” for $1.333.42; and that, thereupon, the bankrupt requested the as-signee to set off and allow to him out of the proceeds of such sale a sum sufficient to make the amount of exemption $500, which the assignee declined to do. The register, on request of the assignee and the bankrupt, certified the question to the court.</p>

In this case two executions were issued to a sheriff against the property of William Welch, one on a judgment for $293 11, and one on a judgment for $3,265 06, under which the sheriff levied on the personal property of Welch. A petition in bankruptcy was then filed, and an injunction issued against the sheriff. On the proving of claims, the claim of the first judgment creditor was objected to and contested. The as-signee sold the property for $1,333 42.

This was an action of covenant in the name of James Welch, the plaintiff, but for the. use, and by the order of Allen Prior, against Mandeville & Jamesson, upon a contract for the sale of land to them by Welch.

Motion to appoint a commissioner to levy and collect taxes to pay the plaintiff’s judgment. Held: and that the failure to elect is for the purpose of preventing the petitioner and others from collecting their bonds; that there is no way in which the petitioner can collect but by the relief prayed for, which is a writ of mandamus to compel Rozier and the aider-men named to levy a tax upon the inhabitants and property of the city…

Writ of entry dated April 6, 1860, plea nul disseisin. The demandant [David Weld] attached the premises by dud process as the property of Caleb Burbank, on the 8th of October, 1853. Judgment for the plaintiff was rendered October 24, 1S57, and he levied his execution on the premises on the 24th of November, same year. Burbank acquired title by deed of warranty from one Joseph Chamberlain, dated November 7, 1S35, duly acknowledged and recorded.

<p>Case No. 17,374.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Equipments and Appuktenan-oes of Ship — -When not Dutiable.</p> <p>1. An anchor and chain cable, which is bona fide a part of the equipments and appurtenances of an American vessel, is not, on being brought by her to the United States, subject to duty, under the revenue laws of the United States.</p> <p>2. If an anchor and chain cable is purchased abroad, by an American vessel, to supply the place of one which has become unsea-worthy, from any cause, after the sailing of the vessel from a port of the United States, and if such purchase is made bona fide, for the use of the vessel, and not to sell it again as merchandise, and if it is used for the vessel, then it is bona fide a part of the equipments and appurtenances of the vessel, and not subject to duty, upon its being imported into the United States.</p> <p>3. To be merely used as a part of the equipments and appurtenances of the vessel is not sufficient to change tbe character of the articles, and to convert them from goods, wares and merchandise into a portion of the vessel. They must also bo bona fide such a part, u-nder a necessity not occasioned by any fault of her master or owners in not properly equipping her originally for her voyage.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,375.</p> <p>Payment or Judgment — Receipt of Depott Glebe — Fuaed—Liability of Glebe —Execution.</p> <p>1. WThere defendants, by the misrepresentation of their agent, procured the deputy clerk to receive an assignment of a judgment, and depreciated paper, in payment of a judgment, for which he gave a receipt, the plaintiffs are not bound by it, and may issue their execution.</p> <p>2. Such an arrangement being wholly unauthorized by the plaintiffs, the court will not set aside the execution.</p> <p>3. Nor will the court enter a rule on the clerk to pay over the paper received by his deputy, the clerk never having sanctioned the arrangement.</p> <p>4. The clerk is bound by the acts of his deputy, but where the act is not in the ordinary course of business, and, especially, where it has been done through the procurement and misrepresentations of a party, the liability of the clerk may be doubtful.</p> <p>5. Under such circumstances the court will not give to the party a summary mode of redress.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Henry S. "Welles, a bank-mpt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,378.</p> <p>■Jurisdiction of Federal Court — Colorable Assignment of Cause of Action.</p> <p>[Where a note is transferred by a bank to a ■nonresident of the state to secure a prior debt, •and is to be restored to the bank in case the ■debt is paid, and the transfer is made merely for the purpose of suing in the United States •court, the note still remaining the property of the bank, the transferee cannot sue thereon in that court.]</p>

Upon affidavit that witnesses resided in 'Fredericksburg (less than one hundred miles from Alexandria)— moved for a commission to Yirginia, to take the depositions of those witnesses to be used as well in a suit in chancery, as at common law depending in this court. The chancery suit was at issue and a general dedimus bad been awarded.

<p>[This was a hill in equity by William M. Welling against the Rubber-Coated Harness Trimming Company and others for infringement of a patent.]</p>

In equity. [This was a motion for an attachment for an alleged violation of an injunction restraining the defendants from making, using, or vending any harness or carriage trimmings containing the invention of the plaintiff [William M. Welling], to wit. “a ring, manufactured as set forth substantially,” with “a metal ring enveloped in composition, as and for the puiposes specified.” The injunction had been obtained upoD proof that the defendants ■had made rings for harness…

In admiralty. Libellant shipped on board this vessel, at the port of Vermillion, in the state of Ohio, to be delivered at the port of Milwaukee, six hundred and thirty-five barrels of apples. The bill of lading is a clean bill-dangers of navigation only excepted, and duly signed by the master. One hundred and ninety-five barrels of the apples not having been delivered to the consignee, this libel was brought to recover their value.

[This was an appeal by George Wellman from a decision of the commissioner of patents in an interference proceeding. The interference was originally declared between an application of Samuel Blood, assignor of Blood & Dix, and the patent of Horace Woodman; and said Wellman came in as a party before the hearing. The commissioner’s decision was that the said Samuel Blood was the first inventor.]

This was the petition of J. Madison Wells, Thomas C. Anderson, Louis M. Kenner and Gardone Casanave, for a writ of certiorari to the superior criminal court of the parish of Orleans.

<p>[This was a petition by H. B. Claflin & Co. for an adjudication in bankruptcy against Alfred L. Wells & Son.]</p>

At law. For a writ of habeas corpus. ' It appears that the petitioner was convicted of murder at the December term of the erim-inal court, 1851, and was sentenced to be hung for murder April 23d, 1852, on which day the president of the United States granted him a pardon, upon the condition that he he imprisoned during his natural life.

<p>Case No. 17,388.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Insolvency Defined — Involuntary Proceedings.</p> <p>1. Held, when a man’s property is taken on legal process against him. that if all his property were sold, and would not produce money enough to pay his debts, that he is insolvent within the meaning of the law.</p> <p>2. A solvent man is one that is able to pay all his debts in full as they become due.</p> <p>3. It is the duty of one who is insolvent to apply to the bankrupt court in his own behalf, and if he does not, and some of his creditors take his property under legal process, he may be held to have suffered his property to be taken, and may be adjudged a bankrupt at the instance of creditors whose claims have not been provided for.</p> <p>[Cited in Starkweather v. Cleveland Ins. Co., Case No. 13.30S: Beattie v. Gardner, Id. 1,195; Re Heller, Id. 6,337; Haskell v. Ingalls, Id. 6,193; Re Dunkle, Id. 4.160.]</p> <p>[Cited in Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 156.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New7 York.)</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,389a.</p> <p>Collision — Pleading and Proofs — Sailing Vessels .on Crossing Tacks.</p> <p>[1. In cases of collision at sea in open view of all parties, courts look carefully to the first version given, and view with distrust all additions or subtractions therefrom. Hence the court will cautiously restrain each party from setting up a case by his proofs which is contradictory to that made by his pleadings.]</p> <p>[2. Omission of the libel to state facts which on the hearing are made cardinal points in the cause — such as the course and strength of the wind, the tacks on which the colliding vessels were running, how far from the shores the collision took place, etc. — is faulty pleading, and not in compliance with admiralty rule 23 of the supreme court]</p> <p>[3. A sailing vessel tacking up Delaware Bay in the midst of a squadron of similar vessels held in fault for keeping so negligent a lookout that she did not discover one of the other vessels, which was coming up very fast astern of her, and making her tacks but little to leeward, until she was within 40 or 50 yards.]</p> <p>[4. When two sailing vessels on opposite , tacks are crossing each other, and there is a probability of collision, the one on the starboard tack keeps close to the wind, and the one on the larboard tack must beat away, or lie answerable for the consequences.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The decree of this court was reversed by the circuit court, and a reference ordered to ascertain the amount of libellant’s damages. Case No. 17,389. For exceptions to the commissioners’ report, see Id. 17.389b. An appeal was subsequently taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was modified as to damages. 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 538.]</p>

This ease came up on exceptions to a commissioner’s report. The libel was filed to recover for the sinking of the schooner William H. Wells, owned by the libelant, by the Ann Caroline [Case No. 17.889a], and a decree was given for the libelant on an appeal to this court [Id. 17.389], and it was referred-to a commissioner to ascertain the damages. The commissioner reported the value of the Wells at 85,000.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Samuel Wells against the Central Vermont Railroad Company and others.]</p>

[These were bills in equity by Eliza Wells against John Gill and others, and Henry J. Yates and others, for infringement of a patent.]

<p>Case No. 17,392.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bill — Sale of Real Estate — Suit to Set Aside — Title of Plaintiff.</p> <p>[1. In a proceeding to set aside a sale of real estate, the plaintiff must possess a judgment lien, or a lien by levy.]</p> <p>[2. The objection that he has no lien is waiy-ed, unless taken in the answer.]</p> <p>[3. To authorize an appellate court to reverse a decree on a question of fact, it should be able to say that, were the case reargued in the court below, that court would reconsider its own judgment.]</p>

In equity. Motion for provisional injunction. Suit [by Eliza Wells against John Gill and George H. Gill] brought upon reissued letters patent for improvement in machinery for making hat-bodies, No. 2,942, dated May 19, 180S, granted to Eliza Wells, as administratrix of Henry A. Wells, deceased.

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Eliza Wells against Ira Gill and others] upon reissued patent, No. 2,942, to Eliza Wells, dated May 19, 1868. The history of this patent, the claims of the original and of the reissue, together with an engraving of the Wells machine, will be found in Wells v. Jacques [Case No. 17,398],

In equity. Bill for infringement of a patent for an invention. Held: in the form of a bat, only by the pressure of the surrounding air induced by the exhaustion of air from the inside of the cone, and hence, if, in that condition, the operation of the exhausting mechanism should be suspended, the fibres would be no longer held by the surrounding air, and would, by force of gravity, fall and destroy…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Eliza Wells against Henry H. Jacques and others for infringement of a patent.]</p>

In equity. Motion for a provisional injunction. Suit brought [by Eliza Wells against Henry H. Jacques and others] upon letters patent for “improvements in the machinery for making hat-bodies, and in the process of their manufacture,” granted to Henry A. Wells, April 25, 1846. This patent was reissued in two divisions, one dated September 30, 1858, and numbered 396, the other dated October 7,1858, and numbered 400.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] Packages of liquors, the same as those described in the libel, and marked “John H. Wells, Portsmouth, N. H., via E. R. R.,” meaning the Eastern Railroad, were, on the 17th of October, 1872, shipped at the port of New York, on board of one of the steamers of the respondents, plying between the port of shipment and the port of Portland, as evidenced by the receipt of the respondents, who it is…

<p>In admiralty; This was a libel in personam, by [Joseph Wells and others] American seamen against [John Meldrun] the master of an American vessel, to recover two months’ extra wages, under the 3d section of the act of congress of February 28, 1803 (2 Stat. 203), which provides, “that whenever a ship or vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States shall be sold in a foreign country, and her company discharged, it shall be the duty of the master or commander to produce to the consul, vice-consul, -commercial agent, or vice-commercial agent, the list of his ship’s company, certified as aforesaid,” (in the manner prescribed in the 1st section) “and to pay to such consul, vice-consul, &c., for every seaman or mariner so discharged, 'being designated on such list as a citizen of the United States, three months’ pay, over and above the wages which may then be due to such mariner or seaman; two-thirds thereof to be paid by such consul or commercial agent to each seaman or mariner so discharged, upon his engagement on board of any vessel to return to the United States, and the other remaining third to be retained for the purpose of creating a fund,” &c. The libellants shipped on a voyage from Xew-Yorli to ports in the bay of Mexico, and back. The vessel proceeded to Campeachy, and was there condemned as un-seaworthy, and sold, and the libellants were discharged, receiving only their wages up to the time of discharge. They demanded, at the time, the extra wages for which this action was brought, but payment was refused, and they afterwards returned to New-York.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,403.</p> <p>Internal Revenue Collectors — Payments to Inspector.</p> <p>Money collected by a collector of internal revenue, under the act of congress of March 3, 1791 [1 Stat. 199], and paid over by him to the inspector, cannot be recovered back by the collector as money had and received to his use.</p>

<p>’ This was originally an action of ejectment, and the plaintiff recovered in this court, and the judgment was affirmed by 'the supreme court as stated below. The present questions arise out of the application of the defendant, under the occupying claimant’s statute of the state. Revision of Iowa, c. 97.</p> <p>This statute enacts that "where an occupant of land has color of title thereto, and in good faith has made any valuable improvements thereon, and is afterwards in the proper action found not to be the rightful owner thereof,” he may be allowed in the manner therein provided the value of the improvements.</p> <p>The facts are as follows: The husband of the defendant, Hannah Riley, settled upon the premises in question in 1S55, and in 1S57 he died, leaving the defendant and several minor children. The defendant applied to the land officers to be permitted to enter the land. Her application was refused until the decision of the case of Litchfield against the Du-buque & Pacific Railroad Company, in 1860. She then renewed her application and was permitted to enter the land. She proved up in 1862, and obtained a patent in 1863. Plaintiff claimed title to the land under a deed from the Des Moines Navigation Company, and the navigation company claimed title from the state of Iowa, and the state of Iowa under act of congress of 1846, and subsequent acts. The circuit court of the United States held that the title was in the plaintiff. Wells. [Case unreported.] The defendant appealed to the supreme court of the United States, and (he decision of the court below was affirmed. [154 U. S. 578, 14 Sup. Ct. 1166.] Then the defendant, Hannah Riley, filed a petition as an occupying claimant, ashing for an appraisement of her improvements, and by agreement of counsel for both parties, the court appointed three commissioners to examine the premises and report to the court the value of the improvements made by the defendant, and in regard to the value of timber cut off and taken away by her, and the value of the rents.</p> <p>The commissioners in their report found: 1st. Value of improvements, including taxes paid by the defendant, 82.S23.S9. 2d. Value of rent and use of said land, $300. 3d. Value of timber cut and destroyed by defendant on said land, 8170.50. This leaves balance in favor of Hannah Riley of 82,353.39.</p> <p>Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to set aside the finding of commissioners, stating exceptions, and relying upon the following extract from the opinion of the supreme court in deciding the main case. The supreme court say: “That the land of which the lot in question was a part had been withdrawn from sale and entry on account of a difference of opinion among the officers of the land department as to the extent of the original grant by congress of lands to aid in the improvement of the Des Moines river, from the year 1S46 down to the resolution of congress of March 2d, 1S61 [12 Stat. 251], and the act of July 12. 1862 [12 Stat. 543], which acts we held (in the Wolcott Case) confirmed the title in the Des Moines Company. As the husband of the plaintiff entered upon the lot in 1855 without right, and the possession was continued without right, the permission of the register to prove up the possession and the improvements, and to make the entry under the pre-emption laws, were acts in violation of law. and void, as was also the issuing of the patent. The reason for this withdrawal of the lands from public sale or private entry are stated at large in the opinion in the ease of Wolcott v. Des Moines Co.. 5 Wall. [72 U. S.] 6S1, a.nd need not be repeated. The point of reservation was very material in that case, and we have seen nothing in the present one, either in the facts or the argument, to distinguish it.”</p>

The plaintiff, to prove his title, gave in evidence, that some time in the* year 1771, Samuel Wells, under whom he claims, went upon the land in dispute, girdled some trees, and collected together and burnt a parcel of brush, raised a cabin, but without a roof; and then retired to some other part of the country, where he remained until the next year, when he returned to the land with instruments of agriculture; and finding the land in the occupation of one Boggs, he demanded…

<p>Case No. 17,406.</p> <p>Income Tax — Returns by Express and Stage Coach Companies — Gross Receipts.</p> <p>1. Under section 9 bis of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 147). a company, engaged in the express business, and also in transporting passengers by stage coach, which makes returns of its gross receipts, under section 109 of the act of June 30. 1864 (13 Stat. 277), and is subject to pay duty thereon, under sections 103 and 104 of the last named act, is required to declare, in such returns, whether such gross receipts are stated according to their values in legal tender currency, or according to their values in coined money, and -is liable to pay such duty according to the values' in coined money when reduced to their equivalent in legal tender currency.</p> <p>2. The terms, “income or articles or objects charged with an internal tax,” in said section of the act of 1866. are comprehensive, and include “gross receipts” of express companies, and “gross receipts” of stage proprietors.</p> <p>3. “Objects” charged with an internal tax are not necessarily and only objects which are specific, tangible, and material in form, such as goods, or products of growth or manufacture.</p>

In bankruptcy. This was a petition by Deluis Welman, representing himself to be unable to meet his •debts and engagements, and praying for the benefit of the bankrupt law. The petition was died March 3d, 1843, and no proceedings having been had upon it in consequence of the •clerk’s refusing to issue the usual order, the petitioner now filed his motion for an order of notice to creditors and others to show cause why he should not be declared a bankrupt.

Assumpsit against the defendant as in-dorser of a promissory note made by Ker-chival to Lindo, who assigned it to Welsh, ‘•without recourse,” who assigned it to Hodg-sett. offered no evidence but a transcript of a record of a suit between Hodgsett and Kerchival, upon the note described in the declaration, in which suit the defendant pleaded payment to Lin-do, and obtained a verdict on that issue.

Debt on a promissory note for $382.47. The defendant pleaded nil debet. offered in evidence under the plea of nil deb-et, a record of Frederick county, Virginia, of a judgment upon a declaration for $10,-000 for goods, wares, and merchandises sold and delivered, upon which judgment was confessed for £789 13s. and .offered parol evidence to prove that the judgment was upon and for this note and another. objected that it ought to have been pleaded; that it cannot be for the…

<p>Case No. 17,410.</p> <p>Collision on Lake Erie — Steamer and Schooner — Vessels Meeting — Lights—Change or Course in Extremis.</p> <p>1. The steamer W. and the schooner F. came in collision on Lake Erie, on the night of November 29, 1869. The wind was about south. The F. was heading about southwest by west, close hauled, running five or six miles an hour. She saw the head-light of the W. nearly ahead, but a little on her starboard bow, and at once displayed a torch light. That light was displayed a second time before the collision. The F. was kept on her course till shortly before the collision, when her helm was put hard a-port. The W. was heading east three-quarters north. She saw the flash light of the F. a little on her port bow, and kept on till the green light of the F. was seen nearly ahead, when her helm was put to starboard, and she swung slowly to port, keeping on at her speed of eight to ten miles an hour, till the vessels were, as she claimed, from an eighth to a quarter of a mile apart, and the ■green light was on her starboard bow, when the green light disappeared, and the red light of the F. came in sight. The helm of the W. was at once put hard a-starboard, and her engine was stopped and backed, and several turns back were made before the collision. The W. struck the F. on her port bow, angling forward, and sunk her. It appeared that the lights of the F. were set on her pawl post, and were twenty-two inches apart, that being the diameter of her bowsprit. EeJd, that the steamer was in fault for not having taken earlier and more decided measures to avoid the schooner: that she should have starboarded more decidedly when she made the first change; that she should have slowed before she did. stopped and backed earlier; and that, on seeing the red light, she should have ported.</p> <p>2. The schooner was not in fault for changing her course on seeing the near approach of the steamer, without any apparent change of her course, notwithstanding the exhibition of the two torch lights.</p> <p>3. The lights of the F. were not placed in accordance with the statute, and their position was a fault on her part, but the W. was not misled by them, and that fault therefore did not contribute to the collision.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court, the above decree was reversed. Case No. 17,411. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to afBrm the decree of the district court. 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 41.]’</p>

<p>Case No. 17,411.</p> <p>Collision between- Steamer and Sail — Presumptions — Change op Course bt Sail — Lights.</p> <p>1. Under the rule which requires a vessel propelled by steam to keep out of the way of a sailing vessel, the mere proof that the former collided with the latter, unaccompanied by circumstances exonerating her, raises a presumption of fault in the former, which she must overcome or be condemned.</p> <p>2. In this case, which was one of a collision between a steamer and a schooner, it was found that the schooner changed her course and thwarted prudent and proper movements which the steamer, on seeing her, had made, to avoid her. and that the schooner was in fault and the’ steamer was not in fault</p> <p>3. When a steamer sees the green light of another vessel directly ahead, it is nearly certain, that, if both keep their courses, there can be no collision; and, in such case, starboarding by the steamer, out of abundant caution, though unnecessary, is not reprehensible. .</p> <p>[Cited in The Excelsior, 12 Fed. 201, 203.]</p> <p>4. "Vessels approaching each other, and seeing the lights of each other, not only have a right, but are bound, to assume that the lights seen are properly set and screened.</p> <p>[Cited in The Free State, Case No. 5,090.]</p> <p>5. The .location of the lights of the schooner, not approved.</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court, the decree of this court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to affirm the decree of the district court. 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 41.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in personam by American seamen discharged in a foreign port on loss of the vessel to recover wages and three months’ extra wages under Rev. St. §§ 4582, 4583, and the damages for non-payment of one fourth of the wages then due them provided by Rev. St. § 4529, against the owners of the vessel, who denied by answer all liability in the premises. The cause was heard upon libel, answer and proofs.

Writ of error to the district court [of the United States for the district] of Massachusetts.

<p>Case No. 17,415.</p> <p>Shipping — Presumption of Seaworthiness — Charter Party — Liability of Owner.</p> <p>1. Ordinarily, a ship is presumed to be seaworthy. But this presumption is rebutted by proof that she is old and approaching the end of her life as a ship, and that she suddenly failed in a vital part without any apparent cause.</p> <p>[Cited in The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. 480.]</p> <p>2. The owner of a ship who charters her to another tacitly agrees that she is in suitable condition for the use to which she is to be put.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. 479.]</p> <p>3. If there is a defect in the ship by which she becomes disabled, even though it may not be apparent upon examination, the charterer cannot recover the charter money, and he will be liable for damages occasioned by the defect.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Lizzie Frank, 31 Fed. 479.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court, the decree of this court was affirmed. 97 U. S. 379.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] The bankrupts, within sixty days of the proceedings in bankruptcy, made a chattel deed of trust upon their stock in trade, fixtures, and a leasehold interest, to secure a debt created at the time, in favor of Rumsey &. Co. There was no actual fraud. The said deed of trust was never recorded, nor was possession ever taken under it.

The appellant had taken out a tavern license and under it claimed a conferred right to sell spirituous liquors in quantities less than a pint, notwithstanding the law of- the corporation to the contrary.

<p>Casé No. 17,420.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Sailing Vessels — Crossing Courses and Opposite Tracks — Lights— Lookout — Change in Extremis.</p> <p>1. A collision took place off Bamegat at night, between a schooner and a brig. The wind was about west. The schooner alleged that she was heading south by west, close-hauled on her starboard tack, and that she saw the red light of the brig a little on-her port bow, and kept her course without change, till just before the eol-lision, when her helm was put down to ease the blow, if possible, but too late to affect the course of the schooner. The brig alleged that she was heading about north northeast; that she saw the green light of the schooner a little on her port bow; that she starboarded her wheel, and changed her course so as to bring the green light on her starboard bow; and that afterwards the schooner changed her course, and attempted to cross the brig's bows, when the helm of the brig was put hard down, but the collision 'could not be avoided. The vessels came together nearly at right angles, the brig striking the schooner on her port side: Held, that this was a case under the 12th article of the sailing rules, and, as the courses were crossing, and the schooner had the wind on her starboard side, while the brig had it on her port side, and was not close hauled, it was the duty of the brig to keep out of the schooner’s way, and of the schooner to keep her course.</p> <p>2. The brig, seeing the schooner’s green light on her port bow. was justified in regarding it as on a vessel which was crossing from port to starboard of the brig, and her starboarding was a proper manceuvre. and was enough to have cleared the two vessels, if the schooner had held her course.</p> <p>3. On the evidence, the schooner must be held to have changed her course after the brig had taken proper measures to avoid her.</p> <p>4. Such porting by the schooner could not be held to have been a change of course in ex-tremis, but it probably resulted from an inefficient lookout.</p> <p>5. The brig was not responsible for the collision.</p>

<p>[This was a bill by Wescott and Comblos against Cole and Shelby.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for .the district of Maryland.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,422.</p> <p>'Vacating Judicial Sales.</p> <p>Where no fraud or unfairness is alleged, a court will not set aside a judicial sale, on the ground of inadequacy of price.</p>

This was an ejectment [by Elizabeth L. West and others against Daniel Pine and others] to recover two hundred and forty acres of land called the ‘Windmill Tract.” After proving that Deborah West, and her husband, Thomas West, lived upon the premises until liis death in 1770, and she continued to live on the land, during the residue of her life time, and that she died seised thereof sometime about December, 1778, leaving by her husband Thomas, three children, Charles, the…

This was a bill in equity, brought by William West, of Southridge, in the state of Massachusetts, one of the children and heirs of i/illiam West, formerly of Scituate, in the state of Rhode-Island, against Job Randall, a son-in-law of the last mentioned William West, and Jeremiah Phillips, both inhabitants of said Scituate.

<p>Case No. 17,425.</p> <p>Patents — Invention—Infringement—Skirt and BU3TLE Stiffenees.</p> <p>1. The patent granted to Edward F. Woodward. dune 16th, 1857, and reissued September 29th, 1857, for “improvements in stiffening ladies’ skirts, or bustles, and other articles of dress,” claims the curving of the material into a spiral form, either with or without a core of a flexible character.</p> <p>2. Whether a hoop so formed is patentable, in view of the prior existence, in stringed musical instruments, of strings formed of a cat-gut core, with metallic wire wound around it in a spiral form, quere.</p> <p>3. In said patent, the elasticity of the hoop is due, almost wholly, to the spiral wire.</p> <p>4. A hoop made of a plain strip of steel, covered with a fine, flexible, iron wire or thread, tinned or silvered, is not an infringement of said patent. In such hoop, the wire coating is not the hoop, but the strip of steel is the hoop, and the patent is for a hoop, and not for the covering of a hoop.</p>

Motion to set aside the judgment by default • entered in this case and the habere facias pos- ¡ sessionem returned executed; upon the ground of irregularity in the service of the ejectment. It appeared by the affidavit of the service, that the declaration was served upon Mr. White, the landlord, who acknowledged the service, and promised to have it acknowledged by the tenant in possession, the defendant, which was not done.

<p>This is an appeal from the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of the state of California, where a decree was rendered in favor of the libelant for the sum of $800. [Case unreported.]</p> <p>[Por a libel by certain seamen of the Uncle Sam to recover extra wages for this voyage, see Cases Nos. 2,371 and 2,372.]</p>

The cause came before the court on the following case stated by counsel: (1) Abraham Van Campen, Esq., the maternal grandfather of the defendant, by deed of gift, bearing date on the 26th day of November, A. D. 1766, conveyed, amongst other lands, the premises in question to his son Moses Van Campen, with the following habendum clause, that is to say: “To have and to hold the said messuage, plantation, and the several tracts or pieces of land above described, heredita-ments…

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,430.</p> <p>Act op Bankruptcy — Commercial Paper — Bona Fide Defences.</p> <p>1. A mercantile firm gave promissory notes as vouchers or memorandums, in exchange for notes of like amounts simultaneously given to them, but not as obligations to be paid at maturity. They did not pay them when they became due on their face, entertaining a bona fide belief that they had a good defence to them. The party to whom they were given filed a petition in bankruptcy against the firm. Held, that the notes were not commercial paper, as between the firm and the petitioner.</p> <p>2. Even if they were such, the refusal of the firm to pay them, entertaining the belief which they did, Yvas not an act of bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,432.</p> <p>Railwat Aid Bonus-Conflicting Decisions of State and Fedekai. Coobts — Bona Fide Purchasehs.</p> <p>1. The supreme court of the United States having held the township railroad act of Missouri constitutional (Cass Co. v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 360), it is the duty of the circuit court to follow that judgment, notwithstanding the later decision of the supreme court of Missouri to the contrary.</p> <p>[Cited in Douglass v. Pike Co., 101 U. S. 679.]</p> <p>2. Where negotiable commercial securities are issued and negotiated before there are any decisions by the courts of the state against the validity of the act authorizing their issue, the supreme court of the United States does not consider itself bound to follow a subsequent decision of the local courts invalidating such securities, but will decide for itself whether, under the constitution and laws of the state,, such securities are valid or void.</p> <p>3. The bond sued on being in the hands of a bona fide holder, containing a recital that it was issued to pay for a subscription to the Cape Girardeau and State Line Railroad, the county cannot be heard to say that the subscription therein specifically recited was not made.</p> <p>4. The fact that the requirement of a two-thirds vote is contained in a provision of the constitution instead of a legislative enactment, makes no difference in principle.</p>

<p>In equity. Heard upon motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

2 [In equity. The cases above mentioned being intimately connected, were argued and decided together, upon the pleadings and evidence.

<p>[In the matter of the Western Insurance Company, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,436.</p> <p>Collision — Rules or River Navigation — Lookout on Deck — Presumption of Fault.</p> <p>1. By the well-established rules of navigation on the Western rivers, an ascending boat has the right to indicate a preference as to her course of navigation, and having done so. the descending boat is bound to conform to her choice as indicated by her signals, unless there are circumstances rendering it improper to do so.</p> <p>2. If there are such circumstances, it is the duty of the descending boat so to indicate that the other boat may be navigated accordingly.</p> <p>3. It is a paramount law of navigation that a collision must be avoided when it is practicable to avoid it.</p> <p>4. The errors and faults of one boat will not justify another boat in the infliction of an injury to her, unless it was the result of an inevitable necessity.</p> <p>5. In a case arising from a collision of boats, it is not enough to relieve from an imputation of fault that there was a pilot in the wheelhouse, but there must be some one on deck, charged with the special duty of keeping a vigilant lookout, not in the wheel-house, but on the forward part of the deck, where the best opportunity is offered for observing approaching and passing boats, and who will be able to communicate promptly to the pilot such information as he may need to insure the safety of his boat.</p> <p>6. The absence of such lookout justifies a prima facie presumption of fault and makes it incumbent on the party against whom the presumption arises, to repel it by clear proof that the fault was on the other side.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,439.</p> <p>Collision — Steamer Pouting in Ignorance of Schooner’s Codrse — Lookout—Speed.</p> <p>1. Where a schooner, heading west-soutli-west on her starboard tack, running over from Horseshoe shoal, near Nantucket, toward the Gross-Rip light, w.as struck on her starboard side by a steamer which had come up. bound east, till near the schooner, the steamer s helm having been at once ported, when the schooner was seen ahead, and kept so till the collision occurred: Held, that the steamer was in fault in porting, whether it was done wilfully, or in ignorance of the schooner's course, for, by that porting she followed up the schooner and struck her.</p> <p>2. The evidence of the pilot of the steamer, that he saw the schooner from a quarter to a half mile off. is more reliable than that of other witnesses who came out suddenly into the darkness, that she could not be seen so far off.</p> <p>3. On the evidence, the night was light enough to have enabled the steamer to discover the schooner sooner than she did, if a good lookout had been kept, and. if it was not light enough, the steamer was running at too great speed.</p> <p>4. The schooner had a light set. and kept her course, and was not in fault: and that the steamer was liable for the collision.</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court the above decree was affirmed. Case No. 17.441. An appeal was taken to the supreme court, and, on motion and affidavit, commissions were issued therefrom to take further testimony. See 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 3S9. It does not appear, however, that the cause was ever brought to a hearing.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,440.</p> <p>Collision — Steam eh and Sailing Vessel — Onus op Proof — Change of Course in Extremis.</p> <p>1. Where it is the duty of a steamer to avoid a sailing vessel, the onus is on the steamer to show, in ease of a collision, that the sailing vessel did not keep her course, or to show some other fault on the part of the sailing vessel, that contributed to the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The II. P. Baldwin. Case No. G,S12: The Cyclops, 45 Fed. 124.J</p> <p>2. Where the change of course by the sailing vessel is made under impending danger and in extremis, the steamer is responsible tor it.</p> <p>[Cited in The H. P. Baldwin, Case No. 6,812; Parr v. The Parnley, 1 Ped. 687; Ladd v. Poster, 31 Ped. 831.]</p> <p>3. The duty of a steamer, at night, not to approach too near to a sailing vessel, in meeting her, when there is room to give her a wide berth, enforced.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] [This was a libel by John Low, Jr., owner of the Triumph, to recover damages for a collision with the Western Metropolis. From a decree of the district court in favor of li-belant (Case No. 17,439), an appeal was taken to this court.]

<p>Case No. 17,442.</p> <p>Petition in Bankhdptct — Allegation of Indebtedness — Insufficiency—Thansfek of Claim — Dismissal of Petition.</p> <p>1. Where the petition contained an allegation that the debtor owed a debt, but no allegation that it was owed to the petitioning creditor, held, insufficient.</p> <p>2. Where the petition of a petitioning credit- or has been dismissed for insufficiency, but leave has been given him to file with the other creditors an amended petition, which has been filed accordingly, and it appears that at the time of signing such amended petition he had ceased to be a creditor, having assigned his demand, held, that the amended petition must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,443.</p> <p>District Courts — Admiraltt Jurisdiction — Foreign Vessels — Allowance of Salvage.</p> <p>1. Under the constitution of the United States and the judiciary act of congress of 1789 [1 Stat. ,73], the district courts of the United States have plenary jurisdiction in admiralty of all cases arising on the Great Lakes, and other waters connected with them and the ocean, wherever practicably navigable, as well above as below the flow of the tide from the sea.</p> <p>[Cited in The Leonard, Case No. 8,256.]</p> <p>2. The restriction in the judiciary act of 1789, confining jurisdiction to waters navigable from the sea by vessels of 10 tons burden or more, applies, exclusively, to seizures under the laws of impost, navigation, or trade, in matters of revenue only.</p> <p>3. This general jurisdiction is not abridged by the act of 1845 [5 Stat. 726], which was passea to extend the jurisdiction of district courts. It is possessed entirely independent of that act. The jurisdiction of the district court of the United States in case of salvage is not confined to American property, nor to cases occurring in American waters. The amount to be allowed for salvage is not prescribed by any rule, or limited to any proportional part of the value of the property saved, but rests entirely in the sound discretion of the court; and is dependent on the labor, perils, and dangers incurred by the salvors, and the good faith that they exercise towards the owners of the property saved. The want of good faith may be such as to reduce the salvage to a very small sum, or to destroy all claims to it.</p>

In equity. This was a motion for an injunction against the American Union and Central Union Telegraph Companies and the Wabash Railway Company, to restrain the construction of the lines • of the American Union Telegraph Company along the right of ■way of the Wabash Railway Company, upon the ground that the railway company, by a contract made in 1S70, had granted to the complainant, the Western Union Telegraph .Company, the exclusive right to construct a line along said right…

<p>In equity. Motion to dissolve injunction.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,445a.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Rent of Puopekty Bpronging to Wife of Bankuupt — Rights of Assignee.</p> <p>A note given to a bankrupt in his own name for rent of a house belonging to his wife cannot be obtained by the assignee. If he thinks the house was fraudulently conveyed to the wife, he must file a bill to set aside the conveyance.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,446.</p> <p>Judgment of Another State — Conceusiveness —Plea of Nul Tiel Record.</p> <p>1. Under the constitution and act of congress, the judgment of a court in any state is conclusive; and the same effect is given to it in every other state as it had in the state where rendered.</p> <p>[Cited in Tenney v. Townsend, Case No. 13,-S32.]</p> <p>[Cited in Melhop v. Doane, 31 Iowa, 400.]</p> <p>2. This question arises under the constitution of the United States and act of congress, and the decision of the supreme court of the Union is consequently binding. Indeed that court can exercise appellate jurisdiction on the subject.</p> <p>[Cited in Lincoln v. Tower, Case No. 8,355.]</p> <p>3. A plea of nil debet, in an action brought on a judgment, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>4. The record, when duly authenticated, contains absolute verity, and is conclusive.</p> <p>[Cited in Lincoln v. Tower, Case No. 8,355.]</p> <p>5. Where no process was served on the defendant. and there has been no appearance, the judgment is a nullity.</p> <p>[Cited in Wctherill v. Stillman, 65 Pa. St. 115.]</p> <p>6. A proceeding by attachment is a proceeding in rem, and only binds the defendant to the extent of the property levied on.</p> <p>[Cited in Homer v. Doe, 1 Ind. 133. Cited •in note to Doe v. Bowen, 8 Ind. 200.]</p> <p>7. Where it appears, from the record, that process was served, or that there was an appearance, the fact cannot be controverted.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Walsh, 22 Fed. 64S; U. S. v. Gayle, 45 Fed. 107.]</p> <p>8. Nul tiel record, the only proper plea in such a case.</p> <p>[Cited in Westcott v. Brown, 13 Ind. 86.]</p>

2 [The plaintiff, in January, 1864, imported and entered at this port a quantity of gin from Rotterdam, and entered it the same month. The duty on this gin was $1 per gallon, under the act of July 14, 1862 [12 Stat. •543]. On the 29th of April, 1864, the plaintiff went to Collector Barney and tendered this money as duties, and demanded the goods.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Florida.]</p> <p>cited: 1 Pars. Mar. Law, 208. and note; The Gray Eagle, 9 Wall. [76 U. S.] 505; The Granite State. 3 Wall. [70 U. S.] 310; Strout v. Foster, 1 How. [42 U. S.] 89: The Express [Case No. 4.598]: The Maria Martin. 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 31; The Brothers [Case No. 1.969]; The Scioto [Id. 12,508]; The B. S. Sheppard [Id. 2,072]; The Palmetto [Id. 10,699].</p> <p>cited: The Express [Case No. 4.596]; Owners of the James Gray v. Owners of the John Fraser, 21 How. [62 U. S.] IS4: Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. [65 U. S.] 110; 1 Pars. Shipp. & Adm. 434.</p>

<p>. Case No. 17,450.</p> <p>Patents fob Inventions — Aik Bbakes — Pbiob Invention — Infrinqement—Valuable Impbovements.</p> <p>1. Although defendant’s apparatus is a valuable additional improvement to prior inventions, be is not thereby justified in appropriating and using such of said prior inventions as have been patented to others.</p> <p>TCited in Strobridge v. Lindsay, 2 Fed. 694.]</p> <p>2. A prior description of a part cannot invalidate a patent for the whole.</p> <p>[Cited in Bundy Manuf'g Co. v. Columbian Time-Recorder Co.. 59 Fed. 295; Id., 12 C. C. A. 442, 64 Fed. 852.]</p> <p>3. The words “substantially as described.” must necessarily be implied; and being so implied they involve a reference to the specification.</p> <p>[Cited in Bortree v. Jackson, 43 Fed. 138.]</p>

Action at law. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 30,-577] for ‘‘Improvements in truss-bridges.” granted Jonathan L. Jones, November 6, 1860, and assigned to plaintiff [James V. Westlake]. The defendants [M. S. Cartter and others] plead the general issue, and gave notice of special matter of defense. Defendants’ counsel offered in evidence patent granted Geo.

<p>Case No. 17,452.</p> <p>Chartered Smps— Adthoritt or Master — Amount or Cargo.</p> <p>Though .the honest opinion of a competent master, that he has taken on board all the cargo his vessel will safely carry, is not absolutely binding on the charterer, it is entitled to very great weight, and can be controlled only by decisive evidence of a mistake on his part.</p> <p>[Cited in Boyd v. Moses, 7 Wall. (74 IT. S.'l 319.]</p>

This was a libel transferred from the district court without any decree there, as the judge was related to one of the parties. It alleged that the libelants [G. B. Weston and others] were owners of the ship Mattakeeset, and in -August, 1843, chartered her to the respondents for a voyage from Boston to Madras and Calcutta, and back to Boston.

Bill in equity [against Nathaniel Nash and others] to restrain alleged infringement of reissued letters-patent [No. 2,S45], granted David M. Weston, Jan. Í4, 1868, for improvement in centrifugal machines for draining sugar and other substances. [The original letters patent, No. 63,770, were granted April 9, 1867.]

Assumpsit. 1st. For money had and received. 2dly. On an order dated on the 8th of September, 1814; drawn by Silas Penni-man, payable to Amos Penniman, or order, and accepted by the defendant on the 8th day of September, 1815. and endorsed to the plaintiff [Asahel Weston]. Plea the general issue. The order produced on the trial, was as follows: “Boston, September 8th, 1814.

The charter-party on which this libel was founded, was as follows: “Memorandum for Charter. It is mutually agreed this day between Captain Weston, of the good ship or vessel called the ‘Hope,’ of the burden of nine hundred tons, now lying in the Port of Liverpool, whereof —- Weston is master, and Train & Co., of Liverpool, merchants and freighters of the other part.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Thomas ’A. Weston against William H. White and others.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Thomas A. Weston against William H. White and others. Heard on motion for a preliminary injunction. For a prior hearing, see Case No. 17,458.]

<p>Case No. 17,460.</p> <p>COLLISION IX THE English ChaNXEL-STEAMER axd Sailing Vessel — Speed—Pog Signals — Presumption.</p> <p>1.The steamer W. and the brig P. came in collision in the English Channel, in the daytime, in a dense fog. When the fog came on, the lookout on the steamer and the wheelsman were doubled, the passengers were directed to keep quiet, and the whistle was blown every fifteen seconds, and her speed was slowed to a rate of from seven to nine miles an hour. The lookout reported the brig right ahead, about 150 feet off. when the engines of the steamer were stopped and backed, and her wheel hove hard-a-port, but the vessels came together, the steamer striking the brig near the fore-rigging, and sinking her. The brig had a lookout and a man at her wheel. She was barely moving through the water, the wind being very light. Her mate and captain had been in the cabin, working out-the ship’s position. Shortly after they came on deck, the steamer's whistle was heard, when a fog-horn was blown, answering the blasts of the steamer's whistle, four or five of which were heard before the collision. No fog-horn had been blown on the brig till the whistle was heard, and no horn was heard at all on the steamer. Held, that the steamer was in fault, in running at too great a speed.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Panama, Case No. 2,-764; The Hansa, Case No. 6.037.]</p> <p>2. The brig was in fault, in not blowing a horn from the time the fog came on till the steamer’s whistle was heard.</p> <p>3. It could not be inferred, from the fact that no horn was heard by those on the steamer, that it would not have been heard if it had been blown before — the presumption must be that it would have been heard.</p> <p>4. Both vessels were in fault, and the damages must be divided.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,461.</p> <p>Affreightment — Damage to Cargo — Interest— Damage by Stevedores.</p> <p>[1. Ship held liable for damage done to a cargo of tea by defacement of the labels by cockroaches.]</p> <p>[2. Interest is allowable on damage occasioned to cargo by the fault of the ship; and the court may enter a decree for such interest on the coming in of the master’s report, although the interlocutory decree did not provide for interest.]</p> <p>[3. The ship is not liable for damage done to cargo, in unlading, by stevedores appointed by the consignees under an express provision therefor in the charter party.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court the above decree was affirmed, without costs. Case No. 9,-545.]</p>

The defendant [George F.] Parmelee. made his individual note payable to the order of the plaintiff, and endorsed it, “G. F. Parme-lee, Cashier,” and gave the plaintiff as collateral security a certificate of stock in the Shawnee County Bank, issued to and owned by him (Parmelee).

[These w*ere two suits in equity by Samuel Wetherill and others against the New Jersey Zinc Company for alleged infringement of letters patent No. 13,806. for a process of making white oxide of zinc. Complainants now move for- an attachment for contempt, for alleged violation of an injunction heretofore granted.]

[In equity. These were two suits by Samuel Wetherili and others against the New Jersey Zinc Company for alleged infringement of letters patent No. 13,806, for a process for making white oxide of zinc. Heard on exceptions to the master’s report of profits.]

[This was a suit by Samuel Wetherill and others against the Passaic Zinc Company and others for alleged infringement of letters patent No. 13,806, for a process of making ■white oxide of zinc.

[In the matter of Wetmore & Bro., bankrupts.] On objections to confirmation of assignee. On the 25th of August a meeting was held before the register, at which thirty-five creditors, representing thirty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars, voted for Mr. Williams, and three creditors, representing one thousand and forty-four dollars, voted against him.

This was an action of ejectment which was tried before a jury at the May term, and verdict found for the plaintiff. Motion for new trial was interposed on the part of the defendant and two errors assigned: First, that the court erred in admitting in evidence on the part of the plaintiff a certified copy of a deed from Julius O. Harris to Nathan D. Elston. The objection made to that deed, was, that there is no seal to the notary public’s certificate of acknowledgment.

This is an action brought against George W. Rice as marshal, and his sureties, for the penalty of twenty thousand dollars, the penalty of the marshal’s bond on the ground that he permitted a certain vessel, in his custody by legal process, to go a voyage up the Lakes by reason of which she was lost in a storm, and the plaintiff failed to recover his claim against the vessel which had been attached at his instance.

<p>[This was an action by A. "Wetter and others against Augustus Schell, collector of customs for the port of New York, to recover back certain duties.paid under protest. Heard on motion of the defendant to open a judgment heretofore rendered against him, and to set aside the verdict of the jury.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,472.</p> <p>Salvage — Inequitable Agreement — Costs.</p> <p>1. A brig, dismasted and in distress, was fallen in with at sea, by a pilot boat. The master of the brig had been hurt and was confined to his bed. Her owner was on board. The pilots boarded her and demanded $5.000. to tow -her into port. This was refused, and they came down to $2,500, threatening to leave the brig if an agreement to pay that sum was not made. The master and owner thereupon agreed to pay them the $2,500, and the pilot boat took hold of the brig, and after nine days’ towing, brought her in safety into the port of New York. The brig and her cargo were worth $3,800. Held that, considering the value of the property, the agreement, under the circumstances, was an inequitable one, and would not be enforced.</p> <p>[Cited in Brooks v. The Adirondack, 2 Fed. 393.]</p> <p>2. $1,500 was as liberal a reward as could be awarded to the salvors.</p> <p>[Cited in The Marie Anne, 48 Fed. 748.]</p> <p>3. Costs would be awarded to them, because the claimants offered no particular sum before suit brought.</p>

Some hours before daylight, in the morning of the 28th of November last, the schooner William F. Garrison, on her voyage from Boston to the southward, in ballast, had arrived some ten or twelve miles to the westward of Gay Head, in Martha’s Vineyard, and in trying to reef her mainsail in a heavy blow from the northwest was taken aback and lost her foremast and part of her maintopmast.

<p>Case No. 17,474.</p> <p>IVOLUNNTARY BANKRUPTCY — APPEARANCE BY ATTORNEY.</p> <p>In proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, the order to show cause having been served on only one of two debtors, and no notice having been published as to the other, held, that the appearance of the debtor not served need not be personal, but might be by attorney.</p>

<p>[On motion for a new trial.]</p>

This was a proceeding in rem instituted by the libelants to recover wages as fishermen on board the Silver Spring, during the last season.

This was an action of ejectment. The plaintiff claimed under the will of James Tibbitt, made March 25th, 1829.

In admiralty. This was a libel filed by the Northwestern Union Packet Company, as owner of the steamboat Mollie Mohler, against the steamboat WT. H. Clark, to recover for damages sustained by the steamer Mollie Mohler, by collision with the W. H. Clark, near the bridge at Winona, Minnesota, on the Mississippi riv.er, July 21, 1872, while the Mollie Mohler was engaged in towing a raft of logs from Beef Slough, in Wisconsin, to Rock Island, Illinois.

Bill in equity. The bill was filed in October. 1793, to open an account which had been settled and signed by the complainants in April. 17.31. touching the transactions between the testator and the defendant, while commissaries in the American army, during the Revolutionary war. The bill charged the defendant tamong other fraudulent practices) with making erasures in the complainant's books, and also set forth a number of specific-errors and overcharges in the account.

This was a libel filed by a seaman of the ship Harvard, against the master, for wages, during her late voyage from Calcutta to Boston.

TPIE COURT refused to put off the trial of this cause on account of the non-payment of the former costs;- the cause having been reinstated on payment of costs. [Case No. 17.484.] objected to the deposition of J. McCanahan. taken under the act of congress. 1. The certificate does not state it to be a civil cause, but only in a suit. 2.

[This was a bill in equity by Wheaton & Donaldson against Peters and Grigg to enjoin the alleged infringement of a copyright in Wheaton’s Reports of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States.]

In this ease, after a decree by the district court, condemning property seized on land as forfeited to the United States under the internal revenue laws, that court, on a controversy between two persons as to which one of them was entitled to the share of the informer in the proceeds of the property, made a decree in favor of one of them. [Case unreported.] The other brought a writ of error in this court to reverse that decree, and a. motion was now made to dismiss such writ.

The bankrupt was a manufacturer of iron at Worcester, Mass., and bought large quantities of pig-iron of the firm of W. T. Carter & Co., of Philadelphia. At the time of his failure he owed them a balance, represented by notes and accounts, amounting to about ?13,000, which they offered for proof against the estate. The assignees claimed a set-off for damages, arising out of the alleged breach of a contract by these creditors to sell the bankrupt five hundred tons of iron.

[In the matter of Edward E. Wheeler and James D. Riggs, bankrupts.] Application for discharge. The bankrupts’ estates paid nothing to their creditors. They applied for a discharge, and procured the assent of one-third in value and one-fourth in number of the creditors whose claims had been proven. One of these was Mrs. Eliza Wheeler, whose claim was for seven thousand dollars, of which four thousand dollars had been contracted prior to 1869.

<p>[In the matter of George M. Wheeler and W. Bailey Lang, bankrupts.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Indiana.] [In the matter of Edward E. Wheeler and James D. Riggs, bankrupts. An application was made for a discharge, and upon its refusal in the district court (Case No. 17,489) an appeal was taken to this court.)

This was an action of forcible entry and detainer to recover possession of certain lands in McHenry and Winnebago counties in this state. All the proper jurisdictional facts were alleged and admitted, save the right of the court to take jurisdiction of this form of action, on which ground defendant demurred to the jurisdiction.

2 [Two suits. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suits brought upon reissues of two letters patent granted Cyrenus Wheeler. Jr., for “improvements in grain and grass harvesters.” The first dated December 5, 1854, was reissued January 3, 1860, in five divisions, numbered respectively S75. S76, 877, 87S, 879. Of these reissues, No. 876 was again reissued May 14, 1867. as No. 2,611). The second patent dated February 6, 1S35, was reissued June 5, 1860, as No. 971, and again.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel in admiralty by James P. Wheeler and others, owners of the Admiral, against the steamer Eastern State, to recover damages for a collision. From a decree of the district court (case unreported), libellants appeal.]

The case of complainants [Ezra Wheeler and others], as stated in the bill, was substantially as follows: The complainants were the holders, by assignment from Foster & Gwynn, of three notes made by the defendant John H. Green, payable to his own order and indorsed by him, one for $10,000, dated May 23, 1870, one for $3,723.01, dated May 23, 1S71, and one for $3,009.55, dated March 7, 1872.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction, founded on a bill, and opposed by the defendants, on an affidavit made by the defendant Helmbold.

<p>Case No. 17,498.</p> <p>Pleas in Equity — Reference to Annexed Paper —INFKINSEMENT OF PATENTS — JURISDICTION of Circuit Court, S. D. New Yore.</p> <p>1. Where the allegations of a plea to a bill in equity are qualified by a reference to a paper annexed to the plea, the plea must be read as if the paper were introduced, in its very terms, into the body of the plea.</p> <p>2. A bill in equity was filed by W., in a circuit court in Illinois, against C. and L., alleging the infringement by them, within the jurisdiction of that court, of a patent granted to W., and praying for an account and an injunction. Subsequently, W. filed a bill in this court, against the said C., alleging the infringement by him, within the- jurisdiction of this court, since the filing of the previous bill in Illinois, of the same patent, and praying for an account and an injunction. To such bill in this court C. interposed a plea, setting up, in abatement, the pendency of such previous suit. Held, that the plea was bad.</p> <p>[Cited in Pennsylvania Salt-Manuf’g Co. v. Myers. Case No. 10,955. Distinguished in Turrell v. Spaeth. Id. 14,268. Cited in Gold & S. Tel. Co. v. Pearce, 19 Fed. 419.]</p> <p>3. The case of Woodworth v. Stone [Case No. 18,021] commented on.</p> <p>4. It is irregular to file, without special leave of the court, two pleas to a bill in equity.</p> <p>5. The 6th section of the act of April 3d, 1818 (3 Stat. 415), declaring that the original jurisdiction of the circuit court of the Southern district of New York shall be confined to causes arising within the said district, and shall not be construed to extend to causes of action arising within the Northern district of New York, does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the Southern district of New York causes of action, arising out of the state of New York.</p> <p>6. Rules for the construction of the particular provisions of a statute, stated.</p> <p>[Cited in Institute for Education of Mute & Blind v. Henderson (Colo. Sup.) 31 Pac. 716.]</p> <p>[For another case involving this patent, see note to AYheeler v. Clipper Mower & Reaper Co., Case No. 17,493.]</p>

2 [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. [Suit brought on reissued letters patent Nos. 875, 877, S78, 879, 2,610, and 2,032, granted Cyrenus Wheeler, Jr., for “improvement in grain and grass harvesters.” The facts in relation to these patents, their history, the specifications of the original and of the reissues, with the claims of the reissues, the drawings of the original and the reissues, as well as of several machines alleged by defendant to antedate the patents, are…

[These were suits in equity, brought respectively by Elisha P. Wheeler and others and by Richard M. Hoe and others against Ambrose H. Simpson and others for alleged infringement of a patent.]

Trespass for taking and attaching the brig Fair American. Plea,- as to force and arms, not guilty: 2. As to residue of trespass, that the defendant [Charles P. Sumner], as sheriff of the county of Suffolk, attached the vessel as the property of Jonathan Bartlett. Replication, traversing that the vessel was the property of Jonathan Bartlett at the time of the attachment. Issue on the traverse.

In equity. This bill is filed by the city of Wheeling, as a stockholder in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, on behalf of itself and all others of the private stockholders who, being entitled, shall come in and contribute to the cost of this proceeding.

The bill in this case was filed against the Erie Railway Company, by [Henry B. Whelpley,] a stockholder, charging that he was the owner of one thousand shares of its stock, and that they were a part of two hundred thousand shares overissued by said company, in violation of its charter, and contrary to law.

<p>Case No. 17,508.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Exemption:—..kroneous Claim— Discharge — Objection by Omitted Creditop..</p> <p>1. The “business of a contractor” is not a “trade, occupation or profession” within the meaning of the act (Code Or. 211) exempting •certain tools and implements from execution.</p> <p>2. Where the affidavit to a schedule states In the prescribed form, that it contains a statement of all the bankrupt’s estate, its truth is not affected by an erroneous claim in such ■schedule that a certain article therein mentioned is exempt from execution.</p> <p>3. If the bankrupt makes an erroneous claim to property mentioned in the schedule, as being exempt from the operation of the bankrupt act, it is the duty of the assignee to correct or disregard it.</p> <p>4. Where a bankrupt, in pursuance of an arrangement with a certain creditor, omits his debt from his schedule, such creditor will not be permitted to object to the bankrupt’s discharge on that ground.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,509.</p> <p>Insolvency — Fraudulent Transfers — Accommodation Acceptances — New Trial — Newly-Discovered Evidence — Diligence.</p> <p>1. Where one has accepted drafts to accommodate another, payable at a future day, he may take notes payable at that day as security. And if, in the mean time, the debtor is likely to fail, he may exchange these notes for others on demand and sue them before the drafts are paid, and attach property as security. The exchange may be agreed on and the new notes taken and put in suit at once, if the old ones are agreed to be returned, and are in fact soon returned.</p> <p>2. But the parties, under such circumstances, being relations, and the debtor going into insolvency the next day after the new notes are executed and the attachment made, are. with other circumstances, some evidence of collusion and want of good consideration.</p> <p>3. A verdict given against the validity of the new notes will not, in such case, be set aside as against the weight of evidence.</p> <p>4. Nor will it be set aside on the ground of newly discovered evidence, if at the trial it was not proved directly that the old notes had been returned, though circumstances were shown from which it might be inferred, but since the trial the insolvent has disclosed that the notes were in fact seasonably returned to him.</p> <p>5. His admissions. or statements as to such a prior transaction, made since his property was transferred to assignees, and in a suit which they defend are not competent evidence, and much less are they sufficient to justify a new trial, when the plaintiffs decline to swear that these facts are newly discovered by them.</p> <p>G. Such assignees may defend on the ground of fraud or want of consideration, and in cases where the insolvent could not. as they represent the other creditors in this, rather than the debtor.</p> <p>. 7. Nor will a new trial be granted for the concealment at the trial of the actual return of the old notes, unless that fact was known to the assignees, and concealed by them and not by the insolvent, as tlie assignees are the virtual defendants, and the debtor here was in feeling friendly to the plaintiffs, rather than the defendants.</p> <p>8. Due diligence required, in such a case, that tlie plaintiffs should have inquired of the debt- or and obtained and used tlie old notes at the former trial.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,510.</p> <p>Application op Payments — How Determined-Principal and Surety.</p> <p>1. In an action on a long running account between the parties, of notes, acceptances. &c.. if the debtor transfer a note or draft to the plaintiffs. which is due at a future day, and give no direction on what claim the money when collected shall be applied, the creditor may apply it before action, and if he do not, the court may at the trial.</p> <p>2. The true application of it by them is to such of the claims as seem most proper under all the circumstances: as to one not bearing interest, if others do; one not secured, if others are; one owned in his own right, if others are not; and finally if none of these exist, to the oldest demand.</p> <p>3. But if one of the claims is not due when the draft is received, or is supposed to be otherwise secured before the money is collected on this draft, or if the creditor, when it is collected, credits it generally and informs the assignees beforehand that when received it will reduce their general balance so much, the money should be applied to the oldest demand or be considered as applied generally to the whole account by the creditor when he received it.</p> <p>4. If notes are given, as in the other 'cases between these parties, to secure acceptances, and are found against by a jury for want of consideration or fraud, the money, when actually paid on the acceptance before the suit, may be recovered as not merged by those notes. But the sum received by the creditor on the draft cannot be applied first to such demand, when the debtor did not so direct, nor the creditor so enter it, but both resorted to what they considered other security for the payment of what might be so advanced on those acceptances.</p> <p>5. Money not paid for a principal before action brought, cannot be recovered by the surety, as money paid, unless on a special promise to pay it previously; and if that promise is found to be fraudulent, the money actually paid after the suit may be recovered, but only in a separate subsequent action.</p>

This was a rule to show cause why certain judgment creditors of the bankrupt [R. M. Whipple] should not be enjoined from proceeding under creditors’ bills against the bankrupt in the state courts, and from enforcing an assignment by the debtor to the receiver appointed in such creditors’ suits. On the Sth day of August. 1874.

<p>Case No. 17,513.</p> <p>Bankruptct— Approval op Composition- — Ddtt of Court.</p> <p>1. In deciding whether a composition should be approved or rejected, it should be compared with what the creditors would receive through an as-signee, not with what the debtor might possibly be able to pay them.</p> <p>[Approved in He Weber Furniture Co., Case No. 17,330.]</p> <p>[Cited in Guild v. Butler, 122 Mass. 500.]</p> <p>2. The act of congress puts upon the judge the responsibility of approving or rejecting a composition.</p> <p>[Approved in Be Weber Furniture Co., Case No. 17,330.]</p> <p>3. It cannot be assumed that any composition accepted by the required proportions of creditors is preferable to bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,614.</p> <p>Patents — Construction op Claimb — Anticipation —Expert Evidence — Infringement— Patented Improvements.</p> <p>1. The concluding part of the specification, where the applicant sums up and states what he claims as new, is that, and that only, which is to be looked at in the first instance.</p> <p>2. If there is a question upon the construction of the claim, the court will look at the other parts of the instrument in order to understand the claim and to give a construction to it.</p> <p>[Cited in Dennis v. Cross, Case No. 3,792.]</p> <p>3. It is of no consequence whether a prior invention is patented or not. If it was described before, then a subsequent patentee was not the first inventor, and can not maintain his patent.</p> <p>4. The opinion of an expert is evidence; but it is not conclusive. It is simply given as the judgment and opinion -of one who may have knowledge upon the subject, or has had the opportunity, at least, to acquire knowledge upon the subject. It is presented to the jury to be weighed and considered.</p> <p>5. If the reasons given by an expert seem to the jury to be satisfactory, they may adopt them. If, on the other hand, they are not satisfactory, the jury will follow their own judgment, and are not obliged to follow the judgment of witnesses.</p> <p>6. The inventor of an improvement can not use the original invention in connection with the improvement. although it may make it work better and more advantageously.</p> <p>[Cited in Norton v. .Tensen, 1 C. C. A. 452. 49 Fed. 863.]</p> <p>7. The inventor of an improvement has a right to his own improvement. The original inventor can not use the improvement because it is en-grafted upon his invention.</p> <p>S. The jury may consider whether the defendant’s machine is like a machine made prior to that of the patentee. If so, it will follow either that the defendant does not infringe, or that the patentee is not the first inventor.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Ely v. Monson & B. Manuf’g Co.. Case No. 4,431: ■Whipple v. Middlesex Co.. Id. 17.020.]</p>

After the trial of this cause [Case No. 17,-516], several questions arose as to the taxation of costs on the part of the plaintiff, which were submitted to… Held: on the usual travelled route from his place of residence. (2) A witness, whose place of residence and business was at Saco, was summoned while temporarily absent on business at Boston, and actually travelled from Boston to Portland to attend the court. The plaintiff claimed to tax travel for a witness from Boston.

Action on the case for flowing back the water of the river Presumpscot, in the town of Gorham, Maine, to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff [Oliver M. Whipple], as a riparian proprietor, and also to the injury and obstruction of the plaintiff’s mills, situated at or near Gambo Falls, on the same river.

This was a motion [by Squire Whipple] for an attachment for the violation of an injunction. The injunction restrained the defendant [John Hutchinson] from constructing iron bridges according to letters patent which secured the exclusive right to the plaintiff. It was alleged, that the injunction had been served on the 23d of March, 1858.

Assumpsit [by John Whipple against Thaddeus & Joshua Levett] on a special note dated the 23d of November, 1S19, for the payment of a sum of money in certain goods, “at factory prices,” signed by Joshua Levett.

<p>Case No. 17,520.</p> <p>Patents — Constkuction’ op Claims — Patentable Combi xat i o s — lx phisgwicst — W ool Cleaning Macuines.</p> <p>1. If hr the examination of a specification, and bx applying it to the then existing state •of the art. it can be ascertained what the invention was. then the claim, which is designed to be a condensed summary of the invention, is to be construed so as to be co-extensive with the invention, if that can be done without doing violence to its language.</p> <p>[Cited in Andrews v. Carman, Case No. 371.]</p> <p>2. Forming and arranging the teeth, within the meaning of Whipple’s claim, includes not merely their points or projections, but also the plain surface in the rear, and against which the guard is to act in removing the burrs.</p> <p>3. If the same form of teeth, and the same surface or arrangement, were combined by applicant for the first time, though both were acknowledged to be old, and, by combining them, he made a cylinder materially different from any which had previously existed, the combination would be patentable.</p> <p>4. Upon the question of infringement, if the result be the same in kind, it is not necessary that it should be the same in degree.</p> <p>5. A patent calling for smooth or plain surfaces is infringed by surfaces having slight inequalities, but which are sufficiently smooth for all practical purposes, and are substantially the same as the patented surfaces in their mode of operation and kind of result.</p>

[This was an appeal by George A. Whipple from a decision of the commissioner of patents, in an interference proceeding awarding priority to James Renton in respect to an invention of an improvement in furnaces for making iron direct from the ore.]

Bill in equity by [P. G. Whiston], the as-signee of one Gray, to set aside two mortgages on the whole stock of goods of the bankrupt as preferences. One of the mortgages was given to A. E. Smith to secure an old debt of $1,200 and a new advance of $300. Smith already held a mortgage on the same stock for the old debt, but it was given within four months of the bankruptcy, and was not of importance, except as it might bear upon intent.

<p>In bankruptcy. The assessor of internal revenue of the Third collection district of Massachusetts and the assignees of the Whipple File Company, a bankrupt corporation, submitted to the court, by an agreed statement in accordance with section 6 of the bankrupt act, the question whether the assignees were liable to be assessed under the act of 31st March, 1868 (15 Stat. 59), as manufacturers, for the excess over five thousand dollars, of the amount of the sales of goods of the company which they had disposed of in the execution of their trust by order of this court in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>This was a suit in rem, against the brig Whitaker, to recover $2330, for services rendered in getting said brig off a beach in Scituate, upon which she had been driven in a storm.</p> <p>It appeared in evidence, that the master of the brig had entered into a contract with one Samuel H. Holbrook, to get his vessel off, for the sum of $9U0, which was to be in full for every expense attending that service. Holbrook, in pursuance of his contract, procured an anchor and chain to be sent to the vessel, to be used in getting her off; employed men to labor upon her at daily wages, and with their aid, attempted to launch her directly into the sea. Having failed in this attempt, he hired Otis, the libellant, to launch her, and directed him to employ such assistance as was necessary. Otis, with the aid of persons employed by him, launched the vessel, across the beach, into the North river, in a direction opposite to that in which Holbrook bad attempted to launch her.</p> <p>All the persons who labored with Hol-brook in his attempt to launch the vessel, and Otis, who. in his schedule, in addition to a claim tor liis own services, charged the wages of tlie persons whom he had employed, as money paid, were joined in this libel.</p> <p>The libellants had knowledge of the contract with Holbrook. The Whitaker belonged in the state of Maine, and the claimants, her owners, all resided there.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 17,525.</p> <p>Salvage Seuvices — Contract por Compensation —Laborers Hired by Contractor.</p> <p>1. It is essential to a claim for salvage, that the services should contribute to ultimate safety.</p> <p>[Cited in The Choteau, 9 Fed. 212.]</p> <p>2. A contract to labor for the relief of a vessel in peril, at. an agreed compensation, to be paid at all events, displaces a claim for salvage.</p> <p>[Cited in The Camanehe v. Coast Wrecking Co. of New York. S Wall. (75 U. S.) 478. Disapproved in The Louisa Jane, Case No. 8.532.]</p> <p>3. An agreement for a specified sum is binding upon the salvor, and his compensation, although still salvage, is limited to the amount agreed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Silver Spray, Case No. 12,-857.]</p> <p>4. Persons assisting such salvor may maintain a claim for a salvage compensation, if their right to payment depends upon success.</p> <p>[Cited in The Silver Spray, Case No. 12,S57; The Marquette, Id. 9,101; The Louisa Jane, Id. 8,532.]</p> <p>5. But the court will take care that the owner of the property shall, in such case, be protected against the contractor, and shall not be forced to pay, in the whole, more than the amount agreed.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,586.</p> <p>Finality op Judgments — Pleading Records — Description — Variance — Plea op Nul Tiel Record — Res Judicata — Judgments of Other States — Pennsylvania Practice — Affidavit op Defense.</p> <p>1. It is not a conclusive criterion, whether a definitive judgment has been rendered, that the entry employs or omits the usual form of “ideo consideratum est." Judgments are final and subject to reyiew by writ of error, as well when entered without, as with that clause.</p> <p>2. In pleading a record, it is not indispensable that the precise words of the record shall be observed. Surplusage, or immaterial omissions in matters of substance, in pleading records, are attended with no other consequences than in other eases. But as to matters of description it is otherwise, and there the record produced must conform strictly to the plea.</p> <p>3. As the plea of nul tiel record puts in question the identity of the record, if circumstances descriptive of the record be untruly stated, though it was not necessary that they should be stated at all. it will be fatal.</p> <p>4. The party by pleading a record with a prout patet, proffers that issue, and it is incumbent on him to maintain it literally; and this as well where the averment has reference to particulars which need not be specifically stated upon the record, as to those which must be so stated.</p> <p>5. A record described as determining the rights of the party by the consideration and judgment of the court, and the conviction of the defendant, is not identical with one directing the same results, but in a different way.</p> <p>6. All the particulars set forth in pleading, descriptive of a record or instrument on which the party relies, must be established by proof, or the variance will be fatal.</p> <p>7. Although a party under the plea of former recovery be precluded from giving the record in evidence, on account of variance, yet he may avail himself of it under the general issue. But whether such proof can be received without notice of the special matter, — quiere.</p> <p>8. A judgment to operate as a bar, must be final. Suitors are not concluded by the pendency of an action in any other court for the same matter, or by any course of proceeding thereon short of final judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Webb v. Buckelew, 82 N. Y. 561.]</p> <p>9. Under the constitution and act of congress, judgments obtained in the different states, have the like effect in every other state as in that where they are rendered. Although, therefore, they, in fact, are, proceedings of foreign and independent tribunals, they bear the character of judgments of courts of concurrent powers with those where they are offered in evidence.</p> <p>10. The court cannot infer from principles of general law. what course of proceedings must liecess'arily have been adopted to obtain a complete judgment, in a neighboring state. It will be presumed that the record conforms to the law or usage of that state, so far as it purports to go: but there may be averments and proof against its supposed operation.</p> <p>11. A judgment imports that the indeterminate claims of a party are reduced to a certainty of the highest order, and one which can never more be questioned by the debtor. It is, therefore, a loose and faulty practice in actions for money, to leave it to the discretion of the party in whose favor judgment is rendered, to determine for himself how much he will take under it.</p> <p>12. At common law, it is indispensable to a full judgment, that what it gives or decrees should be distinctly expressed.</p> <p>13. Under the rule of the district court of Philadelphia, authorizing the plaintiff in actions on contract to sign judgment against the defendant, when he omits to file an affidavit of defence, if the amount be undetermined the judgment is only interlocutory, and to be made final when the appropriate proceedings shall be had for ascertaining the sum to be recovered.</p> <p>14. And where, under the above rule, judgment by confession is entered, it will not be deemed final, unless there are concurring circumstances which denote the intention of the parties that it shall be final and complete as between them.</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Franklin Whitaker against The Fred Lorents to recover damages for injury sustained.]</p>

This was an action on the case [by Jonathan Whitaker against Frederick Freeman for an alleged libel].

Action at law [by Jared I. Whitaker, for the use of E. D. Dodge, against John D. Pope). Heard upon motion in arrest of judgment and motion for new trial.

<p>Case No. 17,529.</p> <p>Baxeküptct — Assignee’s Fees — Discretion of Court — Rules Prescribed by Supreme Court.</p> <p>1. By section 5099 of the Revised Statutes, the allowance of a reasonable compensation to an assignee for his services is within'the discretion of the court of bankruptcy, and cannot be wholly regulated beforehand by the supreme court. This discretion is given to the. court only, and not to the registers.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Cook, 17 Fed. 329.]</p> <p>2. Assignees, intending to charge for services, beyond the fees mentioned in rule 30. must notify creditors of their intention in the notices of the meeting at which their account is to be presented.</p>

This case was submitted upon agreed facts. The defendant company is chartered by the '■ laws of Connecticut, having it» office and ! principal place of business at Hartford, where I all applications are sent and accepted or re- j jected. It had a general agent in Worcester. ! Massachusetts, duly established in accordance I with the laws of Massachusetts, through i which-it transacted business in said commonwealth.

In this case the assignee in bankruptcy applied to the court for an order directing him to sell certain unencumbered assets of the bankrupts which had come into his hands. I

<p>Case No. 17,533.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—References—Practice —Objections to Discharge.</p> <p>1. The bankrupts were members of a firm engaged in the lumber business, with their principal place of business at A., in this state. They were also members of other firms engaged in the same business in Canada, but in each of such firms there was another partner, at least nominally. The creditors of the Canadian firms haring threatened legal proceedings to sequestrate the property of those firms in Canada, transfers of said property were made by way of mortgage to such creditors, in consideration of advances to carry on the business and to secure payment of the debts of the Canadian firms. This course was. recommended by some of the principal creditors of the firm in this state, at an informal meeting of the creditors, as the best thing to be done under the circumstances. It appeared that the transfers were made in good faith. Held that, under the circumstances, the transfers were not preferences, within the meaning of the act, so as to deprive the bankrupts of their discharge.</p> <p>2. The adjudication in this case was made in November, 1873. A petition for discharge had been filed in August, 1875. The present petition for discharge was filed in November, 1876. It was objected that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the discharge, on the ground that a prior petition for discharge was still pending and undetermined. Held, that the objection was frivolous, that no discharge could have been granted on the prior petition, because not seasonably made, and that the proceedings under it were abandoned when this petition was filed.</p> <p>3. Whenever an objection to a discharge rests on facts, there must be a specification, in order that the bankrupt may produce evidence, and that there may be a trial of the fact.</p>

<p>[This was a libel for seamen’s wages by Charles White and others against Samuel P. Adams.]</p>

This was a hill in equity filed to restrain the defendant [Ethan Allen) from infringing letters patent [No. 12,64S] for an “improvement in repeating fire arms,” granted to Rollin White, April 3. 1855. the exclusive right to manufacture which improvement was assigned to Horace Smith and Daniel Wesson.

<p>Case No. 17,536.</p> <p>New Trial — Newly-Discovered Evidence — Excessive Damages — Breach of Contract— Penalties — Liquidated Damages.</p> <p>3. The court will not grant a new trial on the ground of newly-diseovered evidence, unless satisfied that if a new trial was had a different result would follow.</p> <p>2. The rule of damages for the non-fulfillment of a contract for the delivery of property, is the difference between the price at which it was agreed it should be delivered and its actual market value at the time and place of delivery specified in the contract.</p> <p>3. The court will not set aside a verdict on the ground of excessive damages unless the damages are palpably excessive, or, if the action is on a contract, they exceed the legal liability of the defendant under the contract.</p> <p>4. Where it is stipulated in a contract that certain acts are to be done or omitted, and the contract is of such a nature that the actual damages of non-fulfillment are susceptible of computation in money, and a sum is named in the contract as a penalty or forfeiture for a violation, it is to be viewed as a penalty and not as liquidated damages, and in such case the actual damages sustained will constitute the rule of recovery.</p> <p>5. Where the word “penal” or “penalty” is used in a contract, it must be construed as being so intended by the parties, but where a sum named is called “liquidated damages,” it will be held as a penalty if it seems from the contract that it was so intended by the parties, and the justice of the case requires such a construction.</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity [by Rollin White, Horace Smith, and Daniel B. Wesson against Herman Boker. Henry Boker, Jr., and Herman Funke] filed to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 12,619] for “improvement in repeating fire arms.-’ granted to Rollin White, April 3, 1SD5, and more particularly referred to in the case'of White v. Allen [Case No. 17,533].</p>

This was a feigned issue directed by the court to settle the domicil, at different times, of Mathias Aspden, an eccentrick, hypochon-driack and solitary bachelor, who, bom in Philadelphia prior to… Held: that as he had been domiciled in India, and as he was not actually on his way to Scotland, and had not any fixed and settled intention to return there at any particular time, India must be considered as the place of his domicil. In the Case of De Bonneval, 1 Curt, Ecc.

The bill in equity in this case states that on the 2d of July. 1S32. the complainant passed to the defendants his twenty-six promissory notes of that date, each for S274.G7, payable to them at different times, from sixteen to forty-four months, amounting to S7.141.42. three of which notes had been passed away by the defendants to Clagett & Washington; that on the 30th of December. 1S33. he entered into an agreement with the defendants, to anticipate the payment of those…

This cause was tried before HALLETT, District Judge, and a jury. A verdict for the defendant was returned. The following opinion was delivered on the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.

<p>Case No. 17,544.</p> <p>Bailment — Loss or Property — Liability op Bailee — Parties—Credibility.</p> <p>[1. Though a bailor does not own property bailed, yet, there being no privity of contract between the owner and bailee, and the bailor having, as between himself and the bailee, represented the interests of the owner, the bail- or may sue the bailee for loss of the property.]</p> <p>[2. The interest of a party in’ the result should be considered on the question of his credibility.]</p> <p>[3. One depositing in a bank without notice of its by-law that special deposits for safekeeping shall be at the risk of the depositor is not bound thereby.]</p> <p>[4. Where a bank receives a box for safekeeping, without any special compensation therefor, but merely because the depositor keeps an account with it. it is liable for gross negligence only, which includes the omission of any care indispensable to that proper security of the thing deposited which may be reasonably required according to the usages of men of business; the depositor, however, being entitled to such security, neither less nor more, as the course of business between him and the bank shows to have been mutually intended and expected between them.]</p> <p>[5. A bank which received a special deposit of a box for safe-keeping has the burden of showing that the loss thereof is not due to its fault.]</p> <p>[6. A bank which received a special deposit of a box for safe-keeping, though responsible therefor if it is delivered to a wrong person, or is lost or mislaid by the carelessness of an officer or employe thereof, in the course of business, is not responsible, proper care having been observed in the selection of officers and employes, if it is lost through any act of theirs not within the scope of their employment.]</p>

Action by the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, John H. White, on a policy of insurance, dated October 2d, 1874, upon the life of the said White for the sum of $10,000. The assured was a citizen of Missouri, and the policy was issued and delivered to him in this state. When it was so delivered the act of March 23d, 1874, was in force. This act is as follows: “Section 1.

Assumpsit. The plaintiff was described in the writ as a citizen of Virginia, and the defendant as a citizen of New York. The defendant at the time of the service of the writ upon him was in Rhode Island, and was there arrested. moved the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, the defect being apparent on the face of the writ. And he cited, as decisive of the point, the eleventh section of the judicial act of 1789, c. 20 [1 Stat. 78].

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.] Libel in admiralty for supplies furnished in Virginia. The libellants had a decree in the district court [2 Fed. 112], and the claimants appealed.

<p>Case No. 17.548.</p> <p>Basks — Constitutionality of Law — Individual Liability or Likectous — Excessive Loans — Insolvency.</p> <p>1. The act entitled “An act to organize and regulate banking associations,” approved March 15, 1837, is constitutional.</p> <p>2. Under the above act, the directors are liable in their individual capacities in the first instance, if the debts of the institution exceed three times the amount of stock paid.</p> <p>[Cited in Pickaway Co. Bank v. Prather, 12' Ohio St. 512.]</p> <p>3. The directors are liable for all excess of debts above three times the amount of capita) stock paid, and also for all deficits occasioned by the insolvency of the bank.</p> <p>4. If a director protests against certain loans, j at the time they were made, he is not liable, as director, in his individual capacity for such I loans.</p> <p>5. Where the plaintiff seeks to make the directors liable for excess of loans. &c. the declaration must aver the amount of such excess.</p> <p>C. The amendatory bank law, which took effect the 36th December. 1837, somewhat modifies the prior *law.</p> <p>7. In the first law. the legislature reserved the power to dissolve or modify the charters under it. at their discretion.</p> <p>S. But acts under the first law cannot be so changed by the second as to increase their responsibility.</p> <p>■ 9. This question, however, is not involved in the case.</p> <p>10. The act of insolvency fixes the responsibility of the directors under the new law.</p> <p>11. The insolvency of the bank occurred long after the amendatory law took effect.</p> <p>fSee Case No. 17,549.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,549.</p> <p>Banks — Liability or Directors — Notes Fraudulently Circulated — Acts or Agent — Plea of Discharge in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. A plea to an action against the directors of a bank, under the Michigan act of 1S37, which makes them personally liable, where the bank is insolvent. &e. which avers the notes on which the action was brought were fraudulently put into circulation, is no answer to the declaration.</p> <p>2. The plaintiff must be connected with the fraud, or at least have had notice of it.</p> <p>3. A bank is answerable for the acts of its agent. And it is immaterial how notes get into circulation, if they come into the hands of the holder bona fide.</p> <p>4. The proceeding by the bank commissioners under the statute is no bar to an action against the directors, to make them personally liable.</p> <p>5. All that the holder of the notes could claim, from such a proceeding, would be a pro rata payment of the assets.</p> <p>6. That plea is defective which, admitting its averments to be true, does not constitute a bar to the action.</p> <p>7. A plea of bankruptcy which sets out the certificate and discharge, as required in the 4th section, is good.</p> <p>[Cited in Lathrop v. Stuart, Case No. 8,-113.]</p>

Some time prior to February twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, the complainant, White, consigned to the bankrupts. Sehickedantz & Sewell, one hundred and twenty-five barrels of whisky, for sale, directing them to sell and take negotiable notes, payable to his order.

This is a libel filed against the master of the steamship Montana to recover damages for an assault alleged to have been committed, in the presence of and with the express consent of the defendant, upon the libellant, by the commanding officer of troops on board the ship.

Bill to foreclose mortgage brought by the plaintiff as an assignee of the note and mortgage in suit. The plaintiff is a citizen of Missouri. The maker of the note secured by the mortgage, and who is the mortgagor, and is also the present defendant, is a citizen of Kansas, and was at the time the note and mortgage were made and assigned to the plaintiff.

At law. These actions were founded on a letter addressed to the president of the United States by the defendants, Charles C. Fulton, E. M. Linthicum, Rap. Semmes, O. M. Linthicum, Wm. Robinson, Wm. S. Nieholls and Paul Stevens, and written by the defendant. Henry Addison, the successor of the plaintiff [Robert White] in the office of the collector of the port of Georgetown.

<p>Case No. 17,556.</p> <p>Confiscation of Hostile Vessel — Character of Owner — Residence within Insur-rectionary Lines.</p> <p>1. A capture of a steamer, within the insur-rectionary district, by the forces of the United States, vested in the government of the United States an absolute title to the property, without the necessity of any legal condemnation.</p> <p>2. The fact that the libellant, who was at the time of the capture resident in the district in insurrection, afterwards came into the United States and took the oath prescribed by the acts of congress, could not divest the title of the government.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,557.</p> <p>Bond — Action against Surett.</p> <p>In an action against a surety in a bond to perform a decree, it is not necessary that notice of the decree should have been given to the principal.</p>

The traverser, Samuel White, was indicted for the larceny of one bank check of the value of thirty dollars; two cloth coats of the value of forty dollars; two pairs of pantaloons of the value of twenty dollars; one linen shirt of the value of three dollars; and two pocket handkerchiefs of the value of two dolíais, of the moneys, goods and chattels of one John White.

<p>[This was an action brought by Seiden F. White against the Vermont & Massachusetts Railroad Company upon certain bonds.]</p>

The defendant pleaded in abatement as follows: “And the defendant comes and defends, &e., when, &c., and says that he ought not to be held to answer to the above writ and declaration of the plaintiffs, but the same ought to abate; because he says that the said plaintiffs heretofore, to wit, at the honorable superior court, holden at Brooklyn, in and for the county of Windham, in the state of Connecticut, on the second Tuesday of April, A. D. 1853, impleaded the said…

<p>Case No. 17,563.</p> <p>Notice of Protest — Evidence.</p> <p>1. The indorsement of a clerk, in the office of a notary, on the protest of a note for nonpayment, that notice was duly served, is not evidence.</p> <p>2. The deposition of the clerk should have been taken.</p> <p>B5 P fO itf rf® V</p>

<p>Case No. 17,563a.</p> <p>Accident to Tow — Liabilwt of Tug.</p> <p>[A tug engaged to tow a schooner from one anchorage in New York harbor to another is not responsible for the safe transportation of the schooner over sunken rocks, provided she exercise ordinary care and skill in directing the movements of the two vessels.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,564.</p> <p>Judgment for Deceit — Arrest of Bankrupt Defendant.</p> <p>A bankrupt arrested on an execution issued on a judgment in an action for deceit is not entitled to be relieved on habeas corpus, for the arrest is in an action founded on fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in Warner v. Cronkhite, Case No. 17,-180; Re Pitts, Id. 11,190.]</p> <p>[Cited in Donald v. Kell. Ill Ind. 3, 11 N. E. 783; Hamilton v. Reynolds, 88 Ind. 193: Wade v. Clark, 52 Iowa, 159, 2 N. W. 1040.]</p>

Case for injuries received by plaintiff’s intestate, wherefrom he died after lingering a short time, occasioned by the careless and negligent management of defendant’s engines and trains. Plea, the general issue. Verdict for the plaintiff for $5000. The defendant moved for a new trial for misdirection, and because the verdict was both against law and evidence.

<p>Case Ho. 17,566.</p> <p>Accident Insurance — Construction op Policy —External Sign op Injury — Right to Examine Deceased.</p> <p>[1. An intention on the part of the company to deceive cannot be presumed from the fact that some portions of the policy are printed in smaller type than other portions, the former being referred to in the latter.]</p> <p>[2. Nor is the fact that the company made an autopsy on deceased's body any evidence of fraud, when the right to do so is given by the policy.]</p> <p>[3. A nose bleed may be regarded as an “external and visible sign” of the injury, within the meaning of a provision that the insurance shall not extend to any injury of which there is no such sign.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wehle v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass’n, 31 N. Y. S. 868.]</p>

Parker recovered a judgment for three hundred and eight dollars and thirty-four cents with interest, against Riddick & Stall-ings in the superior court of the state of North Carolina, for the county of Perqui-mans, on April 15, 1867. On this judgment a fi. fa. was issued on August 27, 1867, which was levied on September 10, 1867, “on the farm whereon Riddick lives.” By this levy, under the laws of North Carolina, Parker acquired a lien on the lands so levied on.

This was a bill in equity [by William N. Whitely against William Swayne] filed to restrain the defendant from the infringement of letters patent [No. 10,967] for an “improvement in clover and grass-seed harvesters,”' granted to Thomas S. Steadman. May 23, 1854; assigned to complainant and reissued to him in two divisions, June 19, 1860 [Nos.. 985 and 9S6).

<p>Case Wo. 17,569.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Forfeiture and Waiver Thereof — Deductions—Receipts in Full — Fraud and Deception.</p> <p>1. If forfeitures are incurred and the services of the seamen again accepted, not under a new contract, but under the old one. the forfeiture is thereby remitted and the faults are forgiven.</p> <p>2. Deductions from wages may be made for voluntary and unfaithful absence from duty, even where the seamen are again accepted on their return to duty. i</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Hart v. The Otis, Case No. 6,154.]</p> <p>3. Receipts in full by seamen will always be disregarded, when they have been hurried into unjust compliances by fraud, deception, threats, or other improper conduct, palpably imposing on, deceiving, overawing or misleading them. But discharges given with due deliberation and full explanation of circumstances, should not be set aside on light grounds.</p> <p>[Cited in The Topsy, 44 Fed. 632.]</p> <p>NOTE. In the fitli section of the mariner’s act. the mode of proceeding in eases of seamen's wages, is pointed out. The judge of the district. or, if he resides more than three miles from the place, any judge or justice may proceed in a summary way. and determine a controversy so far as to certify or not. as the case may be, cause for issuing admiralty process. If cause is certified, the suit proceeds in the district court: if not, it precludes farther investigation, and places the party defeated in a situation not to admit of a course to bring the point before a superior tribunal, in the form he wishes. These preliminary enquiries are only where a procedure in rem is contemplated; and are not frequently final. They change into a proceeding in personam too often, as the seaman has several remedies. It is then a perplexing continuance of controversy, when parties are embittered and litigious. It is not pleasant for a judge to review his own decision, though the cause may in form be different. Prejudices may, unperceived by one, of the best inclinations, steal into the mind, and pride of opinion may have an influence felt, without being directly known. Parties do not generally submit to the first opinion of either judges or justices, most seldom to those of the latter, of whom there are not many sufficiently acquainted with maritime laws, to have a proper view of the subject. This as often continues as closes litigation. Causes are brought into court, after these prefatory en-quiries, either to appeal, which may now be done in demands for fifty dollars, a sum injuriously too small, to compel compromise, or under a hope of producing an opposite decision. It is at least multiplying chances: which will, at times, operate in suits, as well as in other transactions among mankind. There are some cases “rari nantes in gurgite vasto,” where new evidence, or farther investigation, very properly changes opinion. In the case in question, the cause is now in court.</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, to enforce the payment of a bottomry bond. The vessel was discharged from the arrest on the usual bond being given, under the act of congress of March 3, 1847 (9 Stat. 181). A decree was subsequently rendered in the district court for the libel-lants, condemning the vessel for the sum of 817,591.63, which, after reciting that she had been discharged under the act of congress, gave judgment against the stipulators in pursuance of said act. [Case No. 5.239.] An appeal was taken from that decree to this couht, and duly perfected. [Case unreported.] Pending that appeal, and before any hearing thereon, a stipulation was entered into between the proctors for the respective parties, providing for a sale of the vessel upon certain terms and conditions therein mentioned, and, among others, consenting to a return of the vesssel into the custody of the marshal, and also to a sale of her by that officer. She was subsequently sold. On the 14th of May, 1857, an order was obtained from the circuit judge out of court, directing the clerk to enter an order of record according to such stipulation. A motion was now made by a person who claimed to have an interest in the vessel, but who was not a party to the cause, to vacate such order.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition to prove against the joint estate and. the separate estate of one of the partners such debt as should remain after applying the proceeds of certain collateral security.

<p>Case Wo. 17,571.</p> <p>Running of Limitations — Suspension by Civil War.</p> <p>[The suspension of the federal court in Mississippi by reason of the Rebellion, suspended the running of limitations as to persons having a right to pursue their remedies in that court.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 12,006.]</p> <p>[Nowhere fully reported; opinion not now accessible.]</p>

Assumpsit to recover back money paid to the defendant, the late collector of the customs in Boston, while in office, for duties on goods, asserted to be not liable to'the duty. The money was paid under protest. Plea, the general issue.

Application of certain creditors (heretofore filed) for leave to sue bankrupt in state court, the bankrupt having unreasonably delayed his endeavor to obtain his discharge. Personal notice of such application had been given the bankrupt.

<p>Case Wo. 17,576.</p> <p>Bill of Review — Time of Filing — Final Decrees —Mortgage Foreclosure — Confirmation of Sale.</p> <p>3.A bill of review is brought for errors apparent on the face of the decree.</p> <p>2. It is the nature of a writ of error.</p> <p>3. And the time within which a bill may be filed is limited to five years, by analogy to the limitation of the writ of error.</p> <p>4. A decree of sale of mortgaged premises, is a final decree.</p> <p>5. A confirmation of the sale, on the return of the commissioner, if erroneous, affords no ground on which to reverse the original decree.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by George A. S. Whiting against John A. S. Graves and others for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 176,036, granted to E. L. Howard April 25, 1876.]</p>

[This was a libel by Benjamin >1. Whitlock and others against the barque Thales to enforce an alleged lien.

<p>Case No. 17,579.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Mortgaged Property — Enjoining Sale — Authority of Assignee.</p> <p>1.An injunction to restrain a mortgagee from | making a sale of real estate belonging to a ¡ bankrupt will be granted when it appears that i the mortgagee made a sale of the property be- , fore the "adjudication of bankruptcy, but the . purchaser, under advice of counsel, declined to i make payment and receive deeds therefor, and the sale sought to be enjoined is made under the same terms as before with the appendix, “the above property will be sold for account of whom it may concern.”</p> <p>2. The words of the appendix, “for account of whom it may concern,” cannot be construed to affect the assignee and mortgagee.</p> <p>3. This court can rightfully interfere even though it be alleged that the mortgagee will be injured thereby, its right being simply to regulate through the assignee, the modes and means of foreclosing the mortgage.</p> <p>[Cited in Schulze v. Bolting, Case No. 12,489.]</p> <p>4. The first sale was, in reality, no sale, and hence, from and after the adjudication, the mortgagee’s rights and powers to sell were such, and only such, as could be exercised consistently with the provisions of the bankrupt law, and under that law the assignee is really the agent both of the mortgagee and the other creditors.</p> <p>[NOTE. The following case, cited in the text, is reprinted from S N. B. R. 629 (Quarto, 155), by permission.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Whitney & Munson, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>This was a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the infringement of letters patent, No. 199,948, granted to James G. Wilson, February 5th, 1878, for an improvement in connecting blind slats, consisting of a peculiarly shaped distance-piece in combination with the suspending wires and diamond-shaped slats. A defence of want of novelty was set up on the ground that one Niernsee had suggested taking mortised pieces of wood similar to the blind, and using them to cover up the steel band where it showed between the slats; and also by reason of the English patent to Alexander Clark. No. 1,803. of 1863. The title of the complainant [Edmund S. Whitman] was also disputed, on the ground of certain partnership arrangements between Wilson, the patentee, and the defendant [John D. James],</p>

At a circuit court of the United States for the district of Georgia was tried the case of Eli Whitney v. Isaiah Garter, for infringing a right vested by patent for a new and useful improvement in the mode of ginning cotton. The plaintiff supported his declaration by proving the patent, model, and specification, and proving the use of the machine in question by the defendant.

<p>Case No. 17,581.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Stay op Proceedings — Remedy by Arrest.</p> <p>1. A stay of proceedings, subsequent to final judgment, for the purpose of putting in motion the remedy of arrest "which is reserved to the creditor, is not allowable under sections 5106, 5107, Rev. St. U. S.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Pitts, Case No. 11,190.]</p> <p>2. Prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, a surrogate’s decree was docketed against the bankrupt for the payment of moneys misappropriated by him as administrator, and an appeal taken from a decision of the surrogate refusing an application for a commitment of the bankrupt for failure to pay. Upon such appeal, pending the bankruptcy proceedings, the decision of the surrogate was reversed, and the proceedings remitted to him, to enforce the proper remedy against the person of the bankrupt. Held, that the proceedings could not be stayed, under section 5106, so as to prevent an application to the surrogate for a commitment.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,582.</p>

This was a libel for assault and battery [by F. Gerard Whitney, mariner, against John Eager, master of the brig Oriole]. It appeared, beside the evidence of the assault and battery, that a receipt by the libellant, which contained a release of all complaints on his part against his officers, had been signed by him as the only means of obtaining his wages, which were refused to him unless this was done.

This was an action to recover damages for the violation of a patent for an improved method of making glass knobs, as described in the specification. “To all persons to whom these presents shall come.

<p>Case No. 17,586.</p> <p>Collision is Hell Gate — Steamer and Schooner —Beating out Track — Steamer not Stopping — Evidence—Statements of Crew.</p> <p>1. The schooner Gold Fish was coming through Hell Gate to New York, on an ebb tide, with a six-knot breeze from W.N.W. She stood over from Negro Point, close-hauled on her starboard tack, till near Hallett’s Point, and then tacked off to the northward. ’Before going but a short distance, she was.run into by the Empire State, which was bound from New York. The collision occurred in the afternoon. For the steamboat it was urged: (1) That the schooner, after coming about, ought to have remained in the wind long enough to allow the steamboat to pass her. (2) That the schooner was negligent, in that after she came about she let her sheets flow’, and remained in the steamboat’s track. (3) That the schooner did not run out her tack towards Hallett’s Point. Held, that the circumstances make out a case where the burden of proof is on the steamboat to show by preponderating evidence that she was prevented from passing in safety by some, fault in the management of the schooner.</p> <p>2. It -was not the duty of the schooner to remain in the wind. What the law requires of a sailing vessel in a narrow channel is to beat out her tack, and having done so, to come about with all possible dispatch upon the other, leaving to an approaching steam vessel the responsibility of being in a position to enable her to do so without danger.</p> <p>[Approved in The Northern Warrior. Case No. 10,325. Cited in The Free State, Id. 5.090; The Renovator. 30 Fed. 195: The Servia. Id. 508; The A. W. Thompson, 39 Fed. 116.]</p> <p>3. Though there may be cases where a departure from this rule would be justified, and even required, the present is not one. No sailing vessel in Hell Gate can be asked to check her headway to enable a steamboat to pass her at Hallett’s Point.</p> <p>4. The weight of evidence is against the de-fence that the schooner’s sheets vrere let loose. Testimony of the men on board the schooner, respecting their own acts, must he considered as outweighing the statements of persons from the steamboat.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hope, 4 Fed. 93.]</p> <p>5. The rule requiring a sailing vessel to beat out her tack does not require her in all cases to go as near the shore as the depth of the water will permit, without reference to other exigencies. A schooner tacking above Hallett's Point is entitled to come about in time to insure avoiding the reef at the Point, and the place must vary according to the capacity of each vessel and the strength of the wind and tide.</p> <p>6. The fact that the answer when put in did not deny the averment of the libel that the tack was properly beat out, is to be considered on a conflict of testimony on that point, even though the answer was allowed to be amended on the hearing by inserting such a denial.</p> <p>7. Evidence of conversations with the crew of the schooner is entitled to little weight in determining disputed questions of fact, especially where the statements are denied by the witnesses on the stand, and are inconsistent with the cotemporary act of demanding pay for their vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hope, 4 Fed. 96; The Roman, 14 Fed. 62.]</p> <p>8. The steamer was in fault in not stopping in time, and that, having selected the most hazardous course, by not waiting till the schooner had passed her to the northward, and having failed of success in it, she must be held responsible for the damages.</p> <p>TFor a hearing on exception to the commissioner’s reiwrt, see Case No. 4,473.]</p>

This was an action of libel by William H. Whitney against the Janesville Gazette. The alleged libelous publication consisted of an article about three-fourths of a column in length, published in the issue of January 24. 1S71, and headed “A Desperate Assault on a Peaceable Citizen. It gave an account of an assault by the plaintiff upon one Tompkins, a jeweler in Janesville, in his store. The plaintiff entered by breaking the glass in the window.

<p>Case No. 17,691.</p> <p>Master's LrEX for Wages cxder State Statute.</p> <p>The master of a vessel exclusively engaged in navigating the interior waters of this state may maintain a libel, in rem, for his wages and advances — when a lien therefor is created by the state law.</p> <p>[Cited in The Louis Olseu. 52 Fed. 653; The City of Norwalk. 55 Fed. 106; The Julia. 57 Fed. 235: The Louis Olsen. 6 C. C. A. 60S, 57 Fed. 846.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the above decree was affirmed at the July term. 1874, per Mr. Justice Field. Case unreported.]</p>

This was a suit in equity, brought to restrain the infringement of letters patent “for an improvement in the process of manufacturing cast-iron railroad wheels.” granted to Asa Whitney, April 25, 1848, and extended April 25, 1862, for seven years. The facts, and material portion of Whitney’s specifications, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

These were motions to confirm and reject the report of the master to whom had been referred the inquiry as to the profits derived by the defendant from the infringement of letters patent for method of annealing and cooling cast-iron car-wheels.” granted to Asa AA’hitney. April ó. 1S4S. and extended for seven years from April 5. 18(52. The original case is reported in AVhitney v. Mowry [Case No. lT.óít!].

These were motions upon exceptions to the final report of the master, to which reference has been made in a former report of this case [Case No. 17,593]. The whole amount of profits, as reported by the master, being the whole profit of the manufactured wheel, was over one hundred and eleven thousand dollars, and for this sum a final decree was entered in accordance with the opinion.

Ejectment for a moiety of a parcel of land with a paper-mill, called the “Brown George,” and other buildings, and all the right- of water and privileges thereto belonging. Plea, the general issue.

<p>Case No. 17,596.</p> <p>Infringement of Patents — Preliminary Injunction — When Grantable.</p> <p>1. Where the defendants manufactured under the sanction of a patent of prior date to those held by complainants, which prior patent expired before any proceedings were instituted by the complainants to secure or protect their right, held, that a preliminary injunction should not be granted against the defendant, even though the complainants were able to show that the defendants infringed upon their patents. and that the inventions secured to them antedated the patent under which the defendants had been manufacturing.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Harris, Case No. 15.315; Washburn & Moen Manuf’g Co. v. Griesche, ' 16 Fed. 070.]</p> <p>2. Where the complainants have submitted for so long a space of time to the manufacture and use by the defendants of the infringing machine, without enforcing their rights by proceedings at law or in equity, they have lost the right to invoke the summary process of the court, by an injunction pendente lite, and must await the decree of the court upon the final hearing.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,597.</p> <p>Accident at Railroad Crossing — Negligence and Contributory Negligence — Excessive Speed — Ringing Bell — Province op Court and Jury — New Trial — Measure op Damages.</p> <p>1; Where three persons, having waited for a freight train to pass, at the crossing of a frequented street, then cross the track, and two of them are struck by a switch -train on an adjoining track, and killed, there being at the time a strong wind blowing, the bell on the switch' train not having been rung, and the survivor having neither seen nor heard the switch train until after the accident, the circumstances are not such as to warrant the court in instructing the jury in an action brought by the representative of one of the deceased persons that the plaintiff could not recover.</p> <p>2. Although the freight train was running at a higher speed than allowed by law, and probably if it had not been passing, the accident would not have occurred, nevertheless the only effect of the passing of that train was to modify or influence the conduct of the others, and the fault of the freight train is too remote in law to constitute one of the causes of the accident.</p> <p>3. This court is, however, not prepared to say that every person who. in a populous town at a railroad crossing, fails to pause and look up and down the track, is guilty of such negligence as to prevent a recovery for an injury inflicted by the .flagrant wrong of those in charge of a passing train.</p> <p>4. The bell should be rung not only before crossing a street, but so long as there is danger of encountering passers-by.</p> <p>5. The courts are much influenced by the conduct of the defendant, and. if the wrong is flagrant, are inclined to hold that to be the cause of the injury.</p> <p>6. While there are some things as to which it might be the duty of the court to charge that they constitute negligence, there are many others which the court must leave to the jury to decide. The court properly charged the jury that if the bell of the switch train was not rung, that was negligence, and left it to them 'to decide whether the person injured had been negligent.</p> <p>7. Where, on the objection of a party, competent evidence has been excluded, he cannot urge that as error on motion for a new trial.</p> <p>8. Where the jury rendered a verdict for the highest sum allowed by statute, five thousand dollars, it being shown that the person killed was a superior woman — as wife, mother, and member of society — there is nothing in the amount of the verdict to authorize the court to interfere.</p> <p>NOTE. This case was affirmed by the supreme court (13 Wall. [80 U. S.] 270). Company is bound to use care and dilligence to prevent injury to persons at crossings. Bradley v. Boston & M. R. Co.. 2 Cush. 539; Macon & W. R. Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. G79; Augusta & S. R. Co. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75: Barrett v. Midland R. Co., 1 Fost. & F. 361; Curtis v. Central Ry. [Case No. 3,501]. As to what constitutes negligence on the part of a passer-by at a crossing, consult Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Still, 19 Ill. 500: Beiseigal v. New York Cent. R. Co., 33 Barb. 429. s. c. 34 N. Y. 622; Milwaukee & C. R. Co. T. Hunter, 11 Wis. 160; Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120: Ohio & M. R. Co.v. Gullett. Id. 487: Wilds v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 29 N. Y. 315: Newson v. New York Cent. R. Co.. Id. 383: North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Heileman, 49 Pa. St. 60; Catawissa R. Co. v. Armstrong, Id. 186; Galena & C. U. R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 271;- Ernst v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 24 How. Prac. 97. Whether neglect to give signal is conclusive evidence of negligence. Galena & C. TJ. R. Co. v. Dill, 22 Ill. 271: Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Reid. 24 Ill. 144. Where no signal is given, effect of negligence of injured party. Steves v. Oswego it S. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 422: Dascomb v. Buffalo & S. L. R. Co., 27 Barb. 221: McGrath v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 32 Barb. 144. The New York court of appeals has recently ruled that although a traveler must make vigilant use of his eyes and ears in approaching a railroad track, tó ascertain if there is a train approaching, he is not hound to stop for the purpose of listening, nor, if in a vehicle, to get out and go forward upon the track, nor to stand up in the vehicle to get a better view of the track. Davis v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co.. 47 N. Y. 400. But as to what he must do. consult Gorton v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N. Y. 660: Wilcox v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co.. 39 N. Y. 358. Consult also the following decisions in regard to the duty of travelers in crossing a railroad track, and of company in giving signals, etc.: Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Still, 19 Ill. 500; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Sweeney, 52 Ill. 325; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Gretzner. 46 Ill. 74: Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Baddcley. 54 Ill. 19: Havens v. Erie Ry. Co., N. 1’. 296, approving Ernst v. Hudson R. R. Go., 39 N. Y. 61; Wilcox v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co.. Id. 35S.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[This was a libel by Thomas Whittaker and others against the schooner J. A. Travis, her boats, etc., to recover for supplies furnished the schooner.]

<p>This was at) action for the violation of a patent right in a machine for the making of cotton and wool cards. A verdict having been returned against the defendant, he moved for a new trial upon several grounds, which will appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,601.</p> <p>Infringement op Patent Right — Identitt op Machines — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>1. If a person be the inventor of an improvement only, and not of the whole machine, he is entitled to a patent for no more than his improvement.</p> <p>See note to Woodcock v. Parker [Case No. 17,971].</p> <p>' [Cited in Re Hebbard. Case No. 6,314; Smith v. Downing, Id. 13,036.]</p> <p>[Cited in Holliday v. Rheem, 18 Pa. St. 469.]</p> <p>2. What constitutes the identity or diversity of two machines, so as to give or take away the right to a patent.</p> <p>See Gray v. James [Id. 5,718]; Phil. Pat. 128-133, where the cases are cited and commented on.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Downing, Case No. 13,-036; Singer v. Walmsley, Id. 12,900.]</p> <p>[Cited in Tillotson v. Ramsay, 51 Yt. 314.]</p> <p>3. If a machine produce several different effects, by a particular combination of machinery, and these effects are produced in the same way in another machine, and a new effect added, the inventor of the latter cannot entitle himself to a patent for the whole machine.</p> <p>See note to Woodcock v. Parker [supra],</p> <p>[Cited in Whitney v. Emmett. Case No. 17,-585; In re Hebbard, Id. 6,314.]</p> <p>[Cited in Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 317.]</p> <p>4. If an inventor make a gift of his invention to the public, and suffer it to go into general use, he cannot afterwards resume the invention, and hold a patent.</p> <p>See Morris v. Huntington [Case No. 9,831]; Melius v. Silsbee [Id. 9,404]; Bedford v. Hunt [Id. 1.217]; Gray v. James [supra]; Pennock v. Dealogao, 2 Pet. [27 UjisTf 1; Wyeth v; Stone [Case No. 18.107]; Reed v. Cutter [Id. 11.645): Saunders v. Smith, 3 Mylne & C. 711, 735.</p> <p>[Cited in Bartlette v. Crittenden, Case No. 1,-082; Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 317.]</p> <p>[Cited in Earl v. Page, 6 N. H. 479.]</p> <p>5. In an action for a violation of a patent right, the plaintiff can recover for actual damages only, and not for a vindictive recompense.</p> <p>. 6. If a user of the patented machine be proved, the measure of damages is the value of the use, during the time of the user. If a making only of the machine be proved, the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages only. Neither the price, nor the expanse of making the machine, is a proper measure of damages.</p> <p>[Cited in Earle v. Sawyer, Case No. 4,247; Allen v. Blunt, Id. 215; Steam Stone-Cutter Co. v. Sheldons, 21 Fed. 876.]</p> <p>[Cited in Ogden v. Marshall, 8 N. Y. 344; Pegram v. Stortz (W. Ya.) 6 S. E. 501.]</p> <p>7. In an action on a patent right, the jury are to find single damages, and the court will treble them.</p>

At the trial of this cause before a jury, at which the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff [Emanuel Whittle] for the amount of $2,100 for damages by fire, with interest and costs, the court gave the following instructions or charge to the jury bearing upon the evidence in the cause.

The brig Commerce had been on a long circuitous voyage of between two and three years. She • touched at a foreign port, on her way home, where, on a-difference with the master, the seamen went on shore, as it was alleged, without the master’s leave. An entry, agreeably to the act of congress, was made in the log-book, of their having been absent without leave, for the space of forty-eight hours.

This is an action by the plaintiff, a nonresident holder of about $75,000 of the bonds of the county of Pulaski. Bach of the bonds, except as to date, amount, and name of payee, is of the tenor following: “State of Arkansas. Pulaski County Funded Debt. Five Hundred Dollars. No. 16. $500. One year after date the county of ■ Pulaski will pay five hundred dollars to M. K. Starke, or bearer, with interest at the rate of eight per centum per annum.

[In the matter of William Whyte, a bankrupt.] It appears from the register’s certificate that in the course of proceedings before him, Clarence H. Walker offered to prove, by his own oath, a debt against said bankrupt’s estate in favor of S. W. Walker & Co., which firm, he stated, was composed of Samuel W. Walker and Robert M. Gray; that Mr. Walker was then absent in Cincinnati, in the state of Ohio, and that Mr. Gray was then confined at his house by sickness, so that he…

The schooner Samuel Strong was built at the mouth of Black river, Lorain county, in this state, in the summer of 1847, by citizens of that county. In the course of her construction she contracted a large debt to the libellant [Lemuel Wick], then and still a resident of Cleveland.

<p>In equity.</p> <p>This was an action brought by the complainant [William Wicke], assignee of the invention for a specified territory, under the patent of George Wicke, granted June 16, 1863, for a “machine for nailing boxes.” The complainant, by assignment, acquired the exclusive right under said patent for the state of New York. The remaining territory was owned by the original patentee, but the complainant was his attorney, authorized to collect royalties and grant licenses for said territory. Under this power of attorney he licensed one Oppel to use one of the patented machines in Newark. New Jersey. Oppel sold this machine to the defendants [Henry Klein-knecht and others], who took the same to New York, and there used it. Suit was brought, and defendants pleaded an implied license, which, they claim, they derived from the complainant, through his demand on them for payment of certain royalties due from Oppel at the time he sold the machine.</p>

[This was an appeal by William Wicker-sham from a decision of the commissioner of patents in an interference declared between the appellant’s application and the patent of I. M. Singer for improvements in sewing machines.]

The libel in this case, which was filed on the 28th April, 1S84, set forth that the libel-lant [Marine T. Wickham] signed an agreement on the 5th December, 1832, to perform a voyage in the ship Eliza, from Philadelphia to Canton and back.

[This was an action by William S. Wick-ham and William S. Gosham against Moses Dillon to recover the value of 20 boxes of dry goods. Heard on motion for a new trial.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] This was a bill in equity brought in the ■district court by the assignee in bankruptcy of John R. Picton, against the executors of Jules Valle, deceased, the bankrupt, and his wife, to require the executors of Valle to pay to complainant the share of the personal property and estate of the testator bequeathed to Zoe Valle, wife of J. R. Picton, us residuary legatee, when the estate…

In equity. [Suit by the assignee in bankruptcy of George A. Wicks & Co. against Henry E. Perkins.J On exceptions to the sufficiency of a plea to the bill of complaint.

<p>Case No. 17,614.</p> <p>Admiralty — Respond ent’s Discharge prom Arrest-Suit bt Minor — Guardian ad Litem.</p> <p>1. A motion to discharge respondent from arrest, on the ground that the libellant has no legal cause of action against him, will not be granted where the affidavits read upon the motion in behalf of the respective parties, are contradictory as to the merits of the cause.</p> <p>2. In an action by a minor to recover wages as seaman, the respondent is not entitled to require the appointment of a guardian ad litem or nest friend for the libellant.</p> <p>[Cited in The David Faust, Case No. 3,595; The State of New York, Id. 13,32S; The Melissa, Id. 9,400.]</p>

In equity i Heard upon pleadings and evidence for final decree. The bill was filed to prevent an infringement of certain letters patent granted to one Rhodom 11. Brooks for improvements in cotton presses, and for an account of profits.

<p>Case No. 17,617.</p> <p>Actions on Several Insurance Policies — Trial before Same Jury — Proofs of Loss — False Statements — Failure of Insured to Answer Questions — New Trial — Excessive Verdict.</p> <p>1. Where several actions on policies of insurance are brought by the same plaintiffs against different companies, and the questions are the same, the evidence the same, and the counsel tbe same, the court may order them all to be tried to the same jury.</p> <p>[Cited in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 ü. S. 293, 12 Sup. Ct. 912.1</p> <p>2. A mere failure by the assured to answer questions respecting the loss held, under the terms of the policy, not to “forfeit” or “avoid” it. but only to suspend the right to payment until the answers are given.</p> <p>3. False swearing by the assured in preliminary proofs, or in an examination under oath required by the policy in any material matter, with intent to mislead, avoids the policy; but honest mistakes do not have this effect.</p> <p>4. Duty of court to grant new trials where the verdicts are against the law and evidence discussed by DILLON. Circuit Judge, and a new trial was conditionally granted after five juries had decided the same issues in the same way.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Eberhard Wiegand. On habeas eorpus.j</p>

In December, 1S68, the bankrupt [Jacob Wielarski] filed his petition, and was adjudged a bankrupt, and an assignee was appointed. Held: and at which an assignee was appointed. The matter of said petition is still pending, without any discharge or discontinuance, and, while so pending, the bankrupt filed his petition in this matter in December, 1S70, and the same debts are set forth and the same creditors named in both petitions.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[This was a libel in admiralty by Heinrich Wiener against the Rafael Arroyo for the nondelivery of certain goods.]</p> <p>cited Abb. Shipp. (Am. Ed.) p. 400; Howard v. Tucker, 1 Boyd, Adm. 712; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & E. 474; Berkley v. Watling, 7 Adol. & E. 29; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 Term R. 70; Keener v. Bank of U. S., 2 Barr [2 Pa. St.] 239; Newbold v. Wright, 4 Rawle, 212; Id-dings v. Nagle, 2 Watts & S. 22; Bolton v Colder, 1 Watts, 303; Rapp v. Palmer, 3 Watts, 179; The Reeside [Case No. 11,657].</p>

Thomas had recovered a judgment for a tort against AYiggers in the state court. On the 18th of May, AViggers filed his petition in bankruptcy. scheduling this judgment. On the 23d. Thomas sued out of the state court a capias ad satisfaciendum on his judgment. under which Wiggers was arrested on the morning of the 25th. Afterwards, on the same day, Wiggers was duly adjudicated a bankrupt by the register.

<p>Case for a malicious prosecution. The declaration charged — that the said [George W.] Coffin, maliciously contriving to injure the said [Benjamin] Wiggin and to destroy his character and reputation, falsely, maliciously, and without any just or probable cause, made complaint and swore before the police court of Boston against the said Wiggin, that he, with one Walter Janes and others, at Bangor, did, on the loth day of June last past, unlawfully and wickedly conspire together to defeat the sale of the lands of the commonwealth of Massachusetts offered for sale at public auction on the 19th day of June in Bangor, by bidding therefor, under a false pretence of purchasing the same, a greater sum than any other person would offer, whereby the said land was struck off to him and them, the sale thereof being thereby defeated, and the said commonwealth being thereby defrauded; that the said Wiggin, in virtue of a warrant sued out upon the said complainant, was arrested and brought before the said court at a distance of 250 miles from his home, and in a state other than that wherein he had his usual abode, and was ordered to recognize in the sum of $1.000 to appear and answer before the said court at a future day; that the said Wiggin was kept under arrest for eighteen days, within which time he was brought before the said court at four different times, at which the said Coffin was witness against him; and that the said court, after a full hearing of the case, adjudged that the said AViggin was not guilty, and that there was not probable cause to believe that he was guilt}-, of the said supposed offence, and caused him to be discharged out of custody. The damages were laid at $5.000. Plea, the general issue.</p> <p>At the trial at May term, 1S35, a great deal of evidence was offered on each side, the substance of which was as follows: To support the issue on his part, the plaintiff offered in evidence a complaint made by the defendant against the plaintiff before the police court in Boston, on the 20th July, A. D. 1S33. charging the plaintiff with a conspiracy with one Janes et als. to defraud the commonwealth of Massachusetts: and a warrant founded on the said complaint, upon which the plaintiff was arrested and carried before the said court. He also offered a copy of the record of the said police court, by which it appeared, that, after examination, it was adjudged, that there was no probable cause to believe, that the plaintiff was guilty, as set forth in the complaint, and he was finally discharged. -</p> <p>The plaintiff also introduced Walter Janes as a witness upon the stand, who testified, that he was at the land sale at Bangor, which had been before referred to, and after he had bid off the three first townships, the plaintiff, who was also there, said to him: “Let me bid, as they will not run me, as they will you,” and he accordingly bid upon one, which was struck off, and his (Wiggin’s) name was mentioned as the purchaser, upon which he immediately said to the auctioneer: “Don’t use my name.” and some one then gave the name of Huntingdon. That the bidding by Wiggin was for him (.lanes'). That he never had any conversation with Wiggin previous to the sale about bidding at the sale. That he never saw Wiggin from the time he first learnt there was to be such sale, until he saw him at Bangor on the day immediately preceding the sale. That he did not know that AA:iggin haa any knowledge of his (Janes’s) intention to bid. He further testified, that the defendant never asked him to exhibit any authority, or if he had any, and never asked him to perform the conditions of sale. That the defendant appointed Tuesday then next to meet him at the land office in Boston, to carry the sale into effect, but the defendant was not there on Tuesday as agreed. That he never told the defendant, that there had been an agreement between himself and a man at the eastward to bid off at the sale. That ho never told him that he had seen the same person in Boston both before and after the sale. That he never told him, that while in Bangor, a paper of instructions was drawn up in Judge Williamson's office, and no such paper ever was drawn up. That he never insinuated, or gave Coffin to understand, that Wiggin was concerned in the transaction, and that the defendant never inquired, before the making of his complaint, whether Wiggin was concerned or not. That he never received any money or check from Wiggin in relation to that business. and that he never gave the defendant to understand, that be had received any money or pay from Wiggin. That he inquired of Coffin at the police court why he put "Wiggin’s name into the complaint, to which defendant replied, that it was necessary to do that in order to get hold of him (Janes). That he also asked the defendant, if he had seen the affidavits made by himself and Wiggin, to which he replied, that he had. The witness then asked him if he was satisfied, that AAug-gin had nothing to do with the business, to which he made no answer. That at the hearing before the police court the defendant testified, that it was not Wiggin, who gave the name of Huntingdon as the purchaser of the lot knocked off to Wiggin’s bid, and that the defendant never mentioned Wiggin’s name to the witness, either verbally or in writing, before he made the complaint, nor ever gave any intimation, that he attributed any blame to the plaintiff before he appeared in ..the police court, and that the witness told the defendant, that he was surprised, that he put AA’iggin’s name into the complaint, as he had nothing to do with the business. On cross examination he testified, that he did not inform the defendant before the sale, that he was authorized, to bid for Huntingdon. That he once borrowed a sum of money, a little over a hundred dollars, of the plaintiff, for which he: gave him his note, and soon afterwards paid it. That this was before the sale, and before his failure in business, which was in April. That witness boarded in the same house with the plaintiff from the middle of February to. the first of March, and that the witness never saw him afterwards until he met him at Bangor the day before the sale. That he thought, that the money, which he had before stated he had borrowed of the plaintiff, was borrowed and repaid while they boarded together.</p> <p>The plaintiff also introduced Samuel A’eazie as a witness, who testified, that the defendant was reputed to be a man of property, and Thomas A. Deblois, who testified, that the house, which the defendant occupied in Boston. was worth from twelve to fifteen thousand dollars.</p> <p>The defendant also introduced the deposition of N. O. Pillsbury, which is on file, and John Godfrey as a witness, who testified that he saw the plaintiff in Boston, in the latter part of April. 1SÍU1 — he could not say whether it was before or after the land sale before referred to had been advertised.</p>

Bill in equity [by Timothy Wiggin against John Dorr]. The facts of the case were as follows:. On the 5th of September, 1833, Robert Hooper, Jr., of Boston, as agent of the plaintiff, who is a resident banker in London, entered into an agreement with Messrs. Barrett & Brown, of Boston, whereby Stephen Jarvis, of the brig Tim, was authorized to value and draw bills at the Bra-zils upon the plaintiff, not exceeding £3.000 sterling, at sixty days’ sight, for account of Messrs.

<p>In equity. Bill, brought by Wiggins, a citizen of Massachusetts, Case, Thompson and Bradley, citizens of Pennsylvania, Dennison and Smith, citizens of Ohio, and Brink, a citizen of New Jersey, against the European and North American Railway Company, John A. Poor. Allen Haines, and Charles J. Gilman, citizens of Maine, and Geo. H. Pierce, a citizen of New Hampshire, found and served with process in Maine, praying for an injunction. The bill charges that one of the orators, Wiggins, is the owner of nine shares of the capital stock of the corporation. and that all of them have a joint interest with Pierce, one of the respondents. in 574 shares of the stock of the corporation, standing on the company’s books in the name of Pierce and one Blaisdell. who with Pierce’s assent had assigned all his interest in the same to the orator Case, and that the orators’ interest in that stock was eight-tenths, and Pierce’s interest in it two-tenths.</p>

Bill, answer, replication, and dedimus awarded in October. 1804. The cause was set for hearing in October, 1805. A deposition was taken in July, 1805. that the deposition being taken more than six months after the replication, could not be read as evidence o.n the hearing. See Act Assem. Ya. Nov. 29. 1792, p. 07, § 46. contended, that the act of assembly means six months after the cause is set for hearing.

[This was an action by Edward Wight, William Sturgis, and William Shaw against Edward Curtis, to recover back GO per cent, of certain duties paid under protest.]

On May 20th, 1S73, Muxlow, one of the defendants in this suit, recovered a judgment in the supreme court of the state of New York against William W. Hulst for $1,025.63. The suit was^eommenced by the service on Hulst, on April 28th, 1873, of a summons, without a complaint, by George W. Niles, one of the firm of Niles & Sherman, who were plaintiff’s attorneys in the suit.

This was an action of trespass on the case to recover damages for personal injuries received in consequence of a defect or want of repair of a certain highway in the city of Providence, called “College Street.” In the month of February, 1S56. as the plaintiff [Daniel Wightman] was walking upon the sidewalk of the street, he fell upon the ice which had there accumulated, injuring his arm and hand, and otherwise causing him severe pain and suffering.

<p>Case No. 17,632.</p> <p>Statutes Abolishing Imprisonment for Debt.</p> <p>The act of Ohio abolishing imprisonment for debt, except in certain cases, having been adopted by congress, can only affect proceedings in a case, subsequently to its adoption.</p>

This was an action on the case [by Erastus Wilbur against Mather Beecher], tried before NELSON, Circuit Justice, for the infringement of letters patent granted to Bichard Montgomery and Lewis W. Harris, of Sangerfield, Oneida county, New York, on the 12th of August, 1840, for an “improvement in the mill for breaking and grinding bark.” The plaintiff was the assignee of the patent for the state of New York.

This was a motion made in behalf of certain judgment creditors of the bankrupt [Jeremiah G. Wilbur] for the dissolution of an injunction previously issued by this court restraining them from proceeding to collect upon execution the amount of certain judgments which they had obtained in a state court, and upon which execution' had been issued and a levy made upon certain personal property prior to the filing of the bankrupt’s petition.

This was an action to recover back duties paid to the defendant [Cornelius W. Lawrence] as collector of the port of New-York. The facts were these: The plaintiffs [Jeremiah Wilbur and others] entered at the custom-house, on the 17th of May, 1S4S, a quantity of unwashed wool, imported by them from Buenos Ayres to New-York.

<p>Case No. 17,636.</p> <p>Corporations — Stock Assessments — Equity Powers — Construction of Charter — Bankruptcy — Assessment by Assignee — Counterclaims — Ultra Vires — Liability of Trans-fekees of Stock.</p> <p>1. In the ordinary case of a solvent private corporation, there is no liability of the stockholders to pay the capital until an assessment, but in the case of insolvency, payment is compellable at the suit of the creditors, though no assessment may have been made.</p> <p>2. Under proceedings in equity for this purpose, the court may, if a sufficient corporate organization continues to subsist, order an assessment by the corporate authorities upon the stockholders in any stage of the proceedings for any purpose for which it may be thought convenient. In such case it is only a proceeding in aid of the judicial recourse of the creditors; it may promote the enforcement, but is not essential to the existenae of the obligation of the stockholders.</p> <p>[Cited in Lane's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 60.]</p> <p>3. The bankrupt was a manufacturing company organized under a SDeeial act with a capital of fifty thousand dollars, divided into one thousand shares of fifty dollars each, with power to increase the number of shares to three thousand. The act prescribed no form or method of subscription to the stock, but authorized the payment of subscriptions in real or pers'onal estate appropriate to the corporate business at a bona fide cash valuation, to be agreed upon by a majority in interest of the subscribers and stockholders. It gave no authority to the directors or to any officer to accept payment for the stock except in money or money’s worth. By the articles of association it was provided that the capital stock should be one hundred and forty thousand dollars, divided into two thousand eight hundred shares of fifty dollars each, and that the subscribers should give their notes, without interest, for the amounts subscribed by them respectively, which notes should not be liable, at any time, to an assessment for more than fifty per cent, of their face, nór to an assessment of more than twenty per cent, within eighteen months from the organization of the company. Eeld. that the true, legal, and only rational meaning of the provision was that, with ultimate relation to creditors, the capital was of the full residuary amount of one hundred and forty thousand dollars, but such calls for payments on the stock as might from time to time be made by the corporate authorities, in the course of the active business of the company, as a solvent concern, should not exceed one-half of that amount. There was nothing, therefore, in the articles of association to exempt or absolve stockholders from liability to creditors for so much of the whole capital of one hundred and forty thousand dollars as might be required for the payment of the debts.</p> <p>4. Notes were given by most of the stockholders in payment for the stock subscribed for by them. Each of these notes conformed to the provisions of the articles of association, but contained a provision that all dividends should be credited proportionately upon it until its full amount, by reason of credits by assessments and dividends, should be paid, when the same should be returned and in lieu thereof a paid-up certificate of stock be issued. Eeld. that the operation of the articles of association as to freditors was not and could not be altered by the insertion of this provision in the notes.</p> <p>5. The company having become bankrupt, and the deficiency of other assets exceeding the whole unpaid amount of the capital of one hundred and forty thousand dollars, held, that the stockholders were liable to the assignee in bankruptcy for their respective proportions of such unpaid amount.</p> <p>6. Stockholders of an insolvent corporation who are also creditors, cannot be allowed to deduct the amount due to them from their respective proportions or the unpaid capital; but if they prove their debts under the bankruptcy, deductions equal to their estimated respective dividends may perhaps be made from the amounts of the assignee’s demands against them as stockholders.</p> <p>7. Where an investment in stock by a corporation was ultra viies the corporation will not be held liable as a stockholder.</p> <p>5. A transferee of stock in a bankrupt company is liable to the assignee in bankruptcy in respect to such stock; but where the transfer was not accepted by the transferee, the trans-ferer alone is liable.</p> <p>[See Case No. 17,637.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by one Wilbur, assignee in bankruptcy of the Glen Iron Works, against WiJson and others, to enjoin further proceedings in an attachment suit in the state court of common pleas.] Sur demurrer to bill. The bill filed by the assignee in bankruptcy of the Glen Iron Works set forth that in March, 1S75, the eorpo-ration known as the Glen Iron Works was adjudged a bankrupt.

was the sole owner of the ship Scattergood, of which Phillips, the defendants’ testator, in his lifetime, was captain. In the early part of 1829, the ship was sent out by the plaintiff from Philadelphia to Canton, under a charter-party.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was a libel filed by the appellee in the district court, setting forth that he shipped on board of a vessel owned by the appellant, as a mariner, on a voyage from Canton to Philadelphia, and signed the shipping articles; — that the ship sailed on her voyage, and stopped at a port in the island of Java, where the libellant was forcibly turned on shore by the master, and without any…

This was an action of covenant [by Jede-diah Wilcox against Moritz Cohn]. The defendant put in a special demurrer to the declaration, assigning, for cause of demurrer, that there was no breach properly stated, and specifying several particulars in which the declaration was supposed to be defective in that respect.

[This was a bill in equity by Jedediah Wilcox against Albert Korop for the infringement of letters patent Nos. 34.026 and 37,124, granted, respectively, to B. A. Mann. December 24, 1S61 (reissued August 4, 1S63, No. 1,-5 IS), and to J. H. Baird, December 9, 1862.] Final hearing, on pleadings and proofs.

[This was a motion to dismiss and remand the cause to the state court of common pleas, in an action by the Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Company against E. Follett and L. B. Kinney.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [The receiver of the Ocean National Bank claimed to be admitted as a creditor of the bankrupt, upon indorsements by him upon promissory notes of the Portage Lake & Lake Superior Ship Canal Company, a Michigan corporation. The assignee of the bankrupt resisted the claim, on the ground that the notes were usuriously discounted by the bank for the canal company.

Assumpsit on a bill of exchange by the plaintiff [William Wild], as indorsee, against the defendants, as indorsers. The bill was drawn by one James Franklin on E. F. Green, London, for £260 sterling, payable to one Patterson, or order, in ninety days after sight.

This was an action of covenant, on an agreement alleged to have been made between the plaintiff [Benjamin G. Wilder] and the defendants [William Adams and others] on the 23d day of September, 1843, under their respective seals, and in which the defendants are stated to have made the following covenants: (1) In consequence of the grant to them by Wilder of a right or license to make and vend in New England Fitzgerald’s salamander safe, they agreed to keep a true account of…

In this case, which was an action for the infringement of a patent, the defendants [Charles J. Gayler and Augustus It. Moeu] pleaded the general issue, and a large number of special pleas, and also gave a notice of special matter under § 15 of the patent act of July 4, 1S30 (5 Stat. 123). The matters set forth in the special pleas were those of which notice might have been given under the said 15th section. The plaintiff now moved to strike out the special pleas.

<p>In this case, a bill was filed [by Benjamin G. Wilder against Charles J. Gayler and Leonard Brown] for an account and an injunction, for an infringement of a patent granted to Daniel Fitzgerald, June 1st, 1S43, for an “improvement in fire-proof chests and safes.” On an application by the plaintiff for a provisional injunction, the court made an order, that the defendant Gayler “render and file in the office of the clerk of this court, monthly from the date of this order, a just, full and true account in writing of all iron safes made with plaster of Paris- in whole or in part, hereafter manufactured or sold by him or his agents, the said account in writing to be verified by the oath of said Gayler, and that, in default thereof, an injunction issue pursuant to the prayer of the bill.” The plaintiff now applied again for an injunction, on various grounds, and, among others, that the defendant Gayler had failed to comply with the order.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,650.</p> <p>Pleading — Variance retweex Declaration and Writ — Waiver — Demurrer — Declaration on Patent — Presumptions from Patent — Pkofeet —Damages.</p> <p>1. Where it is assigned, as cause of demurrer to a declaration, that it is not properly entitled, but the defect is not poinled out until the argument. and is then alleged to consist in a variance between the declaration and the writ., the court cannot act upon it on such a suggestion.</p> <p>2. But, even if such an objection were properly raised, an amendment of the error would be allowed.</p> <p>3. Variances between the declaration and the writ cannot be taken advantage of on general demurrer.</p> <p>4. In a declaration cn letters patent for an invention. it is not necessary to aver at what specific time the invention patented was made; it need only be before the application for the patent.</p> <p>5. The grant of letters patent is itself sufficient evidence that all the preliminary steps required by law were properly taken by the pat-entee; and it is noc necessary, in a declaration on a patent, to plead the taking of any of those steps.</p> <p>[Cited in Spaeth v. Barney. 22 Fed. 829. Cited in brief in Fassett v. Ewart Manuf’g Co., 58 Fed. 364.]</p> <p>6. A declaration on a patent must tender an issue on the novelty and utility of the discovery patented, but it need not show the regularity of the proceedings in the patent office preliminary to the grant.</p> <p>7. The authority of the commissioner of patents in granting a patent is not of the nature of jurisdiction, in its common law acceptation, and the doctrine appertaining to the judgments of tribunals of inferior jurisdiction, when pleaded, is not applicable to his acts.</p> <p>8. A declaration on a patent, which avers the patent and specification to be “in language of the import and to the effect following.’’ and then sets them forth in liaec verba, is sufficient, and is not open to the objection that the patent is not set forth according to its legal tenor and effect.</p> <p>9. An averment that the patent and specification are “ready in court to be produced,” is equivalent to a proferí in its most formal terms.</p> <p>[Cited in Bogart v. Hinds, 25 Fed. 484.]</p> <p>10. A reiteration of infringements of a patent may be sued for in one action.</p> <p>11. A declaration for the infringement of a patent, commencing in case, and concluding by demanding actual damages in gross in compensation of the wrong, is good.</p> <p>12. Where a declaration on a patent, though not formal, embodies all that is essential to enable the plaintiff to give evidence of his right and of its violation, and affords to the defendant the opportunity to interpose every defence allowed him by law. the court will not encourage merely critical objections, and will seek, even on special demurrer, to sustain the declaration.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Rich v. Lippincott, Case No. 11,758.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,651.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — National Banks — Fedekal Question — Recohd.</p> <p>1. The fact that one of the parties to a suit is a national bank is no ground for removal from a state to the federal court.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Cruikshank v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 16 Fed. 890.]</p> <p>2. To authorize a removal on the ground that the suit involves a question arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, it must clearly appear-from the record that a federal question is presented and must be passed upon in the disposition of the ease, and the laws referred to and the facts relied upon as affected by these laws must be fuily and clearly set out.</p> <p>NOTE. The federal courts have jurisdiction over suits by or against a national bank, commenced in the circuit court in the district in which the bank is located, irrespective of citizenship or subject matter. Foss v. National Bank [S Fed. 7281; First. Nat. Bank v. Douglas Co. [Case No. 4.809]: Commercial Bank v. Simmons [Id. 3.002]; Kennedy v. Gibson, S Wall. [75 U. S.] 49S; County of Wilson v. National Bank, lud U. S. 770. But the bank cannot bring suit out of the district, when the amount in controversy does not exceed $500. St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Brinkham [1 Fed. 45]. Nor be sued in a federal court outside of the district. Main v. Second Nat. Bank [Case No. S,97li].</p>

This was a bill in eqtiity. brought by the plaintiffs, who are domiciled merchants in the city of London and kingdom of Great Britain, and who were described in the bill as aliens, and partners in trade there, under the firm of George Wildes & Co. The firm is composed of George Wildes, John Pick-ersgill, and William C. Piekersgill, all of whom, for the purposes of this suit, are admitted by the defendants to be subjects of Great Britain, and aliens to the United States, —…

Assumpsit on a guaranty. The case came on to be heard upon a statement of facts, agreed by the parties, in substance as follows: The plaintiffs are bankers, doing business in London and in Boston. Samuel Austin, Jr. is their agent and attorney.

<p>[At chambers. In tbe matter of tbe application of Ira Wildman for a writ of habeas corpus.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,654.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Construction of Instruments Executed at the Same Time — Words of Limitation and Condition — Forfeiture of Estate-Demand of Rent.</p> <p>1. Where two instruments are executed at the same time, between the same parties, relative to the same subject matter, to effectuate one object, they are to be taken in connection, as parts of the same instrument.</p> <p>2. II. 8. and E S. were brothers, and formed a partnership on August 12, 1335. for tin-purpose of manufacturing hats. II. S. was the owner of r factory and a lot of land on which it was situated, and E. 8. was to buy of H. S. one-half the factory and machinery for $6.000. They continuea in business together till October 21. 1856. when H. S. died. A few hours before his death, he executed and delivered to E. S. a quitclaim deed of one-half of the land in question, with the factory, etc., and also “all the machinery situated in said factory which was possessed and owned by me before the 12th of August. 1855.” He also executed to E. S. a lease for fifteen years, of all his ■‘right. Title and interest in and to certain property.” described in the above deed for one-half of said property, “it being the remaining one-half of a certain tract of land. &c\. with a lint manufactory and other buildings thereon standing, with all the water and mill privileges con-ni'cted therewith: also all the machinery sitúale and now being in said manufactory.” The rent was $700 a year, and the lease provided that, “in default of payment for any year during said term, said lease is to be void, and said property is at once to revest in me, or my heirs or assigns. without notice to the lessee, in the same manner as if this lease had not been given." After the death of H. S.. E. S. continued in possession of the whole property till December 9. 1864. when he conveyed the whole unexpired term of the lease to 8. & B., and on September 14. 1865, he quitclaimed to them all Iris right, title and interest in the property. S. & B. mortgaged the property, and were thereafter declared bankrupts, and an assignee was appointed. H. S.. by will, left the bulk of his property to his daughter T. for her life, and on her death, to her children. ■ There was a failure to pay part of the rent due on October 21. 1867, and a failure to pay the rent due on the 21st of October. ISOS, and the agent of the devisees made a demand on that day, generally, for the rent due.</p> <p>3. The assignee in bankruptcy, claiming the right to the possession of the property, filed a bill in equity against all parties. Held', that the deed and lease must he construed together, and that their effect was to convey to E. S. one-half of the whole property absolutely, and the other half for fifteen years, subject to the rent specified.</p> <p>4. The assignee, therefore, would be entitled to all the estate, both under the deed and lease, (subject to intermediate incumhrances,) which the bankrupts received from E. S.</p> <p>5. The words íd the lease as to the non-payment of rent were not words of limitation, but a condition by which the lease might become void at the option of the lessor.</p> <p>6. The devisees, having succeeded to the rights of the lessor, wore entitled to avoid the lease, on the non-payment 0f rent, on October 21, 1S6S.</p> <p>7. To work a forfeiture for non-payment of rent, there must be a demand of the precise sum due.</p> <p>8. No such demand was made here, and the lease was therefore not avoided.</p> <p>9. The assignee was therefore entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the property, both real and personal.</p>

<p>[In the matter of William H. Wiley, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of William H. Wiley, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case Ho. 17,656a.</p> <p>Appeal — Admissibility of Testimony — Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>Where objection is made to the admissibility of testimony, the bill of exceptions must set it out. so that the court may judge of its admissibility, and, if this is not tloue, the judgment will he presumed to be correct.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,658.</p> <p>Charter and Bill of Lading — Damage to Cargo —Blowing—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel was chartered, in Buenos Ayres, to bring a cargo of hides to New York, the charter containing this clause: “The charterer furnishing the lining hides and bones for dunnage only,” and. after the vessel was loaded, ordinary bills of lading were made out. consigning the cargo to the libellant, and. on delivery of cargo, part of it was found to be damaged, held, that, on the facts, the injury was caused by blowing, and that the dunnage was insufficient.</p> <p>2. Where it appears that damage has been caused by an ordinary occurrence on a sea voyage, the burden of proof is on the ship, to show that proper precautions were taken to guard against the danger.</p> <p>3. The clause above set forth had no effect to relieve the ship from the duty to properly protect the cargo, and the consignees, not being parties to the charter, bur claiming under clean bills of lading, would not be bound by that clause.</p> <p>4. The ship was liable for the damage.</p>

This was an action by the consignees of a ■quantity of satin wood and mahogany, to re-■eover for the failure of the brig to deliver part of it, in accordance with the bill of lading which she had given therefor.

This was a suit in equity [by William Wil-kens against Nathan H. Spafford], brought to enforce the equitable rights of the complainant, under certain contracts, in machines and inventions for the treatment of bristles, made by a workman of complainant.

The libel in this case alleged that the libel-lant was under a contract witli tlie ship Le-vanter to deliver to her, on or before April 21st, 1SG9, certain machinery, the ship being in the port of New Y’ork. bound for Callao: that, on April 17th. he shipped tlie machinery. at Philadelphia, on the barge, to be carried to New Y’orlc and delivered to the Levanter: that she wrongfully delayed, so that she did not deliver the machinery to the Levanter till April 28tb; and that he…

<p>Case No. 17,662.</p> <p>Derelict — Puoi'ektt Found at Sea — Abandonment.</p> <p>No length of time shall divest the original owner of property found derelict at sea. It will be restored upon payment of salvage according to circumstances: unless there be proof of an intention to abandon wholly.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Wurts, Case No. 7,434.]</p> <p>[Cited in Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499.]</p>

Action of contract bj- [C. W. Wilkins] the assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of C. W. Eaton to recover $3,545.40, alleged to be due from the defendant [G. P. Davis], The parties waived a trial by jury, and submitted the case on the facts, agreed to be thus: The bankrupt and the defendant were associated in a limited copartnership in the clothing business, which was to have terminated Oct. 11, 1875; the bankrupt was the general partner, and carried on the business in his…

The complainant filed a bill in this court, praying an injunction against a judgment obtained here — which was granted.

<p>Case Wo. 17,666.</p> <p>Deeds of Trust and Mortgages — Foreclosure.</p> <p>1. The distinction between a deed of trust and a mortgage, is somewhat technical.</p> <p>[Cited in Bingham v. Frost, Case No. 1.413.]</p> <p>[Cited in Palmer v. Mason, 42 Mich. 152, 3 N. W. 948.]</p> <p>2. Before a default in payment, the property mortgaged may be sold on execution as the property of die mortgagor.</p> <p>3. This cannot be done under a deed of trust.</p> <p>4. To perfect a title under a mortgage, a judicial sale must be had.</p> <p>5. Under a deed of trust, a sale is not required.</p> <p>6. So nearly are these instruments assimilated, that different minds may come to different cou-elusions in regard to the character of the same instrument.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Joseph L. Wilkinson, a bankrupt.]</p>

■ This was an appeal from a decree of the district court [of the United States for the Western district of Missouri] sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint and dismissing the bill. [Case unreported.] The bill charged that the defendant [James C. Babbitt] is the assignee in bankruptcy of the Union German Savings Bank; that the bank had been adjudged a bankrupt April 3d, 1873; that at the time of the bankruptcy there was on deposit in the bank $1,062.02. moneys…

<p>Case No. 17,669.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Enjoining Proceedings in State C'OU RTi.</p> <p>B. & Co. had possession of a sealed package which, and its contents, the wife of a bankrupt claimed to own. The trustees in bankruptcy claimed the package and its contents, as assets of the bankrupt, and notified B. & Co. of their claim. The wife brought a suit in a state court, against B. & Co., afrer demand and refusal, to recover damages for the conversion of the property. The trustees, having been refused permission, by the state court, to be substituted for B. & Co., as defendants, brought a suit in equity, in this court, against B. & Co. and the bankrupt and his wife, to obtain a determination as to the ownership of the package and its contents, and applied for an injunction to restrain the wife from prosecuting said suit in the state court, during the pendency of the suit in this court: Held, that the injunction should be granted.</p>

<p>In equity. This was a motion for a preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The bill set forth the appointment of the plaintiffs [Alfred Wilkinson and others] as trustees of the estate and effects of White, Barnard & Page, who were adjudicated bankrupts on the petition of creditors, filed on the 24th of July. 1S78, and that an assignment by the bankrupts, pursuant to law, of all their estate, real and personal, was made to the plaintiffs. It then stated: “That, for some time prior to the 22d of April, 1873, the defendant Alanson S. Page, one of the bankrupts, was the registered owner of the vessel called the Alanson Sumner,” but that, in fact, the said vessel was the property of all of the bankrupts, and had been purchased with their money. It then alleged, that, on or before the 21st of January, 1873, Page made a fraudulent and preferential transfer of an undivided one-half of said vessel to the defendant Sallie P. Dobbie, and she subsequently made a transfer of the same to the defendant Gilchrist, and lie to the defendant Thomas Dobbie, and that each of these transfers was made with full knowledge of the fraudulent and preferential character of the original transfer. After stating fully the facts showing the fraudulent character of these transfers, the -bill proceeded as follows: “And your orators further show, that, in case it should be held and decided by this honorable court that the said Thomas Dobbie has any interest whatever in the said vessel, your orators allege that there is an irreconcilable difference between your orators and the said Thomas Dobbie, in regard to the management, disposition and navigation of said vessel.” particularizing this allegation by setting out in detail, that, while the plaintiffs were in the peaceable and exclusive possession of said vessel, said Thomas Dobbie forcibly and riotously dispossessed the plaintiffs and took exclusive possession of the same. The prayer for relief asked that said transfers be adjudged fraudulent and void, and for a decree that the plaintiffs are the sole owners of said vessel, and for a temporary injunction and a receiver, and in the event that the court should adjudge that the said Thomas Dobbie was a part owner of said vessel, “that an accounting may be had between the parties who may be found to own said vessel, the vessel sold, and the proceeds distributed according to the interests of the parties.” Upon this bill, and affidavits, and upon affidavits and exhibits on the part of the defendants fully denying all the averments of fraud, and averring that they had a valid title to an undivided half of the vessel, the motion was presented.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiffs [Arthur Wilkinson and others]. who are merchants in the city of Boston, against the defendant [Philip Greely, Jr.], the collector of that port, to recover back a sum of money paid to him, under protest, for duties on certain merchandise imported by the plaintiffs.

This was an action for money had and received, to recover an alleged excess of duties exacted by the defendant [Philip Greely, Jr.], while collector of the customs for the port of Boston.

This was an action brought by the indorsees of a bill of exchange, drawn by McClenachan and Moore, upon George Barclay, of London, in favor of the defendants, and by them indorsed in blank, to Arthur Crammond & Co., who, likewise, indorsed and discounted them with their bankers, the present plaintiffs, under the following circumstances: The defendants, having opened a commercial correspondence with Arthur Crammond & Co., of London, remitted the bill of exchange in question,…

<p>Case No. 17,674.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Breach of Promise — Special Pleas — General Issue — Evidence—Mitigation of Damages — Scandaloos Matter.</p> <p>1. A plea, without a conclusion, is no plea.</p> <p>2. A plea of the general issue, in an action for breach of promise of murria ¡re. may be treated as a nullity, under rule 2G nf this court, if not accompanied by the affidavit and the certificate required by that rule.</p> <p>3. A special pica, in such an action, may be treated as a nullity, under rule 27 of this court, if not accompanied by the certificate required by that rule.</p> <p>4. Matter pleadable in bar. in such an action, if intended to show that the plaintiff had no subsisting canse of action when the suit was commenced. can be given in evidence under the general issue.</p> <p>5. In such an action, evidence of acts of misfeasance. immediately connected with the cause of action, or evidence sitowing an equitable defence arising out of the cause of action, if admissible at all. can be ¡riven in evidence, -in mitiiration of damages, tinder a plea of the general issue.</p> <p>(j. In such an action, matter, in a plea, which attributes to tlte plaintiff habits, disposition, temper. and aeis. in such wise its would warrant an action for libel against whoever should publicly make such cintraos by printing or writing, is irrelevant, impertinent, and scandalous, and will be stricken out, on motion.</p> <p>[For hearing on a demurrer to the first plea of defendant, see Case No. 17,075.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,675.</p> <p>Breach of Promise to Marry — Pleas—Declaration and Writ — Variance—Demurrer —Joinder of Counts.</p> <p>1. The proper plea to a count on a breach of promise of marriage, is non assumpsit, and not not guilty; and a plea of not guilty will be stricken out, on special demurrer, as bad.</p> <p>2. A writ which requires the defendant to answer to the plaintiff in a plea of trespass, and, also, to a certain bill of the plaintiff against the defendant, for damages, in a sum named, for deceit and breach of promise of marriage, sets forth, in the action for deceit, an action in trespass on the ease, and the rest of the ac etiam clause may be regarded as explanatory of the subject-matter to which the deceit was applied, or may be rejected as surplusage; and, therefore, the writ is not incongruous.</p> <p>3. A variance between the writ and the declaration cannot be taken advantage of by a demurrer.</p> <p>4. A count in assumpsit, for a breach of promise of marriage, and a count in tort, to recover damages for deceit, cannot be joined, and the defect can be reached by demurrer.</p> <p>5. An objection, that a declaration shows that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, cannot be taken by demurrer.</p>

This was an action on a policy of life insurance. The defense was the alleged falsity of certain answers in the application for the insurance. The jury found a special verdict, the general nature of which appears in the opinion. A report of the same case in the supreme court of the United States, more in detail, will be found in 13 Wall. [SO U. S.] 222. The defendant moved for a new trial.

<p>Case Wo. 17,677.</p> <p>Federal Court — Jurisdiction—Suit bt Assignee — Diverse Citizenship — Assignment for Creditors — Purchase by Beneficiary.</p> <p>1. An assignee oí a right to an account of tlio proceeds of sales of mortgaged property, cannot maintain a suit in the circuit court of the United States, in a case where his assignors were not competent on the ground of citizenship, to sue the defendants.</p> <p>[Distinguished in McNichol t. Phelps. 16 Fed. 9. Cited in Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 33 Fed. 194.]</p> <p>2. If a cestui que trust under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, buys a right of property which the assignees were empowered to sell, in the execution of their trust; he must claim as a purchaser under them, not as a cestui que trust.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,677a.</p> <p>Action for Price of Goons — Patment in Worthless Notes.</p> <p>Where a party takes bank notes in payment for goods sold upon the understanding that he should return the notes to the purchaser if they turned out not to be current, held, that the seller could not maintain his action for the price of the goods, unless he return the notes before action brought, unless it-shall appear from the evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the buyer of the goods knew that said notes were issued to defraud the public, and were worthless at the time the bargain was made, in which case the jury would be authorized to disregard the notes in payment, and return the verdict for the price of the goods, as if no notes had been given.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,678.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bile — Judgment or State Court — Garnishment Proceeding — Michigan Statute.</p> <p>1. The courts of the United States can take jurisdiction, where property has been fraudulently conveyed to defeat creditors, and proceed under a state statute, where a judgment has been obtained, and execution has been returned no property.</p> <p>[Cited in Claflin v. McDermott. 12 Fed. 376.]</p> <p>2. And this proceeding may be bad where the judgment was entered, and execution issued, in the state court.</p> <p>3. And the same proceeding may be had in the •state court, on a judgment obtained in this court.</p> <p>4. Under the statute, judgment and execution are required. Many authorities require this on general principles.</p> <p>5. But execution can never be required, on .general principles, where at law the property cannot be reached.</p> <p>6. A proceeding in a state court by attachment, whore a garnishee is summoned, cannot be set up in bar or abatement to a creditor's bill.</p> <p>7. Under a statute of Michigan, the procedure against a garnishee takes place after judgment against the defendant.</p> <p>8. Until this, the procedure against the garnishee, under the statute of Michigan, is not a suit,</p> <p>9. Partners cannot distribute among themselves any part of the stock in trade, to the prejudice of creditors. But when a distribution is made with the assent of the creditors, the act is not fraudulent.</p>

This was a libel. brought by the adminis-tratrix of the master of the ship Jenny, owned by the respondent, John Dorr, for wages earned by the master in a voyage originally undertaken from Boston to China, and back again to Boston, and also for wages earned by his apprentice during the same voyage. The voyage commenced in May, 1807, and was carried on until December, 1808, when the ship was captured as prize by a British cruiser, and carried into Calcutta for adjudication.

This cause [Case No. 17.679] came on again to be heard at this term, the respondent having put in a special answer: and upon a special replication thereto, the parties were at issue, and the points both of fact and law were argued at large.

Libel by the owners and another by the master of the tug Ellen for injuries to the vessel and to the master in a collision with the schooner Willard Saulsbury. At about midnight of the 24th-25th September, 18G7, the tug was lying moored to a boom which was anchored in the “Narrows,” so called, in Boston harbor, to protect the dredging-machines which were at work widening the channel under authority of the United States.

The claimant, a foreign seaman, and one of the crew of a Danish ship, belonging to Altona, cited the master on a claim for wages. Although bound by the articles to return to Altona, the seaman alleged a discharge at Philadelphia. The captain denied the discharge, and charged the mariner with desertion, for more than twenty-four hours, which, by the Danish laws, forfeited wages.

<p>Case No. 17,683.</p> <p>Chaktek Party and Bill of Lading — Nondelivery or Cargo — Perils of tee Sea — Entire Contract.</p> <p>1. A vessel was chartered for a lump sum to bring a cargo from Leghorn to Baltimore. The charter contained no exception as to perils of the seas. She was loaded at Leghorn and sailed: but. meeting heavy weather, she put back leaky to Leghorn, where parts of her cargo, which had been damaged, were taken out "by the authorities" and sold. The rest of it was carried forward by the vessel and delivered according to bills of lading, which the master had signed for it, as stipulated in the charter. The owner of the vessel filed a libel against the charterer to recover the charter money. Held, that the libel did not aver a loss of the cargo by perils of the seas; but, on the assumption that the nondelivery of the cargo which was not delivered, was caused by perils of the sens, the libellants were not entitled to recover, for the contract was an entire one, and. as the vessel did not fully perforin it, she could not recover any part of the charter money, and the receipt of the cargo under the bills of lading by those to whom it was consigned was not a waiver by the charterer of the stipulation in the charter that the cargo should be wholly delivered before the charter money was payable.</p> <p>2. The stipulation in the bills of lading as to perils of the seas could not affect the right of the charterer under the charter party.</p>

This was a libel for possession, by Andrew Carland, who claimed under one Bowler. James Downing and James Carbrey intervened. denying any right in Carland or his grantor, but claiming the sole title in Downing; and Carbrey set up a bottomry bond covering the whole value of the vessel, given him by Downing as sole owner, and which Downing, in his answer, admitted to be due in full. The libellant contended that this bond was void, as against Bowler and his grantee, for fraud.

Petition for freedom. Upon a former petition against Milbume, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner, upon the default of Milbume to rejoin. Milbume had, in that casa, disclaimed to hold the petitioner as a slave; to which the petitioner replied certain facts, showing that Milburne had purchased the petitioner, .and did claim and hold him.

<p>Case No. 17,686.</p> <p>Liex on Vessel — Loan to Owner.</p> <p>1. A libel against a canal boat alleged that she was engaged in transporting goods_ on the navigable waters of the port of New York, and was in need of advances to enable her to prosecute her business; and that the libellant, at the request of her master and owner, advanced money to pay necessary towage bills, wharfage bills, and bills for materials whereby the boat was enabled to earn freight. The owner of the boat excepted to the libel for insufficiency. Sold, that the libel did not state facts sufficient to entitle the libellant to a lien on the boat.</p> <p>2. Mere advances of money’ to the owner of a vessel do not create a lien on her in favor of the lender, in the absence of any agreement for a lien upon the vessel, though the money be applied to the payment of liens upon the vessel.</p>

<p>In admiralty. The brig William and Em-meline. belonging to the port of New-Y’ork, put into the port of Charleston, in the state of South Carolina, disabled and needing repairs: and. while she was there, on the ISth of August. 1S27, her master, in consideration of Soil 48, advanced by the libellants, T. & T. Street & Co., drew upon the claimant, the owner of the brig, a bill of exchange for the amount, payable to the libellants, and, to secure the payment of the bill, executed what the libel alleged to be a bottomry bond upon the body of the vessel. The libel further alleged. that the money was advanced for necessary repairs, and that the hill of exchange had been protested for non-acceptance and non-payment. The answer admitted that the brig was hypothecated “in the manner stated in the libel,” but set up for defence, that the master had no authority to hypothecate the ship: that Charleston was not a foreign port; and that the master was solely concerned in interest in the voyage, and had sufficient means of his own on board to procure the sum advanced, namely, lumber invoiced at 8600 20. The instrument of hypothecation contained this clause: “and, for the better securing the payment of the said bill of exchange, with interest and expenses, unto the said T. & T. Street & Co., their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, in any port or place where the said brig may be, and this bond be produced, I do hereby bind myself, and all and every of the owner and owners of the said brig, and particularly the said brig, her tackle, apparel and furniture, and the freight of the cargo on board of her, for the payment of the said bill of exchange, together with the interest, damages and expenses that may accrue thereon unto the said T. iic T. Street & Co., their executors. administrators and assigns.” The instrument was intended to secure only the sum for which the bill of exchange was given. There was no stipulation for marine interest, and the payment of the bill was not dependent on the hazard of the voyage.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,689.</p> <p>Sale of Vessel bv Master — Validitt.</p> <p>To render a sale valid, made by a master of a vessel under the general authority vested in him, and convey a good title under it, there must be a necessity for such sale, and entire ■good faith on the part of the master.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the above decree was affirmed. Case unreported.]</p>

Libel of mariners for wages, for a voyage, which was, according to the articles, to have been from the United States to St. Paul de Loando, in Africa, (a Portuguese colonial settlement,) and thence to Bahia, and further, to return in twelve months. The vessel made the voyage to Loando in eighty-two days. Through difficulties, which will be mentioned below, the crew left her at Loando, with the sanction of the consul.

<p>Case No. 17,691.</p> <p>ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION — EQUITABLE TITLE TO Vessels.</p> <p>A court of admiralty has no jurisdiction to try questions of equitable title to vessels, or to enforce the equities between mortgagor and mortgagee of vessels; it can only pass upon the legal title.</p> <p>[Cited in Morgan v. Tapscott. Case No. 9.808; The C. C. Trowbridge, 14 Ned. 876; Wen-berg v. Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, 15 Eed. 288; The Ella J. Slaymaker, 28 Eed. 70S.]</p>

The libellants proceeded for thirty-three tons of pig-iron short delivered out of two hundred tons, shipped at Philadelphia, for the Bay State Iron Company at Boston, by the schooner William Gillum, under a bill of lading in the usual form. The answer set up that in a gale it had been necessary to throw overboard this part of the cargo, for the safety of the rest.

<p>Case No. 17,692.</p> <p>Maritime Liex — Bkeach op Chartek Party.</p> <p>A steamboat was hired, to be at a certain place on a certain day. and to be used for one day for a specific trip, for a price agreed on, part of which was paid in advance. She was not at the place as agreed and the charterer did not have the use of her. He filed a libel against her to recover damages. Held, that the breach of the contract created no lien on the vessel enforceable in the admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in Marshall v. Pierrez, Case No. 9.130; The Monte A.. 12 Fed. 332: The J. F. Warner, 22 Fed. 345; The Guiding Star, 53 Fed. 943.]</p>

This was an appeal from a sentence of condemnation in the district court of the [United States for the] Southern district of New York. The vessel was libelled on behalf of the United States for a violation of the “Act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbours of the United States” (4 Laws [Bior. & D.] 129 [2 Stat. 451]), and of the act supplementary to said act, and of the act in addition to said supplementary act.

This was a libel for wages alleged to have been earned on a voyage from Portland to Matanzas, in the island of Cuba, and back to this port. The service was admitted, and the answer sets forth a number of charges which the owners claimed to have deducted from the wages. If all these were allowed, they would amount to more than the whole balance of wages remaining due.

<p>Case No. 17,696.</p> <p>Enemt Vessel — .Fictitious Sale to Neutkal — Condemnation of Vessel — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>1. The alleged sale of an enemy vessel, in time of war, by an enemy resident in the enemy country, to a neutral, held not to be proved.</p> <p>2. The object of the transaction was to have the neutral put the vessel in trade with an enemy port, in evasion of an existing blockade of that port.</p> <p>3. A settled course of trade in violating the blockade, and the employment of the vessel before in such Trade, and the fact that her claimant had before been engaged in such trade, taken into consideration in deciding this case.</p> <p>4. Vessel condemned as enemy property.</p> <p>5. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,697.</p> <p>Contract op Seaman — Suit for Wages — Pro CEEDING AGAINST VESSEL — PORT OF DISCHARGE — Process—Issue bt Ci.erk.</p> <p>1. The rules of evidence in admiralty cannot be changed by a state statute.</p> <p>2. A voyage described in the shipping articles was from “Havre to New Orleans, and thence to one or more ports in ■ Europe, and finally back to a port of discharge in the United States, for a period not exceeding twelve calendar months.” Held, that there were two restrictions. one of time, and the other of ports: and that the seamen were not bound for twelve months, unless the vessel went to the ports in the order described.</p> <p>3. By their contract, the seamen were bound until the vessel should return “to a final port of discharge in the United States.”</p> <p>4. She returned to New Orleans, the only port to which she was then destined, and her cargo was there wholly discharged. Held, that New Orleans was the final port of discharge in tlie United States.</p> <p>5. Requiring the seamen to serve from New Orleans to Boston, was a violation of their rights, for which they were entitled to an indemnity.</p> <p>6. Section 101 of the chapter of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana, entitled “The Black Code.” respecting colored seamen, is unconstitutional.</p> <p>7. The right of a seaman to his wages is perfect, upon the completion of his service.</p> <p>8. Before St. 1790. c. 29. § G. if payment was refused, he could have instantly commenced a suit in personam against the owners or master, or in rem against the vessel or freight.</p> <p>9. The statute affects only one of these remedies, viz., that against the vessel. It does not touch suits in personam, or against the freight.</p> <p>10. By the statute, as a general rule, no proceedings can be had against the vessel, until ten days after the right to wages has accrued.</p> <p>11. But there are three events in which such proceedings may be had within the ten days, viz.: (1) If a dispute has arisen. (2) If the vessel has departed from the port of her discharge. (3) If she is about to proceed to sea. In the last two cases, the statute is inoperative, and the right to process is the same as if it had never been passed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Shelbourne, 30 Fed. 512.]</p> <p>12. The expiration of ten days, and a dispute having arisen, are by the act made equivalent to each other. And upon the happening of either, the proceeding by summons to the master is authorized, but not required.</p> <p>13. It is optional with the seamen whether to resort to the preliminary measure of summoning the master, or to make direct application for ad-jniralty process. And the judge may order process against the vessel, without previous summons to the master.</p> <p>[Cited in The M. TV. Wright. Case No. 9,983; The Waverly, Id. 17.301; Murray v. FerryBoat. 2 Fed. 88; The Frank C. Barker, Í9 Fed. 334.]</p> <p>14. In the absence of the judge, the clerk may issue process according to rules prescribed, or instructions given by the judge.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,698.</p> <p>Whai-ixg Votage— Lay of Seaman— Exr> of Voyage — Expense of Seaman’s Retciix.</p> <p>1. A seaman, during a whaling voyage, being appointed a ship-keeper, is thereafter entitled to the lay of that station.</p> <p>2. Where a seaman has different lays, during the same whaling voyage, he is to have such proportion of each lay, for the whole voyage, as the time he served under such lay was of the time of the whole voyage.</p> <p>S. The vessel not returning home, as she ought, the seaman was allowed compensation for his time and expenses in returning; calculating for his time at the rate of his last lay; deducting what he earned, or might, but for his own neglect, have earned, while so returning.</p>

[In review of the decision of the district court of the United States for the Western district of Wisconsin.] In bankruptcy. On the 22d of June. 1874, Williams & MePheeters were partners in business in the Western district of Wisconsin, and on that day a petition in bankruptcy was filed against them in the district court of the United States for that district. On the 29th of June they were adjudged bankrupts by their own consent.

In bankruptcy. This case was certified into the circuit court of this district.

This case came before the district court on the report of a commissioner in bankruptcy, which set forth that the balance in court, from which the costs taxed were first to be deducted, was §578.70, the whole of which sum belonged to the separate estate of the said Williams. The petition for the benefit of the act of congress of 1841 [5 Stat. 440] was presented by Williams, and no' decree of bankruptcy had been entered against E. Whiting, E. Whiting &.

<p>Petition against the defendants as partners under the firm of Granville Williams & Co., alleging that the firm owe more than three hundred dollars, &c., and that the said G. W. & A. W. made a fraudulent conveyance of their property, and did certain other acts within section 39 of the statute [of 18G7 (14 Stat. 530)]. The assets of the firm consisted of the machinery, fixtures, and stock of a small paper-mill, and the leasehold estate on which the mill stood, and one credit of about three hundred dollars. On the 29th of March. 1809, the respondents conveyed all this property excepting the credit to their brother, Emory Williams, by a bill of sale, which was executed at about three o'clock, and recorded at five o'clock on that morning. In the course of the same morning they sent for a person to whom they owed a debt of some sixty dollars. and gave him a note for three hundred dollars dated back about a month, with the agreement, which was carried out. that he should sue and attach the only debt due then, which was for about three hundred dollars, as above stated. It appeared that a creditor, one of these petitioners, had threatened to sue them by noon of that day unless they gave him security. It was admitted that The giving the note ami causing it to he sued were for the purpose of preventing an attachment by the petitioner, Roberts, but it was said that the real object of thus withdrawing the fund was not to delay the creditors generally, but only Mr. Roberts, and that it was ilie purpose of the respondents to use the money to pay tlieir workmen.</p> <p>[This defense, if true, will not avail. The act had a direct and necessary tendency to defeat and delay creditors generally, though aimed at one only. The immediate result was to give the respondents the secret control of this fund, under the guise of an adverse attachment. It is impossible for the court to go beyond that result and determine on doubtful evidence, or any evidence. That the parties intended, when the fund was illegally withdrawn from the ordinary reach of the law, to apply it more beneficially than the law itself would apply it. Tliis is a fundamental principle of the law of fraudulent conveyances.</p> <p>[It was urged that the conveyance amounted to a dissolution of the partnership, and that the court has no jurisdiction of a petition filed after a dissolution.] 2</p> <p>(1) The petitioners have no standing in court, because the amount due one of them has been paid into court, and the other has less than two hundred and fifty dollars due him. (2) The conveyance to the brother was for a valuable consideration, and disposed of all the property of the firm, and thus dissolved the partnership, after which they cannot be proceeded against in one petition. (3) There is no sufficient allegation that the fraud was joint, and related to the joint estate. (4) There is no sufficient evidence of a fraudulent intent.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

On petition of William W. Crapo, attaching creditor, for leave to intervene and contest the bankruptcy proceedings. A petition was filed against Elias G. Williams on the 13th day of December, 1875, by a number of creditors, praying for his adjudication as a bankrupt, and setting forth, as acts of bankruptcy, the transfer of his property, by a bill of sale, to the Citizens’ National Bank of Flint, and also the nonpayment and suspension of commercial paper.

Petition of review filed by the assignee in bankruptcy. The facts shown by the record are as follows: James J. Williams, of Atlanta, Georgia, and R. R. Anderson, of Loudon, Tennessee, composed the firm of J. J. Williams & Co., and carried on business in Atlanta, Georgia. The same persons composed the firm of Anderson & Williams, and carried on the same business in Loudon, Tennessee.

The indictment charged, that Isaac Williams, of Norwich, in the county of New London, in said district of Connecticut, a citizen of this United States, did, without the jurisdiction of any particular state, viz: at Guadaloupe, in the.

<p>[This was a proceeding under the act of February 12. 1793 (1 Stat. 302), by Ruth Williams, claiming the delivery of “Isaac,” or William Stansbury, as a slave.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Michigan.] The libellant, John Demás, owner of the tug U. S. Grant, claimed a lien upon the brig Williams,… Held: though in fact they are not necessary, and though they were never placed on board at all. The Gustavia [Case No. 5,876]; Bryan v. Pride of the West, 12 Mo. 371; Gibbons v. The Fanny Barker, 40 Mo. 253; Merritt v. Brewer [Case No. 9,483]; The Kearsarge [Id. 7,634]; Brightley, Fed.

In equity. Bill to restrain the use of a trade mark. The alleged trade mark is the use of the word “Yankee,” as a label or mark to designate the complainants’ manufacture of a certain kind of shaving soap.

[This was a libel for salvage by Caleb AYil-liams, Jr., and others against the cargo, tackle, and apparel of the ship Adolphe.]

This was an action [by John Williams] against [Hiram Barney] the collector of the port of New Tork, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid, under protest, on cleaned rice imported from Liverpool, England. Under the 14th section of the act of July 14th, 1862 (12 Stat. 557), the collector imposed an additional duty of 10 per cent, ad valorem on the rice, as being the growth of a country beyond the Cape of Good Hope, but imported from a place this side of it.

<p>Case No. 17,715.</p> <p>Pkincipal and Agent — Liaeilitt of Agent foh Inteuest.</p> <p>Where funds are placed in the hands of an agent to make purchases, and a balance remains in his hands, after the purchases are completed, 'he is not liable to pay interest on such balance before the commencement of the suit, unless a special demand was made.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Irvin A. Williams against the Boston & Albany Railroad Company for the infringement of letters patent No. 35,122, granted to I. A. Williams, April 29, 1862, reissued December 19, 1805 (No. 2,133).]

<p>The American ship Constitution, on a voyage from Havre to Charleston, S. C., having on board a box of gold coin, of the value of $42,000, and a erevd of seventeen men, met with a disaster, and was deserted at sea on the 9th of April. 1843. The crew and box of gold were taken on board the Danish brig Urania, bound to Copenhagen. On the 12th of April, she fell in with the American whale-ship Constellation, bound for New London. The Urania made a signal, and the Constellation bore away, and on speaking her, was requested to take the crew of the Constitution on board, which she did, and also took the box of bullion. The owners and crew of the Constellation brought this libel, claiming, first, salvage, and if not entitled to that, compensation.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,718.</p> <p>Original and Auxiliary Bills — Exjoining Action at Law — Jurisdiction of Federal Courts — Citizexsbip.</p> <p>1. A bill to enjoin a judgment in the circuit court is not considered an original bill between the same parties, as at law. but as growing out of, and as auxiliary to, the suit at law.</p> <p>[Cited in First Nat. Bank of Alexandria v. Turnbull. 1(1 Wall. (83 ü. S.l 195; Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 81.]</p> <p>2. But if other parties are introduced, and different interests involved, it is to that extent an original bill, and the jurisdiction of the court must then depend on the citizenship of the parties: and one of the parties must be a citizen of the state where the suit is brought.</p> <p>[Cited in Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) SI.]</p> <p>3. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a bill to enjoin a judgment at law in the circuit court, brought by a citizen of Tennessee, not a party to the judgment, against a citizen of Mississippi, the plaintiff in the judgment.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,720.</p> <p>Practice in Eqcitt — Plea of No Interest — Jurisdiction of Federal Courts — Con-roratioxs, Where “Found.”</p> <p>1. Where one of the defendants appeared, and pleaded certain facts, which, if true, would show that he had no interest in the subject matter of the suit, and a motion was made to strike out such plea, which motion was, by consent, treated as a demurrer: Held, that the plea should not be overruled, nor ordered to stand as an answer, but that the benefit of the plea should be saved to the defendant until the hearing, when it wmild be treated as the testimony in the case might warrant.</p> <p>2. A foreign corporation transacting business in a state, and amenable to the process of the courts of such state, is “found” within the state, in the sense of the judiciary acts, and may be sued in the federal courts therein.</p> <p>[Cited in Wilson Packing Co. v. Hunter, Case No. 17.852; Hayden v. Androscoggin Mills, 1 Fed. 95; Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co., Id. 478; Eaton v. St. Louis Shakspear Mining & Smelting Co., 7 Fed. 141; Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gaslighting Co., 23 Fed. 839; Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 34 Fed. 288.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,721.</p> <p>Seaman’s Wages — Illness in Foreign Poet.</p> <p>A seaman was left sick at a foreign port, and recovered. He might have rejoined the ship, hut would not; and claimed wages for the voyage, which were refused, and only allowed until the time when he might have rejoined.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,723.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Interior Rivers — Salvage Contracts — Compensation.</p> <p>1. Since the decision of the supreme court of the United States, in the case of The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. [53 U. S. 443], the admiralty jurisdiction has been considered as fully established on the Mississippi river, and all other rivers as far as they are navigable from the ocean, for vessels of ten or more tons burden.</p> <p>2. The establishment of such a jurisdiction, necessarily carries with it all its incidents. Salvage services are as much the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, as damages arising from collisions or other maritime torts.</p> <p>[Cited in Seven Coal Barges, Case No. 12,677.]</p> <p>3. The stipulations of a written contract will be recognized no further in a court of admiralty charged with a case of salvage, than they accord with the opinion of the court in the exercise of a sound discretion.</p> <p>[Cited in Chapman v. The Engines of The Greenpoint, 38 Fed. 672.]</p> <p>4. This court as a court of admiralty, cannot be called upon to enforce a specific performance of such a contract, though such a contract may and often does form a fair and equitable criterion in fixing the quantum of salvage compensation.</p> <p>[Cited in The Silver Spray, Case No. 12,857.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,724.</p> <p>Seamen's Wages — Capture axd Detention — Neutral Seamex.</p> <p>1. "Where an American (neutral) seaman was taken from on board an American vessel by a French cruiser, and the vessel ordered into a French port for adjudication, but subsequently recaptured by a Sicilian cruiser, and restored to the master on payment of salvage: Held, that such seaman, not having been able to return to his ship, was entitled to wages during the time of his detention on board the French cruiser, and for the whole voyage, at the stipulated rate; deducting his proportion of salvage.</p> <p>2. The case of a neutral seaman thus detained, distinguished from the cases of detention of enemy seamen.</p>

<p>[Action by Charles B. Williams against Belinda M. King on a promissory note.]</p>

<p>Case ISTo. 17,726.</p> <p>Infringement of Patents — Suits in Equity — Profits and Damages — Salary of Defendant.</p> <p>1. In a suit in equity, for the infringement of letters patent, brought before the passage of the act of July 8th, 1S70 (16 Stat. 206, 216, §§ 55, 111), both profits and damages cannot be recovered.</p> <p>[Cited in Chapman v. Ferry, 12 Fed. 695. Distinguished in Untermeyer v. Freund, 58 Fed. 212.)</p> <p>2. An interlocutory decree in such a suit, entered after the passage of such act, inadvertently provided for the recovery of both profits and damages. The report of the commissioner reported both profits and damages, and was excepted to by the defendant, on the ground that the damages could not be recovered in the suit: Held, that the point could not be raised by an exception to such report, but that, nevertheless, the court would not award any damages, and would resettle the interlocutory decree, so as to ■exclude them.</p> <p>3. In an accounting for profits, the defendant cannot be credited with a sum of money as a salary earned by and paid to himself, while engaged in the business which earned the profits.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 17,726a.</p> <p>State Pilotase Laws — Discrimination—Constitutionality.</p> <p>[A state statute exempting vessels owned wholly in the state from the payment of any pilotage under the. existing state laws unless a pilot is actually employed (Act Fla. March 7, 1879) is not a contravention of Rev. St. § 4237. prohibiting the states from discriminating in the rates of pilotage or half pilotage between vessels sailing between ports of the same state and vessels sailing between ports of different states; but such an act is void under the provision of the constitution of the United States that “no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another state.” Article 1, § 9, cl. 6. This latter provision is an inhibition upon the states as well as upon United States.]</p>

This was an action brought to recover the value of ten shares of the capital stock of the defendants, a banking corporation. On the trial, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff [Richard S. Williams], subject to the opinion of the court, and the plaintiff now moved for judgment on the verdict.

This was an action, brought originally in one cf the courts of' the state, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful ejection of the plaintiff [Samuel K. Williams] and his family from the cars of the defendant while traveling as passengers upon that part of its road lying in the state of Missouri.

On the 15th o-f May, 1S62, the plaintiff's intestate took from the defendant, the Mobile •Savings Bank, at Mobile, Alabama, a bill of exchange, of which the following is a copy: “State of Alabama, Mobile Savings Bank, Mobile, May 15, 1862. No. 4491. Pay to order of A. A. Williams, Ten Thousand Dollars. C. W. Gazzam, Cashier. To the Bank of New Orleans.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel for freight by Howell L. Williams and others against Jose A. Mora and others.]

Agreed statement. Assumpsit upon a marine policy of insurance. The principal question was, whether the circumstances attending the loss were such that the plaintiff [William P. Williams], within the true intent and meaning of the policy, was entitled to recover.

<p>Case No. 17,733.</p> <p>Attorney and Cj.ient— Disclosure or Adverse Retainer — Negligence—Ratification of Proceedings by llient — Api-raisement of Real Estate.</p> <p>1. An attorney is bound to disclose to his client, if he has any adverse retainer, which may affect his own judgment or his client’s interest. But the concealment of the fact is not a necessary presumption of fraud.</p> <p>2. If a creditor has several debts, some of which are secured by mortgage and some not, it is not gross negligence to unite them all in a single suit at law, and so take a single judgment therefor; and if in such case the execution issuing on the judgment is satisfied in part only, a court of equity will apply the monies received on the execution in the first instance to extinguish such parts of the debt and judgment as were not secured by mortgage.</p> <p>3. A ratification of the proceedings of an attorney in a suit is not valid to bind the client, unless it is made with a full knowledge of all the material facts.</p> <p>4. It seems, that an attorney at law is not bound to be personally present, or personally to cooperate with the appraisers, who, under the laws of Maine, are authorized to set off real estate by appraisement to satisfy an execution.</p> <p>[5. Cited in Elmore v. Johnson, 143 Ill. 534, 32 N. E. 419, to the point that in suits to set aside contracts between parties standing in a confidential relation to each other, although the defense of laches is not usually regarded with favor, yet the application must be made within a reasonable time, to be judged by the court, under all the circumstances of the case.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Irvin A. Williams against the Rome, Watertown & Og-densburgh Railroad Company for the infringement of letters patent No. 35,122, granted to L A. Williams April 29, 1862; reissued December 19, 1865, No. 2,133.]

The bill of complaint commences thus: “Victoria B. Williams, a citizen of the state of New York, and an infant under the age of eighteen years, by her next friend, Jacob V. Adneire, brings this her bill against John Ritchey, a citizen of the state of Kansas, and thereupon your cratrix complains, etc. Demurrer by the defendant on the ground that the prochein amy is not stated in the bill to be a citizen of a state other than the state of Kansas; and counsel admit that in…

[This was a libel by E. R. Williams and ■others against the schooner Sea Gull.] Motion to order conveyances and distribute proceeds.

<p>Case No. 17,737.</p> <p>Pleading — Bill of Pahticclaks — Nonsuit, Setting Aside.</p> <p>1. Where a plaintiff is called on to furnish a bill of particulars, he is limited in his proof to the items thus made out.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Carroll v. Paul, 16 Mo. 228. Cited in Nichols v. Poulson, 6 Ohio, 308.]</p> <p>2. If the bill be found to be erroneous, after the jury to try the case are empannelled, the plaintiff will have to suffer a nonsuit.</p> <p>3. A nonsuit will be set aside, in the discretion of the court, where justice requires it.</p> <p>4. If there has been surprise, or the plaintiff has equity, the nonsuit will be set aside.</p>

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance, dated the 19th of August, 1830, whereby the plaintiff caused to be insured by the defendant, for nine per cent, per annum, premium, warranting twelve per cent, “lost or not lost, forty-nine hundred and nineteen dollars, on fifteen sixteenths of schooner Harriet, and eighteen hundred and seventy-five dollars on board said vessel, at, and from Stonington, (Connecticut), commencing the risk on the 12th day of August instant, at noon, to the…

This was a case upon a policy of insurance, which had been heard before [Case No. 17,-738], and now came on upon the report of Willard Phillips, Esq., an assessor appointed to report the facts, whether there was a loss of the vessel insured, the Breakwater, from necessity.

<p>[This was a libel by Charles Williams and others against the schooner Sylph to recover wages.]</p>

[This was a libel by John E. Williams and others against the steam tug Vanderbilt and the floating derrick Collins. Exceptions to the libel filed by the claimants were heretofore overruled. Case No. 17.744.]

[This was a libel by John E. Williams and others against the steam tug Vanderbilt and the derrick Collins. Certain exceptions to the libel were heretofore overruled by the court. Case No. 17,744.

[This was a libel by John E. Williams and others against the steam tug C. Vanderbilt and the floating derrick Collins to recover damages occasioned by a collision. On exceptions to the libel.] This was an action to recover the damages occasioned to the ship Chancellor, belonging to the libelants, by her being run into while lying at a dock near the navy-yard, by the floating derrick in tow of the steamtug.

<p>Case No. 17,744a.</p> <p>Towage Contract — Exemption prom Injuries bt Ice — Evidence.</p> <p>[1. A statement made by the master of a tug in the course of a heated controversy with the master of one of his tows, as to the manner in which the tow should be made up, to the •effect that “when we hook to a boat we are responsible for her, and you’ve got to be towed how and where we like,” cannot be considered of any weight upon the question as to the existence or nonexistence of an alleged contract exempting the tug from responsibility for injury by ice.]</p> <p>[2. A contract exempting a tug from responsibility for injury to her tow by ice does not relieve her from liability for damage resulting trom her own negligence while towing in the ice.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,745.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Forfeiture — Embezzlement of Cargo.</p> <p>[Embezzlement of pieces of the cargo by a seaman does not necessarily work a forfeiture of all his wages, and, if the amount of his wages exceed the value of the things embezzled, he will be decreed the excess.]</p>

<p>Appeal from orphans’ court</p>