Volume 30 — Federal Cases

[This was a libel in admiralty by the Wil-liamsburg Ferry Company against the steamboat Chelsea to recover damages resulting from a collision.]

This action was commenced originally in the state court On the 26th day of December, 1874, an order was entered in the action requiring the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff sworn copies of entries in certain books kept by the defendant and of certain notes, contracts and other writings alleged to be in his possession, the purpose of which proceeding was to enable the plaintiff to prepare a complaint in the action.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel for salvage by Augustus Williamson against the brig Alphonso and cargo. The district court decreed in favor of libelant (case unreported), and claimant appeals.]

<p>Case No. 17,750.</p> <p>Neutrality Laws—Pitting out Privateer.</p> <p>[Where a privateer was illegally fitted out, and commissioned in this country by the French minister, but was afterwards dismantled, and her register canceled, then sold to a foreigner, and fitted out and commissioned in a foreign port, held, that her proceedings under the latter commission were not in violation of the neutrality laws.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,751a.</p> <p>Bond fok Costs—Sufficiency—Time of Giviso.</p> <p>1. A bond for costs which omits the name of the non-resident plaintiff about to institute suit, is defective, and the suit should be dismissed.</p> <p>2. Nor can bond be given after the institution of suit, so as to prevent dismissal.</p>

In equity. Bill by-[Joseph Williamson and •others] the assignees of a bankrupt against [Josiah A. Coleord] the bankrupt and his wife, seeking to have a claim of the bankrupt, for the destruction of his vessel by the Confederate cruiser Florida, about to be paid from the fund arising from the Geneva award to the wife on her petition, adjudged to be a part of the bankrupt’s estate that passed to his assignees.

<p>In equity. In his bill, the plaintiff states that the defendant owns, and has in operation, a line of railroad, commencing at New Albany, on the Ohio river, extending thence to Michigan City, on Lake Michigan, two hundred and eighty-eight miles; also a branch of said road, not yet in operation, extending from Gosport, in Owen county, to Indianapolis, of the length of forty-three miles; that in connection with the road and branch, the company lias in use a large amount of rolling stock, consisting of locomotive engines ana cars of various descriptions; also various machine-shops for making and repairing engines, cars and machinery; also various other property necessary to equip said road for a successful operation, in the transportation of passengers and freights; with corporate powers to regulate the . same, charge freight and passage money; which machinery in its . operations is so combined as not to admit of a separation, on which account the complainant prays that the same may be sold or otherwise disposed of as an entirety, and in such manner that all of said corporate franchises may pass and vest in the purchaser or purchasers, as a body corporate.</p> <p>The complainant further states that the said company, on the eighth day of February, 1851, being engaged in constructing that part of its railroad which lies between New Albany and Gosport, one hundred and twelve and seventy-one one hundredth miles, and being in need of money to build the road and properly equip it, resolved to borrow five hundred thousand dollars, to be secured by certain bonds, of one thousand dollars each, pay-able semi-annually in the city of New York, at ten per cent per annum, subject to a clause that the holders thereof should have the right to exchange them at .par for stock; that, to secure the payment of said bonds, a deed of trust was executed, which the complainant holds, whereby the company granted, bargained and sold to the complainant and his successors in the trust created, all the following then present, and then in the future to be acquired property of said company, pertaining to that part of the road which lies between New Albany and Gosport, to wit: the road made and to be made, including the right of way, and every description of property which pertained to the road, and which the company might acquire, on the following trusts.</p> <p>If the company should fail to pay the principal or any part thereof, or the interest or any part thereof on the bonds when the same might- become due, when 'demanded, then, after sixty days from such default, upon request of the- holder of such bond, the complainant or his successor in the trust, should enter into and take possession of all and every part of said premises and property, and as the attorney in fact or agent of the company, by himself and agents or substitutes duly constituted. have and employ the same in making all needful repairs, alterations, and additions thereto; and after deducting expenses of such use, repairs, alterations, and additions, apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of the principal and interest of all said bonds remaining unpaid; or the complainant, his successors in said trust, at his or their direction. might 'on the written request of the holders of at least one-haif of the bonds then unpaid and unconverted into stock, cause the same premises, or so much thereof as should be necessary to pay the principal and interest of all the bonds then, unpaid, to be sold at public auction in the city of New Albany, in the state of Indiana, or in the city of New York, giving at least forty days notice. ¿Ec. The bonds were duly executed, and the money loaned on the faith of the security, &e.</p> <p>And the complainant says that the company paid the interest which became due prior to the 1st of February, 1857. That the interest which became due on that day, they failed to pay, and that the whole of the coupons for the installment of interest which fell due on that day are unpaid, amounting to the aggregate sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, more than sixty days after the maturity of said coupons having transpired. After this, the holders of a large number of said bonds required the complainant, as trustee, to enter upon and take possession of said mortgaged premises; and other holders of said bonds, to an amount exceeding one-half th'ereof, requested the complainant in writing, to proceed according to the terms and conditions ol said deed of trust, to make sale of the mortgaged premises. But hé deemed it inexpedient so to do.</p> <p>And the bill states, that several other loans were made of large amounts, at different rates of interest, by issuing and selling bonds, secured by deeds of trust on the property ol the road on the same conditions as those specified in the first mortgage. On all ot which subsequent loans the interest has become due and remains unpaid. He has not entered upon the property as above requested, to sell the same as authorized by the deeds of trust, because he says the company is much embarrassed in its affairs, being largely insolvent and owing a large floating, unsecured debt. That many of that class of creditors have prosecuted suits and judgments against the company, and are seeking to enforce satisfaction by the seizure and sale of the property on the road, &c.</p> <p>That by reason of the premises, it is indispensably necessary to sell and dispose of said mortgaged premises, to the end that the proceeds may be applied as contemplated by all the deeds of trust.</p> <p>All interest due prior to the 1st of February, 1857, has been paid; but that which became due on that date has not been paid, and for this default the bill was filed.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,754.</p> <p>Special and General Agents — Collection of Monet—Revocation op Autboritv— • Bonds—Pa y m ent—U sage.</p> <p>[1. An attorney employed, not to attend to all his client’s legal business, but to collect a particular debt, is a special, as opposed to a general, agent; and those dealing with him are bound to ascertain the extent of his authority.]</p> <p>[2. The appointment of a second attorney or agent to collect a debt is a revocation of the authority of the first one, and persons, knowing of the second appointment are held to a knowledge of the revocation.]</p> <p>[3. A bond given in 1869, payable in '‘dollars” generally, was payable in gold and silver only; but, after the passage of the legal tender acts, it could lawfully be discharged by legal tender notes.]</p> <p>[4. A custom or_ usage of paying debts in Confederate notes in the insurrectionary states during the war of the Rebellion was illegal, and cannot be sanctioned as of any binding force.]</p> <p>IThis was an action at law by Madeline J. Williamson against John Richardson.]</p> <p>Verdict: We find the bond declared upon to be the bond of the defendant, and assess damages to the plaintiff in the sum of twelve thousand dollars, with interest from the 1st day of January, 1864, two thousand dollars of the principal not yet due, one thousand to become due on the 1st day of January, 186S, with interest and one thousand dollars to become on the 1st day of January, 1869, with interest and costs of suit</p>

This was a motion, in an action of ejectment, to allow the defendant [James H. Suy-dam] to turn into a bill of exceptions a case which had been made setting out the exceptions taken by him on the trial. The verdict was for the plaintiffs [William H. Williamson and others], subject to the opinion of the court, on a case to be made.

<p>Case No. 17,757</p> <p>Bill op Lading — Nondelivery — Barratry — Damages—Presumption of Law—Salvage.</p> <p>1. Where cotton was shipped at Galveston, on a vessel bound to New York, and bills of lading were given therefor, and, on the voyage, the vessel was barratrously run ashore, and part of the cotton was lost, and a part of it, which had been saved in a damaged condition, was libelled for salvage, and the owners of the cotton paid the amount of salvage decreed, and libelled the vessel on the bills of lading: Held, that the vessel was liable to the owners of the cotton for the value of the cotton lost, and for the injury to that which was saved, and for the money paid by them as salvage.</p> <p>[Cited in The Albany, 44 Fed. 435.]</p> <p>2. In case of loss or damage to goods covered by a bill of lading, the presumption of law is, that such loss or damage was occasioned by the act or default of the carrier.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,758.</p> <p>Liex —Priority—Repairs—Mortgage.</p> <p>. The lieu given by the law of the state of New York, for repairs to a domestic vessel, has priority over a mortgage on the vessel given before the repairs were made.</p> <p>[Cited in ■ The Hiawatha, Case No. 6,453; The Guiding Star, 9 Fed. 524; The Venture, 26 Fed. 287.]</p> <p>Scott’s Case [Case No. 12,517] disapproved.</p> <p>[On appeal to the circuit court, the above decree was affirmed. Case No. 17,759.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,760.</p> <p>Collision—Steamer and Sailing Vessel—Borden op Proop—Change of Coorse.</p> <p>1. In an action for damages to a sailing vessel by collision with a steamer, the burden of proof lies in the first instance on the libel-lant.</p> <p>[Cited in The New Champion, Case No. 10,-146; Messena v. The Neilson, Id. 9,493a.]</p> <p>2. If the collision is occasioned by an alteration of the course of the sailing vessel, it devolves upon her to prove the propriety or necessity of such movement.</p> <p>[Cited in The New Champion, Case No. 10,-146.]</p> <p>3. Each vessel is bound to observe the rules of navigation applicable to their respective positions.</p> <p>4. The steamer is culpable in crowding upon the sailing vessel so as to render a danger probable in her situation, but is not required to protect her against the consequences of her own mistakes or negligences.</p> <p>[Cited in The Sunnyside, Case No. 13,620.]</p> <p>5. In this case, the two vessels being navigated in opposite directions, and approaching each other on lines nearly parallel, and spread wide enough apart to leave a passage safe to each from the other, and the sailing vessel changing her course, without necessity, to cross the bows of the steamer, so near to the latter that stopping and backing the engine did not avoid a collision, she cannot support an action for the damages thereby incurred.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court. After a decree for the libellant in that court [Case No. 17,75S], the claimants appealed to this court.

<p>Case No. 17,761.</p> <p>Authority op Partner — Milling Business — Purchases for Future Delivery — Wages — Contracts — Custom among Commission Merchants.</p> <p>1. If one member of a firm of millers permits his co-partner to hold the firm out to the world as dealers in grain, and knowingly allows cards and letter heads to be used indicating such business, he will be liable with his co-partner on contracts for the sale or purchase of grain for future delivery, though such contracts are made without his actual knowledge, by his co-partner in the firm name.</p> <p>2. A contract for the sale or purchase of grain for future delivery, legitimate on its face, cannot be held void as a wagering contract, merely by showing that one of the parties so understood it. To render it void it must be proved that both parties regarded it simply a wager on differences.</p> <p>[Cited in Ward v. Vosburgh, 31 Fed. 13.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wall v. Schneider, 59 Wis. 359, 18 N. W. 446.]</p> <p>3. If a purchase or sale of grain for future delivery made in the form of a contract, is in fact simply a bet or wager on differences, the form it assumes does not affect its invalidity.</p> <p>[Cited in Ward v. Vosburgh, 31 Fed. 13.]</p> <p>■4. A custom among commission merchants on a board of trade by which, if A sells for one of his customers a certain quantity of grain for future delivery to B, who buys the same for one of his customers, and B then for another customer sells the same quantity for like delivery to C, who buys for one of his customers, and C afterwards for another customer sells the same amount for same delivery to A, who buys for another one of his customers—the commission merchants A, B and C can reciprocally surrender or cancel the contracts themselves, adjusting the differences in price, and returning margins, and each substitute his buyer customer and seller customer as parties to the contract, himself guaranteeing the performance of such contract—such a custom is founded in commercial convenience and is valid.</p> <p>Verdict for plaintiffs for $17,622.78.</p> <p>[The above judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered, by the supreme court, where it was carried on writ of error. 110 U. S. 499, 4 Sup. Ct. 160.]</p> <p>Consult also Jackson v. Foote [12 Fed. 37], and reporter’s note thereto.</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the United States, claiming a forfeiture of the schooner Willie G. and cargo, for a violation of the revenue laws: (1) Because she brought into this country distilled spirits in packages containing less than thirty gallons.

<p>Case No. 17,763.</p> <p>Patent por Inventions—Thread Winding Machine—Combination of Old Instrumen-talities—Anticipation.</p> <p>1. A foreign patent is not admissible as evidence to anticipate an American patent of a date anterior to the enrolment of the foreign patent.</p> <p>2. Old instrumentalities are patentable when combined for the first time in such a manner ■as to produce new and useful results.</p> <p>3. The rule, that, a claim for a combination of old instrumentalities, in a machine, is not anticipated by a prior invention in which the ■combination of equivalent instrumentalities appears, when the inventor of the second patent has changed the mechanism so as to produce new and valuable results, stated.</p> <p>4. The first and third claims of letters patent No. 26,415, granted to Hezekiah Conant, December 13th, 1859, and extended for seven •years June 21st, 1873, for an “improvement in machines for winding thread on spools,” held .valid.</p>

■ Upon the record it appeared that this was an action upon a bond, dated the 16th of November, 1802, given by Willings and Francis and J. Miller, in the penal sum of 15,442 dollars to secure the payment of 7,720.41 dollars, being the amount of one half the duties payable on the cargo of the ship Missouri, on the 16th of May, 1803.

This was a petition to permit the majority of owners to proceed with the brig Amelia on a voyage, after giving stipulation for value of the recusant owner’s share.

The jury were impanelled to try five actions; three brought by Willings and Francis, and Willings and Francis and Curwen, and Willings and Francis and Kuhn, against Con-sequa; and two by Consequa against Willings and Francis. In the latter suits there was no dispute.

These causes, having been tried at the October sessions of the court, in 1815 [Case No. 17,-760], and new trials having been ordered at the last sessions (Consequa v. Willings [Id. 3.128]), again came on for trial. In addition to the evidence given at the former trial, Mr. Kuhn was offered as a witness, and was objected lo on the ground of interest, he being one of the plaintiffs in the suit of Willings and Francis and Kuhn, which the jury were charged to try.

Ejectment for land on the north and west of Ohio and Alleghany rivers, and Conewango creek. The only question which was raised as to the plaintiff’s title, was, whether the deed poll from the person in whose name the application was made, to the plaintiff, who obtained the warrants and paid the purchase money, was sufficiently proved; it having been acknowledged before a person who styles himself a justice of the common pleas of the county where the land lies.

This was an ejectment for an undivided moiety of a tract of land, in York county, Pennsylvania.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a proceeding by Charles Carpenter and others against Charles J. Willis. From a decree of the district court in favor of plaintiffs (case unreported) defendant appealed.]

This was an action against the defendant as ex-cóllector of New York, to recover an amount of duties alleged to have been improperly charged on goods imported by the plaintiff. The goods consisted of eight bales - of silk striped Lama handkerchiefs, imported by the ship Liverpool, January 5th, 1841. The article was composed of silk, worsted, and cotton, and the collector charged it with the reduced woolen duty of 41 per cent., which' the importer paid under protest.

Action for a malicious prosecution. The plaintiff produced the record of the indictment in the mayor’s court of this city for larceny, which the grand jury returned ignoramus. The plaintiff proved that the defendant Mountford, put into the hands of a constable of the city a warrant to arrest the plaintiff on a charge of larceny, issued by Mr. Badger, one of the aldermen.

<p>Action [by B. A. Wills and others] against [Thomas Bussell] the collector of Boston to recover duties paid by the plaintiffs under protest</p>

This was a cause in equity which was first heard at chambers in Savannah, on the 5th and 7th of December, 1874, by WOODS. Circuit Judge, on the motion of complainants for the appointment of a receiver.

<p>Case No. 17,776.</p> <p>Railroad Foreclosures—Bondholders’ Bill-Parties—Default is Interest—Jurisdiction of Court—Appeal Bond.</p> <p>1. Where certain bondholders whose bonds were secured by a deed of trust filed in behalf of themselves and all other bondholders whose bonds were secured by the same deed, who chose to come in as complainants and bear their share of the expenses of the suit, a bill against the trustees named in the deed, to have the trust administered and the trust property sold and its proceeds distributed, and the other bondholders were numerous and some of them unknown: He’d, that it was not a valid objection to the making of a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill, that all the bondholders were not made actual parties; they might be allowed to come in as complainants, or might propound their claims before the master.</p> <p>[Cited in McFadden v. May’s Landing & E. H. C. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 185, 22 Atl. 935.]</p> <p>2. A trust deed, executed by a railroad company to secure bondholders, construed.</p> <p>3. Where a railway is conveyed by a trust deed or mortgage to secure bonds, and it cannot be divided and sold in pieces without manifest injury to its '-alue, the whole may be sold before the principal is due, on default in the payment of interest.</p> <p>4. If two railroad corporations, created by different states, join in making a trust deed conveying their joint property to secure bonds issued by them jointly, and suit is brought to enforce the trust in the district where one of the corporations tesides, and it is served with process, and the other corporation, being a nonresident of the state or district where the suit is brought, enters its appearance and files an answer jointly with the other, both will be bound by the decree of the court.</p> <p>5. The Atlanta & Richmond Air Line Railway Company conveyed to trustees by a single deed all its line of road extending from Atlanta, Georgia, through South Carolina to Charlotte, North Carolina, to secure the payment of a series of bonds issued by the railway company, and the railroad was an indivisible and inseparable piece of property which could not be divided without injury to its value: Held, that the court had jurisdiction to decree that the trustees should sell the entire line of road, according to the terms of the trust, notwithstanding a large part of the road lay beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court; and that a sale and deed under such decree would convey a good title to the whole property.</p> <p>6. Penalty of bond for appeal fixed under rule 32 of the supreme court.</p> <p>See Wilmer v. Atlanta & R. Air Line Ry. Co. [Case No. 17,775]. Before the final hearing, the receiver appointed by this court succeeded in obtaining possession of so much of the trust property as lay within the state of Georgia without the aid of the court. At the September term, 1875, the cause came on for final hearing before WOODS, Circuit Judge, upon the pleadings, evidence and report of the master. In the meantime, Mr. L. E. Bleckley, who was originally of counsel for complainants, had been appointed a judge of the supreme court of Georgia. His place was supplied by Mr. H. R. McCay.</p>

The libel in this cause was founded on a bot-tomry bond for two thousand dollars, hazarded on a specified voyage, which voyage was never performed; but instead thereof, the vessel performed a different voyage, and was afterwards sold by Smith (who executed the bottomry) to Grace, the claimant, who alleged himself to be a bona fide purchaser, claiming an exemption from the bottomry, on two grounds—1st, that the bottomry never attached; and, 2dly, if it did attach, that the…

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition for review. The original proceeding was a petition in bankruptcy filed by P. Vanvalkenburg & Co. against Guy Wilson, a merchant doing business in Chicago, alleging as an act of bankruptcy, that on the 2d of June, 1873, he suspended payment of his commercial paper, and had not resumed payment of the same within a period of fourteen days thereafter, nor at any time since.

The question before the court arises upon two-separate demurrers filed by said several alleged bankrupts to the said petition -for adjudication of bankruptcy against them.

. [In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [In the matter of Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, bankrupts. From an order of the district court for the confirmation of a composition (Case No. 17,785) the case was brought to this court on petition of review.)

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia.] In this case nearly all the estate of the bankrupt [N. F. Wilson] was covered by the exemptions allowed him by law, and was decreed to him as such. But it was more than equal to thirty per cent of the debts proved against him. Many cases had arisen presenting this state of things in a partial degree.

W. P. Wilson was adjudged bankrupt upon the petition of one Harrington, alleging himself a partner with Wilson, and that the firm was insolvent. Wilson denied the partnership, and a jury trial was had, which resulted in a verdict for the petitioner. Wilson now applied for his discharge, but filed no assent of creditors, and had not paid a sufficient dividend to enable him to dispense with the assent, if any is required.

<p>In bankruptcy. This was the case of a petition by [George Wilson] a bankrupt for his discharge; a majority of his creditors having objected thereto, the bankrupt obtained a trial by jury. The objections filed by the creditors were: 1. That the bankrupt had been guilty of fraud and of wilful concealment of his property and rights of property contrary to the provisions of the law. 2. That he had preferred some of his creditors contrary to the provisions of said act. 3. Because he wilfully omitted and refused to conform to the requisitions of said act. 4. Because he had admitted false or fictitious debts against his estate. The principal ground relied on by the creditors, was, that in March, 1842, all the stock of the bankrupt, except groceries and furniture, was attached by the Kinderhook Bank, when a receipt was given on a valuation of $900, and the suit is now pending. The receiptor took the property, and the bankrupt took no notice of it in the schedule annexed to his original petition. There was considerable testimony upon this ahd other points, the bankrupt taking the ground that he acted under a mistake as to his duty in this particular.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Samuel Wilson and Thomas Greig, bankrupts.]</p>

The court having directed from its equity side, an issue of fact for trial by a jury, Mr. St. G. T. Campbell and Mr. S. V. Smith for the plaintiff, filed a formal declaration, in the old fashioned way, setting forth a fictitious conversation that had been moved between the parties, a consequent dispute, wager, &c. Mr. Hirst and Mr. W. W. Hubbell made an objection to the declaration as not embodying, in a full and issuable way, the matter directed to be tried.

This was a bill for an interlocutory Injunction, to' restrain the defendant from using a patented machine which it was said interfered with another machine previously patented to the complainant. The defendant did not deny the originality of the complainant’s invention, but asserted his own to be no Infringement of it. The complainant’s patent was an ancient one.

<p>Case No. 17,789.</p> <p>Judgments—Equitable Relief—Injunction.</p> <p>A general allegation of difficulty in procuring vouchers, or of unavoidable delay in settling an ^administration account without stating from what circumstances that difficulty and delay ■arose, is not sufficient ground of equity to enjoin a judgment at law.</p>

At a foreign port of delivery and re-loading, where mariners are bound to deliver and reload; a cask of wine having been brought along side, and slung, in a lighter, by men not of the crew, was hoisted on board by part of the crew, and the mate, who occasionally assisted at the tackle fall, when the labour was bard.

<p>[This was a suit by C. L. Wilson against Blodget and others. Heard on motion to dismiss.]</p>

This is an action of ejectment for a tract of land in Scott county, in this state.

A petition was filed by creditors against August Brinkman, of Cape Girardeau, alleging several acts of bankruptcy, by the confession of judgment to several creditors with a view of giving them a preference, and by procuring and suffering his goods to be taken in execution with a view of giving a preference.

<p>Case No. 17,796.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Execution Creditors—Priority— Injunction.</p> <p>1. The right of an execution creditor or a landlord, upon a warrant of distress, is paramount to that of the assignee in bankruptcy, where the execution or warrant of distress was issued before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. Marshall v. Knox [16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 551] cited and followed. ■</p> <p>2. An injunction will be refused when there has been a failure to file a bill in equity, as there is, in such a case, nothing upon which a motion for an injunction can rest.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,797.</p> <p>Federar Courts—Jurisdictional Averments— Alienage of Party — Corporations — Citizenship of Corporators.</p> <p>1. It is not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the courts of the United States, to allege, that a party is -an alien. There must also he an allegation, that he is a subject or citizen of some one foreign state.</p> <p>[Cited in Prentiss v. Brennan, Case No. 11,-385; Hinckley v. Byrne, Id. 6,5Í0.)</p> <p>2. Nor is it sufficient to give jurisdiction, where a corporation is a party, to allege, that all the corporators are citizens of the United States. There must he an allegation, that the corporators are all citizens of some one or more state 'or states of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Commercial Bank of Commerce v. Green, Case No. 3,059.)</p> <p>3. The circuit court has jurisdiction to aid in enforcing the judgment of a state court.</p> <p>4. In the case of a bill against a banking corporation, to account for certain property held by them, as collateral security for debts due them from a third person, and to apply the surplus, after satisfying themselves, to the plaintiff’s debt, the debtor is a necessary party to the bill.</p> <p>[Cited in Greene v. Sisson, Case No. 5,768; Kellum v. Emerson, Id. 7,669; Florence Sewing Mach. Co. v. Singer Manuf’g Co., Id. 4,884.)</p>

Assumpsit on acceptance of an inland bill. The defendant proved that upon the assumption of J. H. Barney in writing, to pay the debt, the acceptance was given up by A. & W. Bowyer to the defendant to be cancelled.

This was a case commenced by a bill in equity, on the 12th day of December, 1844, to restrain the defendants [Curtius and Grabau] from infringing the patent right granted to William Woodworth in 1828, and extended for a further term of seven years in 1842.

<p>Case No. 17,801a.</p> <p>.'Special Bail — Stat op Execution — Liability pok Debt.</p> <p>1. Special bail for the stay of execution be-fore a justice of the peace, become liable to pay the debt, in case it is not paid by the principal, or made out of his property, on the issuing of execution at the expiration of the stay, and nothing can discharge the hail except payment of the judgment.</p> <p>2. Bail cannot complain of what is for his ■ benefit, or by which he is not injured.</p>

William Brownjohn, a citizen of New York, had obtained a judgment against Charles Hurst, a citizen of Pennsylvania, in the supreme court of this state. This judgment was assigned to William Hurst, a citizen of New York, in trust for himself and his brothers and sisters, citizens of Pennsylvania. Under this assignment J. H. Hurst, a citizen of Pennsylvania, became entitled to two-' thirds of this judgment.

<p>Case No. 17,802.</p> <p>Collision—Scow with Vessel at'Anchor.</p> <p>[A heavily laden scow allowing herself to be cast off by a steam tug, while in. motion in the tideway, and with a sheer towards the shore, in a crowded harbor, stands as her own insurer against the hazards of a collision with an anchored vessel; and, if the scow is sunk by striking against the stem of such a vessel, it can be no ground of liability on the part of the latter that her anchor may have been hanging atrip, contrary to good seamenship, so as to cause increased damage to the scow.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania.] This was an appeal from a pro forma decree of the district court.

<p>Case No. 17,806.</p> <p>Chabtkr Party — Impi.ieo Warranty of Seaworthiness.</p> <p>W., by a charter-party under seal, hired from G. a vessel, for a specified term, to be run, as a freight and passenger vessel, between New York and San Domingo, for so much per month, W. to supply, man and navigate the vessel, and G., in case of damage to her by the perils of the seas, to repair her, and no claim for charter money to be made during the time she" should be unfitted for use on such route by such damage. The charter party contained no covenant that, at the time of the charter, the vessel was seaworthy. W. • sued G., in covenant, averring such a covenant, and alleging a breach of it, in that the vessel was not seaworthy, so that the voyages stated in the charter party could not be commenced. G. demurred to the declaration: Be:d, that there was an implied covenant by G. that the vessel was seaworthy, or fit for the service for which she •vas hired, and that W. could aver such a warranty and declare on it, in covenant.</p> <p>[Cited in Hubert v. Reeknagel. 13 Fed. 913; The Edwin T. Morrison, 27 Fed. 141; The Director, 34 Fed. 64.]</p>

In the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, judgment in this action was confessed. In one thousand eight hundred and five, a scire facias was sued out and judgment confessed in April, 1808. In October, 1S06, a fieri facias was issued and levied on two lots; which upon an inquisition returned, were condemned. On the motion of the plaintiff, in 1813, this levy, inquisition, - and the venditioni exponas issued on it, were quashed.

This case came before the court at the April sessions, 1816, and upon a demurrer, which was adjudged good, a respondeas ouster was awarded. The defendants pleaded payment and no assets. In support of the first plea, they contended, that Charles Hurst, having been arrested under a capias ad satisfaciendum issued on the original judgment in 1791, was discharged by order of the plaintiff; and they offered to examine a witness to prove this fact. BY THE COURT.

<p>Case No. 17,810.</p> <p>Armt — Alien Enemies as Voldntbeks — Discharge—VOL'ONTEERS TO SERVE AT PARTIC-tilar Post—Powers op President.</p> <p>1. Alien enemies who had enrolled themselves as volunteers, and been accepted by the president, under the act of the 6th of February, ■1812 [2 Stat. 676], not entitled to be discharged; there being no law enjoining the president from accepting them.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McDonald, Case No. 8,751.]</p> <p>2. It seems that the president had a right to accept volunteers, to serve at a particular nost as well as for general service, the act being silent on the subject. At any rate he had a discretion in the premises, not to be controlled by a court of justice.</p> <p>3. The insertion in their enrolment of the officer’s name under whom the volunteers were to serve, was meant merely to ascertain the post where they were to serve by designating its commander, and not to attach them to his personal command, so that he could not be changed.</p>

This was an action on the case for the infringement of letters patent granted to the plaintiff [Carrington Wilson] October 10th, 1834, and extended for seven years, for an improvement in cooking stoves. It was tried in October term, 1851, before NELSON, Circuit Justice, and a jury,- and a verdict was found for the plaintiff.

<p>[This was a libel in rem by James S. Wilson and others against the steamer Jewess, for materials and repairs.]</p>

In equity. Heard upon pleadings and evi- • dence for final decree. The bill was filed by the complainant [Robert H. Wilson] as as-signee in bankruptcy of Fleming Jordan, to set aside as fraudulent two deeds made by Jordan on September 29, 1866, one to his wife, Lucy Jordan, and the other to Frederick B. Moore. Both these deeds conveyed personal as well as real property.

This was an action [by Daniel M. Wilson and others] against [Cornelius W. Lawrence), the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid, him. A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs,, subject to the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 17,815.</p> <p>Trespass vi bt Armis—Beating Slave.</p> <p>Trespass vi et armis lies by the owner of a slave against a stranger who beats the slave per quod servitium amisit.</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by John Wilson against Charles H. Leiberman.l</p>

The plaintiff, George Wilson, in October, 1815, exhibited his bill against the defendants, Le Roy, Bayard & M’lver, merchants, and residents of the state of New York, and against Moses Myers & Son, residents of Norfolk, in Virginia, who held in their hands effects of, and were otherwise indebted to, the said Le Roy, Bayard & M’lver, in the chancery court held in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Assumpsit The declaration consisted of three counts: (1) Indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. (2) Quantum vale-bant.

<p>Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. Pleas general issue, and limitation of five years. Va. Law, Dec. 19, 1792, p. 107, § 4.</p> <p>moved for leave to withdraw the general replication and put in a special replication, that the money in the several promises, &c., became' due “on trade and merchandise had between the plaintiff and defendants as merchants, and wholly con cerned the trade of merchandise.” This replication was taken verbatim from that in Web-ber v. Tivill, 2 Saund. 122.</p> <p>Mr. Lee cited Scudemore v. White, 1 Vern. 456; Chievly v. Bond, 4 Mod. 105; Catling V» Skoulding, 6 Term R, 189.</p> <p>contended that the exception in the statute applies only to actions of account.</p>

Wilson, a debtor confined in the prison bounds of Alexandria, upon a capias satisfaciendum in a civil cause, to be discharged. The marshal having demanded of the creditor the daily allowance according to the act of congress of March 3, 1803 (2 Stat. 237), which the creditor refused to pay. Notice of this motion had been served on Colonel Simms, the agent of the creditor.

The libellants [Edward Wilson and John Richards] were seamen on board of the American brig Mary [Dodd, master], which arrived in the harbour of Port-au-Prince on the 28th August, 182S, and remained there until the 22d •October, following. On several occasions, while the brig lay in port, the crew were guilty of much insubordination, and the captain, after consulting the American commercial agent, as he alleged, caused the libellants to be confined in the common gaol.

This was an action to recover back money paid to the defendant [Hugh Maxwell] as collector of the port of New York. The facts were these: The plaintiffs [William S. Wilson and Francis Brown] imported from Marseilles into New York a quantity of castile soap in boxes, and entered it at the customhouse, in July, 1850, at the invoice weight of 11,749 pounds, and at the net weight, deducting the weight of the boxes as tare, of 9,436 pounds.

<p>Case No. 17,825.</p> <p>Admibautt Juiusdictios— Navigable Tide Riveks—Seamens’ Wages.</p> <p>1. A contract for wages on board of a steamboat, plying between ports of adjoining states, on a navigable tide river, may be enforced by a suit in rem, in the admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary, Case No. 9,190.]</p> <p>[Cited in Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. St. 215.]</p> <p>2. The pilot, deck-hands, engineer, and firemen on board of a steamboat are entitled to sue in the admiralty for their wages.</p> <p>[Cited in Thackarey v. The Farmer, Case No. 13,852; The Sultana, Id. 13,602.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,826.</p> <p>Admiralty Proceeding—Foreign Attachment— Nonresident Dependant—Judiciary Act.</p> <p>'1. The 11th section of the judiciary act of 1789 [1 Stat. 79] applies to the courts of the United States sitting in admiralty, as well as when sitting in equity and common law.</p> <p>2. The libellant brought his libel in personam against the respondent, and joined other parties as trustees. Process of foreign attachment issued, according to the prayer of the libel, against the respondent and the supposed trustees. The marshal returned, as to the defendant, non est inventus, and that he had attached his goods, effects, and credits, in the hands of the trustees. The respondent, by his proctor, pleaded specially to the jurisdiction of the court, that the defendant was a citizen of another state, and then domiciliated therein, and was not found within that district at the time of serving the writ. Held, that it was a civil suit, against an inhabitant of the United States, commenced by original process, and, as such, within the prohibition of the 11th section of the judiciary act.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating (Jo., Case No. 600. Approved in s. c. Id. 602, but overruled in s. c. 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 306. Disapproved in Cushing v. Laird, Case No. 3,508.]</p> <p>3. The case of Clarke v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. [Case No. 2,859] considered.</p>

In equity. Heard on pleadings and evidence for final decree. The purpose of the bill was to obtain a decree of the court, setting aside as fraudulent, and null and void, a marriage settlement, made on April 27, 1866, by the defendant Richard Prewett, on Josephine Prewett, whom he afterwards, on May 6, 1866, married Prewett was fifty-eight years of age.

The defendant had given an obligation to make Clark a deed in fee simple, to six hundred and forty acres of land, his choice out of two thousand acres on the waters of Stone’s river, to join some corner of the tract. The bond was given about twenty years ago, and the title was to be made .so soon as grants should issue. It did not appear that the defendant had any such land on the waters of Stone’s river.

This was an application for a provisional injunction for an infringement of the Wood-worth patent [for an “improvement in the method of planing, tonguing, and grooving, and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards, or other material, and reducing the same to an equal length and thickness,” &e., granted to William Woodworth December 27, 1828, extending for seven years, from December 27, 1842, and reissued July 8, 1845],2 The defendant Jehaniel Sherman resided at…

<p>Case No. 17,832a.</p> <p>Ecjcitt Practice — Bile or Revivor—Represen-tative of Deceased Partner.</p> <p>In a suit in equity against the members of a firm a demurrer will not lie to a bill of revivor to bring in the representative of a deceased partner.</p>

<p>On appeal from the decision of the commissioner of patents of the 20th of December, 1859.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,836.</p> <p>Marking Article as Patented—Expiration op Patent.</p> <p>1. The manufacturer of an article, which has been patented, can affix upon such article the word “Patented” or any other word of similar import, together with the date of the patent, after the patent has expired.</p> <p>2. Such an article does not come within the meaning of the statute which prohibits the affixing of the word “Patented” upon any “un-patented article.”</p> <p>[Cited in Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss. 2 Fed. 224.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,838.</p> <p>Sale by Bankrupt—Validity—Bubden op Proof.</p> <p>1. The 35th section of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 534)], which declares a sale, transfer, etc., not made in the URual and ordinary course of business of the debtor, shall be prima facie evidence of fraud, throws the burden of proof on the purchaser to sustain the validity of his purchase.</p> <p>2. In such a case the proofs may be taken ore tenus at the hearing.</p> <p>3. Under the evidence in this case the sale was void.</p>

[This was a motion by James G. Wilson for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendant John H. Stolley from infringing the letters patent for an “improved method of planing, tonguing, and grooving, and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards, or any other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness,” etc., granted December 27, 1828, to William Woodworth, extended for seven years, from December 27, 1842, and reissued July 8, 1845.

2 [Action on the case. Suit brought on letters patent for an improved method of planing, tonguing, and grooving and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards, or other material, and for… Held: as aforesaid, the exclusive right under said extended patent, and had authority to use and construct the planing machine, as described in the patent, they granted, on September 11, 1843, to John H. Stolley, the defendant, a license.

[This was an action by Mary A. and Michael P. Wilson against Marion M. Taylor.] A summons was served on the administrator to show cause why he does not distribute the balance in his hands as administrator de bonis non of.Geo. B. Scott, deceased.

<p>Case No. 17,841.</p> <p>Sale of Chattels—Passing of Title — Failure to Deliver.</p> <p>[The seller of merchandise agreed with the vendee to deliver it on board a brig lying at pier No. 9, North river, but by mistake of the carman it was delivered to another brig lying at pier No. 9, East river, and a receipt for the merchandise was signed by the master of the latter brig, which sailed before the mistake was discovered. The seller then delivered similar merchandise on the other brig in fulfillment of his contract. Belli, that the title to the merchandise shipped on the wrong brig remained in the vendor, so that he could sue such brig for the value thereof.]</p>

Special assumpsit by defendant’s testator to sell all his crops for several years at a certain price; breach, that he did not sell and deliver, &c. Pleas, non assumpsit and limitations.

In equity. On the 31st of August, 1844, James G. Wilson, a citizen of the state of New York, filed his bill in this court, stating that on the 27th of December, 1828, William Woodworth, of the state of New York, obtained a patent for a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tongueing, grooving and cutting into mouldings, either plank, boards or any other materials, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness; and also, for facing and dressing…

<p>Case No. 17,846.</p> <p>Customs Duties—Scope op Act—Foreign Privateer-Necessity op Report and Entry— Importation of Coloured Seamen.</p> <p>1. The 31 section of the act of congress passed on the 2d of March, 1799 [1 Stat. 651], “to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage,” which exempts “ships or vessels of war” from the necessity of making a report and entry, on arriving at any of the ports of the United States, from any foreign port or place, extends as well to privateers as to national ships.</p> <p>2. The power of controlling navigation, is incidental to the power to regulate commerce, which the constitution confers upon congress; and, consequently, the power of congress over the vessel, is co-extensive with that over the cargo.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Jackson, Case No. 16,458.]</p> <p>3. The act of congress of the 28th of February, 1803 L2 Stat. 205], forbidding any master or captain of a ship or vessel, to import or bring, into any port of the United States, any negro, mulatto, or other person of colour, under certain penalties, where the admission or importation of such persons is prohibited by the laws of such state, does not apply to coloured seamen, employed in navigating such ship or vessel.</p>

This was scire facias against the defendant, one of the executors of Susannah Rodney, who was executrix of Charles Hurst; to revive a judgment, recovered by the plaintiff against said Hurst, in his life time. See [Case No. 17,808).

Bill for injunction to prevent the administrators from confessing judgment at law in favor of other creditors in equal degree; and to distribute the assets pari passu. An administrator is a trustee, and subject to equitable jurisdiction. At law an administrator may prefer a creditor in equal degree; but a court of equity may interfere; especially before any payments are made. The equity of him who claims pro rata is superior to that of him who contends for all.

In equity. On the 5th of January last, a motion was made by complainants, based on the bill and affidavits previously filed, for an injunction, restraining the defendant [William B. Clapp] from putting up, manufacturing, or selling canned corned beef, in such manner as to infringe upon certain patents belonging to complainants and particularly described in the bill.

<p>Case No. 17,851.</p> <p>Patents—Canned Beef—Novelty—Fokm of Can.</p> <p>1. The method of cutting up meat, preparing it with antiseptics, pressing, putting into cans, pressing afterwards, and then hermetically sealing the cans, íb not patentable, for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. A patent for cooked meat put up ik a solid form, in its natural state, without disintegration or desiccation, in hermetically sealed packages, can not be sustained as a new article of commerce.</p> <p>3. The pyramidal form of can, for packing food, is not patentable.</p> <p>4. The Marshall and Wilson patents for canning beef not sustained.</p> <p>■ [Cited in Wilson Packing Co. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co., 9 Fed. 548.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court, the decree of this court was affirmed. 105 U. S. 566, note.]</p> <p>These patents were again brought before this court, at the December term, 1881, and decided invalid in the case of Wilson Packing Oo. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co. [9 Fed. 547]. See, also, Wilson Packing Co. v. Clapp [Case Ño. 17,-850].</p>

[This suit was brought for an infringement of a patent as to the process. of preserving and canning meats. The defendants [Robert Hunter and others] object to the jurisdiction of the court, because they are a corporation of the state of Missouri, and, therefore, can not be sued in the Southern district of Illinois.

<p>Case No. 17,853.</p> <p>Depositions de Bene Esse—Administkation op Oath.</p> <p>1. Section 864. Rev. St. U. S.. is in derogation of the common law. and therefore its provisions must be strictly complied with in taking depositions de bene esse under it; the witness must be “carefúlly examined,” and must be sworn to testify the “whole truth” on the entire subject-matter of the depositions, and not merely the whole truth in response to each of several interrogatories propounded to him.</p> <p>2. As to the mode of administering the oath, it is sufficient in that respect to follow the directions of the statute law of the state of the United States where the depositions were taken.</p>

[This was a bill of review filed by George F. Wilt, administrator of Harrison Wilt, against Edson Stickney, assignee in bankruptcy of Peter I. Vanderveer, to review a decree of this court declaring invalid a mortgage held by the said Harrison Wilt on certain of the bankrupt’s property, and directing a sale thereof.]

In the case of James H. Wiltbank, charged with mutiny, the jury came into court, and stated that they were still unable to agree upon a verdict. Judge CADWALADER said that in his opinion, if the jury gave due effect to the evidence, their verdict should be one of guilty.

In this suit, which was one for an infringement of a patent right, the defendants pleaded the general issue; and, relying in their defence upon a previous use and knowledge of the thing patented, gave notice to the plaintiffs under the act of congress,2 that they would offer proof upon the trial that it had been publiekly used at certain places which they named, and that a prior knowledge of it was possessed by certain persons, whom, together with their places of residence,…

Case for infringement of a patent dated the 30th of July, 1831, for “a new and useful improvement of railway and other wheeled carriages.” Plea, the general issue with special matters of defence; (1) That the invention was not new. (2) That the invention was in public use before the patent, with the consent of the patentee.

This was an action by Koss Winans against Charles Danforth and others for damages for an alleged infringement of a patent granted in November, 1846, to the plaintiff, for an improvement in the machinery of locomotive ■engines, by which the exhaust steam which was made to discharge itself into the smoke pipe, was so regulated as to increase or decrease the draught of the smoke-stack, according as the engineer desired to increase or decrease the working power of the engine.

This was a motion for a provisional injunction to restrain [Orsamus Eaton from] the infringement of letters patent for “a new and useful improvement in the construction of cars or carriages intended to travel upon railroads.” granted to Ross Wi-nans, October 1, 1834, and extended for seven years from October 1, 1848.

[This was a bill in equity by Theodore E. Winans against the McKean Railroad & Navigation Company.] The case came before the court, on a demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill of complaint,

This was an action on the case tried before Judge Hall and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of the letters patent for “a new and useful improvement in the construction of cars or carriages intended to travel upon railroads,” granted to Ross Winans. October 31, 1834. A portion of the specification and the claims will be found in the report of the case of Winans v. Eaton [Case No. 17,861].

This was an action on the case tried before NELSON, Circuit Justice, and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for “improvement in the construction of cars or carriages intended to travel upon railroads,” granted to Ross Winans, October 1, 1834, and extended for seven years from October 1, 184S. The material portion of the specification is quoted in the report of the case of Winans v. Eaton [Case No. 17,-861].

This was an action on the case, tried before CONKLING, District Judge, in June, .1850, foj: the infringement of letters patent 2 granted to the plaintiff on the 1st of October, 1834, for an “improvement in the construction of ears or carriages intended to run on rail-roads.” At the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence the original patent.

Bill in equity by Isabella H. Winchell, wife and administratrix of the estate of George I. Winchell,. deceased, and Harry Winched, only child of said George» against John Hancock Mutual Bife Insurance Company. The complainants alleged that said George I. Winchell obtained from the defendants a policy for $3,000 upon his life, for the benefit of his wife and children, a copy of which is annexed to the bill.

This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circumstances of the case are fully set forth in the petition and the opinion of the court.

This was a summary proceeding in equity, instituted by (Henry Winder] the assignee of Nathaniel Blake, a bankrupt, to recover of the respondent [William Whiting] a fund amounting to about $3,000, which had been collected by him under an assignment made to him by Blake, for the benefit of his creditors, December 10, 1S3S, according to the provisions of the statute of April 15, 1836.

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain, the defendant [Charles F. Richardson] from infringing letters patent for a “plate holder for cameras,” granted to Albert S. South-worth, April 10, 1855, reissued September 25, 1860, and assigned to plaintiff [Simon Wing].

This was a bill in equity filed to restrain the defendant [Christopher C. Schoonmaker] from infringing letters patent for a ‘’plate holder for cameras,” granted to Albert S. Southworth, April 10, 1855, reissued September 25, 1800, and assigned to complainant [Simon Wing]. The nature of the invention and the claims are stated in the report of the case of Wing v. Richardson [Case No. 17,809],

<p>Demurrer to bill in equity [brought by Simon Wing, Marcus Ormsbee, and A. S. Southworth, against W. S. Warren]. Suit brought upon letters patent for an “improvement in plate-holders for cameras,” granted A. S. Southworth in 1855.</p> <p>The bill alleged the issue of the patent to Southworth, and his subsequent assignment of all his right, title, and interest in it, except the right to make, use, and sell the thing patented in Salem, Massachusetts; that Southworth afterward, at the request of the assignees, surrendered the patent, and the commissioner of patents, at the request of all the parties, reissued it to Southworth, who assigned the reissued patent as before; that, on its expiration, in 1869, it was renewed for seven years to Southworth, and that it was then vested in the complainants.</p> <p>The defendant demurred to the bill on the following grounds: (1) By the assignment of the original patent, Southworth’s whole interest passed, and all that was left him was a license for Salem. Potter v. Holland [Case No. 11,329]; Smith v. Mercer [Id. 13,078]. (2) Therefore, Southworth could not surrender the patent, and his act assuming to do this was void. The bill says that this was done by request of the assignees, but there is no pretense that this was in writing, as in Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Wetherbee [Id. 3,-810], (3) Even if the surrender was good, the reissue was void, because not made to the true owners. In the case of the Cummings patent, involved in the above-named suit, a similar mistake was made, but it was immediately corrected in the office as a clerical error, and this was held to cure the difficulty.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, against the ship Wings of the Morning, to recover for damage caused to the barge Stephen Warren, by a collision which occurred between the two vessels, in the Hudson river, at New York, off pier number 4, on the night of November 22, 1852. The barge was lashed to the steam tug General Wool, on her starboard side. The tug was descending the river with her tow. a quarter or a third of the way from the New York side, intending to pass around the Battery into, the East river, for the purpose of discharging her cargo. The Wings of the Morning was coming up the river, having taken in all her sails except the spanker, preparatory to dropping anchor in the stream. The wind was southeast or south-southeast, and the tide was ebb. The Wings of the Morning had come up the river near the middle of it, and had ported her helm to luff into the wind and check her headway, to enable her to drop anchor, and was in the act of dropping it, or about to drop it, as the mate discovered the tug and tow coming down upon him. The district court held, that both vessels were in fault, and divided the damages. [Case unreported.] Both parties appealed to this court.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,873.</p> <p>Enemy Vessel—Condemnation—Neutral Owners of Cargo—Liens.</p> <p>1. Vessel condemned as enemy property.</p> <p>2. A part of her cargo condemned as enemy property, although under hypothecation to a neutral merchant for advances on the invoice and bill of lading.</p> <p>3.The title of the absolute owner prevails, in a prize court, over the interest of a lien holder, whatever the equities between those parties may be.</p> <p>The decree in this case was affirmed by the circuit court on appeal July 17, 1863, except as to five-eighths of the cargo condemned below. As to that the circuit court allowed further proofs. On those that court. December 3, 1863, allowed Phipps & Co. the amount of their advance on the five-eighths, with interest, to be paid out of its proceeds. [Case unreported.]</p>

The case was brought first in the corporation court of Norfolk, and was removed thence into the United States circuit court.

[In the matter of Elijah E. Winn, a bankrupt.] In this case the following questions arose In the proceedings of the same, and upon request of James R. Hanks, a judgment creditor, were certified by the register, Lawson Black, for the opinion of the district judge. First. Does a debt secured by lien lose its lien by proof of the debtor? Seeond. Does a judgment in this state retain its lien in bank-rupty? Third.

<p>Case No. 17,876a.</p> <p>Collision — Sailing Vessels in East River — Costs in A.dmiraltt.</p> <p>[1. Failure of a sloop running before the wind in the East river to foresee the point at which an approaching schooner will run out her tack, so as to keep out of her way when she goes about, is a fault barring recovery for an ensuing collision.)</p> <p>[2. When the blame for a collision is found to lie with the libelant alone, the costs will be taxed against him.)</p> <p>[This was a libel by Gilbert G. Winne against the schooner Carroll-to recover damages for a collision.)</p>

<p>Case No. 17,879.</p> <p>Patent Office Appeals—Sufficiency of “Reasons of Appeal”—Vagueness.</p> <p>[1. Reasons of appeal which state “that the decision 'is in opposition to a clear apprehension of the merits of the case”: “that the decision is inconsistent as opposed in affirmation to precedents which have governed such eases”; and ‘•that the decision is adverse to the opinion of skillful and competent men,”—held too vague and indefinite to raise any question for the judge to pass upon.]</p> <p>[2. Where the commissioner’s refusal to grant a patent is based upon want of novelty, the judge cannot consider a reason of appeal which is occupied mainly in a description of the object and importance of the machine, and of the comparative merits of the applicant’s machine and a prior machine which the commissioner has cited as an anticipation.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,880.</p> <p>Makitime Lien—Local Law.</p> <p>Furnishing an air pump to a water craft familiarly called a “chuncker,” used for pumping the water out of a dry dock in the Hudson river, is a maritime service. The lien given by the local law for such service may be enforced by the district court in admiralty.</p>

<p>Appeal from decree of district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois, dismissing the libel, which was filed to recover demurrage for delay in loading and unloading a cargo of salt. [Case unreported.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by Henry Winso and others, owners of the steamship Saxon, against the ship Cornelius Grinnell, to recover compensation for salvage services.]</p>

This cause came before the circuit court, being certified from the district court, on account of the district judge being interested therein.

<p>[In the matter of Zenas G. Winsor, a bankrupt.] '</p>

This case was adjourned from the district court into this court on account of the district judge being interested therein.

<p>This was the case of a question adjourned into the circuit court from the district court of Massachusetts. The petition 'set forth, that Edward and William H. McLellan, of Boston, merchants and co-partners, of whom the petitioner, Henry Winsor, of Boston, was the assignee in bankruptcy, included in the schedule of their assets one half of the brig Napoleon, at sea, and in the schedule of their liabilities, 82.000 due to the trustees of Mrs. Bebecca S. McLellan, secured by a bill of sale of one half of the brig Napoleon. The bill of sale was made Dec. 9, 1841, and the petition of the McLellans for the benefit of the bankrupt law was filed Nov. 22, 1842. In the intermediate time, the trustees did not take possession of the vessel, but the bankrupts employed her for their own use. And on April 28, 1842, Edward McLellan made oath at the custom-house, that he and his partner, and George W. Jordan, were the owners of the brig. Jordan was the master of the vessel, and owned one moiety. The trustees, on the 8th of April, 1843, petitioned the court for leave to sell the half of the brig, which had been conveyed to them, and the sale was authorized to be made under the direction of the assignee. The sale took place, and the trustees executed a conveyance, but the collector refused to issue a new register, unless upon a transfer by the assignee. The assignee accordingly executed a bill of sale to the purchasers, and received the purchase-money, amounting to 81.600, which sum was subject to deductions, for payments and charges, of 8133.59. The balance was claimed by the assignee to be paid into the general fund, for the benefit of the creditors.</p> <p>The answer of the trustees, in addition to the above facts, set forth, that the policies of insurance, made upon the'said moiety, subsequent to the bill of sale, had been transferred and made payable to them, and that it was agreed, at the time the bill of sale was given, that the bankrupts should use the vessel until default of payment. The vessel, at that time, was at sea, but between that time and the time of filing the petition for the benefit of the bankrupt law It had been once at Boston, and twice at ■ Bath, where the master lived. The trustees did not take possession; but, on the 17th of November, 1842, they addressed a letter to the master, notifying him of the transfer to them, and, subsequently to the receipt of that letter, the vessel was managed for the joint use of the trustees and the master. The answer concluded with a prayer, that the assignee be ordered to pay over to them the balance of the proceeds in his hands, and for costs.</p> <p>Upon these facts, the question was adjourned into the circuit court.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,888.</p> <p>Trustees of Vessel — Liabilitt for Master’s Wages—Set-Offs.</p> <p>’ -, 1. Trustees holding the title of a vessel, and controlling and managing her, for the benefit of others, are liable for the wages of the master.</p> <p>2. Charges by the owners, against the master, for passage of his minor son,—for freight of a piano forte,—for board-bill paid for him,— passage of his servant,—for regulating a chronometer,—and for use of extra state rooms, considered and decided upon.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,889.</p> <p>Collision’—Change of Course.</p> <p>Mere apprehension of danger, not then imminent, is not sufficient to justify a change of course by a sailing-vessel meeting. a steamer under way.</p>

This is a petition for revision under the second section of the bankrupt act. Louis C. Winter filed his petition in the district •court, representing that he was a creditor ■of the above named railway company, and •charging that the company had committed •certain specified acts of bankruptcy, asked that it be declared a bankrupt.

In equity. After a final hearing, the decision of this cause was prevented by an objection that a decree could not be made until a person of the name of S. B. Ludlow should have been brought into court as a party. The qtiestion afterwards arose whether a subpoena issued by this court against this person, who was a resident of the Western district of the state, could be served upon him in that district.

Petition for the confirmation of a Spanish grant, determined in the district court of the United States for the district of Arkansas, under the act of congress of the 26th of May, 1824 (4 Stat. 62), before Benjamin JOHNSON, District Judge. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

•This was an action on the case [by John Wintermute against Alexander H. Redington], tried before Judge Willson and a jury, for the infringement of letters patent granted to Zeb-ulon and Austin Parker, October 9, 1829, and assigned to plaintiff. The nature of the patent' is sufficiently stated in the report of the case-of Parker v. Hulme [Case No. 10,740].

<p>Case No. 17,897.</p> <p>Deputy Marshal—Failure to Return Appointment— Right to Fees — Suit against Marshal.</p> <p>1. Where a deputy marshal was regularly appointed by a marshal, and duly sworn as deputy, but no return of such appointment was made by the marshal to the district judge, such omission did not affect the legality of the service of subpenas made by such deputy, nor deprive him of the right to his fees.</p> <p>2. A deputy marshal is not entitled to charge for service or mileage for himself as a witness.</p> <p>S. Though the service is rendered by the deputy marshal, the fees legally belong to the marshal, and his receipt for them operates as a discharge from liability for such service.</p> <p>4. A deputy marshal’s remedy for compensation is against the marshal for whom he performed the services.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,898.</p> <p>Contract or Sale — Offer and Acceptance — Cargo of Vessel—Sale at Intermediate Port.</p> <p>1. The agent of the owners of a cargo of wood, described in the bill of lading as con-, sisting of ninety-five cords, more or less, while the vessel was lying in a port to which she had been taken in an unseaworthy condition, offered by letter to sell the wood to the master of the vessel, at a certain price ‘‘per cord, for the quantity shipped.” The master seasonably mailed to the agent an acceptance of the offer, and on the next day wrote that he would have che wood surveyed, and would remit as soon as he could make it convenient. On receipt of these communications, the agent replied, claiming that the term “quantity shipped” in his offer meant the quantity “as per bill of lading,” and requiring the master at once to remit the proceeds, with the bill of lading to verify the account, and notifying him that the wood was not his “property to move away or dispose of until he complied with these conditions.” Before this reply was received the master sold the wood, which on survey proved to contain seventy-eight cords and one foot. Held, that the sale was complete, and the title to the wood vested in the master, when his acceptance of the offer to sell was mailed.</p> <p>2. A voyage from Maine to Boston was abandoned on account of unseaworthiness of the vessel, caused by perils of the seas, and the vessel taken to an intermediate port, where the agent of the owners of the cargo sold the cargo to the master. Held, that the'Owners of the cargo had no lien upon the vessel for non-delivery of the cargo at the port of destination.</p>

<p>In this case the bankrupt [Grenville T. Winthrop] presented his petition, setting forth that the petitioner, upon the 8th day of March, was, upon his petition to this court, declared to be a bankrupt; that an assignee had been appointed, according to the late act of congress [5 Stat. 440], in his behalf, and that it was necessary for him to be ready, at all times, for examination in regard to his affairs; that he had filed his petition for a discharge; that Ebenezer Trescott, of Boston, recovered a judgment against the petitioner, in the court of common pleas, at the last January term, and had sued out an execution thereon, and placed the same in the hands of a deputy sheriff of Middlesex, on March 22d, with written directions to collect the amount of .the same, or commit the petitioner forthwith to prison, and in consequence of such directions, said deputy sheriff was about to commit the petitioner to jail. Wherefore he prayed, that said Trescott, and said deputy sheriff, and all other persons, might be enjoined from arresting or committing the petitioner to jail, until a hearing could be heard upon his petition for a discharge.</p>

Action on a policy, of the 4th of January, 1804, entered into by the Union Insurance Company, on goods on board the Maryland, lost or not lost, at and from New-York to the Cape of Good Hope, with liberty to proceed to, and trade at the Isle of France, and any other port or ports in the Indian seas, and at and from the ports she might go to, back to New-York; with liberty to touch and trade, as usual, for refreshments, on the outward and homeward voyage.

The bill in equity of the state of Wisconsin asserts the interest of the state and of her citizens in the navigation of the river St. Louis, from its mouth, where it empties into Lake Superior, at Superior City, for about twenty miles up the river, a part of which, by reason of the expansion of the river, is known as the “Bay of Superior,” and it alleges that the city of Duluth, and Mr. Luce, the mayor of that city, and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, are now…

<p>Case No. 17,903.</p> <p>Practice or Federal Courts—Mandamus—Levy of Taxes.</p> <p>1. Where writs of mandamus are resorted to for the purpose of compelling a municipal corporation to levy a tax, this court will conform as much as possible to the state practice in similar cases.</p> <p>2. Unless special circumstances should require it, a peremptory writ will not be issued, commanding a levy of taxes to pay a judgment against a municipal corporation at a time different from the next general levy.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,904.</p> <p>Plea Puis Dabrein Continuance.</p> <p>A plea puis darrein continuance, admits the plaintiff’s cause of action, displaces all previous pleas and defenses, and the defendant must stand on that alone.</p>

There had been a plea of “owe nothing,” by the appearance-bail and issue. The principal defendant now came in, and gave special bail, and pleaded the same plea, “owe nothing.” contended for a continuance, as a matter of course. cited the case of Alexander v. Patten [Case No. 171], where the court refused a continuance to the defendant, on account of the appearance of the administrator of the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 17,914.</p> <p>Construction of Will — Partial Intestacy — Limitations—Trusts—Suit against Executor’s Administrator — Parties — Jurisdiction — Diverse Citizenship.</p> <p>1. The testator devised as follows: “I give to-my wife, her heirs and assigns, all my estate, real and personal, excepting my outstanding debts, which I order my said wife, whom I appoint my executor, to collect, and give three persons that I shall hereafter direct her to give the same to.” The testator died without naming the thj-ee persons, and giving any direction. The wife collected the debts, and invested them in securities; for one half of which the next of kin of the testator brought this suit. Held, that these outstanding debts did not pass by the will to the wife, as residuary legatee, or devisee or executrix, or as a trustee by implication; but they are to be distributed according to the statute of distributions of the state.</p> <p>2. Where a bill in equity states a case to which the act of limitations applies, without bringing it within some one of the savings, the defendant may take advantage of the bar by demurrer.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Demekson v. Cady, 7 Pa. St. ■ 30; Cited in Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 141.]</p> <p>3. The rule in equity as to the statute of limitations in cases of trusts is, that those trusts which are mere creatures of a court of equity, and not within the cognizance of a court of law, are not within the opération of the statute. So long as there is a subsisting and continuing trust, acknowledged or acted upon by the parties, the statute does not apply. But other trusts, which are the ground of an action at law, are within it. Under this rule, the statute does not apply in the state of New Jersey to a bill by legatees or dis-tributees.</p> <p>[Cited in App v. Dreisbach, 2 Rawle, 305; Hayward v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 389; Hedges v. Norris, 32 N. J. Eq. 197; Webster v. New-bold, 41 Pa. St. 492.]</p> <p>4. This suit was against the administrator pen-dente lite of the executrix, (charging in the bill that the administrator had possessed himself of all the securities in which the outstanding debts had been invested, and claimed them as the property of his intestate,) and such of the next of kin as the bill charges had refused to join in the suit. It is in this case no objection for the want of parties that the legal representative of the testator is no party.</p> <p>5. The executor or administrator of the deceased next of kin, who might be made a party, must be. It is not sufficient to make his devisee, or persons entitled to his estate parties.</p> <p>6. If the jurisdiction of the court could be ousted by making all the parties concerned in interest plaintiffs; those who ¿re citizens of the same state, with the real defendants, may refuse to join in the suit, and may be made defendants.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,915.</p> <p>Vessel in Legal Custody—Creation op Lien.</p> <p>An owner who has regained possession of his vessel after seizure, either by successfully defending the original suit or by paying or giving bonds for the payment of the debts for which she was seized, cannot defeat an otherwise valid lien on the ground that the contract out of which it arose was made, and the consideration for it rendered, before the release and while the vessel was in the custody of the law.</p> <p>[Cited in The Young America, 30 Fed. 790;</p> <p>The Willamette Valley, 62 Fed. 298.]</p>

<p>Case No. 17,916.</p> <p>Lien of Material Men—Property Covered.</p> <p>Where a vessel was supplied with a diving-bell, air-pump, and other apparatus not required for her use as a “navigating ship,” but indispensable for the accomplishment of the enterprise in which she was about to engage, lidd, that the lien of the material men extended to all articles belonging to the owner which (not being cargo), have been placed on board for the objects and purposes of this voyage.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,917.</p> <p>Nature op Mortgage—Mortgagee’s Right to Possession—Frivolous Plea.</p> <p>1. In Oregon a mortgage is a mere security, and the mortgagor, both before and after condition broken, is the owner of the premises, subject to the lien of the mortgage, arid he cannot be deprived of the possession of the same against his will otherwise than by foreclosure and sale.</p> <p>[Cited in Oregon & W. Trust Inv. Co. v. Shaw, Case No. 10,556; Semple v. Bank of British Columbia, Id. 12.659 and 12,660; Gest v. Packwood, 34 Fed. 373.)</p> <p>2. A mortgagee has no right or authority to take possession of the mortgaged premises and hold the same for the satisfaction of his debt without the consent of the mortgagor.</p> <p>[Cited in Edwards v. Wray. 12 Fed. 44; The Holladay Case, 29 Fed. 230.)</p> <p>3. A plea stating that the defendant is in possession as assignee of an unsatisfied mortgage, but which does not allege that he entered with the assent of the mortgagor, is frivolous, but not sham or redundant.</p> <p>[Cited in Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. & Nav. Co., 22 Fed. 249.)</p> <p>4. The nature and duration of an estate license or right to the possession, how pleaded within the meaning of section 316, Civ. Code Or.</p> <p>[Cited in Lewis v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., Case No. 8,329.)</p>

The plaintiff in this suit [James E. With-row] sought to recover, as assignee of Thomas S. Dunbar and Edward T. Smith, bankrupts, $512.32, the value of certain accounts and claims alleged to have been transferred by the bankrupts to the defendant [M. K. Fowler] within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against Dunbar and Smith, they being at tbe time insolvent, and the defendant having, at the date of the transfer, reasonable cause to believe tbem…

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

On the 31st day of July, 1875, Henry Hereth filed his complaint before William H. Schmitts, a justice of the peace in and for Center township, Marion county,. Indiana, demanding judgment against William M. Aughinbaugh for two hundred dollars upon a note, the principal of which was two hundred dollars and eighty-three cents, and on the same day a summons was duly issued to a constable of said township, and served on said Aughin-baugh.

<p>Case No. 17,922.</p> <p>Towage—Jurisdiction—Lies.</p> <p>1. A lien exists upon a canal-boat, for towage services rendered to her in the harbor of New York, which an admiralty fcourt has jurisdiction to enforce.</p> <p>2. What is a maritime contract, considered.</p> <p>[Cited in Lands v. Cargo of Coal, 4 Fed. 480; The Wilmington, 48 Fed. 567.]</p>

This was a petition for an adjudication of bankruptcy, charging that the respondent had suspended and stopped payment of his commercial paper, and had not resumed in forty days. Upon the return day of the order to show cause, the only proof offered of the act of bankruptcy was a promissory note made by E. Wolf in favor of one Parker, for $1,000, payable “one day after date,” which showed upon its face that it had been due more than forty days.

On the mutual application of the parties for directions to the clerk as to taxation of costs. This cause was commenced in the circuit court for the county of Wayne, in this state, and after issue and one continuance in that court, the cause was removed to this court by the defendant, under and in pursuance of the acts of congress in such cases made and provided.

<p>Case No. 17,925a.</p> <p>Life Insurance—Suicide—Insanitt—Temperate Habits.</p> <p>[1. Under a policy conditioned to be void in case the insured should “die by his own hand,” there is no liability if the insured kills himself while in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, and from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life. If, however, his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect of his act, or if he was impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he had not the power to resist, the insurer is liable.]</p> <p>[2. A representation in the application that the applicant is “sober and temperate” does not mean that he totally abstains from the use of intoxicating liquors, or that he may not have been drunk on some occasions. It means, rather, that he is temperate in the use of spirituous liquors,—not addicted to their excessive use.]</p>

Mrs. Looney owned the tract of land in controversy. She and Pfannenstiehl made a trade by which Pfannenstiehl conveyed her certain property in Memphis, and Mrs. Looney conveyed him the tract of land in question and other tracts. The last mentioned conveyance was made on the 28th of September, 1867.

<p>[This was a suit by Aaron Wolf and others against John G. Smythe.]</p>

The action was upon a policy of insurance, which insured the life of Henry Wolff, in the amount of $2,000. Defense was made that the assured committed suicide; which was a risk not covered by the policy; to which the assured replied that he was insane at the time he took his life. The case was brought before a jury and a verdict rendered for the full amount of the policy and interest.

<p>Case No. 17,930.</p> <p>Discharge of Bankrupt—Effect of Preference.</p> <p>Where the bankrupt had maae a conveyance constituting a preference fourteen months before the commencement of the proceedings, hdl, that the discharge should be granted notwithstanding. The words “’in contemplation of becoming bankrupt” considered.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,932.</p> <p>CONSOLIDATION OF ACTIONS—DEBT FOB PENALTIES cndeu St. 1790, Ch. 29, § 1 (1 Stat. 181)—Dec-labation in—Female Seamen—Shipping Articles—Maritime Jurisdiction on the Lakes.</p> <p>1. Where the plaintiff has several causes of action which may be joined, one suit only should be brought; otherw'se, the court will compel a consolidation with costs of the application therefor.</p> <p>2. In an action of debt, to recover several penalties under the act of congress of 1790. c. 29, § 1, against the master of a vessel for shipping seamen without articles, a single count for all the penalties is sufficient.</p> <p>3. A female shipped on board a vessel as cook and steward is entitled to all the rights and subject to all the disabilities of a seaman or mariner, and the provisions of the statute concerning shipping articles apply as well to such cook and steward as to the sailor before the mast.</p> <p>4. The provisions of this act. imposing a penalty on masters of vessels in the merchant service for shipping seamen without articles, extend to the merchant marine upon the lakes and public navigable waters connecting the same.</p> <p>5. Independent of the act of congress of February 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 726), under the constitution, the maritime law of the United States has the same application to cases upon the lakes as upon tide waters.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Augustus H. Wonson against Sumner Gilman and others, for the infringement of letters patent No. 40,-515, granted to Tarr & Wonson, November 318G3, reissue No. 4,59S, granted October 17, 1871.]

[This was a bill in equity by Augustus H. Wonson against Benjamin D. Peterson and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 40,515, granted to Tarr& Wonson, November 3,1863, reissue No. 4,598, granted October 17, 1871.]

[In the matter of Edward T. Wood, a bankrupt.] The petition in this case was filed February 29, 1868. It stated that the petitioner “had a place of business in New York.” In February, 1873,. the petitioner asked to file an amended petition, in which the following words: “And has there carried on business of his owd,” were added to the above allegation.

<p>Case No. 17,936.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Time of Application for Discharge.</p> <p>1. W. was adjudged a bankrupt on March 2, 1868. His application for a discharge was not made till June 19, 1869. A debt was proved and assets came to the hands of the as-signee. Reid that, under the decision of the circuit court for the Northern district of New York; in Re Sloan [Case Ño. 12,945], the application was made too late, and that no discharge could be granted in the case.</p> <p>2. All applications for discharge must _ be made within one year from the adjudication. Where no debts have been proved, or no assets have come to the hands of the assignee, the application may be made after the expiration of sixty days from the adjudication. Where debts have been proved, and assets have come to the hands of the assignee, the application may be made after, but not till after, the expiration of six months from the adjudication.</p>

In December, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, within six, but more than four months prior to the filing of the petition in this case, James P. Wood, the bankrupt, proposed to one Willingham, to whom he owed a note for five thousand dollars, to convey to him certain land in payment of the debt, which proposition Willingham declined.

<p>This was an action [by Hamilton Wood and others against Milton S. Abbott and others] in the nature of a qui tarn suit, founded on the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 7th sections of the act of February 3, 1831 (4 Stat. 436), relating to copyrights. At the trial, a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, for the sum fixed by the 7th section of the act, subject to the opinion of the court, and the plaintiffs now moved for judgment on the verdict.</p>

This was a suit brought to recover the interest due on several bonds of the county of Allegheny, which had been issued in. aid of certain railway companies, and under authority or pretence of authority of statutes of Pennsylvania, giving the county power to take stock in them. The railways ran to other counties, and even into other states.

The defendant, being sheriff of the county of Penobscot, had placed in his hands for collection, an execution issued on a judgment recovered by the Bangor House Proprietary against the plaintiff. He had also placed in his hands for collection an execution issued on a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the Bangor House Proprietary.

These were bills in equity, filed [by Charles A. Wood and others, executors of James-Wood, deceased] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 8,427] for “Improvement in the manufacture of nuts,” granted to Joseph P. Haigh, Andrew Hart-upee, and John Morrow, assignees of William Kenyon, October 14, 1851, reissued to-them March 18, 1856, assigned and reissued to James Wood, February 15, 1859 [No. 666], and extended for seven years from October-14, 1865;…

The will of Dr. Gideon Jaquex, of the state ■of Delaware, contains the following provisions: “I give and bequeath unto my friend, John S. Newlin, of the city of Philadelphia, -the sum of three thousand dollars, upon this special trust—that is to say, to invest .the said sum of three thousand dollars in the names of my grandchildren, Edward Denny, Gideon J. Denny, Henry Denny, Martha Anne Denny, Alfred Denny, and Oswald Denny, in the purchase of lands in the territory of…

Bill in equity brought by the plaintiffs [Joshua B. Wood and others], as holders of the bank notes of the Hallowell and Augusta Bank, against the defendants LJere-miali Dummer and others], as stockholders in the same bank, for payment of the same notes upon the ground of an asserted fraudulent division of the capital stock of the bank by the stockholders.

<p>Case No. 17,946.</p> <p>Debt on Replevin Bond—Sufficiency of Pleas.</p> <p>In an action of debt upon a replevin bond, setting forth the condition and averring special breaches, the plea of general performance is a bad plea; so is the plea of non damnifieatus; so is the plea that the plaintiff had no property in the goods replevied; so is the plea of nul tiel record if no record is averred in the declaration; and so is a plea to the whole declaration, which is an answer to a part only.</p>

<p>[This was a suit by Jethro Wood’s administrator against Amos and Daniel Gold.]</p>

This was an action for money had and received by the defendant from the plaintiff [Thomas J. Wood] in part, and in part from the plaintiff’s assignors. The city received the moneys sued for as the consideration of certain bonds issued by it, and antedated so as to evade the local registration act of March, 1872, which was construed in Anthony v. Jasper County [Case No. 4S8]. Apparently the bonds were valid.

In admiralty. In this case John E. Wood libels the tug for the amount of $104.24, the price of coal furnished the tug while it was owned by C. H. Hostetter. The tug was soon afterwards purchased by Brillinger, the present claimant and owner. The law of Virginia gives a lien to material men upon domestic vessels.

<p>[Proceeding by Wood, Grant & Wood against Luse & Niles.]</p>

Bill in equity to set aside a certain conveyance, made by the plaintiff [Josiah Wood, Jr.] to one John R. Adams (a defendant), asserted to have been procured by fraud and imposition upon the plaintiff.

Bill in equity [by Josiah Wood, Jr., against Samuel H. Mann], The answer of the defendant was excepted to for impertinence, and referred to a master, who reported, that the answer, being a general answer to the whole bill on the merits, was impertinent in an allegation, which traversed and put in issue the citizenship of the plaintiff alleged in the bill. The defendant filed an exception to the report on this point.

Bill in equity' [by Josiah Wood, Jr., against Samuel H. Mann and others] to set aside a certain conveyance made by the complainant to one John R. Adams (a defendant,) asserted to have been procured by fraud and imposition, upon the plaintiff. The case has already been twice before the court, on interlocutory motions [Cases Nos. 17,951 and 17,952], and was set down for a hearing, at the next September adjournment of the court.

[This was a hill in equity by Josiah Wood; Jr., against Samuel H. Mann, John R. Adams, and others.] In this ease, which bad been, several times before the court [Oases Nos. 17,951, 17,952, and 17,903], a sale of certain real estate, mentioned in the bill and proceedings, having been made by the master, pursuant to a decretal order of the court, the biddings were ordered by the court to be re-opened, by a decretal order of the 9th of December, 1837; and, in pursuance of the…

This was an action [by John Wood, Jr., against Philo A. Matthews] originally commenced in one of the subordinate courts of Vermont, held by a justice of the peace, and was removed into this court, at the instance of thq defendant, by a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, under the act of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. 633, § 3). It was an action of trespass for taking and detaining a certain horse belonging to the plaintiff.

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent for an “improvement on the mode of operating brakes for cars,” granted to Nehemiah Hodge, October 2, 1849, re-issued March 1, 1853, extended to him for seven years from October 2, 1863, and by mesne assignments vested in complainant -within and for the territory within which the defendant’s road was operated.

<p>Case No. 17,959.</p> <p>Shipping Articles — Construction — Ports op • Call—Pohfeiture op Seaman’s Wages—Absence—Confinement for Misbehavior.</p> <p>1. Where shipping articles authorise the master to touch at certain intermediate ports, “or ns he may direct,’’ it is no violation of his contract with the seamen to stop at a place not named, and affords no justification to them for leaving the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Moslem, Case No. 9,875; Magee v. The Moss, Id. 8,944.)</p> <p>2. To justify the forfeiture of a seaman’s wages for absence, under the provisions of the act of 20th July, 1790 [1 Stat. 131], it is indispensable that there be an entry in the log book of the fact, of the name of the seaman, and of his having gone without leave.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin, Case No. 7,357.)</p> <p>3. Where a seaman is appointed to act as mate of a vessel, by the master, during the voyage, he may be removed by the master for incompetency, and is not entitled to any other wages than those originally contracted for.</p> <p>4. Whore a seaman is imprisoned for misbe-haviour, he does not forfeit the wages accruing during his confinement.</p> <p>[Cited in The David Pratt, Case No. 3,597.)</p>

<p>This was a libel claiming to recover from the brig wages alleged to be due the libel-ant from the 20th of March, 1840, to the month of October in the same year, for a voyage from New York to Hamburg and back, for which voyage he had signed the ship’s articles for wages at the rate' of $25 per month. The libelant was first mate, and the vessel arrived at Hamburg in the month of May, 1840, where the libelant alleged he was turned off by the master of the vessel. But, as it appeared in the evidence, the master did not turn him out of the vessel, but degraded him from the rank of mate to that of a man before the mast. It appeared, from the deposition of the American consul at Hamburg, that in July, 1840, Wood called at the consul’s office, and complained that the captain of the vessel had ordered the cook not to give him any thing to eat, and that, in consequence, he left the vessel. The consul then summoned the master of the vessel before him, and he admitted that he had given the order complained of, in consequence of Wood’s conduct. He also stated that he had ordered Wood to go back to the vessel, not in his capacity of mate, but as a man before the mast, and in such capacity to come home in the vessel. This Wood refused to do, and now claimed his full wages up to the time the vessel arrived at New York, and also $50 for his passage home, and $20 for his expenses at Hamburg while he was waiting to get an opportunity to return here,—being in all $178.</p> <p>Counsel for the plaintiff contended that a master of a vessel has no right to thus degrade his mate in a foreign port, and leave him no choice but to submit to the degradation or come home in some other vessel.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,961.</p> <p>Marine Insurance—Deviation on Voyage—Justification.</p> <p>1. An insurance was effected on the cargo of the Actress, from New Xorli to New Orleans; and after she passed Havana, she returned to that port, on the plea of a deficiency of water, when, by order of the .government, the cargo was landed and put into the custom-house stores; the vessel not being permitted to depart with her cargo. The American consul sold the cargo; and the plaintiff claimed, in this suit, to recover the amount of the loss sustained by the sale. The certificate of the collector of Havana, under the seal of his office, of the arrival of the vessel at that place for water, and that before permission to take it on board was given to the captain, he was obliged to stipulate that the cargo should be landed, the articles composing it being wanted for the use of the place, is not evidence, as the deposition of the collector to these facts should have been taken.</p> <p>2. If the necessity produced by the want of water really and fairly existed, a sufficiency for the voyage having been taken on board at New York, and Havana was the nearest port, a deviation was justifiable.</p>

<p>[This was. a libel by R. D. Wood and Walter Wood against the schooner Sallie C. Morton, for the non-delivery of freight.)</p>

<p>Case No. 17,965.</p> <p>Slavery—Presumption op Freedom—Statute op Limitations — Absence prom State — Duress—Res Judicata.</p> <p>[1. Freedom, being the natural right of man, and the constitution of Ohio declaring that all men are born equally free, and that servitude shall not exist in the state, the presumption is that a person who has for several years resided in Ohio is free)</p> <p>[2. Where a cause of action arose in Ohio, and immediately afterwards plaintiff, while temporarily in another state, was seized and imprisoned, sold into slavery, and carried into another state, held, that if, upon emancipation, she returned to Ohio as soon as she could, and if, during her absence, she did not reside in the same states with the defendant, the statute of limitations did not commence to run against her until her return to the state)</p> <p>[3. Under the Ohio statute, if, when a cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the state, the period of limitation does not begin to run until he comes into the state)</p> <p>[4. In order to set the statute to running in favor of a defendant, who was out of the state when the cause of action accrued, his coming into the state must either be of a permanent character, or, if not so, it must be brought to plaintiff’s knowledge; or, if not, then his stay must be of such a nature that plaintiff by ordinary reasonable diligence can ascertain it)</p> <p>[5. The statute of limitations of a state does not run against one who, immediately upon coming within the state, is east into prison, and detained there during her stay.]</p> <p>[6. An adjudication by a court of one state against a plaintiff in an action to establish her right to freedom, after being imprisoned as a slave, does not preclude a court of another state, in a subsequent action for damages for abduction and the value of services while held as a slave, from examining the question whether the first suit was in fact brought by the plaintiff herself, or by some other person in her name and without her knowledge or consent.]</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,500.</p> <p>[For opinion on motion for new trial, see Case No. 17,966.]</p>

<p>On motion for new trial.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Charles B. Wood against Wells, Crittenden & Co.] Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 53,075] for an “improvement in landau carriage-doors,” granted to Frederick Wood, March 6, 1866.

[This was a suit by Benjamin Wood against William Williams.] On the 23d May, 1834, a rule was granted on the defendant, to show cause why process should not be issued to repeal his patent, for a certain machine for hulling and clearing clover seed; under the provisions of the tenth section of the act of congress of 21st February, 1793,— 1 Story’s Laws, 303 [1 Stat. 323], Meredith, for plaintiff. The affidavit of the plaintiff, on which the rule was granted, was read. .

This was an action on a promissory note for $1,144, bearing date May 23, 1853, made by ü. P. Coonrod, payable to Robert Crum, or bearer, thirty months after date, with interest after six months, and indorsed by the payee to .the plaintiffs.

<p>Case No. 17,970.</p> <p>Patents fok Inventions—Planing Machines— Anticipation—Abandonment of Invention.</p> <p>1. The question as to what constitutes an abandonment of an invention, considered.</p> <p>2. The improvement in planing machines, by which flat bars are placed before and behind the cutters, to keep the stock firm during the ■operation, instead of rollers previously used, for which letters patent No. 138,462 were granted to Joseph P. Woodbury, April 29, 1873, was not new, having been anticipated by the Anson machine.</p> <p>3. A feature in a machine, anticipating the invention described in the patent in suit, will none the less anticipate such invention, because the inventor of such anticipating feature had not in view or did not understand the particular advantage of, or function performed by the anticipating feature.</p> <p>[This case was taken by appeal to the supreme court, and the decision was there affirmed. 101 ü. S. 479.]</p>

<p>This was an action on the case for a violation of a patent right of the plaintiff for splitting leather. The cause was tried at this term before Story, J., in the absence of the district judge. The plaintiff [John Woodcock], at the trial, produced his letters patent, dated 8th May, 1809, securing to him the patent right of a machine for splitting leather. The defendants [David Parker and another] admitted the use of a similar machine, but contended that the machine was the invention of one Samuel Parker, (under 'whom they claimed, who had obtained his original letters patent for the same invention, dated-the 9th July, 1808, and letters patent for certain improvements therein, dated the 26th of April, 1809. The principal questions between the parties were: (1) Whether Woodcock or Parker was the first inventor of the machine in controversy, and entitled to the patent. (2) Whether, admitting the plaintiff to be the original inventor of the machine, in its present improved state, his patent was not too broad, and did not include machinery previously invented and applied to the same purpose by the said Parker.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,972.</p> <p>Involuntauy Bankruptcy—Sufficiency of Petition-Number of Petitioners.</p> <p>1. Creditors whose claims are under two hundred and fifty dollars are not to be counted in computing the number who must unite in an involuntary petition, if one-fourth of the creditors whose claims are above that sum join in the petition.</p> <p>2. In computing the amount, all the claims must be counted irrespective of the amount.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Broich, Case No. 1,921; Re Lloyd, Id. 8,429.]</p> <p>3. A party may purchase a claim in good faith, in order to join in an involuntary petition and make the necessary number.</p> <p>4. If the sale of a claim is void for fraud or want of consideration, the claim is to be deemed to belong to the assignor.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,974.</p> <p>Difference between Preventive and Remedial Justice—County Bonds—Doubtful Validity.</p> <p>1. A court will frequently issue process to prevent acts being done on the ground that they are unauthorized, which same acts, after they are done, the court will enforce as having been made in pursuance of authority sufficiently given.</p> <p>2. Ex. gr. It will hold a county bound to pay bonds actually issued and negotiated by it under an authority assumed from an ambiguously and ill expressed statute—although had any citizen of the county applied for an injunction to restrain the issue on the ground of want of authority clearly given by the statute, the court would have granted such preventive remedy.</p> <p>[Cited in Lewis v. Shreveport, Case No. 8,-331; Memphis v. Brown, Id. 9,415.]</p>

This was an application to discharge the defendant from custody under a capias ad satisfaciendum, and was submitted to the court upon a statement of the facts, as follows: William Wagner, residing in Philadelphia, drew a bill upon Woodhull & Davis, presiding in New York. It was accepted and paid at maturity .by the acceptors.

<p>Case No. 17,976.</p> <p>Lien on Fessel—Advances in Foreign Port-Limitation op Master’s Authority—Jurisdiction op English Admibaltt.</p> <p>1. The barque W., a British vessel, bound from Montevideo to New York, put into St. Thomas, a Danish port, in distress. The master applied to N. & Co., merchants there, to do the business of the vessel. The cargo was discharged, some of it was found to be damaged’ and was sold, and the rest was reshipped on the vessel, after she had been repaired. Her repairs took about two months. For the balance of the amount claimed by N. & Co. for services and expenses for the vessel and her cargo, after deducting the proceeds of cargo sold, N. & Co. received from the master drafts on his owners, each containing on its face the words, “place to account of disbursements of barque W. and cargo, at this port, and recoverable against the vessel, freight and cargo.” The owners of the vessel had written to the master, from St. John, New Brunswick, a letter containing these words: “As soon as H. & P. heard of the disaster, they wrote you to draw on them for funds to pay for your repairs, and sent letters to S. & Oo. to show their standing. With these we doubt not you will be able to obtain your funds cheaply, and thereby avoid the great expense of a bottomry: or, if it could be done better, draw on us, either payable here or In New York, in gold.” H. & P. were the agents in New York of the owners of the vessel. S. & Co. had refused to furnish the funds, and N. & Co. had agreed to raise them by bottomry and respon-dentia, before this letter arrived. On its arrival, the agreement for bottomry and respondentia was given up, and a conditional agreement to take the master’s drafts on the owners of the vessel was made. N. & Co. then offered to sell the proposed drafts to P. & Co., showing them the above passage in the letter of the owners. F. & Co. thereupon declined to buy the drafts, unless the master would put in the clause making them recoverable against vessel, freight and cargo. This was done, and P. & Co. then bought the drafts of N. & Co., at 2% per cent, discount, paying for them in cash. P. & Co., on the arrival of the vessel in New York, filed a libel against her to recover the amount of the drafts: Held, that the authority of the master to pledge the vessel to raise money for the repairs, was, by the letter of the owners, expressly limited to a pledge by way of bottomry; and that, as that letter was shown to P. & Co., they took the drafts with knowledge that the master was exceeding his powers in putting the hypothecation of the vessel into the drafts, and that P. & Co., therefore, had no lien on the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Columbus, Case No. 3,044; The Wexford, 7 Fed. 679; The William Cook, 12 Fed. 920; Stephenson v. The Francis. 21 Fed. 726: The Scotia, 35 Fed. 908: The Lykus, 36 Fed. 921; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 V. S. 450, 9 Sup. Ct. 475.]</p> <p>[Cited in Mitchell v. Chambers, 43 Mich. 164, 5 N. W. 67.]</p> <p>2. Whether the high court of admiralty in England would, under the 5th section of the act of May 17, 1861 (24 Viet. e. 10), take jurisdiction of a suit in rem against this British vessel to enforce a lien for necessaries furnished her in a Danish port, quaere.</p> <p>[This decree was affirmed by the circuit court (Case No. 17,977), and the decree of the latter court was affirmed by the supreme court (104 U. S. 180).]</p>

<p>[Appeal from district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>[This was a libel by J. H. Fechtenburg and another, trading as J. H. Fechtenburg & Co., against the British barque Woodland. There was a decree by the district court in favor of the vessel (Case No. 17,976), and libellants appeal.]</p>

[This was a bill by one Woodman against the Kilbourn Manufacturing Company to. enjoin it from constructing a dam across the Wisconsin river, cited Davis v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 14 N. Y. 526; 2 Story, Bq. Jur. § 927; Trustees of Water-town v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510; Corning v. Lowerre, 6 Johns.

This was an action on the case [by Charles T. Woodman against James C. Stimpson] tried by LuWELL, District Judge, and a jury, which was brought to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for an “improved machine for ornamenting leather,” granted to Charles T. Woodman, March 29, 1804.

<p>[This was an action in replevin by the Walter A. Wood M. & R. Co. against Lloyd Brooke, to recover the possession of certain machines.]</p>

<p>Bill in equity [by Woodman Pebbling-Machine Company against Charles H. Guild and others] for infringement of -letters-patent No. 42,136, date March 27, 1864, for ornamenting leather. The nature of the invention was stated to consist of producing the pebbled or boarded grain or finish on leather, by subjecting it to the pressure of a short revolving cylinder or roller, of steel or other suitable metal, having the desired design or figure engraved on its periphery; also of certain mechanical devices for managing the roller, and accomplishing the object with rapidity and cheapness.</p> <p>The following is an extract from the descriptive portion of the schedule annexed to the letters-patent:—“A is a wooden table, about four feet and six inches long and five inches wide, the two ends of which slide up and down freely in vertical slots in the uprights, G and H, as shown in Pig. 1. The upper surface of this table, on which the leather to be ‘boarded’ or ‘pebbled’ is placed, is the arc of a circle whose centre is at J, at the top of the pendulum I. This table, when the roller Z is going back over it, is lowered, and rests on three strips of rubber WWW placed upon the stationary beam B, the extremities of which are framed into the uprights G and H. The rubber strips W are also designed to prevent noise and jar when the table descends.” The claim was as follows;—“I do not claim embossing by means of two or more cylinders working together; but what I do claim as new, and desire to secure by letters-patent, is: First. Boarding or pebbling skins or leather by means of a single short cylinder rolling over a table, with requisite pressure, substantially as described. I also claim raising and lowering the table A by means of the toggles Q, arm S, spring U, arm T, and cam P, or their equivalent, substantially as set forth, and for the purpose described.”</p>

An appeal from a decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant letters patent to Andrew Woodruff for an improvement in harrows.

<p>offered to plead a breach of covenant on the part of the plaintiff in bar of the action, and contended that the covenants were dependent.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,986.</p> <p>Costs in Patent Cases — Models and Copies — Pees op Witnesses.</p> <p>1.The words “pursuant to law,” in the act of February 26, 1853 [10 Stat. 161], are equivalent to the word “summoned.” in the act of February 2S. 1799 [1 Stat. 624], and, in both cases, import that witnesses who attend without being summoned, are voluntary witnesses, whose fees can not be taxed against the losing party.</p> <p>[Cited in Spaulding v. Tucker, Case No. 13,-221; Haines v. McLaughlin, 29 Fed. 70. Disapproved in The Vernon, 36 Fed. 116: Dennis v. Eddy, Case No. 3,793; U. S. v. Sanborn, 28 Fed. 303.]</p> <p>[Cited in Alexander v. Harrison, 2 Ind. Apji. ■52. 28 N. E. 121; Meagher v. Van Zandt (Nev.) 2 Pac. 58.]</p> <p>2.If a witness, whose residence is not at the place of holding court, is summoned at the place of trial, he is allowed mileage for returning to his home, but not for coming to the court: and by a liberal construction of the statute, return travel has been allowed, even beyond the limits of the district for which the court was held.</p> <p>[Cited in Burrow v. Kansas Citv, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 54 Fed. 2S2.]</p> <p>3. Models of the invention described in the plaintiff’s patent, and procured by the defendant in good faith, may be included in the taxation of costs, but not other models.</p> <p>[Cited in Wooster v. Handy. 23 Fed. 62. Followed in Cornelly v. Markwald, 24 Fed. 187. Cited in Ryan v. Gould, 32 Fed. 754.]</p> <p>4. Copies of patents, either that of the plaintiff or others, procured by the defendant, can not be taxed as costs to the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,986a.</p> <p>Detinue—When Lies.</p> <p>1. Detinue lies against a person who has quitted the possession of property prior to the institution of suit.</p> <p>'2. If a defendant has been legally evicted, or returned the property before suit, this will bar the action.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,987.</p> <p>Vessel in Pout—Lien fok Supplies.</p> <p>Where cordage and other materials are furnished, at the instance of the owner, to a vessel not on a voyage, but lying within the body of a county, no lien on the vessel is created, so as to affect her in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, without notice.</p> <p>[The decree was affirmed by the circuit court on appeal. Case No. 17,988.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Georgia.] [This was a libel by Woodruff & Brant and others against the ship Levi Dearborne to enforce an alleged lien for… Held: that suit may be maintained in the admiralty for seamen’s wages, though the agreement was made on land. Rolle, Abr. 533, 2 Bac. Abr. 181. In Hilary term, 8 Car.

<p>Case No. 17,989.</p> <p>Patents — Priority of Invention — Effect of Caveat.</p> <p>[1. When a caveat is not general enough in its terms to cover a principle or a class, but is precise and definite in every detail of an agreement and combination of parts, which are severally familiar, and the patentability of the invention depends on the particular combination alone, the caveator cannot, after applying for a patent not varying in any respect from the caveat, claim that the caveat protected anything more.)</p> <p>[2. A caveat will protect only one of several distinct patentable subjects falling within its general scope, though in connection with other circumstances it may furnish strong proof of his claim to priority in another invention in the same line.)</p>

<p>Case No. 17,990.</p> <p>Acts of Bankruptcy—Negotiable Papek—Sus-pension of Payment—Procurement of Judgment.</p> <p>1. The owner of oil lands, who divides it into leaseholds and receives the rent in oil, is not a trader within the meaning of the bankrupt law [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)], inasmuch as he deals only in the products of his land. Hence, he does not commit an act of bankruptcy by any suspension of payment of his negotiable paper for a period of fourteen days, however multiplied the transactions of his business through the leases, and however extended his credits.</p> <p>[Cited in Gardner v. Cook, Case No. 5,226.]</p> <p>2. Although the assets of a debtor may be rightly estimated, at four times the amount of his debts, yet he is insolvent if unable to meet his engagements as they accrue and become due.</p> <p>3. The procuring or suffering a judgment to be obtained against him by a debtor, without giving any warrant of attorney, is not in itself an act of bankruptcy; yet. if he directly or indirectly assists or facilitates the obtaining of judgment on which an execution has followed. this may be evidence in support of an alie-gation that he has committed an act of bankruptcy by procuring or suffering his property to be taken in execution.</p>

Petition for review of appointment of as-signee in bankruptcy. O’Fallon & Hatch were adjudged bankrupts in the United States district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, on the petition of Archie Woods et al., creditors of said bankrupts. The usual warrant in bankruptcy was issued and a meeting of the creditors called thereunder for the purpose of electing an assignee.

<p>Case No. 17,993.</p> <p>Statute—Repeal by Implication—Conveyance of State Lands—Record.</p> <p>1. The provisions of a statute, so far as they are inconsistent with those of a subsequent statute relating to the same subject-matter, are by implication, if not expressly, repealed by tlie later statute.</p> <p>2. Under the resolve of the legislature of New Hampshire, approved June 22, 1831, conveyances of state lands by a land commissioner may be recorded in tbe office of the secretary of state at any time, and take effect only on being so recorded.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,992.</p> <p>Bankrupt Act—Jurisdiction op Circuit Court.</p> <p>The circuit court has not jurisdiction of suits brought by the assignee of the bankrupt, simply to collect the assets assigned.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodall v. Tuttle, Case No. 5,533; Smith t. Crawford, Id. 13,030.]</p> <p>Suit by the assignee of Tesson & Co., bankers, to collect a debt due by the defendant to the bankrupts prior to the bankruptcy. Pleas; general issue and set off. Demurrer to special pleas.</p>

<p>Case No. 17,994.</p> <p>Continuance—Absent Witness.</p> <p>The court will not continue a cause for the absence of a witness, who has been summoned, if no attachment has been moved for. if the witness resides within one hundred miles of this place, although he resides out of this district.</p> <p>[Cited in Park v. Willis, Case No. 10,716; Lewis v. Mandeville, Id. 8,326.]</p> <p>[The judgment of the court was affirmed on appeal to the supreme court. 4 Cranch, 237.]</p>

The town council of Harrisonburg in Rock-ingham, county, Virginia, had been elected under the laws of the state at the regular town election during the war, and some time before its termination, the town and county being part of the recognized state of Virginia, and within the Confederate military lines of occupation.

<p>[This was an action by C. A. Woodsum, as-signee in bankruptcy, against Frank Bray and Isaac N. Thompson.]</p>

<p>[Proceedings in the matter of William S. Woodward, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>[Proceedings in the matter of "William S. Woodward; a bankrupt. For prior proceedings, see Case No. 18,000.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,002.</p> <p>County Bonds — Validity — Aiding Railroad Construction—Consent op Electors—Second Election — Constitutional Provision— R eqo-tiability op Bonds.</p> <p>1. It is now too well settled to be controverted, that the legislature may authorize a county or other municipal corporation to aid in the building of a railway in which the inhabitants are interested; and .that such authority may be given with or without the assent of the qualified electors of such municipality, unless there be some provision in the constitution denying or limiting this power.</p> <p>2. The legislature of Mississippi authorized the board of police of Calhoun county to subscribe for stock in a railway company, provided, that there should be an election first held in that county, at which the question should be submitted to the qualified electors. And the act provides that, in case said election should result favorably, the subscription should be made;- and in case a majority of the votes be cast against the subscription, the same shall not be made. Under the act, an election was held in 1860, and a majority voted against subscription. In 1869, the board of police again submitted the question to the voters; and at that election, a majority voted for subscription. Held, that the first election did not exhaust the power of the board to subscribe; that the manifest meaning of the act was to authorize the subscription on an approving vote whenever it should be had; that the voters of the county, in this matter, like individuals in making similar contracts, were not bound finally by a rejection of the proposition; that circumstances might change so as to justify a change in their action; and that in acting on a proposition to subscribe, the voters might deliberate, reject at one time, and accept at another. Citing Society for Savings v. New London. 29 Conn. 174: Smith v. Clark Co. [54 Mo. 58): Woods v. Lawrence Co., 1 Black [66 U. S.) 386.</p> <p>3. Nor did it affect the validity of the second election, that by the constitution in force in I860, only whites were allowed to vote, and that when the last election was held freedmen were legal voters.</p> <p>4. Nor is it any objection to such second election, that nine years had passed since the power to hold it was granted. Whatever might have been the effect in times of peace, the civil war which ensued soon after the power was granted, and the consequent disorganization of business, etc., in the state, justified the delay.</p> <p>5. The act authorizing Calhoun county to sjib-seribe for stock in the railroad company was passed in 1860; an election was held in October. 1869, at which a majority of the voters assented to the subscription. The new constitution of the state, which prohibits the legislature from authorizing cities, counties, and towns from giving such aid unless upon assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters, was ratified by a popular vote under the reconstruction laws of congress, on the 1st of December. 1869, and the subscription of the stock for the county was actually made on the books of the railway company, on the 1st of January, 1870; and the state was admitted to representation in congress on tue 17th of February, 1870. Held, that the new constitution did not apply, because, (1) it did not abrogate prior authorities already granted by the legislature, but only prohibited the granting of such authority thereafter; (2) because the new constitution had not on the 1st of January, 1870, taken effect, as to that clause of it which prohibits the granting of such authorities except on terms prescribed. Citing Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; State v. Union Tp.. 8 Ohio St. 394; State v. Sullivan Co., 51 Mo. 531; Kansas City. St. J. & C. B. R. Co. v. Alderman, 47 Mo. 349; State v. Nodaway Co. Ct., 48 Mo. 339; State v. Macon Co., 41 Mo. 453.</p> <p>6. The said clause of the constitution in relation to municipal subscriptions, does not apply where a debt has already been created for subscription to a railway company; and the legislature might, after the new constitution went into effect, authorize a county to issue its bonds in payment of such debt,' and that without submitting the question to the people.</p> <p>7. The act of 1871. which authorized the issuance of the bonds to pay the county subscriptions to the railway company, directed that the bonds so issued should be made payable to “the president and directors of the railroad company, and their successors and assigns.” The bonds issued were made payable to “the railroad company, or bearer.” Held, that the power granted was sufficiently pursued, and that the bonds so issued were valid; that it was the intention of the legislature to authorize the issuance of bonds which were negotiable, and which, in the hands of innocent holders, for value, would not come under the operation .of the statute which subjects innocent holders to the equities existing between the maker and the payee.</p> <p>8 When negotiable municipal bonds are issued, payable out of the state, or to bearer, they are unimpeachable in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, if there be a law authorizing their issuance. And if the act giving the authority annexes to its exercise certain conditions, and the bonds on their face recite that these conditions have been complied with, then the municipality, on being sued on the bonds by an innocent holder for value, is estopped to deny the truth of the recital.</p> <p>NOTE. The act of 1860, is as follows: “The board of police of the several counties, Yallo-busha. Calhoun, etc., through which the G. H. & E. B. B. may pass, may, for their respective counties, open (S’e) such conditions as they think proper, subscribe for capital stock not to exceed in amount two hundred thousand dollars, for any one county. Provided, however, that an election shall be held in the county for and on account of which stock is proposed to be subscribed by the qualified electors thereof, at the regular precincts of said county, twenty days notice of the time of holding such election, and of the amount proposed to be subscribed, and in what number of installments, being first given by the board of police: and if a.t said election a majority of the qualified electors voting shall be in favor of such subscription, then said board shall make such subscription for and in behalf of the county, for the amount specified by the president of said board of police. subscribing the amount so specified to the capital stock of said company, but if a majority of those voting shall be opposed to such subscription, the same shall not be made.” Section 1.</p> <p>The clause of the new constitution, referred-to, is as follows: “The legislature shall not authorize any counts, city, or town, to become a stockholder in, or to lend its credit to any company, association, or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or town, at „ special election, or regular election, to be held therein, shall assent thereto.” Section 14, art. 12.</p> <p>Section 4 of the act of 1871 is as follows: “That it shall and may be lawful for the hoard of supervisors” (formerly board of police) “of any county which shall have voted a tax as provided by this act, or of the act to which this act is amendatory” (i. e., act of 1860, supra), “to issue bonds due and payable at such time or times as said boards of supervisors may deem best for the tax-payers of their respective counties, not to extend beyond ten years from the date of issuance, for such sums as said boards of supervisors may deem necessary to meet, payoff and discharge the subscriptions of said counties. respectively, for capital stock in the G. H. & E. B. B. Go., which have been or which may hereafter be subscribed by said boards of supervisors, or by the boards of police (as the case may be), respectively, not to exceed the total sum of such slock subscriptions, which said bonds shall be signed by the president of the board of supervisors issuing the same, and be made payable to the president and directors of the G. H. & E. B. B. Go. and their successors and assigrs, and may be assigned, sold and conveyed with or witho it guarantee of payment by the said president and directors, or may be mortgaged in like manner at their discretion, as they may deem best for the company.”</p>

This was a bill in equity filed- to restrain the defendant [Christopher Dinsmore] from infringing letters patent [No. 16,700] for an “improvement in solar camera,” granted to complainant [David A. Woodward] February 24, 1857. and reissued July 10, 1806 [No. 2,311].

In the fall of 1862, the plaintiffs, who were merchants in Baltimore through their agent, Mr. Meyer, purchased and forwarded to that and other eastern cities from Memphis, Tennessee, considerable quantities of cotton, the transit being over the road of the defendant. At that time Dan.

This was a suit brought to recover the amount of costs in an action in New York, for which the defendant had agreed to be responsible. offered the deposition of Richard Riker, prothonotary of the court in New York, stating the amount of the costs taxed, and a copy of the bill of costs as taxed. objected that the judge who took the deposition had not certified the reasons of its being taken.

Action against the defendant as a common carrier, to recover the value of one hundred bales of cotton burned on the cars in transit. The statement of the case will be found in [Case No. 18,006.]

Bill in equity [by Joseph Woodward against L. P. Morrison and. others] to restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent [No. 52,779] for a paste for bookbinders, granted the complainant Feb. 20, 1866.

Assumpsit [by James Woodward and others against Sutton & Mandeville] for goods sold and delivered.

<p>The bill in this case was filed in June, 1847, and set forth the granting of the Woodworth patent, its extension for seven years from the 27th of December, 1842, and its re-issue on the 8th of July, 1845. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 646. It also set forth that, on the 25th of November, 1S45, the plaintiff [William W.] Woodworth, the patentee of the re-issued patent, conveyed to the plaintiff Gibson the exclusive right to the patent during the extension, for the city and county of Albany, N. Y., except the right to use two machines in Watervliet in that county; that on the same day. James G. Wilson, who, on the 9th of July, 1845, had become the assignee of the right under Woodworth for' the territory specified in the conveyance next mentioned, conveyed to the plaintiff [John] Gibson all the right to the patent, during the extension, .for the state of New York, excepting the exclusive right to run seven machines, in six specified places (none of them, however, in the county of Washington, N. Y.), in addition to the two machines in Watervliet, before excepted; that the defendant had had in operation for some time three Woodworth machines at Whitehall, Washington county, N. Y., and dressed large quantities of lumber with, them, and sold it in Albany and Troy, and had had and still had' depositaries in those cities and elsewhere, for the sale of such dressed lumber; that the plaintiff Gibson had a large and expensive establishment at Albany for running and making the Wood-worth machines and selling them and the lumber dressed by them, and his licensees had large establishments of the same kind at Troy and other places in the state of New York, the whole being of the value of not less than $200,000; that the operations of these establishments had been materially injured by the defendant’s acts, and that the defendant claimed the right to do as he had done, under a license from the plaintiff Woodworth, given on the 4th of July, 1843.</p> <p>The license, which was set forth in the bill and was under seal, was executed by both Woodworth and the defendant, recited that the defendant desired a license to construct and use the Woodworth machines in the county of Washington, “on the conditions hereinafter mentioned,” and then gave the defendant permission to construct and use six of the planing machines in the county of Washington, N. Y., and not elsewhere, during the extension, “and also, within said limits, to dispose of the plank or other things dressed and prepared in the said machines.” The license then provided that Woodworth should not permit any other person than the defendant to construct or use the machine within the county of Washington, and further. that the defendant “shall not, nor will, during the term aforesaid, construct or use more than six machines as aforesaid within the limits above mentioned, nor construct or use any such machines, nor sell and dispose of any plank or other thing dressed and prepared in such machines, anywhere else within the United States and the territories thereof.” The license concluded as follows: “It is understood that said Cook has all the rights I have, in the county of Washington, under said patent, to use six machines, and no more.”</p> <p>The bill claimed that the defendant [William W. Cook], by vending the products of his machines out of the county of Washington, had violated the conditions and cove- j nants of his license and forfeited all his rights under it. The bill further set forth that, on the 20th of August, 1846, the plaintiff Wood-worth, by an instrument in writing, authorized and empowered the plaintiff Gibson, in the name of Woodworth or otherwise, to prosecute the defendant for the violation of the covenant and condition in the said license contained, and to recover from him such damages as he was liable to pay therefor, and to restrain him from further violating his covenant, and to receive to his own use all damages that might be recovered. The bill prayed for an account of profits, and an injunction against the further use of the machines, and that the license might be annulled. The answer admitted the running of three Woodworth machines by the defendant at Whitehall, and the sale by him, out of the county of Washington, of the lumber dressed by them. It insisted that the plaintiff Gibson could not have been injured by the defendant’s operations, unless the lumber dressed by the defendant would otherwise have gone to the machines of Gibson to be dressed; that the defendant had a right to sell his dressed lumber wherever he thought proper; that, in March, 183S, he and his brother acquired a right, through several mesne conveyances, by deed from William Woodworth, to use two of the Woodworth planing machines in Washington county, for the residue of the original fourteen years, and that they at the same time bought two of the machines and put them in use at Whitehall, and had used them there ever since; that, at the time the license of the 4th of July, 1S43, was executed, it was actually agreed between the plaintiff Woodworth and the defendant, that the latter should possess the right to vend the products of the six machines without any restriction as to place, and the parties intended that the license should so provide, and understood that it did, and the last clause in it was inserted to effect that object; that the defendant had a right, at all events, to use the two machines so purchased by him and his brother, and to sell anywhere the lumber dressed by them; that the restriction insisted on by the plaintiffs was in restraint of trade, and void; that the patent did not grant to the patentee the exclusive right of selling the products of the machines, and he had no right to restrict their sale; that this court had no jurisdiction of the ease; that the bill did not show any joint interest of the plaintiffs in the relief prayed for; and that they had a_ perfect remedy at law. There was a replication to the answer, and the ease was heard on pleadings and proofs. The material parts of the evidence are stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>I. The objections to the bill, as set forth in the answer, are untenable. (I) This court has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the bill. The objection taken is that, if the bill is founded on the forfeiture or the breach of any covenant, this court has no jurisdiction. The answer is, that we are to consider the covenant as broken and set aside, and the bill as a bill for infringement, founded on the patent. Of a bill complaining of the unauthorized use of a patent right, and praying an account and injunction, a state court has no jurisdiction, even by consent. Act July 4, 1836. § 17 (5 Stat. 124); Dudley v. Mayliew, 3 Comst. [3 N. Y.] 9. (2) Woodworth, the patentee, is properly joined as plaintiff with Gibson, his assignee for the territory where the injury is alleged to have been done: the lumber dressed by the defendant’s machines having, contrary to the license from Woodworth, been sold in Gibson’s territory. Act July 4, 1836, § 14; Whittemore v. Cutter [Case No. 17,600]; Woodworth v. Wilson, 4 How. [45 TJ. S.] 712, 716. (3) The plaintiffs have not an adequate remedy at- law. They pray that the defendant’s license be declared void, and for an account and an injunction; for all of which they have a manifest right to come into a court of equity.</p> <p>II. The planing of lumber in Whitehall, for sale elsewhere, was contrary to the terms and true meaning of the license. The last sentence of the instrument does not contradict the prior explicit restriction as to disposing of the dressed lumber. Whatever was authorized to be done by the last sentence, was to be done “in the county of Washington.” It expressly relates to using the machines, and was inserted for abundant caution, to show that Woodworth reserved no rights to himself in the county. To allow such a general expression to overrule an explicit condition not mentioned or referred to in it, would violate the fundamental rules of construction. Co. Litt. 147a; Story, Cont. (2d Ed.) § 639.</p> <p>III. The allegation in the answer, that the parties intended by the contract something different from what is expressed in it, is nugatory, and the oral evidence given in its support should be rejected. (1) Parol evidence is inadmissible to add to, defeat or vary the terms of a written instrument, especially where, as in the present case, an instrument in writing is required by law to give effect to the contract. Act July 4, 1830, §11; 3 Starkie, Ev. pt. 4, pp. 100-102; 1 Phil. Ev. (C. & H. Ed.) 559; Rich v. Jackson, 4 Erown, Ch. 514; Sherman v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 1 Comst. [1 N. Y.] 310; Norton v. Woodruff, 2 Comst. [2 N. Y.] 153. (2) The construction of a written contract, or the presumption arising from it, can no more be varied by parol evidence, than can its terms. Creery v. Holly, 14 Wend. 26, 30; Hull v. Adams, 1 Hill. 001. (3) There is no pretence of any latent ambiguity in the instrument. If there be any ambiguity, it is patent, and cannot be explained by oral evidence. Story, Cont. (2d Ed.) § 077. (4) If there was any mistake or fraud in the license, Cook should have filed his bill against Woodworth, to be relieved from his contract, or to reform it according to the intention of the parties. He cannot be permitted to claim under it as it is, and then, when sued for its violation, alter some of its provisions by parol evidence. (5) Especially can he not be permitted to do this against Gibson, an innocent third person, who, on the faith of the records of the patent office, has for years conducted his business under the patent, and has incurred the expense of this prosecution.</p> <p>IV. The license was, by its terms, granted on certain conditions, one of which has been violated by Cook. The violation of this condition was a forfeiture of the license. Story, Cont. §§ 2S, 29; Com. Dig. “Condition,” B. C.</p> <p>I. The defendant had a right to use, without restriction, the two machines bought by him in 1838; and the plaintiffs can, in any event, reach only the third machine.</p> <p>II. The license does not restrict the defendant as to the place of selling the lumber dressed in the machines. And, even if it does, it is not a condition on which his title depends, but merely a covenant, for a breach of which the parties injured must obtain relief by damages. Courts will not create a condition by construction, when the consequence is to be a forfeiture; but will sometimes construe a condition to be a covenant, in order to avoid' a forfeiture.</p> <p>III. But, if the license does restrict the place of sale, the proofs show that there was a mistake in the contract, and that the agreenieut was, there should be no restriction.</p> <p>IV. The court will, therefore, in a suit in equity, give such a construction to the license as the parties intended it to receive; especially will they do so where a different decision will work a forfeiture. Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 8 Wheat. [21 U. S.] 174.</p> <p>V. The bill is defective for the reasons set forth in the answer.</p>

This was a bill in equity, praying for an injunction against the use, by the respond-dent, of the planing machine invented by William Woodworth. The plaintiff claimed to be possessed of Woodworth’s rights, and also Emmons’s under a like patent. The answer of the respondent [Hiram Curtis] admits the use of one of said machines in Boston, in the county of Suffolk, but insists on his authority to do it under a license from the proprietors of the patents for said machine.

This was a bill in chancery, praying for an injunction against the respondents [James Edwards and others] for using a planing machine, the patent for which was alleged to be vested in the plaintiffs [William w. Wood-worth and others].

This was a bill in -chancery, filed July 28, 1845, praying for an injunction against the defendants [Isaac Hall and another] not to use longer the planing machine invented and patented by William Woodworth; and for an account of profits from the use heretofore. The letters patent were alleged to have been issued to him as the inventor of that machine, December 27, 1828, for the term of fourteen .years.

In these cases, injunctions were granted at May term, 1845, and at May term, 1846; a motion was made, in the first-named ease, to dissolve the injunction.

This was a bill in equity, filed September 8, 1846. It averred, that the' plaintiffs possessed the title to the patent rights of William Wood-worth, Senior, to the planing machine alleged to have been invented by him. That the defendants were using one of said machines, or one substantially like them.

These were bills in equity, filed in the circuit court of the United States, in this dis■tract, to obtain injunctions against the defendants [Abraham P. Sherman, William A. Cheever, and eighteen others] in twenty suits, to restrain them from using or selling any planing machine, constructed substantially according to the specification under William Woodworth’s patent. See the ease of Wash-burn t. Gould [Case No. 17,214].

<p>Case No. 18,020.</p> <p>Joint Note—Merger —Judgment against One Prom i sor—J udicial Notice—Courts of General Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. A judgment obtained against Earl, in a suit against him, and the other two defendants, merges the instrument on which the action was founded.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Rose v. Comstock, 17 Ind. 6. Cited in Maghee v. Collins, 27 Ind. 85.]</p> <p>2. And such judgment may bé pleaded-in bar to an action on the instrument against one or all of the defendants.</p> <p>3. This court is presumed to know the laws of the respective states, and, consequently, that the circuit court of Wayne county, in Michigan, is a court of general jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Bennett v. Bennett, Case No. 1,318.)</p> <p>4. It is not necessary, therefore, in the plea setting up the judgment of the circuit court of Wayne, to aver that it had jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Earl v. Raymond, Case No. 4,243.]</p> <p>5. Where the note is joint the suit must be brought against all, and a joint responsibility must be shown, unless one or more of the promisors has been discharged by infancy, or by operation of law.</p>

This was the ease of a bill in equity, brought [by William W. Woodworth, administrator] for an infringement of what is commonly called “Woodworth’s Planing Machine.” The bill prayed for an injunction and other relief. Upon an interlocutory hearing a temporary injunction was granted by the district judge.

<p>Case No. 18,022.</p> <p>Patents—Sai.e op License—Forfeiture for Nonpayment of Purchase Money—Injunction.</p> <p>1. W. granted to .T. a license to use a patented machine, for which J. gave his five promissory notes, payable at different times, and J. agreed, in writing, that if any one of the notes should become due and be unpaid, the license should be void and should revert to W. Held, that the license was forfeited the moment one of the notes became due and was unpaid, and that it was optional with W. to resort to his remedy at common law to enforce the collection of the unpaid note, or to treat the rights of J. as forfeited, and apply for an injunction against the further use of the machine.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodyear v. Congress Rubber Co., Case No. 5,565; Cohn v. National Rubber Co., Id. 2,968. Approved in Abbett v. Zusi, Id. 7; McKay v. Smith, 29 Fed. 296; Hat Sweat Manuf’g Co. v. Porter, 34 Fed. 747; Washburn & M. Manuf'g Co. v. Cincinnati Barbed Wire Fence Co., 42 Fed. 677.]</p> <p>2. The stipulation as to forfeiture is to be considered as a double security given by J. to W. for the consideration money.</p> <p>3. Where, in such a case, W. applied for a provisional injunction, an order was made granting it, unless J. should within 60 days pay to W. the amount of the due and unpaid note, and his costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodyear v. Union India R. Co., Case No. 5,586.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Bickneii v. Todd, Case No. 1,3S9.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,024.</p> <p>Infringement op Patent—Speaking-Tube Whistles.</p> <p>The first claim of the letters patent granted, May 24, 1S70, to Thomas J. Woolcocks, for an “improvement in speaking-tube whistles,” namely, “in combination with the eylindrieally formed barrel A, the stem F, having the reacting spring G attached to it, and operating on the •outside of the barrel, as hereinbefore described, and for the purposes set forth,” is infringed by a combination consisting of the barrel, stem and spring, the spring being attached to the stem, and operating on the outside of the barrel, and the barrel being octagonal instead of cylindrical, the combination being, in all other respects, the same, and the octagonal form possessing all the advantages of. and being the equivalent of, the cylindrical form, as contradistinguished from the previous square form.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,026.</p> <p>Liabilities op Bank—Collection of Draft— Delivery of Bills of Lading.</p> <p>1. W., a banker at Indianapolis, sent to a bank at Buffalo a draft drawn on B., who resided in Buffalo, and bills of lading for some lumber, in a letter stating that he inclosed, for collection and remittance of proceeds, the draft and the bills of lading. The draft was drawn by 0. on B., and was payable 15 days after date, and was endorsed by M., and then, by special endorsement by W„ to the cashier of the bank, “for collection.” By the terms of the draft, the drawer, endorsers and acceptor waived presentment for payment and notice of protest and non-payment. The bills of lading set forth O. as the shipper of the lumber, and were dated at times two or three days prior to the date of the draft, and were endorsed by C., by M., and by W. The draft was accepted by B., and the bank delivered the bills of lading to him. B. failed before the maturity of the draft. The lumber had been sold by O. to B„ and the draft was for the purchase price, and was discounted by W. for C. on the security of the bills of lading, as collateral. By ordinary course, the lumber would reach Buffalo eight days before the maturity of the draft. W. brought suit against the bank to recover the amount of the draft, on the ground that the defendant violated its duty by delivering the bills of lading before the collection of the draft. Held, that the bank was not liable.</p> <p>' 2. The drawee was entitled to the bills of lading, on accepting the draft, as the draft was drawn on time.</p> <p>[Cited in Walters v. Western & A. R. Co., 63 Fed. 392.]</p>

A voyage was broken up by a seizure for the debts of the owner. A claim for the wages, pro tanto, to the time of seizure was brought forward and allowed. Two months’ pay in addition were also claimed, under a practice in such cases: damages for the seamen’s boarding and expenditures were also demanded.

<p>The following are the material facts in these two cases:</p> <p>No. 1: Mrs. [Gertrude J.] Woolfolk applied for an exemption of her husband’s land as a homestead for herself and children, and the cause came before the superior court by appeal. [Joseph E.] Murray, as trustee for her husband’s creditors, and certain of the creditors below, and on the appeal, objected to the setting apart of the homestead, upon the following grounds: First. Prior to her application, the husband was adjudged a bankrupt in the district court of the United States, and all his property, including this sought to be set apart as a homestead, by order of said United States district court, passed into the hands of the United States marshal, and he had it when this application was filed; and before the hearing before the ordinary, said property had been, according to the bankrupt act, conveyed to Murray, as trustee as aforesaid, which conveyance, by relation back, is older than this application, and therefore the ordinary had no jurisdiction over the matter. Second. Because the husband claimed the exemption allowed him under the bankrupt act, and had been allowed the same. These objections were demurred to. The demurrer was overruled, and that is assigned as error.</p> <p>No. 2: This was ejectment by [C. C.] Sims against Benjamin D. Bryan, for certain land in said county. It was admitted that defendant was in possession of the premises when the suit was begun, and yet that William Bryan was in possession and owned the premises on the 19th of December, 186S, and filed his petition to be adjudged a bankrupt on that day, and put this property in his schedule; that his wife knew that he intended making his application in bankruptcy when she filed her petition for-exemption of homestead, and that the premises would rent for four hundred dollars per annum. Plaintiff read in evidence a deed of assignment from Hasselton, register in bankruptcy, to Holtzelaw, made the 25th of January, 1869, conveying to Holtzelaw, as assignee, all William Bryan’s property, which he owned on the 19th of December, 1SG8. He then read in evidence a deed from Holtzelaw, assignee, to plaintiff, for said premises, made on the-day of -, 1869, and here the plaintiff closed. Defendant showed that, on the 16th of December, 186S, William Bryan’s wife applied for a homestead, etc., which was granted to her by the ordinary of said county, on the 28th of December, 1868. It was admitted that Holtzelaw and Sims (the purchaser at this sale) had actual notice at the time of the sale, that these premises had been set apart to Mrs. Bryan and her children as a homestead; that Benjamin D. Bryan was but her tenant; that she was the real defendant, and that William Bryan was not yet discharged in bankruptcy. Holtzelaw testified that he was not appointed assignee till after the 28th of December, 1868, and gave notice at the sale of this homestead, but stated also that the purchaser would get a good title, and plaintiff bid off the property at one thousand dollars. He further testified that William Bryan had two hundred and two and a half acres of land, including his dwelling and outhouses and personalty, worth in the aggregate two thousand six hundred dollars, allowed to him as exempt by the bankrupt register. Defendant’s counsel asked the court to charge the jury, that the judgment of the ordinary was conclusive as to Mrs. Bryan’s rights; that the deed of assignment to Holtzelaw conveyed only the right, title, and interest in the property which William Bryan had at the date of his application for bankruptcy, subject to, and affected by all the equities and incumbrances existing against it in the bankrupt’s hands, and this rule applies to purchasers at his sale. If this property had been set apart as a homestead before said assignee’s sale, the verdict should be for defendant. The court charged the jury, that the voluntary taking of the exemption by the bankrupt, under the bankrupt act, defeated the wife’s right to a homestead; that the petition in bankruptcy being filed first, the ordinary had no jurisdiction in the premises, and the purchaser, at the assignee’s sale, got a good title against the wife and children. The jury found for the plaintiff, for the premises in dispute, and one thousand two hundred dollars for mesne profits.</p> <p>Prior petition in bankrupt court ousted ordinary’s jurisdiction. Bankrupt Act 1867 (by Rice) p. 43; General Clause 34, p. 45; Clause 46; Code Ga. 1873, tit. “Homestead & Exemption,” § 2013; Act 1868. All bankrupt’s property passed to assignee from date of application. Rice, Manual, p. 49, els. 63, 64. Bankrupt law paramount to homestead provisions. Const. U. S. art. 7, § 2; Const. Ga. art. 11, § 1; James, Bankr. Law, 13; Am. Law T. (Jan., 1871) 14; In re Barrow [Case No. 1,057]; In re Black [Id. 1,457]; Scofield v. Moorhead [Id. 12,510]; Phipps v. Morrow [49 Ga. 37], last term. He elected his exemption. ' 41 Ga. 180; In re Askew [Case No. 585]. Ordinary had no jurisdiction. [Taylor v. Carryl] 20 How. [61 U. S.] 601; James, Bankr. Law, 13; Gay. 66; 30 Ga. 69; 13 Ga. 10; 7 Ga. 362; 12 Ga. 424; [Den v. Turner] 9 Wheat. [22 U. S.] 541; 11 Ga. 453; Lumpkin v. Eason [44 Ga. 339], this term.</p>

<p>2 [At a court of bankruptcy, held at the court-house in Catskill, in said district, on the 17th day of January, A. D. 181U, beiore Mr. THEODORE B. GATES, register of said court in bankruptcy:</p> <p>[On the 23d day of November, A. D. 1869, Edwin H. Crandell, the assignee in the above entitled matter [of Staats D. Woolford, a bankrupt], filed with the undersigned a written application for the examination of one George Titus, and Olive Woolford, wife of the said bankrupt, which said application was filed, with other papers, in the district clerk’s office, on the 2d day of December, A. D. 1869, and to which reference may be had. Such proceedings were thereupon had that an alias order was granted, returnable before me at the court-house in Catskill, on the 7th day of January, 1870, which said order is hereto attached.</p> <p>[On the return day of said order, said Olive Woolford appeared by James B. Olney, her attorney, and filed the certificate and affidavit, upon which the examination of said Olive Woolford was adjourned to the 17th day of January instant, when the said Olive Wool-ford appeared by her said attorney for the purpose of taking the objection, and did take the objection, that the bankrupt law does not give the register authority, nor does it vest in the court any power to require the wife of the bankrupt to appear and be examined, and that there were no sufficient grounds for such examination set out in the application for her examination. And her said attorney requested that such question might be certified to his honor the district judge, for his decision. And I do so certify it.]</p>

[Action by W. W. Woollen, administrator, against Peter P. Banker upon a promissory note. Upon a trial before Swing, J., and a jury, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff (case unreported). A motion for a new trial was heard by Mr. Justice SWAYNE.]

<p>Case No. 18,031.</p> <p>Lien on Vessel—Labohers and MaterialMen— Excavation' of Trench for Launching.</p> <p>1.A trench excavated in front of the launching ways of a ship, for the purpose of deepening the water, does not make a part of the launching ways, within the meaning of the act of the legislature of Massachusetts of 1855 (chapter 231).</p> <p>2. And though this was necessary for the launching of the vessel, yet as the trench remains to be used for other vessels, this was not, within the meaning of the act, labor performed in launching the vessel.</p> <p>3. The general objects of the act are to give to material men, mechanics and laborers, a lien for all the materials and labor which go into the ship, constitute any part of it, and make up its entire cost.</p> <p>[Cited in Young v. The Orpheus, 119 Mass. 184.]</p> <p>4. For this the law constitutes the ship a debtor, and it is what she naturally owes, and it would require the most express and unequivocal language to extend the lien beyond this natural limit.</p>

[This was a bill by John M. Woolsey against George C. Dodge and the directors of the Commercial Bank of Cleveland to enjoin the collection of a certain tax.]

<p>[In the matter of B. W. & J. H. Woolums, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.]</p> <p>Appeal in admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,035.</p> <p>Patent fob Ruffle—Improvement in Manufacture.</p> <p>1. A patent for a ruffle, to be made by machinery, cannot be sustained, where the ruffle is identical, in mechanical construction, with a ruffle before made, although the machinery, or the process it works, performs at one operation what before required more than one.</p> <p>[Cited in Excelsior Needle Co. v. Union Needle Co., 32 Fed. 224; Blumenthal v. Burrell. 43 Fed. 070; Risdon Iron & L. Works v. Med-art, 158 U. S. 83, 15 Sup. Ct. 751.]</p> <p>2. The product of a machine is not patentable merely because the machine makes an already known article more perfectly than it has been, or can be, made without a machine.</p> <p>[Cited in Holliday v. Pickhardt, 29 Fed. 800.]</p> <p>[For another case involving this patent, see Wooster v. Blake. 23 Fed. 40.]</p>

<p>[This was a suit by George H. Wooster against the Howe Machine Company. On motion for injunction)</p>

This was a final hearing in equity, on a bill Lby Emma C. Wooster against Jason Crane and others] founded on letters patent, issued October 20, 1863, for a design for a reel to contain ruffles, ladies’ dress trimmings and other goods, and consisting of two parallel discs of pasteboard connected by four bits of wood, on which the ruffle was wound between two pasteboard sides.

<p>Case No. 18,039.</p> <p>Extension of Patent—Rights of Licensee.</p> <p>W., during the first term of a patent for a folding guide for sewing machines, and while he was the sole owner of such patent, and was also interested in the sale of certain sewing machines, publicly authorized ail purchasers of such sewing machines to use such folding guides without compensation. S. owned and used, during such first term, 125 of such sewing machines, and owned and was using, when such first term expired, 56 of such folding guides. The patent was extended. Held, that S. had a right to continue to use. during the extended term, such identical 56 folding guides.</p> <p>[Cited in Black v. Hubbard, Case No. 1,460. American Tube Works v. Bridgewater Iron Co., 26 Fed. 336.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see note to Wooster v. Taylor, Case No. 18,040.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,038.</p> <p>Infringement of Patent.</p> <p>A man worked for the defendants by the piece, in the defendants’ manufactory, and there used, in the defendants’ business, folding guides, his own property, which infringed the plaintiffs patent. Held, in a suit in equity, that the defendants had infringed the patent.</p>

Bill in equity founded upon infringement of letters patent Defendant pleaded a license to make and sell the articles embodying the inventions described in the patent. In the argreement for a license defendant covenanted that it would not contest the validity of the patents. Plaintiff revoked the license on account of defendant’s breach of the conditions of the agreement.

[This was a bill in equity by George H. Wooster against Edmund W. Taylor, Jr., and Margaret Woodbury, to enjoin tbe infringement of letters patent No. 21,659, granted to A. Douglas October 5, 1858, and reissued December 10, 1872,—No. 5,180.]

<p>Case No. 18,041.</p> <p>Infringement of Patent—Recoveiit of Profits.</p> <p>Where the profits made by a defendant from the unlawful use of a patented invention amount to more than the license fees for such use would amount to, the plaintiff, although exercising his monopoly by the granting of licenses, is entitled to recover such profits, on an accounting for profits, and is not limited to such license fees.</p>

3 [This was a case for seamen’s wages. Libellants were respectable men, natives of Sweden, were going to California, and had partly engaged a direct passage to San Francisco. A shipping master from Mr. Hemen-way called at their boarding house in Boston, and offered them wages to go to Valparaiso in the ship Loo Choo, as seamen. He told them they had better earn wages to Valparaiso, and they could always easily get a passage from Valparaiso to San Francisco.

<p>Case No. 18,043.</p> <p>Breach of Injunction — Enfokoement of Penalty.</p> <p>1. A rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue, for breach of an injunction, is not the mode of proceeding in this court.</p> <p>[Cited in Fanshawe v. Tracy, Case No. 4,043; U. S. v. Anonymous, 21 Fed. 767.]</p> <p>[Cited in Hawkins v. State, 120 Ind. 290, 26 N. E. 44.]</p> <p>2. A motion should be made that the defendant stand committed for a breach of the injunction, and this motion is made on notice being given to the defendant.</p> <p>3. No notice having been given in this case, the court overruled the motion for an attachment.</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Western district of Pennsylvania.] In bankruptcy.

The steam tug Workman was hired to tow the bark White Wing from Fiske’s wharf in Boston into the stream, and farther if required. The master of the tug made his boat fast to the port side of the ship, ordered the lines of the latter to be cast off, and steamed ahead. Presently the starboard side of the bark’s stern came in contact with the wharf, but was soon cleared, and after they had proceeded a short distance it was found that the stern of the vessel had come off.

<p>Case No. 18,046.</p> <p>Injunction—Public Nuisance— Obstruction of Navigation — Draw-Bridge over Navigable Water—Consent of Sovereign Power—Charter of Railroad—Lines Authorized.</p> <p>1. A citizen of another state owning property in this state, has a right to come into the circuit court of the United States, asking for an injunction to restrain the acts of a corporation, incorporated under the laws of Ohio, which, if consummated, would do irreparable injury to his property situated here.</p> <p>2. A private person cannot apply to a court of j chancery to prevent or remove a public nuisance, which does him no special injury. But he may, if I the nuisance is immediately injurious to himself, ! although it may also affect the public. A private person owning a tannery, flour mill, saw mill, stores and warehouses, a wharf and water lots, ¡ and stock in a plank road leading from the town ] where they are situated, which is upon a river | navigable for steamboats, schooners, and other i vessels, and from which trade is carried on with ! other ports, in which he participates, may injoin a railroad company from obstructing the navigation of the bay into which that river empties, when such obstruction will materially injure the trade of that town.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 478, 40 N. W. 737; Ballentine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 47, 47 N. W. 488.]</p> <p>3. Prom the nature of such an injury, its extent cannot be ascertained with precision. Jt is permanent; consequently suits at law for relief must be endless. To establish a wrong of this nature, it need not be measured by dollars and cents. It must be shown to exist; it must be material; but the particular amount of damages can not and need not be shown. In such cases, adequate relief can be given only by injunction.</p> <p>4. Where the termini of a railroad are fixed by its charter, and an amendment is made thereto authorizing the company “to extend its line of railroad to a point on a river” named, which is beyond the original terminus and not in a direct line with the termini, the company are not authorized in departing from one terminus named, and constructing a direct line.between the other terminus and the point designated on the river, which will leave the original point of termination entirely out of the line of the road. The extension of a line does not authorize a departure from it in the middle or any other part of it, except from its terminus.</p> <p>5. Where a railroad company was authorized by its charter “to construct branched roads from the main route, to other towns or places in the several counties through which the road might pass.” they are limited to the construction of branch roads, which leave the main route and terminate at some town or place within the same county as that in which the other terminus of the branch is situated. The construction of a line of road, commencing in one county and terminating in another, is not authorized by such a provision.</p> <p>6. A railroad company was authorized to construct a railroad, making S. and F. points in the main line. They proceeded to put under construction a line from S. to P., which lies thirty-eight degrees north of a direct line from S. to F.. and which, if brought down to that line, would not be half way between S. and F.</p> <p>7. The court considered that this was manifestly intended to be the main line, and could not be called a branch.</p> <p>8. A right to change a location, “either for the difficulty of construction, or of procuring a right of way at a reasonable cost, or whenever a better and cheaper route can be had,” does not authorize a company to relocate, because a particular town, on the selected route, will not contribute to the road. Nor will it authorize a departure from the points named in the charter.</p> <p>9. The right to cross a navigable water by a railroad bridge, must be given by the sovereign power, by a special or general act. Where this is not done, neither the board of public works, nor an acting commissioner of that board, ean approve of the structure of a bridge over it. No such power is given by the twentieth section of the act of Ohio of May 1, 1852, to provide for the creation and regulation of incorporated companies. 3 Ourwen’s Rev. St. p. 1882.</p> <p>10. By the twentieth section of that act (3 Curwen’s Rev. St. 1882), either the acting commissioner of the board of public works, within whose territorial jurisdiction the work is to be erected, or the board of public works may approve of the plan or structure of a proposed bridge over a navigable water; and as the law has provided for no appeal from the'decision of the acting commissioner, his favorable decision is final. A reversal of that decision by the board is a nullity, they having no jurisdiction over the subject.</p> <p>11. The expression, “the acting commissioner having charge of the public works where such crossing is proposed,” in the twentieth section of the act alluded to (3 Curwen’s Rev. St. 1882). means nothing more than that such place shall be within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioner. It does not mean that the water over which the bridge is proposed to be erected, should be a portion of the public works of Ohio. The words “navigable waters” are used in no such restricted sense; they embrace and were intended to embrace, all waters within the state, which are navigable by the works of art or nature.</p> <p>12. Where a company is authorized to eonstruel a railroad between two points, “over” a navigable water, a right to construct a bridge over that water is implied, as a necessary means of carrying into effect the power granted.</p> <p>13. Under the power to regulate commerce, congress have power to prevent the obstruction of any navigable river, which is a means of commerce between any two or more states. The exercise of this great public right is not incompatible with' the enjoyment of local rights. The public right consists in an unobstructed use of a navi-irable water connecting two or more states. The local right is to cross such water. The general commercial right is paramount to all state authority.</p> <p>14. A public nuisance can not be tolerated on the ground that the community may realize some advantages from its existence. The doctrine on this subject, as it is stated in the Wheeling Bridge Case, 9 West. Law J. 535, adopted and followed.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 478. 46 N. W. 737; Ballentine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 47. 47 N. W. 488.]</p> <p>15. A draw-bridge over navigable water, although it unavoidably occasions some delay in passing it, is not necessarily such an obstruction to the navigation as to amount to a nuisance. The delay is submitted to in consideration of the benefits conferred.</p> <p>16. In considering whether a draw-bridge is an obstruction, the unskillfulness of the seamen, and the probability of men not being ready at the draw to open it, are to he laid oiit of consideration. The law presumes that what ought to be done will be done, and that since seamen should be skillful, they will be so.</p> <p>17. When the chancellor is asked to restrain the erection of a bridge, on the ground that it will' be an obstruction to the navigation, and the testimony offered to prove it-so, is so nearly balanced as not to incline the scale on either side, the extraordinary and preventive power oí an injunction, which may be ruinous to one of the parties, ought not to be exercised.</p>

This was a bill in chancery, exhibited by Mary Wormeley, the wife of Hugh Wallace Wormeley, and her infant children, John S., Mary W., Jane B., and Anne B. Wormeley, by their next friend, against the said Hugh Wallace Wormeley, Thomas Strode, Richard Veitch, and David Castleman, and Charles McCormick, for the purpose of enforcing the trusts of a marriage settlement (■executed by the said Hugh and Mary, previous to their marriage, ;in which the said Strode was the trustee),…

<p>Case No. 18,048.</p> <p>Removal of Cause — Nonresident Defendant— Notice of Application.</p> <p>1. W. brought suit in a state court of New York against D. and K. and R.. as copartners, to recover on a promissory note. Process was served on D. alone. He alone appeared. W. and K. were, at the time the suit was commenced, citizens of New lork. D. and R. were, at that time, citizens of California. D. took proceedings, under subdivision 2 of section 639 of the Revised Statutes, to remove the suit, so far as it concerned him, into this court, without notice to the attorney for W. The petition for removal was not signed or verified by D., but by D.’s attorney in the suit. W. moved to remand the cause to the state court BeM, subdivision 2 of section 039 of the Revised Statutes was not repealed by the act of March 3, 1S75 (18 Stat. 470).</p> <p>2. The suit was one in which there could be a final determination of the controversy, so far as concerned D., without the presence of K. and R., as parties.</p> <p>3. Any rights which W. would have had as against K. and R., from serving process on D., remain to W. in this court.</p> <p>4. Notice of the application for the removal was not necessary.</p> <p>5. The petition was sufficiently signed and verified.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by John B. Wor-lenciyke against James White, for the infringement of letters patent No. 44,249, granted to complainant September 13, 1864; reissued November 22, 18G4,—No. 1,825.]

<p>Case No. 18,051.</p> <p>Non-Jubidical Dat—Entry or Transcript op Judgment.</p> <p>The act of the circuit clerk in filing the docket transcript of a judgment, is a ministerial act, and not void, though done on a non-juridical day, and the judgment creditors thereby acquired a lien upon the real estate of the judgment debtor the same as if done on any other day.</p> <p>[Cited in-Re Boyd, Case No. 1,746.]</p> <p>[Cited in Whipple v. Hill (Neb.) 55 N. W. 228.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>This was an action on a judgment. The defendant [Leonard W. Jerome] pleaded an insolvent’s discharge, and the plaintiffs [Lewis Worthington and others] demurred to the plea.</p>

This was an action on the case for not keeping in safety Tom, a fugitive slave, the property of the plaintiff, who was delivered to him by the plaintiff! s agent and attorney, to be safely kept in the gaol at Doylestown. Upon the plea of the general issue, it was proved that the defendant was the clerk or deputy of the sheriff of Bucks county, in which the gaol was, at the time of the transaction which forms the subject of this suit.

This was a rule upon the marshal, to show cause, why he should not return the writ to the following effect, viz. “that the property levied upon, has been sold, and the purchaser retains the money in his hands, by virtue of a prior lien.” After argument, WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice, discharged the rule; THE COURT not thinking it proper, to dictate to the marshal, what return he should make, to process put into his hands to execute.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in personam, filed in the district court, to recover compensation for services rendered by the libellant in repairing a steamboat. The district court decreed for the libellant [case unreported], and the respondents appealed to this court.

<p>[Suit by the Woven Wire Mattress Company against John E. Whittlesey and others.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,081.</p> <p>Admiralty—Compensation or Counsel—Allowance Out op Fund.</p> <p>[In cases in which a common interest has been promoted by services of counsel which a mere selfish consideration of his client’s interest would not have induced him to render, a part or even the whole of his compensation may occasionally be allowed from the general fund arising from the sale of the vessel.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William C. Wren against the Spencer Optical Manufacturing Company and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 36,065, granted to W. P. Battey, August 5, 1862.]

Royal Southwick offered for proof, against the estate of the Wrentham Manufacturing Company in bankruptcy, a certain instrument, of which this is a copy: “$2,000. Boston, Jan. 21,1870. Received of Royal South-wick, two thousand dollars, on account. Loan. J. H. Jones, Jr., & Co.” Indorsed: “Waiving demand and notice.

<p>Case No. 18,064.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Discharge—Embezzlement.</p> <p>[One who, as register of the land ofiice, converted to his own use money deposited with him by private parties for the purchase of public lands, and returned the names of the depositors in the schedule of his debts, held not entitled to a discharge, the same being, forbidden by the clause of the act which denounces any defalcation in “any other fiduciary capacity” (Act 1841).]</p>

[In the matter of John S. Wright, a bankrupt..] By JOHN FITCH, Register: 2 [This cause is now pending before me in this court of bankruptcy. The petitioner sets forth in his schedules an indebtedness as a member of the firm of Wright, Maxwell & Co. to Knowles & Forster, creditors.

[In the matter of the petition of John G. Wright and others for limitation of liability in respect to damages alleged to have been caused by their schooner, the Adeline Townsend.]

In bankruptcy. Geprge C. Wright had for several years been the owner and occupant of a comfortable house and lot in Fond du Lae, occupying said premises with his family until about two weeks before proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced against him. He had been doing a small business as a boot and shoe dealer and manufacturer, and a short time before being put into bankruptcy he purchased, on credit, an unusually large amount of goods.

<p>Case No. 18,068.</p> <p>Statute of Limitations—Suspension on Debtor’s Bankruptcy—Right to Return of Assets.</p> <p>1. Where a debtor had filed a petition in bankruptcy, his only debts being apparently barred by the statute of limitations, bis widow and heirs cannot procure a withdrawal of the property from the bankruptcy court, even though no debts had been proved against the estate. They may have been taken out of the statute, and if provable at the time of filing the petition they would not be barred subsequently. The statute ceases to run on the filing of the petition.</p> <p>2. The heirs of the bankrupt cannot profit by delay of creditors in proving their debts; and the widow of an intestate has no possible standing in court, her dower claim not passing to the assignee.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,069.</p> <p>Register in Bankruptcy—Ceiitifioate op Question.</p> <p>A question, in order to he properly certified to the judge, must arise regularly in the course of proceedings before the register, and between the parties having the legal right to raise it.</p>

In this case, on the return day of the order to show cause why the bankrupts [Wright & Peckham] should not have a final discharge, Messrs. O. P. Eamsdell & Co., creditors, of Buffalo, N. Y., by their attorneys, appeared before the register, H. E. Thompson, Esq., in opposition thereto, and filed a specification of the grounds of their opposition, substantially as follows: That immediately prior to the purchase of the goods from the said O. P.

This was an action of assumpsit [by B. Huntington Wright against Levi Blakeslee] to recover the amount of a succession tax, paid under protest, assessed upon the assignors of the plaintiff. It was tried by the court without jury.

<p>Case No. 18,074.</p> <p>Affidavit to Hold to Bail—Sufficiency.</p> <p>1. An affidavit to hold to bail must be positive, and the indebtment must be stated from the knowledge of the affiant</p> <p>[Cited in Postley v. Higgens, Case No. 11-304; Nelson v. Cutter, Id. 10,104.]</p> <p>[Cited in Quarles v. Robinson, 2 Pin. 99.]</p> <p>2. An affidavit that the affiant was informed and verily believes the defendant is indebted to the plaintiffs is insufficient.</p> <p>3. The affiant must state more than the mere legal import of the instrument on which the action is brought</p>

<p>Case No. 18,076.</p> <p>Dismissal op Bill—Conclüsivexess—Evidence-Declarations of Witness—Paroi. Evidence —Contradiction op Wkitinq.</p> <p>1. The dismission of a bill in chancery, is not conclusive against the complainant, in a court of law, although the bill may have beén brought for the same matter.</p> <p>[Explained and limited in Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. (48 U. S.) 217.]</p> <p>[Cited in Cramer v. Moore, 36 Ohio St. 350; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1.]</p> <p>2. The decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, directly upon the same point, is conclusive, whenever it may again come in question.</p> <p>[Cited in Sarchet v. The General Isaac Davis, Case No. 12,357.]</p> <p>[Cited in White v. Coatsworth, 6 N. Y. 143; Wyman v. Campbell, 6 Port. (Ala.) 219. Cited in brief in Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cow. 126.]</p> <p>3. Declarations of a witness, cannot be given in evidence, except only, in answer to evidence of other declarations of the witness, inconsistent with what he had previously sworn to.</p> <p>[Cited in - Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blaekf. 399. Cited in brief in Shaw v. Emery, 42 Me. 61.]</p> <p>4. Parol evidence of the declarations of an auctioneer, contrary to the written terms of sale, is not admissible; but such evidence, as to the property intended to be sold by him, is proper.</p> <p>[Cited in Chouteau v. Goddin, 39 Mo. 249.]</p>

Wright was proceeded against in the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, by Filley, a creditor, under the thirty-ninth section of the bankrupt act.

[Action to recover the penalty for taking usurious interest, brought by Arthur L. Wright and Henry H. Woollery, assignees of Francis J. Randolph, Frank Wright, and Ebenezer Nutting, bankrupts, against the First National Bank of Greensburg.] 2

This was a bill filed by the complainant to enforce his equitable rights under a bond made by the defendant to one Albert Shep-hard, dated October 31, 1835, in the penal sum of .$441, with a condition concerning the conveyance of three certain tracts of land therein described. The bond was assigned by Shephard to the complainant on the 4th of March, 1830.

<p>[This was an action by Isaac H. Wright, as-signee in bankruptcy of Lyman K. Hitchcock and Samuel K. Place, against James Johnson.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Ethan B. Wright against Roland McMillan, Lewis Hickey, William Smithpeter, and Henry Glick.] Suit was brought in all four cases for infringement of letters patent (reissue) No. 2.667, granted to A. C. Teel, July 2. 1867, for “improvement in farm gates.” [Original letters patent No. 40,777 were granted December 1, 1803.] In delivering an oral opinion, the judge stated that it did not aiipear from the evidence that Teel was the first and original…

<p>Case No. 18,084.</p> <p>National Bank—Appointment op Receiver.</p> <p>The general banking law has provisions for winding up banks under the direction of the comptroller of the currency. These are not exclusive, and were not intended to put it out of the power of the courts to appoint receivers upon a judgment-creditor’s bill.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,086.</p> <p>Collision—Limitation of Liability — Proceedings to Apportion Liability—Jurisdiction of District Court.</p> <p>1. Where, in a collision between a steamer and a schooner, both vessels were sunk, and the steamer was afterwards raised and repaired, and this suit was brought by the owners of the schooner against the owners of the steamer, in which a decree was rendered for the libellants, with an order of reference to a commissioner to ascertain the damage, and his report, fixing such damage, was confirmed by the court. And where the respondents, thereupon, applied to the court on motion to reserve the final decree, that they might take “appropriate proceedings” to apportion the sum for which they might be liable among the parties entitled thereto, under the provisions of the act of congress of March 3, 1851 [9 Stat. 635], offering to the court proof of the value of their vessel and her freight, and that such value was exceeded by the amount of the claims for property destroyed in the collision. Held, that the liability of owners of vessels for damages done by their own to other craft in cases of collision, is limited by the third section of the act to the amount and value of their interest in the vessel at fault and her pending freight.</p> <p>2. This limitation of liability is not confined to damages done to property on board the faulty vessel, but embraces all damages.</p> <p>3. The respondents are, under the circumstances of this case, entitled, by the fourth section of the act, to take proceedings to have the amount for which they are liable apportioned among the parties entitled to it.</p> <p>4. But that this court has no power to give tflem such relief in any form of proceeding. That power does not belong to its jurisdiction in admiralty, certainly not in a suit in personam, where neither the faulty ship and freight, nor their amount or value, is within the control of the court, and where the court can render no judgment that will bind parties not before it, and cannot make parties of such as reside and remain out of the district. And the court has no equity powers adequate to granting such relief.</p> <p>5. The evidence must be rejected and the motion denied; and as the value of the steamer and her freight, at the time of the collision, was greater than the amount of the report, the libel-lants must have a decree for that amount.</p> <p>[The decree of the district court was affirmed by the circuit court, Case No. 18.0S7, and the decree of the latter court was affirmed by the supreme court in 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 104. For other cases growing out of the same collision, and involving some of the same questions, see Oases Nos. 11,202 and 2,760-2,762.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,087.</p> <p>Collision — Limitation of Liabilitt of Vessel Owneu.</p> <p>1. Where a lookout, whose duty it is to report a vessel which he sees, does not report her when he sees her, that fact leads to the belief that he was not performing his duty as a lookout in any respect.</p> <p>2. The 3d section of the act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 635), entitled, “An act to limit the liability of ship-owners and for other purposes,” by which such liability is, in certain cases, limited to the amount or value of their interest in the ship and her freight then pending, does not limit or affect the liability of the owner of a vessel for loss, damage, or injury resulting, through the fault of such vessel, to another vessel and her cargo, from a collision between the two vessels.</p> <p>' 3. Whether this court, as a court of admiralty, has power or jurisdiction adequate to give full effect to the limitation of liability provided by that act, quere.</p> <p>[The decree of the circuit court was affirmed by the supreme court, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 104. For other cases growing out of the same collision, and involving some of'the same questions, see Cases Nos. 11,202 and 2,760-2,762.] .</p>

This was an action on the case for slanderous words spoken of the plaintiff [John Wright] in his trade as a master calico-printer and manager of print works.

<p>Case No. 18,090.</p> <p>Bankrupt as Witness — Competency—Set Ope.</p> <p>1. A set off must be in the same right.</p> <p>2. A witness may be competent to prove some facts, and incompetent to prove others.</p> <p>3. The bankrupt is a competent witness where his assignee is a party, as he can have no legal interest in the decision of the case.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,092.</p> <p>Construction op Wii.l — Estate Tail — Statute op Limitations.</p> <p>1. P. F. being seised of 1705 acres of land, devised the same as follows: “Unto my well beloved and only daughter, E. F. alias W. and her husband J. W. all the remaining part of my -estate, not sold in my life time, both real and personal, to them, their heirs begotten of their bodies, or assigns, for ever: or for iwant of such •heirs or assigns, then to the heirs begotten by, or either of them, and to their assigns for ever; all which estate is given as a portion to my dear and only daughter aforementioned.” The will elf&rly intended to give, and does give to J. W. and wife, an estate tail; and in the event of their death without issue, then it was given to the heirs of the body of the survivor.</p> <p>2. Construction of the act of limitations of New Jersey, passed in 1799 (section 10).</p> <p>[Cited in Croxall v. Sherrerd, 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 268.]</p> <p>[3. Cited in Pritchard v. Spencer, 2 Ind. 486, to the point that the legislature may enact retrospective limitation laws, where they do not deprive parties of a reasonable time for prosecuting their claims before being barred.]</p>

In 'equity. The defendants, Charles N. Shumway, John P. Shumway, Jabez N. Bog-ers, and John S. Harris, in the year 1849, became indebted to the complainants, by several promissory notes in the sum of twelve hundred dollars.

<p>Case No. 18,094.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyance — Husband to Wife — Inadequate Consideration—Sale under Decree—Title of Purchaser.</p> <p>1. The statute of frauds, avoids all covinous conveyances, made with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, but does not extend to conveyances made on valuable consideration, and in good faith: therefore, where husband and wife, made a conveyance of land to trustees, for the use and benefit of the wife, in consideration of the wife’s relinquishing her right of dower in other lands, for the payment of her husband’s debts, although the value of the right of dower, is only about a third of the value of the land conveyed for her benefit, yet such conveyance is not absolutely void, but, in a court of law, must be adjudged to be valid.</p> <p>[Cited in Robinson v. Boyd, 17 Mich. 134.)</p> <p>2. Mere inadequacy of price may be so great, as to be evidence of fraud, proper to be submitted to a jury; but is not in itself a fraud, on which a court of law will pronounce a deed to be absolutely void.</p> <p>[Cited in Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326.)</p> <p>3. Although a court of equity would consider the deed before described, as being held in trust for the wife, only to the value of the dower she has released, and for the creditor, as to the residue: yet in a court of law, the deed cannot be sustained in part, and avoided in part, but will be considered as entirely good.</p> <p>[Cited in Phelps v. Curts, 80 Ill. 115.)</p> <p>4. W. & C., obtained a judgment at law against K., in December, 1824, and sued out an elegit in November, 1825: meanwhile, that is, in March, 1825, M., R. & G., other creditors of K., obtained a decree from the court of chancery, directing a sale of land which had been conveyed by K. to trustees, for the benefit of his wife, (made bona fide, and for valuable, though inadequate, consideration.) and that out of the proceeds of the sale, the trustees for the wife, should first be paid the amount of the consideration which had actually passed from the wife, and then the residue to be applied to the extinguishment of the debt of the said M., R. & G. Beld, that the judgment-creditors. W. & C., (who had their elegit executed whilst the sale was being made under the decree,) cannot recover the land in ejectment against the purchaser under the decree.</p>

[These were actions by John S. Wright against the Sun Mutual Insurance Company of New York and the Orient Mutual Insurance Company of New York, respectively.] The suits were begun by attachment, issued in the superior court, for the city of Baltimore, and were removed into the circuit court of the United States for this district, under the act of congress.

Ejectment, military bounty lands, &c. This was an action of ejectment [by David C.' Wright against Samuel E. Taylor] to recover possession of certain land in Chariton county, Missouri, forming part of the track appropriated for military bounties.

<p>Case No. 18,098.</p> <p>Obtaining Goons under False Pretences—In-dictment.</p> <p>In an indictment under the act of congress of March 2,1831 [4 Stat. 448], for obtaining goods, etc., by false pretences, it is error to aver “that by reason of which false pretence the prisoner did then and there unlawfully obtain,” etc.</p>

<p>At law. In error from the criminal court. rWilliam S. Wright] indicted for obtaining money under false pretenses.</p>

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

Rule to show cause why this suit, which had been removed from the state court, should not be remanded, on a suggestion that the sum demanded is less than five hundred dollars. After this suit was entered in the state court, and before a declaration was filed, the defendant filed his petition, praying that. the cause might be removed into this court, which was directed accordingly.

Claim of Beinicke & Co. to the surplus arising on the sale of certain mortgaged property of the bankrupts [Frank Wrisley and John L. Wrisley], on the ground that they held a lien thereon by virtue of an execution issued prior to the filing of the petition.

<p>Case No. 18,105.</p> <p>Compromise by Bankrupts—Approval by Court ! —Composition Proceedings—Attend- j ance op Bankrupt.</p> <p>1. The jurisdiction of the district court, as to the composition proceedings, in this case, in bankruptcy, sustained.</p> <p>2. A composition of 20 per cent., payable in money, on time, secured by notes, leaving certain real estate which had passed to the assignee in bankruptcy, to be converted into money, and paid to the creditors, in addition, is a lawful composition.</p> <p>3. A bankrupt is not required, by the statute, to attend aDy other meeting, in composition proceedings, than the first one.</p> <p>[Approved in Re Wilson, Case No. 17,781.]</p> <p>4. A decision of the creditors excusing the bankrupt from attendance, ought not to be disturbed by the district court, unless "it appears that wrong has been done to the minority creditors; and, after the district court has affirmed the action of the majority, the circuit court, oil review, ought not to interfere, except in a very clear case.</p> <p>[Approved in Re Wilson, Case No. 17,781.]</p> <p>5. If the creditors interested in composition proceedings fail to attend to their interests in time, they must not expect the courts to relieve them from the consequences of their neglect, unless they make a clear case for equitable interference in their behalf.</p> <p>6. Where the creditors, and the register, and the district court have approved a composition, the circuit court ought not to interfere, unless specific errors in the action of the creditors or of the district court are pointed out, which, if sustained, would change the judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Joseph, 24 Fed. 138.]</p>

The mariner Sheffer had shipped on board the Richmond to perform a voyage to the East Indies, and back to Philadelphia. He died on the outward passage; and now Writer, his administrator, claimed wages for the whole voyage. The decisions of the court in the ease of the administrators of Walton v. The Neptune [Case No. 17,135], were relied on by the counsel for the claimant.

On an application for a discharge by the bankrupt [W. Wyatt], certain creditors, Morton, Galt & Co., bankers, opposed the same on two grounds, yiz.: First. That he concealed an interest of three thousand dollars (which they allege he had in a lot of land and four cottages thereon), with the intent to defraud his creditors. Second.

<p>[Appeal by John Wyatt from a judgment in favor of Jacob Harden.]</p>

<p>On motion for a new trial.</p>

Bill in equity for a perpetual injunction, and for other relief, founded upon allegations of the violation, by the defendants, of a patent right, granted originally to the plaintiff [Nathaniel J.j Wyeth, as the invent- or, by letters patent, dated the 18th ot March, A. D. 1829, “for a new and useful improvement in the manner of cutting ice, together with the machinery and apparatus therefor,” as set forth in the schedule to the letters patent; and afterwards with a small…

By B. F. M. HURLEY, Register: I, the undersigned, having been designated ■by the court as the register in bankruptcy before whom the proceedings in the above matter of the bankruptcy of William H. Wylie are to be had, do hereby certify that in the due course of such proceedings the following question, pertinent to the same, arose, and was stated: “Has a register the right to assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, when the title…

<p>Petition to review decree of the district court sitting in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy. This case was heard in conjunction with several others, involving the question of homestead.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,113.</p> <p>Absolute Deed as Mortgage—Oral Evidence— Denials in Answer—Equity of Redemption —Presumption op Release—Lapse of Time— Constructive Trust.</p> <p>1. A deed, absolute in form, may be shown to have been really a mortgage, by the oral testimony of two witnesses, against the denials of the answer, where those denials are not satisfactory in themselves, and are accompanied with admissions that some confidential relations existed between the parties, not consistent with the terms of the deed. The statutes of Massachusetts, as to the foreclosure of mortgages, apply only to legal mortgages.</p> <p>[Cited in Andrews v. Hyde, Case No. 377; Amory v. Lawrence. Id. 33(5.1</p> <p>[Cited in Newton v. Fay, 10 Allen, 509; Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 139.]</p> <p>2. The presumption that an equity of redemption is released after twenty years’ possession by a mortgagee, does not apply to a case where the mortgagee was in possession under an absolute deed, with an agreement that the mortgagor might redeem when he found it convenient, no specific time being fixed, and the mortgagee had no notice or request to redeem. And if, in such case, the mortgagee sells the land to a bona fide purchaser, and so destroys the equity of redemption, a court of equity treats him as a constructive trustee, so the trust is not barred till the expiration of six years from the discovery of the right to an account.</p> <p>[Cited in Amory v. Lawrence, Case No. 336.]</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Walker’s Adm’r v. Farmers’ Bank, 6 Del. Ch. 81, 10 Atl. 96. Cited in Linnell v. Lyford, 72 Me. 284; Hinckley v. Hinckley, 9 Atl. 898, 79 Me. 323.]</p> <p>[On appeal to the supreme court, the above decree was affirmed. 19 How. (60 U. S.) 289.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,114.</p> <p>Declaration in Assumpsit—Sukplusage.</p> <p>1. If a count in a declaration contains sufficient averments, surplusage will not vitiate it.</p> <p>2. Goods received, whicSi are to be sold at certain prices, or the goods returned on demand; if sold, and the money received, no special demand need be alleged.</p> <p>3. If the action were for a failure to return the goods, a special demand necessary.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,115.</p> <p>Foreclosure—Limitation—Sale under' Attachment—Recording Mortgage — Effect of'Extension on Note — Parties — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. As a general rule, mortgages cannot be foreclosed after the lapse of twenty years from the date when the cause of action accrued.</p> <p>2. Under the statutes of Indiana of 1S38, in a proceeding in foreign attachment where there was only constructive notice to the defendant, and where he did not appear to the action, no personal judgment could be rendered against him. In such a case, the judgment should have been simply for a sale of the property attached. And the only writ that could issue on such a judgment was a venditioni exponas. A sale on a fieri facias issued on such a judgment is void.</p> <p>3. Under the Indiana Code of 1838, a neglect to record a mortgage within the prescribed time did not invalidate it, except as to a subsequent bona fide purchaser or moitgagee whose deed or mortgage was first recorded.</p> <p>4. A mortgage was made in 1838, to secure notes which on their face all fell due in nine months thereafter. A suit to foreclose this mortgage was commenced in 1860. On each note the mortgagees indorsed an agreement to delay the collection of the notes for three years from the date of the mortgage. But these in-dorsements were not referred to in the mortgage, nor recorded. Quaere, did this engagement thus indorsed on the notes, as between the mortgagee and innocent purchaser, take the case out of the operation of the Indiana statute of limitation of twenty years?</p> <p>5. In a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage, all persons holding the equity of redemption of the lands or any part thereof must be made parties.</p> <p>6. In a suit by assignees of a note and mortgage, if the assignment is denied it must be proved.</p> <p>NOTE. Where creditors have allowed the statute to run against their debts, it runs also against the security for the debt; and where the creditors for whose benefit an assignment was made delay asserting any claim to the trust funds until the debts intended to be secured are barred by the statute, it becomes the duty of the trustee, after such lapse of time, to refuse to pay the debts, and a court of equity will refuse to enforce the trust. Gibson v. Bees. 50 III. 384.</p> <p>For the general statement of the doctrines of limitations to mortgages, consult 2 Washb. Beal Prop. (3d Ed.) 174. The purchaser from a mortgagor may avail himself of the statute in the same manner as the mortgagor might have done. McCarthy v. White. 21 Cal. 495; Coster v. Brown, 23 Cal. 142; Lord v. Morris, 18 Cal. 4S2. The period from which the statute begins to run is the breach of the condition of the mortgage. Rodman v. Hedden. 10 Wend. 498; Powell v. Smith. 8 Johns. 249; Odlin v. Green-leaf, 3 N. H. 270.</p> <p>In case of judgment by default, only constructive notice being had on the defendant, the property attached is alone liable. Conn v. Caldwell, 1 Gilman, 531; Boswell v. Dickerson [Case No. 1,683]. And a special execution will, in Illinois, issue for the sale of the attached property. But if the defendant appear or is serred. the judgment is in personam, and the plaintiff can have an execution generally and also a special one for the sale of the property. Conn v. Caldwell, supra. The general rule is that all persons interested in the mortgaged .property, are necessary parties to a suit of foreclosure, and this includes all entitled to redeem. 1 Daniell, Oh. PI. & Prac. 212 et seq.</p> <p>At common law an indorsee of a promissory note is bound to prove the indorsement in the ordinary mode like any other handwriting, and that it was made by the person by whom' it purports to have been made, and when the indorsement is special, that the indorsee is the person described in it. 3 Phil. Ev. 189. And in Illinois, where by statute the assignee in an action upon an assignable instrument is not bound to prove the assignment or signature unless they are put in issue by a verified plea, the statute is held to apply only to cases where the declaration is upon the instrument. When it is offered in evidence under the common counts the common law rule still obtains. Hall v. Freeman, 59 Ill. 54.</p>

PETER V. DANIEL, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, at chambers, in Washington City.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Virginia.] Wynne executed a deed of trust in August, 1866, to secure certain debts due to Enders, Paine & Williams, and this deed was at the time of its execution delivered to the latter. but never recorded by them. ■ Afterwards, in December, 1866, Wynne made another deed for the benefit of the same parties to secure the same debts as were secured by the unrecorded deed of August, which deed was…

<p>Case No. 18,118.</p> <p>Donation Act — Title op Settler — Partition between Husband and Wife—Patent to Follow Certificate—Construction—Location or Donation.</p> <p>1. A settler under the donation act of Oregon acquires title to his donation from the passage of the act or the date of his settlement; and the patent which issues to him upon the performance of the conditions- upon which the grant was made, is only record evidence of the existence of such title, or of the facts out of which it arose.</p> <p>2. Under said act the surveyor-general had authority to partition the donation of a married settler, in equal parts as to quantity, between him and his wife, at any point of the compass he might deem expedient; but his action in this particular, under section 1 of the act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat. 107), was subject to the supervision of the commissioner of the general land office.</p> <p>3. When the surveyor issued a certificate to a settler under the donation act, the commissioner of the general land office was required to issue a patent thereon and in conformity therewith, unless he found some valid objection thereto; and if said objection was found, it could not be disposed of by issuing a patent so far contrary to the certificate, but the certificate should have been returned to the local office for correction, and the patent issued upon such corrected certificate.</p> <p>4. A certificate and patent thereon, issued under said act, are parts of the same transaction or procedure, and may be read together for the purpose of correcting or explaining the patent, and where there is an absolute contradiction between them, the certificate must prevail.</p> <p>5. On July 28, 1853, the surveyor-general issued a certificate to William H. Willson and Chloe A., his wife, for donation 44, includi the site of the town of Salem, assigning therein “the north half, parallel with the south line of the claim, to Chloe A. Willson, and the south half to William H. Willson,” upon which certificate, on February 4. 1862, a patent was issued, giving to said William H., “the south half” of said donation, and to said Chloe A., “the north half” thereof: Held, that the certificate and patent, taken together, showed that the partition line of the donation was a line running south, 70 degrees 21 minutes east, and parallel with the southern boundary of the tract, and not a due east and west one.</p>

<p>[This was an action by W. T. Wythe against A. Myers.] Motion to strike out defenses.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,120.</p> <p>Conveyance by Administrator—Authority op Court—Donation Act—Title op Settler —Equity Pleading.</p> <p>1. The probate court of Marion county, in 1856, had no power to authorize an administrator, generally, to convey lands in performance of his intestate’s obligations; but only to convey specific premises upon the ' petition of the person claiming to be entitled thereto.</p> <p>2. Where a married settler under section 4 of the donation act [9 Stat. 497], has completed the residence and cultivation -required by the act, and made proof thereof, he is entitled to a patent for his donation, and may convey the same in fee simple. Per Field, Circuit Justice.</p> <p>3. Plea to bill in equity may be good in part and bad in part.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,121.</p> <p>Estoppel—Plea Stbickex Out—Plea of Fobmeb Judgment.</p> <p>1. A plea of estoppel by conduct, not showing that the defendant was ignorant of .the truth of the matter or could not have conveniently ascertained the same; nor that the defendant had acted upon the matter claimed as an estoppel, stricken out on motion of plaintiff.</p> <p>[Cited in Coos Bay Wagon Co. v. Crocker, 4 Fed. 581.]</p> <p>2. In a plea of a former judgment in an action at law, it is a sufficient description of the cause of action in the first action to allege that it was identical with that stated in the complaint in the action pending.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,122.</p> <p>Donation Act—Husband’s and Wife’s Interests — Equitable Estoppel — Running of Di m itati on s—Cove rture.</p> <p>1. The wife’s share of the donation made by the act of September 27, 1850 (9 Stat. 496), was not her separate estate; and the act of January 20, 1852, which undertook to declare it so, so far as prior settlements are concerned, was void.</p> <p>[Cited in Elliott v. Teal, Case No. 4;396.)</p> <p>2. By virtue of the marriage the husband took an estate for the-life of himself and wife in the latter’s half of the donation claim, and [ it was not in the power of the territorial leg- : islature to divest him of this estate, although it ! might exempt it from execution.</p> <p>[Cited in Manning v. Hayden, Case No. 9,-043; Alexander v. Ivnox, Id. 170; Stubble-field v. Menzies, 11 Fed. 272, 274.]</p> <p>3. What constitutes an estoppel in pais?</p> <p>4. Equitable estoppels in pais cannot be set up as a defense to an action at law to recover the possession of real property.</p> <p>0. The Oregon statute of limitations upon actions to recover real property does not run against a woman to whom the right to sue accrues during coverture, until the removal of such disability: and this, whether the action concerns her separate property or otherwise.</p> <p>[Cited in Stubblefield v. Menzies, 11 Fed. 271.]</p>

2 [This was a bill in equity filed to restrain defendant [Frederick H. North] from infringing letters patent [No. 32.331] for “improvement in locks,” granted to Linus Yale, Jr., May 14, 1861, and reissued to him April 28. 1S63 [No. 1,470], the sole and exclusive right to the use of which was granted to the Yale and Greenleaf Manufacturing Company, September 21, 1861. [The claims of the original patent were as follows: “1.

A libel was filed in the said court in rein and in personam, and objections filed to the jurisdiction of the court. The exception to the jurisdiction in rem was sustained; and the jurisdiction as to the proceeding.in personam was maintained, and the exception to it overruled. The court rendered a decision on the merits, against the respondent, for the sum of three thousand dollars [Case No. 5.190], from which the present appeal has been prosecuted.

The original bill was filed on the 20th day of May, 1875, in the chancery court of Shelby county, Tennessee, by T. W. Yardley as owner of three bonds for $1,000 each, of an issue of 600 bonds for $1,000 each, made by the Memphis Water Company, and secured by a trust deed or mortgage of the franchises and property of the company made to F. S. Davis and T. R. Farnsworth, trustees.

Assumpsit for money.had and received. Plea, the general issue. At the • trial if appeared, that J. B. Wood had been employed by the plaintiffs to sell and dispose of large numbers of lottery tickets in different lotteries on their own account, he receiving a commission therefor.

<p>Case No. 18,128.</p> <p>Equitable Jurisdiction"—Belief from Mistake —Appraisement for Partition.</p> <p>Three persons having an interest in fifty lots in Saginaw city, they selected” certain persons to appraise lots, and on this appraisement they made partition and executed Quit claims. To the complainants were assigned lots one and two, with the warehouses and wharf, valued at seven thousand dollars. To the defendants was assigned lot three, with the wharf, at two hundred dollars. The warehouse, after the papers were all executed, was found to extend twenty feet on lot three, which adjoined lot numbered two. The warehouse was worth six thousand and five or six hundred dollars, it being divided into stores of thirty-three feet The defendants claim twenty feet of the warehouse on the lot three, from which the plaintiffs gave a quit claim, not supposing that any part of the warehouse was on it. A bill was filed to correct the mistake, to which the defendants demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that, under the circumstances stated in the bill, the mistake was a matter for equitable jurisdiction and relief.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Ashmead v. McCarthur, 67 Pa. St. 328.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,129.</p> <p>Practice—Following State Law.</p> <p>A law of the state regulating the practice of the state courts, does not apply to the courts of the United States, unless adopted by act of ■congress, or by the courts of the United States.</p>

[This was a suit in equity by Richard Yeadon, Sandiford Holmes, and James M. Wilson, assignee of Andrew M’Dowall and William G. Mood, bankrupts, against the Planters’ & Mechanics’ Bank, the Bank of South. Carolina, and others, to procure a sale of certain property mortgaged by the bankrupt to the defendants, for an account of rents and profits thereof, and for an injunction to restrain defendants from prosecuting a suit in the state courts, etc.]

[This was an appeal by Pascal Yearsley from a decision of the commissioner of patents, in interference proceedings, awarding priority to James M. Brookfield and Ephraim V. White in respect to an alleged invention of a new and useful improvement in the art of making glass.]

<p>Case No. 18,132.</p> <p>Plea in Bar—Withdrawal—Discontinuance— •Entry without Leave.</p> <p>1. A plea in bar cannot be withdrawn, after the case has been prepared for trial, in order to file a plea in abatement.</p> <p>2. A discontinuance, though required to be by leave of court, is generally entered without such leave, which is presumed, unless the defendant interfere, and ask the court to withhold leave, on account of the discontinuance being oppressive.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,133.</p> <p>Mortgage for Rent—Bankruptcy of Lessee-Effect.</p> <p>3. The lessor of a shop took a mortgage on the fixtures as security for the rent and the perform-anee of the covenants of the lease. The lessee was to pay a certain rent monthly, and taxes. The lease provided that it should terminate if the lessee should be declared bankrupt, or any assignment of his property should be made for the benefit of creditors, unless within ten days from the date of the petition or assignment some sufficient person should become surety for the rent. The lessee became bankrupt November 1, 1869, an assignee was chosen November 23, and the keys were returned to the lessor January 1. 1870. Eeld, the mortgage was a valid security for the rent up to January 1.</p> <p>2. It seems, that an assignee in bankruptcy will not become responsible for rent of a store merely by leaving some goods there mingled with other goods, which were mortgaged to the lessor.</p>

• The defendant LStephen T. Gage], as collector of internal revenue for the district of Nevada, collected of plaintiff a special tax levied upon it as an assayer. The tax was paid under protest, and this action brought to recover the tax so collected. Plaintiff claimed, that it was not an assayer, under the act of congress, and not liable to the tax.

<p>Case No. 18,136.</p> <p>Arbitration Clause—Insurance Policy—Right to Sue.</p> <p>1. The policy provided that, in case of differences arising touching any loss or damage, the matter may, at the written request of either party, be submitted to impartial arbitrators, whose award in writing should be binding on .the parties to the amount of such loss or damage, “but shall not decide the liability of the company under this policy;” also, “it is furthermore hereby provided and mutually agreed that no suit or action against this company for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any court of law or chancery, until an award shall have been obtained fixing the amount of such claim in the manner herein above provided.” Held, that whilst a mere collateral agreement to refer to arbitration all differences arising upon a policy is not binding, and does not pi-eclude a suit without such reference, it is not unlawful for parties to agree that no action shall be sustainable at law or equity until arbitration shall have determined what amount is due, and that in such a ease a reference and ascertainment of the amount due are conditions precedent to the right of bringing an action.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Schollenberger v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Case No. 12,470.]</p> <p>2. No suit could be sustained against the objection of the company until after an award had been made, although neither party had, previous to the suit, requested arbitration.</p>

<p>[Bill of review by Henry A. Yerrington against Henry W. Putnam.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,138.</p> <p>Mortgage for Advances—Supplies for Plantation—Date of Mortgage.</p> <p>1. Where a valid mortgage of a plantation was made in Louisiana to secure advances of cash and supplies, to be made from time to time, for the purpose of working it, not to exceed in amount twenty-five thousand dollars, to be reimbursed out of its products; and advances were made to exceed fifty thousand dollars, and reimbursements to an amount that, •however, left a balance due exceeding twenty-.five thousand dollars, held, the mortgage is good as security to its full amount, on any balance remaining on advances and reimbursements under it, and is not extinguished by the reimbursement of the first twenty-five thousand dollars.</p> <p>2. A mortgage given to secure the payment of four promissory notes, made to raise means to work a plantation, is valid, and, upon the negotiation of the notes, relates back to the date of execution.</p> <p>[For hearing on a petition to review the above proceedings, see Case No. IS,139. See, also, Id. 6,441.]</p>

2 [This was a petition to review certain proceedings in bankruptcy in the district court of Louisiana. Ober, Atwater & Co. claimed first mortgages on two plantations surrendered by the bankrupts, York & Hoover. They obtained an order for the sale of them, and purchased both at the as-signee’s sale. They applied for a rule to confirm the sale, and asked that the proceeds of sale be applied to the extinguishment of. their mortgages.

<p>Case No. 18,140»</p> <p>Salvage Compensation—Professional "Wreckers on Florida Coast—Misconduct of Crew.</p> <p>[1. $13,000 upon a valuation of $95,000 awarded to professional wreckers for getting a ship off of Florida Reef in a condition to proceed on her voyage, the vessel having been in considerable danger, though not thumping on the bottom, and the weather being fair, the services occupying about 14 hours, and consisting in transferring 363 bales of cotton to the wrecking vessels, and thus floating the ship.]</p> <p>[2. The conduct of the crew of a stranded vessel in refusing to assist in getting her off after wreckers were employed, unless promised extra compensation out of the salvage, is deserving of the severest reprobation, and, although such a promise is given, the court will prohibit the payment of any part of the salvage to them.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,141.</p> <p>Mutuai, Accounts — Settlement — Promise to Pat Balance—Presumption—Conflict of Laws.</p> <p>[1. Where the contract was that the purchasers should pay the sellers in England, and the uniform mode of payment was to remit bills of exchange on England, the contract was to be governed by the laws of that country.]</p> <p>[2. In order that a usage of trade shall control the method of stating accounts between two persons, it must have been continued for such a length of time as to have become generally known to those engaged in the trade, and must be so general as to have become the settled rule of commercial intercourse, in the absence of any special agreement or particular course of dealing between individuals.]</p> <p>[3. The existence of a usage may be proved by one witness.]</p> <p>[4. An account may be a stated or settled account, though not signed by the parties.]</p> <p>[5. From the fact of stating an account, the law raises a promise to pay the balance found due.]</p> <p>[6. The balance found on a statement of account may properly bear interest, though items of interest were included in the account.]</p> <p>[7. The presumption of a promise to pay the sum claimed arises when the account is rendered and received without objections made in a reasonable time, especially if the same course of dealing is continued by the parties.]</p>

This action is brought against;.the defendants Asbury and Pierce, as partners, the latter being a citizen of California (on whom the process was not served), who are charged to be indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of five thousand dollars for money lent, paid, had and received, and due on account stated &c. The defendants pleaded, (1) The general issue of non-assumpsit. (2) That the bank was not a corporation.

This action was brought to recover the value of one hundred bales of cotton, the property of the plaintiff, which, it is alleged, were lost by the wrongful act of the defendant, in course of transit from Memphis to Boston. Thos. Trout & Sons were the agents of the plaintiff at Memphis in the fall of 1859, and on the 8th of November, purchased 201 bales of cotton on account of the plaintiff.

These questions come up on motion by Sidney A. Kent, the assignee of Peyton R. Chandler, and Chandler, Pomeroy & Co., to expunge the claims of Wm. Young & Co., Bensley & Wagner, and a large number of others of the same character, on what are called “puts.” These claims, having been first allowed pro forma by the register, were referred to him by the court for re-examination under the 34th general order, and the evidence was by him reported to the court.

<p>Case No. 18,146.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Discharge of Debtor — Opening Defaui.t Decree.</p> <p>[A delay of a month in moving to vacate a decree denying the bankrupt’s discharge, which was rendered by default after full notice, is sufficient, under ordinary circumstances, to defeat the motion: but, in view of the fact that the bankruptcy law is about to be repealed, the court in this case permits the default to be opened on terms, in order that the bankrupt may not be finally debarred from bringing his case before the court.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,147.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Decree—Fiduciary Debt.</p> <p>A single debt, due from one petitioning to be declared a bankrupt, in a fiduciary capacity, will not prevent a decree as to all other debts. But whether the certificate of discharge, in such a case, should contain an exception of such debt, —quaere.</p>

[In the matter of Bernard P. Young and John M. Young, bankrupts.] “At the request of George W. Lubke, Esq., attorney in this matter for John M. Young, I make the following statement of facts: At the second meeting the assignee presented his accounts for audit. In them I found two items of one hundred and fifty dollars each to his credit, thus: By cash exempted to B. P. Young, $150. By cash exempted to John M. Young, ?150.

<p>Case No. 18,161.</p> <p>Removal of Causes—Time for Application.</p> <p>1. Under the act of March 3, 1875 [18 Stat. 470], a removal of a suit pending in the state court at the passage of that act wherein a trial had been had after such passage, cannot be made, although the verdict was set aside and a | new trial granted, and the petition for removal i was made at the first term at which the second trial could have been had.</p> <p>[Cited in Hendecker v. Rosenbaum, 6 Fed. 99.]</p> <p>2. Although no motion be made to remove the cause to the state court until a full term had passed by since the filing of such motion and the transcript of the proceedings in the state court— there is no' waiver of the right so to do, nor will such conduct be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the United States court; no other proceedings being had therein than the filing of such transcript and motion. |</p>

Debt on a promissory note. The defendants [Bell & Wray] pleaded nil debet, and offered evidence of infancy in support of the plea. There is a difference between contracts void and voidable. This note was not void, but voidable, if infancy be pleaded, the plaintiff may reply that it was given for necessaries.

Assumpsit for disobedience of orders. The first count of the declaration stated a cargo shipped jointly by plaintiffs and one Lawra-son, and joint orders from all three, and an express promise in writing by the defendant to obey those orders; and a breach of the orders; and averred that if the defendant had obeyed the orders and brought in a cargo of salt, the profit of the plaintiffs on the sale of that salt would have been fourteen hundred and thirty-five dollars; by…

<p>Case No. 18,155.</p> <p>Infringement of Patent—Cross Bill for Dis-covert.</p> <p>1. A defendant in a suit in equity founded on the infringement of a patent, can not, by a cross-bill which sets up no color of title in himself, demand a discovery from the plaintiff in the original suit as to the source or validity of his title.</p> <p>[Cited in Stonemetz Printers’ Machinery Co. v. Brown Folding-Mach. Co., 46 Fed. 852.]</p> <p>2. It is essential,to a bill of discovery that it should set forth a title sufficient to support or defend a suit, and pray a discovery pertinent to that title and nothing beyond. And, where it cannot be sustained as a bill for discovery, it cannot be retained for the purpose of relief, unless it makes a case for relief independently of the discovery sought.</p> <p>[Cited in Home Ins. Co. v. Stanchfield, Case No. 6,660.]</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Cases Nos. 3,030 and 3,032.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,156.</p> <p>Deokee—Persons not Parties.</p> <p>1. This court will not make a decree the execution of which would affect the right of a party not before it, or throw a cloud upon his title.</p> <p>[Cited in Beasley y. Shively, 20 Or. 508, 26 Pac. 847.]</p> <p>2. If such absent party is a necessary party for a final decree, the bill should be dismissed without prejudice.</p> <p>[Cited in Beasley v. Shively, 20 Or. 508, 26 Pac. 847.]</p>

<p>Injunction against use of a trademark.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Alexander K. Young against Philip Lippman and Clara Seligman. [Motion for provisional injunction.

<p>[Action by James Young against the Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Mason Young and others against the Montgomery & Eu-faula Railroad Company and others. Heard on demurrer to the bill.]

[Action by James Young against the Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria.] Mr. James R. Riddle, being called as a juror, was objected to by the plaintiff, because he was the nephew of a stockholder in the insurance company. The fact being agreed, THE COURT decided it was a good principal cause of challenge. Mr. Swann, for plaintiff, cited “Williams v. Delafield, 2 N. Y. T. R. [Caines] 329; Livingston v. Delafield, 3 N. Y. T. R. [Caines] 49.

On June 5, 1867, McPherson Toung made application to H. S. Homans, general agent of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New Tork for the Pacific coast, at the office of said company, in the city of San Francisco. for a policy of insurance on his life for $5,000, and said Homans delivered to him a memorandum of agreement in writing, bearing date on that day, acknowledging the receipt of “ninety-nine dollars and thirty cents, being the first one fourth annual premium on his…

[Appeals from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Both suits were in rem to enforce on the ship Orpheus a lien arising under the law of the state, for… Held: that a suit in admiralty would not lie. See Roaeh v. Chapman, 22 How. [63 U. S.] 129. Any former dicta or decisions which seem to favor a contrary doctrine were overruled by this court in the case of Perry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. [61 U. S.] 400.

<p>[Bill by John S. Young against James Porter.] Heard upon demurrer to the bill for want of equity.</p> <p>cited Jackson v. Morse, 16 Johns. 197; Bogert v. Perry, 17 Johns. 350; Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. [62 U. S.] 481; Tyler, Ej. 43, 44.</p> <p>cited Orton v. Smith, 18 How. [59 U. S.] 263; Herrington v. Williams, 31 Tex. 448.</p>

The bill states that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement for a purchase, by the former, from the latter, of a certain tract of land, for which he was to receive a good title, and was to pay a certain sum by instalments.

Petition [by William Young and others] for review under section 2 of the bankrupt act. William Ridenbaugh was thrown into bankruptcy in 1870. The ease went through all the stages of bankruptcy proceedings. In April, 1874, the bankrupt regularly applied'to be discharged.

<p>Case No. 18,176.</p> <p>Pkize—Condemnation and Sale—Restitution.</p> <p>Property purchased at a provisional sale at Barracoa, afterwards confirmed by sentence of condemnation of the constituted authority at Guadaloupe, is not liable to restitution in a suit in personam against the purchaser’s consignee.</p>

Libel for collision, by Frederick H. Blood, against the tug Young America, the schooner Home, and Francis R. P. Cottrell, owner of the scow Wilcox. Case came up on motion by the respondent Cottrell to dismiss the citation as to him, and to vacate the order allowing an amendment to the original libel upon which the citation was issued. The original libel was filed against the tug, schooner and scow, in rem, for an alleged joint liability for damages on account of a collision.

<p>Case No. 18,179.</p> <p>Collision—Insufficient Manning—Presumption op Fault.</p> <p>1. Where the master of a small tug was also acting as wheelsman and lookout, but it was clear this fact did not contribute to the collision, held, the tug was not thereby chargeable with a fault.</p> <p>2. But where the master, even of a small scow, was e.cting as wheelsman and lookout, and the proofs left it doubtful whether this contributed to the collision, the scow was held liable.</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court in a suit in rem, to enforce payment of a claim for materials supplied by the libellant for building a vessel within the district of Maine. The decree was in favor of the libellant [Case No. 18,181], and the claimant appealed.

<p>Case No. 18,181.</p> <p>.Libel.against Vessel — Lien foe Materials — Death and Insolvency of Owner—Effect.</p> <p>■■, .1. The privileged lien against a .vessel given to'material men by the Revised'Statutes of 'Maine' (chapter 125, § 35) amounts--essentially to. an ¡.hypothecation of the vessel to-the privi-, leged. creditor.</p> <p>. [Cited in The Richard Busteed, Case No. 11,-.764.]</p> <p>; 2. An hypothecary creditor has the same jus in re, or proprietary interest in the thing, as . a' pawnee >or -mortgagee. -. - > - -•</p> <p>- ’‘3. His Tights are paramount'to the rights'of the general creditors under the laws of the state regulating the distribution of estates of deceased insolvent debtors. . .</p> <p>4. .The case of Severance v. Hammatt, 28 Me. 522, .was decided against a lien creditor on the death and insolvency of the debtor, on the . ground that the laws provided no means by . which the lien could be enforced in such a-case, consistently with the rights of the.general creditors under, the' laws for the distribution of insolvent-estates. ’ But as no such difficulty exists in,.the -admiralty, that court can give the creditor his appropriate remedy.</p> <p>[NOTE.’ The decree of the district court was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court. - Case ;No. 18;180.. • The libels were afterwards referred to a commissioner to - ascertain the. amount of. each claim, and, upon his report being confirmed ,by the court,-the parties were heard on thetáxation of costs. Case No. 18,182.]</p>

In this case, several libels were filed against the vessel while on the stocks, and before she was launched, by material men claiming a lien under the law of the state. The claimant, for whom she was built, had advanced large sums of money to the .builder from -time to time while the work was in progress, for which he had taken a mortgage ■of the unfinished vessel, and finally, before she was completed, had taken a bill of sale.

<p>Case No. 18,186.</p> <p>Maritime Lien* fok Materials—Requisites.</p> <p>The party claiming a lien on a vessel for materials must show that the contract under which the materials were furnished had reference to some particular vessel, for the construction or repair whereof said materials were to be used.</p> <p>[Cited in The General Burnside, 3 Fed. 229; The James H. Prentice, 36 Fed. 781.]</p>

[Claim by George C. Yount for the rancho of Caymus, 2 square leagues, in Napa county, granted February 23, 1836, by Nicholas Gutierrez to George C. Yount. Claim filed May 26, 1852, confirmed by the commission February 8, 1853, by the district court July 17, 1855 (Case No. 16,784), and appeal dismissed February 23, 1857. Heard on objections to survey.]

Claim for [the Baneho La Jota] one league of land in Napa county, rejected by the board, and appealed by claimant [George C. Yount].

This was an action on a Canton note, given by the defendants [Nixon and Walker] to the plaintiff. . By -the agreement of the plaintiff’s counsel, the defendants were permitted to give in evidence, the breach of a contract entered into by'the plaintiff, at the time this note was given; to deliver to the supercargoes of the defendants’ ship, a certain number of chests of Young Hyson tea, of the first chop, at thirty-seven tales per pichol.

Rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted. It was made manifest to the court, that the jury had allowed to the defendants [Nixon And Walker] damages, at the rate of thirty per cent., applied to the prime cost; and had ■credited these damages against the notes of the defendants, as of the time when the teas were delivered. [See Case No. 18,189.]

<p>[Claim by the executor and heirs of Agustín ■de Tturbide for 400 square leagues in Upper •California.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court against the barque Yuba, to recover the amount due on a bottomry bond for $9,240, given by her master at New Orleans, for money required to repair her, she having put into that port in distress.

This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court against the bark Yuba, to recover the amount of a bottomry bond on the vessel, executed at New Orleans. [The vessel was in New Orleans in distress, and was repaired under the directions of her master, and the money advanced by the firm of Ad. Odier, Stouse & Leisy, who took this bond for the amount with maritime interest of 20 per cent, and afterwards transferred it to the libellant.

<p>Case No. 18,194.</p> <p>Salvage — Authority and Duty of Master of Wreck—Intruding Salvors—Amount of Compensation.</p> <p>[1. The master of a ship wrecked upon the coast continues to be the master, with all a master’s rights, authority, and responsibility, as long as anything remains of ship or cargo to be saved by him. And he cannot divest himself of that character, or so delegate his authority to a salvor as that he may not at any time resume it He has the custody and charge of the property, and may make such arrangements as he sees fit for saving it, and no stranger can interfere without his consent.]</p> <p>[2. One who weighs up and carries off, against the express commands of the master, cargo accidentally fallen overboard in the salvage operations, and which the authorized salvors intend to save at their earliest convenience, can recover no salvage therein. Nor can he have salvage in cargo which he takes from the wreck during the temporary absence of the master and authorized salvors.]</p> <p>[3. Forty-three per cent, allowed, upon a gross valuation of $41,924.26, for saving cargo, mainly by diving, from a vessel totally wrecked on Florida Reef; 9 vessels and 96 men being employed for about 17 days. Also 60 per cent, allowed to small boats upon remnants of cargo saved by diving after the wreck was abandoned by the principal salvors.]</p> <p>[4. A vessel, employed for a Stipulated sum, by the principal salvors, with the acquiescence of the master of the wrecked ship, cannot, under any circumstances, recover salvage in addition to the sum agreed.]</p>

On bill of injunction [by David G. Yueng-ling, Jr., against Fountain D. Johnson] to enjoin the infringement of a patent right. Motion for a rule to show cause against .a preliminary injunction was made on August 8th, 1877, in the -circuít court at Norfolk; and also a motion ex parte, without notice, for an immediate restraining order. Exhibits were filed with the bill, consisting of the affidavits of experts, and extracts from the records of the patent office.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiffs [Antonio Yznaga and others] as importers of foreign merchandise, against the defendant [Charles H. I’easlee] as collector of the port of Boston, to recover back an alleged excess of duties which they had previously paid on an importation from Trinidad, of two hundred hogsheads of Mus-covado sugars. The goods were entered at the custom-house at Boston for warehousing at the public stores, October 28,1853.

This was an action [by Antonio Yznaga and others] against [Hernán J. BedfieldJ the collector of the port of New York to recover back a penalty of twenty per cent, imposed, for undervaluation, upon a cargo of molasses and sugar, imported from Cuba into that port.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Pennsylvania.] In 1807, Albert G. Fry, George Duerr, and Wm. Holzner, came from York county, Pa., to Cambria county, for the apparent purpose of manufacturing and selling lumber.

<p>Case No. 18,200.</p> <p>Patents ron Self-Ci.osing Faucet—Anticipation.</p> <p>1. The patent for a self-closing faucet, granted to Nathaniel Jenkins. June 27th, ÍSG3. was not anticipated by the French patent of Chre-t>en Morand, dated November 14th, 1S51.</p> <p>2. Where an anticipating device has been changed, so that by the change the thing which is produced is practically a new structure, the new device, though subsidiary to the former one, is patentable.</p> <p>[See Zane v. Peck Bros., 9 Fed. 101, and 13 Fed. 475.]</p>

This was an appeal from the district court, where the appellant filed a petition praying to be paid the sum of 8408.10 cents, due to him for a certain number of water casks, and two barrels of vinegar, furnished the brig President, at Baltimore, where she then lay, in October, 1821. as part of her outfits.

<p>Case No. 18,203.</p> <p>CONDEMNATION OP PRIZE—EVIDENCE—SPOLIATION op Papers—Decree bt Default.</p> <p>1. The vessel was destroyed by her captors because unfit to be sent in for adjudication. The cargo was sent in. Held, that the court had judicial cognizance of the capture of the vessel without having her within its territorial jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. The crew of the vessel were, at their request, put on shore by the captors, and no person on board of her at her capture was sent in for examination. On special leave of the court, witnesses from the capturing vessel were examined.</p> <p>3. The rule that the testimony for the condemnation of the prize must be obtained directly from documents or witnesses found on board of her at the time of her seizure is always adhered to, unless satisfactory reasons are shown for its non-observance.</p> <p>4. The court, during the present war, always regards, by force of the standing prize rules, a decree by default, regularly obtained, as equivalent to an admission on the record of the offence charged in the libel.</p> <p>5. Spoliation of papers not explained by satisfactory proof.</p> <p>6. Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

In the ease of Augustus Zarega, heard before the United States district court of New York, one of the questions submitted to the court for its decision was whether the certificate of the bankrupt, under the laws of this country, would discharge him from the debts of those creditors who reside abroad?

The fishing schooner Pescador, of Gloucester, of ninety-one tons burden, and having a crew of nine men, all told, fell in with this derelict near the edge of George’s Banks on the 27th of March. 1864, and undertook to tow her to Gloucester, a distance of about one hundred and eighty miles, abandoning her own voyage. The wind and weather were not favorable,- and on the second day, in trying to make the harbor, the Pescador broke her main-boom.

[This was an action by Albert Zeiber against Andrew Hill, assignee of Thomas Martin, to recover the balance of an amount alleged to be due him for keeping defendant’s sheep.]

<p>Case No. 18,207.</p> <p>Shippixg — Rights of Passengehs — Delay in Sailing.</p> <p>[Plaintiff engaged passage in a ship from New York to California, paid his passage money, and obtained a receipt therefor. Becoming dissatisfied at the delay in sailing, he complained to the ship’s agent, who thereupon added to the receipt the words “Ship to sail 27th October.” Before that day plaintiff demanded his passage money back, which was refused, but half of it was tendered to him. This he refused, and on Nov. 7th the ship sailed without him. It was claimed that the delay beyond Oct. 27th was caused solely by storms. Belch that as plaintiff, before that date, had determined not to take passage in the ship, he had no cause of complaint that she did not sail on that day, and that under the circumstances he should have a decree for one-half the money, leaving the rest as indemnity to the ship for expenses in preparation for carrying him on the voyage.]</p>

This was a libel filed by Henry J. Carr against the bark Zenobia, in rem, and also in personam against her master, A. E. Cron-stadt, to recover damages for the non-performance of a contract of affreightment.

This was a libel filed by Henry J. Carr against the bark Zenobia in rem, and also in personam against her master, A. R. Crou-stadt. The case was brought before the court in July, 1847, upon a motion by the master to require the libellant to elect between the two remedies sought by him, and upon exceptions filed by the owner, as elaim-ant, to the jurisdiction of the court, and to the form of the libel.

This was a libel, upon a bottomry bond, against the schooner Zephyr, her cargo, and freight. The schooner was bound on a voyage from Messina in Sicily to Boston, with a cargo consisting principally of fruit, and being greatly injured by the perils of the sea during her voyage was compelled to put into the port of Lisbon for repairs and refitment.

<p>Case No. 18,212.</p> <p>Attachment Proceeding—Breach op Contract — Unliquidated Damages — Jurisdiction op County Court — Injunction against Judgment.</p> <p>1. Under the local law of Georgia, no attachment lies for the recovery of unliquidated damages consequent upon the breach of a contract.</p> <p>2. And when from the answer of the garnishees, it appears that there are no debts due the defendants in attachment in the county where the proceedings are commenced, and none of their property is seized in the county, the county court has no jurisdiction to proceed further in the case.</p> <p>3. A judgment in attachment will be enjoined in equity if the defendant had no actual notice, and had a good defense, and his failure to make defense was owing not to any fault or negligence on his part, but to the fault of the plaintiff.</p> <p>This was a cause in equity which was submitted for final decree on the pleadings and evidence.</p>

Suit by Augustus Zarega and others against Edward A. Gee and others for freight on bill of lading from Liverpool to this port. A lot of iron was delivered to respondents by the libellants in this port, in a very rusty condition, produced by water or soda ash stains. The bill of lading had a reservation written on it, “Ship not accountable for rust,” and the libellants proved that the cargo was put on board at Liverpool badly rusted.

This was a libel in personam, by Augustus Zerega, Thomas Andrews, and Isaiah C. Whit-more, owners of the ship James H. Shepherd, against Edward Poppe and Theodore Poppe, to recover the freight of' thirty-two casks of linseed oil, shipped on board the James H. Shepherd, at Antwerp, and consigned to the defendants at this port.

<p>Case No. 18,214.</p> <p>Removal of Causes—Amount in Dispute.</p> <p>[Where a suit is commenced by summons, and no complaint is filed showing the amount in dispute. defendant may, in a proper case, in his petition for removal, show that the amount in controversy exceeds 8500, and thereby obtain a removal to the federal court; and, the jurisdiction of the latter court having attached, plaintiff cannot acquire a right to have the case returned to the state court by afterwards filing a complaint, stating the amount in dispute at less than $500.]</p>

<p>[Proceedings in the matter of William G. Zinn and others, bankrupts. For prior proceedings, see Case No. 18,216.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,216.</p> <p>Assignee in Bankruptcy—Qualifications.</p> <p>The election of a near relative of the bankrupt as assignee is not. proper. In such ease, the appointment by the register of a regular as-signee (according to the rules of the district) will be confirmed.</p> <p>[For subsequent proceedings, see Case No. 18,215.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,217.</p> <p>Collision — Opposite Courses — Lights—Remiss Lookouts—Steamer and Schooner— Steamer’s Dutt.</p> <p>1. A collision took place at night off Cape May, between the steamship Z. and the schooner W. W. The schooner was heading S. W. by S., and going about 7 knots, with a fresh breeze from S. E. The steamer was heading N. E. by N., when a red light ahead was seen, soon after changing to red and green, and then to green. The steamer then starboarded one point, changing her course to N. N. E., when the schooner changed her course and showed her red light alone. It was not till after this change that the schooner noticed the steamer. The steamer immediately put her heim hard-a-port, whistled, slowed, stopped and backed, but struck the port side of the schooner, sinking her. In extremis, the schooner ported hard. The schooner averred that the steamer had a bright light visible, but no red- or green light. The testimony of the lookout and of the wheelsman of the schooner was not taken: Held, that it was a fault on the part of the schooner for her lookout not to have sooner seen the white light of the steamer.</p> <p>2. There can be no doubt that the steamer’s green and red lights were burning.</p> <p>3. The steamer was in fault in not starboard-ing enough when the schooner showed her green light. Damage apportioned.</p> <p>[Cited in The Beta, 40 Fed. 900.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,218.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction’—Materials Furnished at Home Ports—C. O. D. Bills—Liens and Mortgages—Priorities.</p> <p>1. The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts in no way depends on the residence, or citizenship of the parties.</p> <p>2. It is only when liens are given by state laws for materials supplied at home ports that they can be enforced in the admiralty courts.</p> <p>3. When goods are delivered to the master of a vessel to transport to consignees and collect and return the money therefor, the consignor has a lien against the vessel for the money so collected, since the whole contract is one of af-freightment.</p> <p>[Disapproved in The Illinois, Case No. 7,005.]</p> <p>4. The master and clerk of a vessel are not entitled to liens for their wages.</p> <p>5. Maritime liens have priority over mortgages.</p> <p>[Cited in The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 18, 13 Sup. Ct. 502.]</p>

This was a libel in rem to recover damage to a quantity of almonds shipped under a French bill of lading, of which the following is a translation. “Marseilles, February 6, 1858.

<p>Case No. 18,221.</p> <p>Collision—Doties op Togs and Tows.</p> <p>1. The contract of towage implies knowledge of the channel and safe pilotage.</p> <p>2. Good seamanship requires that vessels of heavy draft should be placed behind those of lighter draft.</p> <p>[Followed in The Sweepstakes, Case No. 13,-687. Cited in Orhanovich v. The America, 4 Fed. 340.]</p> <p>3. An improper order given in a moment of imminent peril is no fault.</p> <p>[Cited in The Coleman, Case No. 2,981.]</p> <p>The case of The Morton [Case No. 9,864], cited in this opinion, was reversed on appeal.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,222.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Proceedings—Ascertaining Character op Assets—Partnership Real Estate —Appeal to Circuit Court.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt law [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)] does not prescribe any rule or furnish any method for ascertaining the character of distributable assets. That is a subject of preliminary judicial inquiry, to be determined by legal principles of recognized controlling applicability.</p> <p>2. As to questions touching the tenure of real estate, the federal courts are to be governed by the laws and decisions of local tribunals of the country where such real estate is situated.</p> <p>3. Where real estate has been held by partners as tenants in common, the classification thereof as partnership assets, in the schedule filed by them, will not change the nature of the title to the prejudice of the rights of separate creditors.</p> <p>4. An appeal to the circuit court is allowed only upon final 'decrees of the district court in a suit in equity by or against an assignee where the sum in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars.</p>

<p>Appeal from Independence circuit court.</p> <p>[Suit by Samuel Allen against Elizabeth Allén for divorce. From a decree of the circuit court, plaintiff appeals.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,224.</p> <p>Abatement—Form op Plea—Evidence.</p> <p>1. Pleas in abatement, not being received with favor, require the greatest accuracy and precision in their form, and must be certain to every intent, and are not amendable; they must not be double.</p> <p>2. If bad, the plaintiff need not demur, but may treat them as nullities and sign judgment.</p> <p>3. If on the whole record the judgment of the inferior court is correct, it will not be reversed because improper evidence was admitted.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,225.</p> <p>Trial op Issues—EpPect op Judgment—Plea op Payment—Interest.</p> <p>1. Where a case is submitted to the court, all. questions of law and fact involved, are necessarily passed on, and the result is embodied in the judgment.</p> <p>2. In such case no formal and technical finding of the issue is necessary.</p> <p>3. A general finding for the plaintiff or defendant by a jury is good, and disposes of all the issues.</p> <p>4. A plea of payment admits all the allegations in the plaintiff’s declaration, essential to support the action, and it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove them.</p> <p>5. Judgment may be given for interest from the maturity of the note, or in damages. Either mode is regular.</p>

] This was a petition of Hyppoletus Estko and others, against admitting the following will to probate: “This is my will: I, the undersigned, Thadeus Kosciusko, residing at Buwille, in the township of Geneviage, department of Seine and Marm, being at present at Solena, in Switzerland.

<p>Case No. 18,227.</p> <p>Garnishment—Prospective Operation op Act— Double Judgment por Single Debt.</p> <p>1. Garnishments could not issue on judgments rendered prior to November 7, 1831, as the garnishment act was prospective and not retrospective. Ter. Dig. 346.</p> <p>2. A double judgment cannot be rendered for a single debt.</p>

[Indictment of Ludam A. Bargie for false pretences.] There were two counts in the indictment, the substance of which will be found in the opinion of the court. The jury brought in a verdict of guilty.

<p>Appeal from orphans’ court.</p> <p>At law.</p>

In equity. [Bill for an injunction.] The bill in substance states that the American brig Caspian was sold with her cargo in Montevideo, in South America, on the 20th of September, 1827, to sundry persons, one of whom, Stephen J. Lewis, late of New York, but now deceased, acquired an interest of 85,000, or one-fifth part thereof.

[This was an action of debt by George Bentley against Samuel B. Joslin and others. From a judgment against plaintiff for costs, he appeals.]

<p>[Scire facias by Eli Bentley, executor of the will of .George Bentley, against Ambrose H. Sevier and others.]</p>

[Motion to appoint an executor.] It appears that all the executors named in the will of Thos. H. Benton had renounced or -failed to qualify and give bonds when summoned.

At law. This was a suit brought by [R. A. Davis, to the use of Thomas Waters, against Mary R. Bibbs] on the following instrument in writing: “September 9, 1S58. Balance, due on settlement with Mr. R. A. Davis, by me, 34 dollars. Mary R. Bjibbs.” Judgment was rendered against the appellant for the. amount, with interest, from September 9, 185S, and costs, by William A. King, a justice of the peace. On appeal the judgment was affirmed.

[On a writ of habeas corpus.] Four United States sailors named Richard Biddle, Sam’l Kays, David Hazard, and John MeKenny. The first and second were tried by a court martial at Norfolk, Val; the others, by a court martial at New York City, and convicted and sentenced to service at hard labor in the penitentiary of this District.

<p>Case No. 18,237.</p> <p>Appeals—Notice.</p> <p>If the .appeal is prayed on the day of trial, notice is unnecessary, and the appeal bond may be given at any time within ten days.</p>

[Bill in chancery by William Blakeley against Henry L. Biscoe for an accounting. Defendant demurred to the bill, and the demurrer was sustained.]

<p>Case No. 18,240.</p> <p>Appeal—When Lies.</p> <p>An appeal will not lie except from a final decision or judgment, and where none is given, the appellate court has not jurisdiction.</p>

[At law. Action of trover by William Blakely, administrator of Moses Graham, against Abraham Ruddell. There was a verdict and judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.]

<p>Case No. 18,242.</p> <p>Patents — Validity — Planing, Tonguing, and Grooving Machine.</p> <p>[The Woodworth patent of December 27, 1S2S, and the reissue thereof granted July 8, 1845. are both valid.]</p> <p>[Cited in Pitts v. Edmonds, Case No. 11,191.]</p> <p>Jury affirmed both questions.</p> <p>[For cases involving this patent, see note to Bicknell v. Todd, Case No. 1,389.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,243.</p> <p>Collision —Fekrtboat with Scow — Change op Course.</p> <p>[Where a ferryboat laden with passengers changed her course to avoid being run into by a sloop which had missed stays, and, in consequence of such change, collided with a scow, held, that she was free from fault, it appearing that she reversed as soon as it was perceived that the change of course involved risk of striking the scow, and that a collision with the sloop would probably have been disastrous.]</p> <p>[Reversed by circuit court in Case No. 18,244.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by John A. Bouker against the steam ferry boat Delaware.

[At law. Scire facias under lien law.] This action, under the act of March 2, 1833, was commenced by serving on the defendant the following writ: “District of Columbia, the United States of America, to wit—To the Marshal of the D. C., Greeting: Whereas, a ■certain Andrew D. Caldwell did, on the 9th day of March, A. D. 1849, file in the clerk’s ■office of the circuit court of the D. C., for the county of Washington, his certain account •or claim against a certain William H.…

<p>Case No. 18,246.</p> <p>Violation of National Banking Laws—Fraud and Embezzlement by Bank Officers and ¡Directors—Necessity for Punishment—Duty of Grand Jurt.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,247</p> <p>Frauds ox the Revenue.</p> <p>1. Description of the manner in which frauds on the revenue are perpetrated, in obtaining from the government the payment of moneys on drawbacks, on the exportation of goods which have paid internal revenue taxes.</p> <p>2. Frauds in the warehouse department, commented upon.</p> <p>3. The subject of giving and taking gratuities for the performance of official duties, referred to.</p> <p>4. The duties of a grand jury, enforced.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,248.</p> <p>Authority axd Duty ofGkaxd Juries—Examination of Public Officers.</p> <p>[A grand jury of the united States should not be satisfied by acting upon such cases only as may be < brought before them by the district attorney. They have authority, and it is their duty, to summon before them officers of the government, and others who, they have reason to believe, possess information proper for their action. Officers connected with the collection of internal revenue—collectors and assessors, and their subordinates—may with special propriety be thus examined.)</p>

Extract from tbe charge of Mr. Justice CUK-TIS to the grand jury, concerning the law of corporal punishment in the merchant service.

<p>Case No. 18,250.</p> <p>Obstructing Process-Federal and State Laws —PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY.</p> <p>[1. The criminal laws of the United States are to be enforced by the federal judiciary, including grand juries summoned by the federal courts, without any regard to the criminal laws of the state in which the court is sitting, or the nature of the crime under the state laws.]</p> <p>[2. The act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 112), making it a misdemeanor to willfully obstruct, resist, or oppose an officer of the United States in serving or executing any process or warrant, embraces every legal process whatsoever, whether issued by a court in session or by a judge or magistrate, or commissioner acting in the due administration of any law of the United States.]</p> <p>[3. To constitute the offense of obstructing the service of process under this statute, it is not necessary that the accused shall have used or even threatened active violence. Any obstruction to the free action of the officer or his lawful assistants, willfully placed in his or their way, is sufficient. If a multitude of persons should assemble, even in a public highway, with the design to stand together and thus prevent the officer from passing freely along the way in the execution of his precept, and he should thus be hindered or obstructed, this would, of itself, and without any active violence, be an obstruction, within the meaning of the law.]</p> <p>[4. In cases of misdemeanor, not only those who are present, participating in the act, but those who. though absent when the offense was committed, did procure, counsel, command, or abet others to commit it, are indictable as principals.]</p> <p>[5. Language addressed to persons who immediately afterwards commit an offense, if actually intended by the speaker to incite those addressed to commit it, and adapted thus to incite them, is such a counseling or advising to the crime as the law contemplates, and the person so inciting is liable to indictment as a principal.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,251.</p> <p>Frauds ufo>: the Revenue—Counterfeiting the Currency — Violations of Postal Laws — Corruption and Intimidation of Juries.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,252.</p> <p>Elections and Voters—Constitutional Law-Enforcement Act of 1870.</p> <p>[1. The ac,t of May 31, 1S70 (16 Stat. 140), to enforce the rights of citizens of the United Slates to vote in the several states of the Union, which provides, in section 1, that “all citizens of the United States, who are otherwise qualified to vote by the laws of the states in which they live, shall be entitled to and allowed to vote at all elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” is not unconstitutional on the ground of discriminating between different classes of citizens. The words, “without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” are general terms, descriptive in character, and are not restricted, and do not limit the preceding words, which apply to all citizens otherwise qualified to vote.J</p> <p>[2. under section 2 of that act, which relates to registration of voters, any officer having charge of the registration of voters under the state laws, who “refuses or Knowingly omits to give full effect to the law,” by placing the name of any citizen on the list of voters, who applies for registration, and who is entitled under the state constitution and laws to be registered as a voter, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to a criminal prosecution, as well as to a civil action by the party aggrieved.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,253.</p> <p>Shipping—Public Regulations—Negligence in Respect to Steam Vessels.</p> <p>[The twelfth section of the act of 1838 (5 Stat. 804), which declares that every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on board of any steam vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to duty the lives of any persons on board may be destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, makes the negligence, etc., in question a crime, when followed by the consequences named, without regard to the question of motive or intent on the part of the persons charged.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,254.</p> <p>Violation of Election Laws—Act of Mat 30-1S70, Analyzed and Explained.</p>

At a term of the circuit court, of the United States for the district of Cali'fornia. held at San Francisco on the 26th of August. 1872, a grand jury was empaneled, and to its foreman the following oath was administered: “You, as foreman of this inquest for the body of the district of California, do swear that you will diligently inquire, and true presentment make, of such articles, matters and things as shall be given you in charge, or otherwise come to your knowledge,…

<p>Case No. 18,256.</p> <p>Constitutional Law—Power or Congress to Protect Commerce — Penal Enactments —Insurrection—Belligerent Rights—Functions 'o‘r Jduiciart.</p> <p>[1. The clause In the constitution which gives to congress the power to define and punish piracy is not the only provision conferring authority to protect the commerce of the United States by penal enactments. The power given to regulate commerce, and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying that power into effect, invests congress with authority to give full protection to commerce by its criminal jurisprudence.]</p> <p>[2. Statutes passed by congress in pursuance of this power are of paramount authority, and cannot be invalidated or impaired by the action of any state or states. Any law, ordinance, or constitution made by them for that purpose is wholly nugatory, and can ailord no legal protection to these who may act under it.]</p> <p>[3. In case of an attempted revolution to overthrow the authority of the United States, where a numDer of states combine for that purpose, it is the province of the political department of the government to determine whether belligerent rights shall be accorded to them. Until belligerent rights are so accorded, the judiciary cannot recognize any right in the insurgents to carry on legitimate war, but must regard them as rebels and lawless aggressors upon the citizens of the United States, and apply to them the penal laws which make their acts punishable as crimes.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,257.</p> <p>Grand Juries—Evidence to Justify Presentment.</p> <p>[Grand jurors should present no one, unless. In their deliberate judgment, the evidence before them is sufficient, in the absence of any other proof, to justify the conviction of the party accused.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,258.</p> <p>Civil Rights Bill—Effect.</p> <p>1.In North Carolina, the equal rights. In Inns and public conveyances, of all persons without distinction of class, are fully protected by state statutes, and existed as to inns at common law; and the act o£ congress commonly called the "Civil RightsBill,” was unnecessary in the state; and its only effect is to give jurisdiction of wrongs committed against citizens on account of class to the federal courts.</p> <p>2. These laws, state and national, were intended to secure political and legal equality of rights to all citizens, but were not intended to establish social equality, or to enforce social intercourse between different classes of citizens.</p> <p>3. Quaere, whether the civil rights acts of congress are constitutional in so far as they legislate upon the rights which appertain to men in their character as citizens of the states as distinguished from those which belong to them as citizens of the United States?</p>

The laws of Virginia intrust the whole duty of selecting jurors to serve in the state courts. to the judges of the county courts.

<p>Case No. 18,260.</p> <p>Constitutional Law—Civil Rights of Colored People — Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.</p> <p>[1. The thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States simply abolished slavery. It gave the freedman no right of protection from the federal government superior to that of his white fellow citizens, and no exemption from the power of state control which might be exercised against others. It gave congiess no more authority to enact that he should have the right'to vote, to testify, to make contracts, to hold real estate, exercise trade, attend public school, or any other matter within the limits of a state, than it does to enact the same thing in reference to white men.J</p> <p>[2. The provision of the fourteenth amendment, that “no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;” prohibits the action of the state alone; it gave congress no power to legislate against the wrongs and personal violence of citizens.]</p> <p>[3. The privileges and immunities which this clause forbids the states to abridge are only that limited class which depend immediately upon the constitution of the United States, such as the right to pass from state to state and to the national capital, to protection upon the high seas and in foreign countries, and the like.]</p> <p>[4. Congress has no authority, under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, or otherwise, to declare it a crime for any individuals to deny to negroes the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of the theaters and inns of a state.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,261.</p> <p>The Fugitive Slave Law.</p> <p>1. Considerations stated, which led lo the enactment of the law of September 18, 1850 (9 Stat. 462), commonly called "The Fugitive Slave Law."</p> <p>2. The several provisions of that law examined.</p> <p>3. The prior act of February 12, 1793 (1 Stat. 302), was constitutional.</p> <p>4. In regard to the power conferred by the act of 1850 upon those appointed to administer it judicially, It simply substitutes commissioners in place of the state magistrates to whom the act of 1793 confided the power.</p> <p>6.The power to execute the act of 1850 is exclusive in the federal courts and officers named in it.</p> <p>6. State tribunals and officers cannot, by the writ of habeas corpus, interfere with the federal authorities when they are acting upon cases arising under that act.</p> <p>7. Nor can the state tribunals, under that writ, en-quire into the constitutionality of the law or the jurisdiction of the federal court oi officer.</p> <p>8. The writ may be issued by the state authority, and it is the duty of the federal officer to make a return to it; but, when it appears that the detainer is by virtue of process issued under the act of 1850, any further proceeding under the writ is void.</p> <p>9. In such case the federal officer must not give the party up, but must maintain his process with all the power conferred upon him.</p> <p>10. The last clause of section 6 of the act of 1850 includes, among other process, the state writ of habeas corpus: but it does not embrace that writ when issued by the federal judiciary.</p> <p>11. 'The constitutionality of the provisions of the act of 1850, which confer on commissioners the power to act under it, and which provide for a summary hearing and decision, was settled bv the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. [41 U. S.] 539.</p> <p>12. The "judicial power" mentioned in the constitution and vested in the "courts." means the power conferred upon "courts” in the strict sense of that term —-courts that compose one of the three great departments of the government; and not power judicial in its nature, or quasi judicial, invested from time to time in individuals, separately or collectively, for a particular purpose and limited time.</p> <p>13. The proceeding contemplated by the clause, of the constitution in regard to the delivery of fugitives from service or labor, is not a suit at common law, within the meaning-of the seventh amendment to the constitution.</p> <p>14. So far as state laws conflict with the act of 1850, or tend to obstruct and embarrass its execution, they are utterly void.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,262.</p> <p>The Fugitive Slave Law.</p> <p>X. So far as It respects an obstruction to the execution of legal process, or a forcible rescue of a fugitive from service, under the act of September IS, 1850 (9 Stat. 462), commonly called “The Fugitive Slave Law,” the provisions of that act probably supersede those of the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 112), with one exception.</p> <p>2. The provision in the 22d section of the act of 1790, for the case of assaulting, beating or wounding any federal officer, or other person duly authorized, while engaged in serving or executing any process, may apply as well to the execution of process under the act of 1850 as under any other act, the case not being specifically provided for in the act of 1850, and there being no necessary repugnancy between the two acts in this respect.</p> <p>3. There is some doubt whether a circuit court has Jurisdiction of the offences named in the 7th section of the act of 1850, as that act in terms limits cognizance of those offences to the district courts.</p> <p>4. It may be a question whether the provision of the 11th section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 78), conferring on the circuit court concurrent jurisdiction with the district court of all crimes and offences cognizable therein, applies to jurisdiction subsequently conferred on the district court in as specific terms as that conferred by the act of 1850.</p> <p>5. The provision of the 2d'section of the act of August S, 1846 (9 Stat. 72), by which the district court is authorized to remit to the circuit court any indictment pending in the district court, no doubt embraces the cases specified in the 7th section of the act of 1850.</p> <p>6. The consequences of forcible resistance and obstruction to the execution of the act of 1850, considered.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,263.</p> <p>Tkeason against the United States— Resist- . '■ . ANCE TO THE EXECUTION ‘OF- A Law.</p> <p>[1. A mere treasonable conspiracy, whether for the purpose of entirely overthrowing the government, or to prevent the execution of any of its laws, is not sufficient to constitute the crime of treason, as defined by the constitution of the United States. In addition to the conspiracy, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying the conspiracy into effect by force.]</p> <p>[2. A conspiracy to prevent, by force, the execution of any one law of the United States in all cases, is a treasonable conspiracy; and if there be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying this intention into effect,—that is, of acting together, and preventing by force the execution of the law generally,—this constitutes a levying of war, and involves the crime of treason.]</p> <p>[3. The sudden outbreak of a mob, or the assembling of men, in order, by force, to prevent the execution of a law in a particular instance, and then to disperse, without any intention of continuing together or reassembling for defeating the law generally and in all cases, is not a levying of war such as constitutes treason.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,264.</p> <p>Thb Law of jSel’tkalitx'.</p> <p>1. The 6th section of the act ot April 20,1818 (3 Stat. 449), fobidding military expeditions by individuals against countries with which the United States are at peace, commented on.</p> <p>2. The duties of neutrality, enforced.</p>

In regard to aiding or favoring unlawful military combinations, by our citizens, against any foreign government, or people, with whom we are at peace.

<p>Case No. 18,266.</p> <p>Violation op Neutrality Laws — Setting on Foot Military Expedition against Friendly Power.</p> <p>fUnder the provision of the sixth section of the act of 1818 (3 Stat. 449), making it a misdemeanor to “begin or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise,” the overt act is not an invasion of a foreign country, but taking the incipient steps in the enterprise, such as providing the means for the expedition, furnishing munitions of war or money, enlisting men, and in short doing anything and everything that is necessary to the commencement and prosecution of the enterprise.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,267.</p> <p>Violation of Neutralitt Laws — Setting < N Foot Military Expedition—International Laiv.</p> <p>[1. The acts enumerated in section 6 ol the neutrality law oí April 20, 1818 (3 Stat. 449), are all in the disjunctive. The offense is consummated by any overt act which shall be a commencement of an expedition, though it should not be prosecuted. Any combination of individuals to carry on an expedition is “setting it on foot,” within the meaning of the statute, and the contribution of money or anything else which shall induce such combination may be a beginning of the enterprise.]</p> <p>[2. A person may be convicted of “providing the means” for such an enterprise, if he furnish munitions of war, provisions, transportation, clothing, or any other necessaries to men engaged in the expedition.]</p> <p>[3. Citizens of the United States, who organize an expedition and invade a province or colony which is part of the dominions of a power with which the United States are at peace, thereby place themselves beyond the pale of civilization, and become pirates and outlaws.]</p> <p>[4. If citizens of one nation commit depredations against another, and are not punished by their own government or given up to the injured government for punishment, the nation to whom they owe allegiance becomes a party to their wrong, under the principles of international law.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,268.</p> <p>Violation of Nectiiality Laws — Fiiepauino Militaky Expedition.</p> <p>[“To provide or prepare the means for” any military expedition or enterprise, within the meaning of the neutrality laws, such preparation must be made as shall aid the expedition. The contribution of money, clothing for the troops, provisions, arms, or any other contributions, which shall tend to forward the expedition or add to the comfort or maintenance of those engaged in it, is a violation of the law. These acts must all be done under such circumstances as to show the criminal intent, unless such intent shall he avowed. Following Case No. 18,265.]</p>

Extract from a charge delivered to the grand jury in Boston, October 15, 1851, concerning the neutrality laws and the law of treason:

<p>Case No. 18,269a.</p> <p>Slave Teade—Statutes—Interpbetation—Con-stitutional Law.</p> <p>[1. A vessel becomes liable to forfeiture because built or equipped In the United States for use in transporting slaves from one foreign country to another (Act Cong. March 22, 1794; 1 Stat. 347) as soon as any preparation of it for such purpose is made, a completion of the equipment not being necessary.]</p> <p>[2. A vessel is “employed in the transportation of slaves from one foreign country to another” (Act Cong. May 10, 1800; Rev. St. U. S. § 6556), bo as to be liable to forfeiture, when il is on a voyage to procure slaves for that purpose, though no slaves have as yet been taken on board.]</p> <p>[3. Service on a voyage known to be for the purpose of procuring slaves for transportation from one foreign country to another is a violation of Act Cong. May 10, 1800 (Rev. St § 6381), forbidding citizens and residents of the United States to serve on a vessel used in such transportation.]</p> <p>[4. Under the power to define and punish piracies (Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, subd. 10), congress may declare to be piracy the service of a citizen or resident of the United States on a vessel used in kidnapping the inhabitants of a foreign country for the purpose of making them slaves, or the use of a vessel owned in the United States in such kidnapping.]</p> <p>[5. Congress ■ has power to prohibit citizens and residents of the United States from engaging in the slave trade with or between foreign countries, both under tbe power to regulate commerce (Const, art. 1, § 8, subd. 3), and because such traffic concerns the relations between citizens of the United States and those of foreign countries.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,270.</p> <p>The Law or Treason.</p> <p>1. The provision of the- constitution of the United States in regard to treason, explained.</p> <p>2. What acts constitute treason and misprision of treason, under the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 112), defined.</p> <p>3. A mere conspiracy to subvert by force the government, is not treason.</p> <p>i. The combination oí a body ol men, with the design ■of seizing, and the actual seizing, of the forts and other public property of the United States, is a levying of war against the United States, and is treason.</p> <p>5. All persons engaged therein are by the law regarded as levying war against the United States; and all who adhere to them are to be regarded as enemies; and all who give them, In any part of the United .States, aid and comfort, come within the provisions of the act of April 30, 17S0, and are guilty of treason.</p> <p>6. "What amounts to adhering to the enemies of the United States and giving them aid and comfort, explained.</p> <p>■7. The extent of the jurisdiction of this court in regard to the offences of treason and misprision of treason, defined.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,271.</p> <p>The Law of Treason.</p> <p>1. To constitute the crime of treason, in levying war against the United States, as defined in article 3, i 3, of the constitution, there must be an actual levying of war. A consultation or conspiracy to do so is not an overt act, within the constitutional definition.</p> <p>2. what acts constitute adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort, within article 3, § 3, of the constitution, considered.</p> <p>3. Words, oral, written or printed, however treasonable, seditious or criminal of themselves, do not constitute an overt act of treason.</p> <p>4. The extent to which the fact of the use of such words may be used, in finding an indictment, or on the trial of it, considered.</p> <p>5. There is no law of the United States making thG. use of treasonable words an offence.</p> <p>6. In a civil war, persons who adhere to their allegiance, are not, although they reside in an insur-rectionary district, regarded as enemies; and trade with such persons in good faith and without collusion with the enemy, is lawful, unless interdicted by the government.</p> <p>7. The provisions of the act of July 13, 1861* (12 Stat. 255), in regard to trade with territory in insurrection, explained, as bearing on the subject of treason.</p>

<p>Case No. 18,272.</p> <p>TREASON AGAINST UNITED STATES—CONSTITUTIONAL Definition—Acts Covered Thereby—Conspiracy to Overthrow Government—Recruiting Insurrectionary Forces.</p> <p>. [1. To be employed in actual service in an army raised to oppose the government in its action, or directly or indirectly to aid or assist in the levying or embodying of a military force for the subversion of the -government, are plainly acts of “levying war/* and involve the commission of the crime of treason The constitutional definition of treason, however, h> of broader signification, and includes all those who .join a hostile army after war is begun.]</p> <p>[2. Treason may be predicated of acts which are not a direct levying of war. The words “adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,” include, in general, any act committed after war actually exists which indicates a want of loyalty to the government and sympathy with its enemies, and which, by fair construction, is directly in furtherance of their hostile designs. If this be the natural effect of'the .act, though prompted solely by the expectation of pecuniary gain, it is treasonable in character.]</p> <p>[3. Thus, after war actually exists, it is treasonable to sell to, or provide arms or munitions of war, •or military stores and suDplies, including food, clothing, etc., for the use of. the enemy; to hire, sell, or furnish boats, railroad cars, or other means of transportation, or to advance money or obtain credits for the use and support of the hostile army; and to communicate intelligence to the enemy by letter, telegraph, or otherwise, relating to the strength, movements, or position of the army.]</p> <p>[4. The meaning of the words “overt act” as used in the constitutional definition of treason and in the statute, is an act of a character susceptible of clear proof, and not resting in mere inference or conjecture. They were intended to exclude the possibility of a conviction upon proof of facts which were only treasonable by construction or inference, or which had no better foundation than mere suspicion.]</p> <p>[5.. Mere expressions of opinion indicative of sympathy with the public enemy, though sufficient to justify a strong feeling of indignation against the individual, and the suspicion that he is at heart a traitor, are not sufficient, under the constitution and laws, to warrant a conviction of treason.]</p> <p>[6. The act of August 6, 1863 (12 Stat. 317), making it a high misdemeanor to recruit soldiers or sailors in any state or territory to engage in armed hostility against the United States, or to open a recruiting station for the enlistment of such persons, was intended to reach acts not deemed treasonable under the statute ■of 1790.]</p> <p>[7. The act of July 31, 1861 C12 Stat. 284), making it a high crime to conspire to overthrow or destroy by force the government of the United States, or to levy war against the United States, or oppose by force their authority, or to do certain other acts therein specified, was designed to punish the mere act of, conspiring, which, under the constitutional definition and the act of 1790, do not involve the crime of treason, unless there is an attempt to consummate the treasonable act.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,273.</p> <p>■Constitutional Law — Supremacy op National Government — Resistance by States to Enforcement op Laws—What Constitutes Treason—Jurisdiction op National Courts- Modes of Procedure—Qualifications and Selection of Jurors.</p> <p>[1. The government of the united States is not a mere confederacy. It is, on the contrary, a government possessing the highest attributes of sovereignty, embracing a legislature to enact laws, a judiciary to expound them, and an executive to enforce them. These laws, within the sphere of their operation, act directly upon individuals, and are of paramount authority over all the territory of every state. They cannot be annulled, nor the force of any of them be in any degree impaired, by any state law, constitution, ordinance, or resolve.]</p> <p>[2. The Criminal Code of the United States is in full force over all persons and places within every state of the Union, notwithstanding any attempt to invalidate it by any organization, whether in the form of state legislatures, conventions, or other voluntary associations.]</p> <p>[3. If a body of men be actually assembled taf the purpose of effecting a treasonable purpose by force, that is levying war. But it must be an assemblage in force, a military assemblage in a condition to make war.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,274.</p> <p>TREASON AND &INDRED CRIMES.</p> <p>[1. Until the year 1861 there were no provisions in the criminal legislation of the United States to punish any measures that had not ripened into an overt act of levying war or actual interference with the administration of the law. All the incipient and preparatory measures, leading to the overthrow of the government, were left without punishment or reprehension.]</p> <p>[2. After the commencement of the war of the Rebellion congress endeavored to secure the fidelity of officers and employes of the United States by various acts requiring an oath of allegiance from them,—Act Aug. 6, 1861 (12 Stat. 326); Act March 6, 1862 (12 Stat. 354); Act July 2, 1862 (12 Stat. 502): Act July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. 593); and to punish conspiracies to effect treasonable objects, and other acts of disloyalty, or of opposition or interference with the government, falling short of the crime of treason,—Act July 31, 1861 (12 Stat. 284): Act July 17. 1862 (12 Stat. 593); Act March 3,-1863, § 24 (12 Stat. 735).]</p> <p>[3. A mere conspiracy to overthrow the government does not of itself amount to the crime of treason. Thus, if a convention, legislature, junto, or other assemblage entertain the purpose of subverting the government, and to that end pass acts, resolves, ordinances, or decrees, even with the view of raising a military force, to carry their purpose into effect, this alone does not constitute a levying of war.]</p> <p>[4. A purpose to prevent, by force, the execution of any public law of the United States, generally, and in all cases, is a treasonable purpose, for it is entirely to overthrow the government as to one of its Jaws; and, if there be an assemblage of mén for the purpose of carrying this purpose into effect by force, this will constitute a levying of war.]</p> <p>[5. The sudden outbreak of a mob, or the assembling of men in order, by force, to defeat the execution of a law in a particular instance, and then to disperse, without any intention of continuing together, or of reassembling for the purpose of defeating the law generally, and in all cases, is not levying war.]</p> <p>[6. If a body of men be actually assembled in force, in a condition to make war, in order to overturn the government at any one place by force, this is levying war. It is not necessary that the assemblage should be with military arms and array; numbers alone may supply the requisite force.]</p> <p>[7. If any such assemblage for the purpose of subverting the government at any place take forcible possession of any fort, arsenal, or other property of the United States, this is an act of levying war.]</p> <p>[8. If war be actually levied at one place, and any person in league with those actually engaged therein send them 'arms, money, provisions, or intelligence for the purpose of aiding them, he is guilty of treason, however distant he may be from the place of their assemblage. Following Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 126.]</p> <p>[9. Under the constitution, treason or other crime committed within the limits of the United States can be tried only within the state and judicial district within which it is committed, and the accused has the right to a trial by jury in such state and district. If, therefore, the condition of such state or district be such that the federal courts there cannot or will not perform their functions, crimes committed there cannot be punished by the regular administration of justice.]</p> <p>[10. Although congress has heretofore adopted some of the state laws and modes of procedure, especially those which prescribe the qualifications of jurors and the mode of summoning them, there is no necessity for so doing, or for using any part of the state machinery. The national legislature has constitutional power to prescribe the qualifications of jurors and the manner in which they shall be selected and summoned: it may make the judicial system of the United States complete for the independent exercise of all its functions.]</p> <p>[11. If a crime has been committed on the high seas, or in any place not within any state or district, and the offender has been legally arrested without the limits of the United States, and brought into any judicial district, he must, under the existing statutes, bo tried in that district. If he has been arrested within the United States, he must be tried in the district in which he was apprehended.]</p> <p>[12. Every person owing allegiance to the United States may subject himself to the penalties of treason. Allegiance is of two kinds.—that due from citizens and that due from aliens resident within the United States. Every sojourner who enjoys our protection is bound to good faith towards our government, and, though an alien, he may be guilty of treason by cooperating either with rebels or foreign enemies.]</p> <p>[13. Under our complex system of government there is no power extrinsic to that of the national government by which its laws can be rightfully resisted or their obligation impaired.]</p> <p>[14. The theory, or opinion, that the constitution of the United States does not contemplate making war upon a state, is true only in the sense that a state, as a political body, is not to be compelled to execute the laws of the United States: for those laws act directly upon individuals and are to be enforced by national instrumentalities. But the constitution does contemplate and provide for the contingency of adverse state interposition or legislation to annul or defeat the execution of national laws: for it expressly declares that the national law shall he supreme, “anything in the constitution or the laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding/']</p>

<p>Case No. 18,275.</p> <p>TKEA80N AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND AGAINST a State-Constitutional Definition of Treason — Opposing Execution of Laws.</p> <p>[1. To constitute treason against the United States by-levying war, there must be a levying of war against the United States in .their sovereign character, and not merely a levying of war exclusively against the sovereignty of a particular state.]</p> <p>[2. To constitute a levying of war, within the meaning of the constitutional definition, it is not sufficient that there should be an assembly of persons merely to meditate and consult about the means of levying war at some future time, or upon some future contingency, without any present force. This would be a mere conspiracy to levy war. To actually levy war, there must be an assembly of persons, met for a treasonable purpose, and some overt act done, or some attempt made by them, with force, to execute, or towards executing, that purpose. The assembly must be in a condition to use force, and must intend to use it, if necessary, to further, aid, or accomplish the treasonable design.]</p> <p>[3. If the assembly is arrayed in a military manner, if they are armed and marched in military form, for the express purpose of overawing and intimidating the public, and thus attempt to carry into effect the treasonable design, this will, of itself, amount to & levy of war, although no actual blow be struct or engagement take place.]</p> <p>[4. It is not necessary to a treasonable design that there should be a direct and positive intention entirely to subvert or overthrow the government. It is sufficient if there is an intention by force to prevent the execution of any one or more of the general and public laws of the government, or to resist the exercise of any legitimate authority of the government in its sovereign capacity.]</p> <p>[5. If there be an assembly of persons, with force, with an intent to prevent the collection of lawful taxes or duties levied by the government, or to destroy all customhouses, or to resist the administration of justice in the courts of the United States, and the assemblage proceed to execute this purpose by force, this is treason against the United States.]</p> <p>[6. There may be treason against a state by levying war which is aimed altogether against the sovereignty of the state, as would be the case if the object of an assembly of persons, met with force, were to overturn the government or constitution of the state, or to prevent the due exercise of its sovereign powers, or to resist the execution of any one or more of its general laws, without any intention to inter» meddle with the relations of the state with the national government, or to displace the national laws or sovereignty therein.]</p> <p>[7. Treason begun against a state may be mixed up or merged in treason against the United States. If the treasonable purpose be to overthrow the government of the state, and forcibly to withdraw it from the Union, and thereby to prevent the exercise of the national sovereignty within the limits of the state, this would be treason against the United States.]</p> <p>[S. If the troops of the United States should be called out by the president, upon the application of a state legislature or executive, to protect the state against domestic violence, and there should be an assembly of persons with force to resist and oppose the United States troops, this would be treason against the United States, although the primary intention of the insurgents may have been only to overthrow the state government or the state laws.]</p>

On the 18th of September, 1850 [9 Stat. 462], congress, in order to give effect to a provision of the constitution, passed a law to enable the owners of fugitive slaves to recover them when found in the states to which they had fled. Slavery, the abolition of slavery, this law, or any law for the recovery of slaves, had been for some time prior to the passage of the act, the themes of passionate and fanatical debate by extreme factions in the Northern and Southern states.

<p>Case No. 18,277.</p> <p>Treason and Treasonable Conspiracies—Piracy —Constitutional and International La-w— Regulation op Commerce.</p> <p>[1. If war be actually levied, all those who, perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be regarded as traitors. Such part may be performed, not only by giving permission or other direct aid to the rebels, but also by acts which tend and are designed to defeat, obstruct, or weaken the arms of the United States.]</p> <p>[2. Offences committed without the limits of the United States, upon the ocean, must be tried in the judicial district into which the offender is first brought, or into which he shall have been first apprehended.]</p> <p>[3. Pirates are sea robbers or highwaymen of the sea, and all civilized nations have a common interest, and are under a moral obligation, to arrest and suppress them; and the constitution, in express terms, confers upon the United States the power to perform this duty, as one of the family of nations.]</p> <p>[4. If a number of persons associate together, and undertake to establish a new government, and assume the character of a nation, and, as such, to issue military commissions, any other nation may, according to its own view of policy or duty, .either utterly refuse to recognize the existence of such government, and treat all, who, acting under it, commit aggressions upon the ocean, as mere pirates, or it may fully recognize such new government, or may adopt the intermediate course between these two extremes, and, to some extent, and for some purposes, recognize the existence of a new government, while in other respects, and for other purposes, it rejects its pretensions to be deemed a nation.]</p> <p>[o. The constitutional power to regulate commerce, and to pass all laws necessary to carry that power into effect, vests in congress the right, not merely to preserve and protect commerce, but to foster, strengthen, and extend it; and this authority is sufficient to sustain the validity of the legislation whereby congress has declared certain acts committed upon the high seas to be piracy, and punishable as such, even if those acts do not strictly constitute the crime of piracy as known to international law. Act 1790, c. 9, §§ 8, 9 (1 Stat. 113); Act 1820, c. 113, § 3 (3 Stat. 600); Act 1847, c. 51 (9 Stat. 175).]</p> <p>[6. It is an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment, under the act of 1799 (1 Stat. 618, c. 1), for a. citizen of the United States, at a time when a part of the inhabitants of the United States are in rebellion against the government, to write letters to a member-of the British parliament, urging that body to acknowledge the independence of the insurgents.]</p> <p>[7. Prior to the act of July 31, 1861 (12 Stat. 284), there was no law for punishing treasonable combinations or conspiracies which were not consummated by an overt act. The statute of that date, however,, makes criminal not only combinations to overthrow-the government, but conspiracies or mutual agreements, whether by few or many, whether public or-private, foroibly to resist, or even to delay the execution of, any law.]</p>

In equity, for an injunction and distribution of funds in the treasury in the defendant’s name. The bill in substance states: That the claimant [Benjamin O. Clarke] was a judgment creditor of the defendant [Ferdinand N. Clarke]; that the defendant at the time' the judgment was entered against him was wholly insolvent.

At law. Writ of error from the criminal court. On an indictment for a nuisance in not repairing a highway, etc. The object of this prosecution being to ascertain judicially •whether the corporation of Georgetown is bound to keep in repair the road mentioned in the indictment, and there being no dispute about the matter of fact, but only in matter of law, touching the obligation to repair and liability to this indictment, the case is submitted to the court under the statute,…

<p>Case No. 18,382.</p> <p>Bankrcptct — Costs, Fees, and Disbursements.</p> <p>Semble, 1. That a regular taxation by the clerk should be made oí all the fees and disbursements in each bankrupt case.</p> <p>2. The sum of $50, deposited with the clerk, is not a fund in court for general distribution among creditors, but is to be disbursed under the supervision of the court</p> <p>3. The sum, or such portion of it as may be necessary, may be appropriated to the register in the first place.</p> <p>4. Where a bankrupt is relieves by order of the court from further payment of fees, the $50 deposit ■will be distributed pro rata to the register, clerk, and marshal.</p> <p>5. Printers’ fees are chargeable according to the United States fee bill.</p>

The question of the proper rate of costs to be allowed and taxed for the services of attorneys, solicitors, and counsel, in civil suits, at law or in equity, in the circuit courts of the United States, having been submitted to Mr. Justice NELSON, in May, 1852, he delivered the following opinion:

<p>Case No. 18,283.</p>

This was a bill in equity [by George Cromp-ton against the Belknap Mills and others] filed to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 6,939] for an improvement in looms for weaving figured fab-tics,” granted to Moses Marshall, December 11,1849, assigned to eomplainant May 5,1859, reissued to complainant April 24, 1860 [No. 974], and extended to the inventor for seven years from December 11, 1863, and assigned to eomplainant for the extended term, December…

At law. Issue from the orphans’ court as to the validity of a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of the late Benjamin E. Brooke, of the marine corps.

Petition [by John W. De Kraft] for the appointment of a guardian to the minor children of Samuel Chase Barney and Maty E. De Kraft (formerly Barney) deceased. The following is the opinion of the orphans’ court (PURCELL, Judge): “The above named, John W. De Kraft, filed his petition some months since in this court, praying that some competent person should be appointed guardian to such children.

At law. Action of debt. The declaration states that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $449.92, for material furnished and work and labor, performed and bestowed on the • party-wall, being the north wall of the warehouse-owned by the plaintiff, and being between the plaintiff and defendant, agreeable to the 4th section of Regulation No. 1, entitled “Terms and conditions declared by president of the United States, the 17th October, 1791, for regulating…

The bills of James R. Lawrence, Esq., district attorney for the Northern district of New York, for services rendered to the United States in civil and criminal cases, at the October term, 1851, of the circuit court for that district, at Albany, having been submitted to Mr, Justice NELSON, he delivered the following opinion:

<p>For the distribution of the estate of a naturalized citizen, who died intestate. Proceeding by James Dixon and others, heirs of James Dixon, deceased, against James' Walker, administrator of the estate of James Dixon, deceased, to recover the estate of decedent.</p>

At law. Motion in arrest of judgment [in an action by William T. Dove, to the use of Richard 'Halleek, trustee, etc., against J. H. Blair]. The clerk will please enter a motion in arrest of judgment in this case, on the ground that there are errors appearing*on the face of the record.

When the bankrupt act first went into operation, the tariff of fees for proving debts was construed to authorize the charge of about one dollar to the officer who took the proof, and twenty-five cents in addition to the register by whom it was received and filed, making the usual charge, for proofs of the usual length, one dollar and twenty-five cents, or thereabouts.

At law. Action of replevin. The following rules were adopted March 25, 1857, by the court, in compliance with the provisions of an act of congress on the subject passed at the last session: “Three terms of this court shall be held in every year, commencing on the respective days following, viz.: On the third Monday of October, on the third Monday of January and on the first Monday of May.

At law. Writ of error to the criminal court. Indictment for an assault on a slave.

At law. This is an issue from the orphans’ court between Jacob Hines and John. Gordon and John Fitzhugh to try the validity of a will executed by Mrs. Rachel Hines,, the mother by a former husband of the defendants’ wives.

[Bill] in equity for an injunction [by John Johnston against Richard H. Clarke and Daniel Ratcliffe, trustees of the Potomac Building Association].

<p>Case No. 18,306.</p> <p>Nuncopative Wild — Cannot Pass Real Estate —Witnesses.</p> <p>1. From 1676, when the act of 29 Car. II. was enacted, no nuncupative will can, under any circumstances, pass real estate.</p> <p>2. That by 29 Car. n. c. 3, f§ 19, 20, 22,2 and the act of Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sube. 2, § 13, 3 in force in this district, there must be not less than three witnesses to a nuncupative will, where the amount of personal property exceeds thirty pounds.</p>

Action by Edward Lange against - Benedict for false imprisonment. Held: that no action lies against a judge for acts done in that capacity; that the law raises a presumption in favor of a judge, and will not (as in ordinary cases) suffer that presumption to be rebutted; and that, if otherwise, it would deter them from doing their duty. Many other English cases could be cited.

<p>Overruling a mandate of the circuit court</p> <p>[Proceeding for the appointment of a guardian for Samuel C. Barney, Jr., and others, .minor children of Samuel Chase Barney.]</p>

<p>Case No. 18,309.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of Courts—Collateral Attack-Attachment from State Court—Wrongful Seizure bt Sheriff — Replevin in Federal Court.</p> <p>[1. The question of jurisdiction over any particular case must be decided, in the first instance, by the court whose judicial action is first invoked. The question arises immediately upon the application for the original or first process in the action, and is necessarily decided in favor of the jurisdiction at the time when the process is issued, whether issued by the judge or the clerk. And it is thereafter also necessarily decided, by implication, preliminary to every order, sentence, or mandate of the writ; and every order arid process exhibits on its face a decision of the court that it is made and awarded by competent authority.]</p> <p>[2. When it is within the general jurisdiction of a court in a proper case to issue a writ, or make an order, which it has issued or made, but, in the particular ease, the facts were not such as confer jurisdiction, such writ or order must be taken as valid and effectual, until quashed, reversed, or otherwise superseded by a tribunal competent to review and correct tfie error.]</p> <p>[3. An order for the attachment of the property of the defendant in a personal action, in .order to have it brought into the custody of the court, and subjected to whatever, after due proceedings, may be adjudged against the defendant, being within the general jurisdiction of the Kentucky circuit courts, under the Code of Practice of that state, the validity of such an attachment cannot be questioned by a federal court, in an action brought therein to re-plevy the property from the possession of the sheriff. The Kentucky court having necessarily decided, in issuing the writ, that a proper case was presented for the exercise of its jurisdiction, the federal court has no authority to review that decision, and consequently must respect and give full effect to the writ.]</p> <p>[4. An order for the attachment “of the property of” a defendant named, issued as a provisional remedy, prior to judgment, under the provisions of Code Prac. Ky. § 223, gives the sheriff no authority to seize property, which has been conveyed to another, on the ground that such conveyance was in fraud of creditors; and such a seizure, if made, does not carry the property into the custody of the court.]</p> <p>[5. Where a sheriff, under the authority of a writ of attachment issued by a state court, seizes property not within the coinmand of the writ, a third person, not a party to the suit, may (when the other requisites of federal jurisdiction exist) maintain a suit in replevin in a federal court to recover the property from the possession of the sheriff; and this notwithstanding the fact that the state laws provide a mode in which he may intervene in the state court for the purpose of asserting his right to the property.]</p>

This was an action at law by the National Bank of Commerce, of New York, against the National Bank of Missouri, of St Louis, which suspended in June, 1877, to recover $400,000 and accrued interest, the remainder of a loan of $1,000,000 made by the plaintiff to the defendant In 1866 James B. Eads, James H. Britton, John J. Roe, Charles K. Dickson, Amos -Cotting, Barton Bates, and John A. Ubsdell, the directors of the National Bank of Missouri, borrowed $1,000,000 of the…

About the year 1783-S4, there appeared at low tide in the Delaware river, about five miles below New Castle, a small muddy exposure of the soil, “about the size,” as was testified, “of a man’s hat.”… Held: as far back as my memory goes, by the courts, publick officers, and lawyers of Delaware, that the title and jurisdiction of the state of Delaware extended to a circle of twelve miles around New Castle, to low water mark on the New Jersey shore.

<p>Case No. 18,313.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Legislative Powee — Chimes Committed on Naval Vessel — Jurisdiction of Civil Courts and Courts Martial.</p> <p>[1. The fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States provides that “no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual .service in time of war or public danger." Held, that the limitation “when in actual service in time of war or public danger” refers only to the militia, and does not apply to the regular land and naval forces. In respect to these latter, the power-of eongreBs is. irrespective of the actual condition of the country, and the same in time of peace as in time of war or public danger.]</p> <p>[2. Congress has constitutional power to provide that crimes, even of a capital character, committed on board a naval vessel, by persons who form part of the naval forces of the United States, shall be tried exclusively by courts martial; and the act of April 23, 1800 (2 Stat. 45), establishing rules for the government and regulation of the navy, is valid, even If this be its tnie construction. and effect.]</p> <p>[3. Congress has not, by the crimes acts of 1825 and 1835 (4 Stat. 115, 775), given to the civil courts any jurisdiction over the crime of murder, when committed on board a-United States ship of war, and tria-ble before a court martial under the navy regulations.]</p> <p>[4. The fact that manslaughter is not named in the naval code as an offence punishable by court martial is no ground for holding that the civil courts of the United States have jurisdiction thereof. In the absence of any statute conferring jurisdiction upon these courts, it is sufficient, in any case, to exclude such jurisdiction, that the accused is charged with the of-fence, in taking the life of a seaman belonging to a naval ship, in the exercise of what was claimed to be his rightful authority as an officer in command.]</p> <p>[5. To warrant a court in declaring unconstitutional a law passed by congress, the defect of legislative power must be of the most plain and indisputable character.]</p> <p>[6. The fact that a law of congress has been in course of execution for many years, and has been acquiesced in during that time, is a strong reason why toe courts, especially those of a subordinate character, should not decide toe same to be unconstitutional.]</p>