State v. Didlot

                                      662

    Argued and submitted December 22, 2021, affirmed November 16, 2022,
            petition for review denied March 9, 2023 (

)


                       STATE OF OREGON,
                        Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                  v.
                    MITCHEL JAMES DIDLOT,
                       Defendant-Appellant.
                     Lane County Circuit Court
                       18CR48893; A171537
                                  

    Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of first-degree
rape and one count of first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant assigns error to the
trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he made during a police
interview, which he alleges were the product of unlawful inducements. Held: The
detective’s statements did not offer a benefit in exchange for defendant’s confession and did not constitute unlawful inducements. In light of the totality of the
circumstances of the interrogation, the statements by defendant were made voluntarily. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
    Affirmed.



    Valeri L. Love, Judge.
   Anne Kimiko Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section,
Office of Public Defense Services.
   Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.
    SHORR, J.
    Affirmed.
Cite as 

 (2022)                                             663

           SHORR, J.
         Defendant, who was convicted of one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sexual abuse after
a stipulated facts trial before the court, appeals from the
judgment of conviction. In his sole assignment of error,
defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to exclude statements that he made during a police
interview, which he alleges were the product of unlawful
inducement in violation of ORS 136.425(1) and Article I,
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. We conclude that
defendant’s statements were made voluntarily, and the
trial court did not err in denying his motion. Therefore, we
affirm.
         We state the facts in accordance with the trial
court’s findings of fact as supplemented by the record.1 The
facts are undisputed for purposes of appeal.
         A report of abuse of the victim, defendant’s fiveyear-old daughter, was made sometime in July 2018. On
July 17, 2018, Detective Murray of the Springfield Police
Department was assigned to investigate, and he witnessed
a forensic interview of the child. The following day, Murray
telephoned defendant and asked if he would come to the
police station to speak with him. Before he called defendant,
it was his understanding that the child’s mother had already
called defendant and confronted him about the alleged
abuse.2 Defendant agreed to come to the police department
to speak with Murray.
        On July 20, defendant and his then fiancée went
to the police station around noon. Murray met defendant
and defendant’s fiancée in the department lobby. Murray
was dressed in plain clothes with a firearm and handcuffs
on his belt. Murray spoke to defendant’s fiancée before he
spoke with defendant. Regarding the interview itself, which
was video recorded and lasted approximately one hour and

    1
      After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court issued a written
order denying defendant’s motion to exclude certain statements and admissions.
The order contains findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    2
      Prior to defendant’s arrest, the child would spend time with her mother in
Salem and her father in Springfield.
664                                                           State v. Didlot

35 minutes,3 the trial court found, in its written order,4 as
follows:
    “At approximately 12:26 p.m. Detective Murray began his
    interview with Defendant. The interview took place in an
    interview room. Detective Murray did not make any promises or threats to the defendant before entering the interview room. Prior to the interview, Detective Murray did not
    notice any signs of impairment or cognitive defect on the part
    of the defendant. In reviewing the video, the Court notes
    that the defendant followed the conversation with ease and
    did not exhibit any difficulty in tracking the conversation.
    Defendant was advised the interview was being recorded.
    Detective Murray and Defendant were the only two people
    in the room during the interview. Both Detective Murray
    and Defendant were cordial with one another during the
    interview. Voices were calm and the Court did not witness
    any evidence of body language or posturing by either individual that could be viewed as intimidating, threatening
    or coercive. Both Detective Murray and the defendant were
    sitting in their chairs, not leaning forward. The interview
    resembled a conversation not an interrogation.
       “Before any questioning began, Detective Murray
    advised the defendant that he was not under arrest and
    advised him of his Miranda rights. The defendant was
    asked if he understood his rights and answered yes to the
    question.
       “During the interview the defendant shared his
    thoughts on why he thinks he is at the police department
    and states that it is due to false accusations by the child’s
    mother. …
       “Detective Murray advised the defendant about the
    forensic interview of the child and that the child disclosed

    3
      The trial court noted in its order that the length of the video “is one hour,
thirty-five minutes and thirty-eight seconds” and that there are three times that
Murray leaves the interview room. The total time of the actual interview—the
interaction between defendant and Murray—is approximately 63 minutes.
    4
      The trial court stated that it had compared a transcript of the videotaped
interview of defendant that had been received as an exhibit with the video of
the interview and had observed numerous errors in the transcript; it included
a notation of where those discrepancies were. Those notations indicate that the
court relied on its own understanding of the statements in the video. The noted
differences are not substantive for purposes of our analysis. In all events, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s factual findings; rather, he challenges
the court’s legal conclusion.
Cite as 

 (2022)                                665

  that some ‘stuff’ happened between her and the defendant.
  After he tells the defendant about the interview, the following exchange occurs:
         “ ‘Detective Murray: What kind of what I like to do,
     [defendant], is is [sic] I like to get people help because
     it’s—part of it’s a sickness. …
        “ ‘Defendant: Yeah.
         “ ‘Detective Murray: And I like to get people on the
     right track if something happened, whether it was just
     a little thing or like—I’m not saying like you, you know,
     held a gun to her head and did some—
       “ ‘Defendant: (shakes head side to side) I don’t even
     own one. …
        “ ‘Detective Murray: —stuff. All right. I’m not saying that. But sometimes less violent stuff like that has
     occurred, and sometimes people just make a stupid mistake, all right? And if they did it, this is kind of the
     opportunity ‘cause, like, I’m—we’re we’re [sic] just in
     a casual setting, you and I. We’re just here talking, a
     couple guys, to each other. I’m not shocked by anything
     that comes out of people’s mouths. I don’t judge people.
     So what I’m getting at is if there’s something that happened, let’s talk about it today and get it behind us and
     maybe come up with a safety plan, what might be an
     option. So when she talked about what you and her did,
     she was pretty specific. And I won’t give details—not
     right now ‘cause that’s not how this works. I’m just more
     kind of gauging you on on [sic] honesty. Tell me your
     version and, like I say, we can get to the bottom of it.
     Okay? What happened? …’
     “The interview continues without the defendant admitting to any inappropriate touching of his child. Detective
  Murray tells the defendant the following:
         “ ‘I’m trying to help you out today by giving you this
     opportunity to just to be honest, because, like I said, I
     don’t, I don’t see where kids in this particular setting
     (referring to forensic interview) make false accusations.
     So I think something happened between the two of you,
     and that’s why I’m, I’m trying to get just down to the
     bottom of it. You know, I’m wanting to get everybody
     help involved, including (the child) if she needs the
     proper counseling, stuff like that. …’
666                                                  State v. Didlot

     “The defendant then responds that the child’s mom says
  the counseling is not helping and Detective Murray tells
  the defendant that ‘it may not be the right counselor. But
  this—this is when we get involved, we hopefully get them
  on that right track.’ The interview continues with Detective
  Murray stating:
          “ ‘So here’s a couple things that I like to do. I, we like
      to prove somebody’s innocent, innocence just as much
      as if there if [sic] they did something. We’ve never met
      before, but I’m a straight shooter. I will always, if you
      cooperate today and if you tell me the absolute truth, I’m
      going to document that he was cooperative and he was
      truthful. That’s what I’ll do for you. If for some reason
      during this investigation—because I have to investigate
      it—I find out you were dishonest on anything, its going
      to come back and bite you. And that’s why I’m giving
      today as your opportunity to go—if, if you’ve made a stupid mistake—everybody makes mistakes—then we’ll—
      like I say, we’ll talk about that and get get [sic] past it.
      But I I don’t want to waste everybody’s time. …’
      “Defendant continues with the interview without any
  clear admissions to sexual contact with his child. Detective
  Murray tells the defendant that something is telling him
  that the defendant is leaving something out and he is just
  looking for the defendant to be honest and states ‘you know,
  I’m gonna, I’m gonna, I’m gonna support you.’ Detective
  Murray also talks with the defendant about how sometimes getting things off your shoulders is a huge relief.
  In response the defendant responds ‘my biggest worry is
  jail.’ In response to that concern expressed by Defendant,
  Detective Murray replies, ‘Oh, don’t—we’re not even talking
  about that right now—I want—I want to get people help is
  what I’m trying to do.’
     “It is during the remainder of the interview that
  Defendant ultimately admits to sexual contact with his
  child and writes an apology letter to her. Later during the
  interview Defendant tells Detective Murray the following:
  ‘My curiosity is—am I going to jail after this, is my mom
  and brother going to find out, and my fiancée going to find
  out about this.’ ”
(Footnote omitted.)
       At that point, Murray asks defendant what he
thinks should happen to somebody in his situation and
Cite as 

 (2022)                                  667

defendant replies, “Help. … Get as much help as possible.”
When Murray asks what would be help, defendant responds,
“I don’t know. I mean you guys are experts on what—what’s
good ….” After defendant writes an apology letter to his
daughter, Murray arrests him.
         Thereafter, defendant was charged by indictment
with one count of rape in the first degree, ORS 163.375, and
one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427.
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to exclude the statements and admissions he made during interrogation by the
police, which he asserted were illegally, improperly, and/or
involuntarily obtained. Defendant specifically argued that
Murray impliedly promised that defendant would get help
instead of going to jail and that, considering the totality of
the circumstances, defendant’s statements and confession
were involuntary.
        As noted above, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion. The court explained:
       “While there was discussion about getting the defendant ‘help,’ none of Detective Murray’s statements individually or taken as a whole, amount to an implied promise
   of ‘help’ or treatment instead of or in lieu of prosecution or
   jail. Detective Murray did not make an explicit promise of
   any kind other than he would be documenting if defendant
   was truthful. Even Defendant’s own volunteered statements about his concern regarding jail, before and after his
   admissions, evidence his recognition that any ‘help’ was not
   instead of or in lieu of prosecution or jail. The defendant’s
   affirmative inquiries about jail demonstrate his awareness
   of jail as a potential consequence. To construe Detective
   Murray’s statements as an implied promise of treatment
   instead of or in lieu of prosecution or incarceration would
   not be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”
(Emphases in original.)
        Thereafter, defendant waived his right to a jury trial
and proceeded with a stipulated facts trial and sentencing.
The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts, sentenced him, and entered a judgment of conviction.
        On appeal, defendant contends, as he did below, that
the totality of the circumstances shows that defendant was
668                                                          State v. Didlot

induced to make admissions by Murray’s promises of help
and the implication that he would not go to jail. Therefore,
according to defendant, his confession was given involuntarily under ORS 136.425(1) and Article I, section 12, of
the Oregon Constitution.5 The state responds that Murray
did not impliedly promise defendant leniency in exchange
for his admissions; Murray did not condition any benefit on
defendant making an admission, nor did Murray offer any
reason for defendant to believe that he could avoid criminal
prosecution. Therefore, according to the state, the trial court
correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress because his
admissions were made voluntarily and were not induced by
promises of leniency.
           We begin with the standard of review:
    “We review trial court rulings on motions to suppress for
    legal error, deferring to the trial court’s explicit and implicit
    factual findings where there is evidence in the record to
    support them. State v. Simmons, 

, 

 (2020). Whether a confession was the product of
    a prohibited inducement and whether a confession was
    otherwise involuntary are ultimately questions of law. See
    State v. Jackson, 

, 

 (2018). Thus,
    the primary inquiry here is whether, in light of the trial
    court’s factual findings, ‘the state met its burden to prove
    that defendant’s free will was not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired, and
    that he made his statements without inducement from fear
    or promises.’ Id.”
State v. Pryor, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2021).
         ORS 136.425(1) states that “[a] confession or admission of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or otherwise, cannot be given in evidence against
the defendant when it was made under the influence of fear
produced by threats.” The Supreme Court has recognized
    “that both the statute and Article I, section 12, embody
    the common-law rule that confessions made by a defendant
    5
      Defendant states that he has a constitutional right not to incriminate
himself under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. His argument is focused on ORS
136.425(1), and he does not make a separate constitutional argument.
Cite as 

 (2022)                                 669

   in custody that were induced by the influence of hope or
   fear, applied by a public officer having the prisoner in his
   charge, are inadmissible against the defendant.”
Jackson, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Confessions are presumed to be involuntary and the “burden is on the state to overcome that presumption by offering
evidence affirmatively establishing that the confession was
voluntary.” State v. Chavez-Meza, 

, 

 (2019), rev den, 

 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The reason for the presumption is “to
ensure that confessions are reliable.” 

   “[W]hether a confession has been unlawfully induced
   turns, in essence, on (1) whether the defendant has been
   told something that communicates the idea of a temporal
   benefit or disadvantage attached to confessing, that is, that
   the defendant ‘ha[s] been offered a quid pro quo … in
   exchange for a confession,’ and (2) whether the defendant
   accepts that quid pro quo offer by confessing in the hopes of
   obtaining the offered benefit.”
Pryor, 

 (quoting Chavez-Meza, 

). It “involves a highly fact-specific inquiry.” Id. at 20.
Further, when we evaluate whether the “inducements were,
at least collectively, sufficiently compelling to elicit a false
confession,” we apply the test from State v. Powell, 

, 

 (2012):
   “ ‘As our cases consistently have recognized, confessions are
   unreliable when rendered under circumstances in which
   the confessor perceives that he or she may receive some
   benefit or avoid some detriment by confessing, regardless
   of the truth or falsity of the confession.’ ”
State v. Center, 

, 

 (2021)
(quoting Powell, 

)). We recently explained in
Center that a promise need not be related to the defendant’s
criminal prosecution for it to be a compelling benefit that
has legal significance. Id. at 823.
         As noted above, the issue as framed for and decided
by the trial court was whether defendant confessed because
he thought he would get “help” instead of going to jail, with
the court concluding that Murray’s statements did not
amount to “an implied promise of treatment instead of or in
670                                             State v. Didlot

lieu of prosecution or incarceration.” Given our recent case
law, we do not necessarily agree that that framing of the
issue accurately describes the test for assessing whether
defendant’s confession was voluntary. Under Center, a
promise of help need not be tied to prosecutorial leniency;
rather, a promise of some benefit, by itself, could suffice to
improperly compel a confession. Id. However, given the parties’ arguments below and the court’s ruling, we consider
whether the trial court erred in concluding that defendant’s
confession was not induced by a promise that he would get
help instead of jail, alongside the broader issue of whether
there was a promise by Murray that communicated to defendant that there would be a temporal benefit to confessing,
namely “help,” regardless of whether that offer of help was
made as an alternative to jail.
         Our recent decision in State v. Rodriguez-Aquino,

, 

 (2021), provides some guidance, although it is also distinguishable as to some of the
significant facts. In that case, we explained that, “when an
officer holds out the specter of help or assistance to a suspect
during an interrogation, that officer is treading a potentially
risky path,” and we held, under the circumstances there,
that the state did not meet its burden to establish that the
defendant’s confession was not the product of an unlawful
inducement—“specifically, the promise of ‘help,’ which, in
context, [could not] reasonably be understood as anything
other than help with his legal problems.” 

.
There, the defendant and his wife had taken their infant son
to the emergency room at the hospital where it was determined that the infant’s leg was broken in a manner that was
consistent with physical abuse. 

. The defendant
was transported to the police station on an unrelated warrant and was questioned about his son’s injury after being
read his Miranda rights and agreeing to talk. 

.
The defendant was an immigrant and English was his third
language. 

. The interrogation, which took place
over approximately five hours, was conducted by a detective
and a police lieutenant. 

.
         The officers told the defendant that it was important
to be honest about everything and that they just wanted to
find the truth. 

. We summarized the interrogation:
Cite as 

 (2022)                                   671

   “The officers here repeatedly invoked the district attorney and [the Department of Human Services (DHS)], and
   intimated, if not outright stated, that systemic help in the
   form of parenting classes would be contingent on defendant’s honesty as reflected in the police reports. Further,
   those parenting classes were held out as an alternative to
   something more severe. That alternative was vague and
   unspecified, but nonetheless present. According to the officers, defendant could be seen ‘as a criminal who hurt his
   kid on purpose,’ or, in the alternative, could be honest and,
   ‘take a parenting class or two.’ Finally, the officers indicated that dishonesty would mean that ‘no one’ which can
   only be contextually understood to mean the prosecutor or
   judge, ‘should give them any leniency or any type of help.’ ”

Id. at 533-34.
         In describing our reasoning for our holding, we
stated, “This is a close case. But ultimately, we conclude
that the statements here communicated to defendant the
idea that there would be a temporal benefit to confessing.”
Id. at 534. We explained that the officer had made it clear
that he considered the truth to be that the defendant had
injured his child in a fit of anger, then communicated that
there would be “no turning back” if the defendant continued
to maintain a “provable lie,” and that he wanted to help the
defendant. Id.
       “The detective then communicated that such ‘help’ would
   be accomplished through what he included in his report,
   which he tied to what happens with the district attorney
   and DHS. The detective explained that ‘DHS is obviously
   involved’ when there is an injury to a child. Immediately
   after explaining his desire to help defendant and his family and referring to DHS’s involvement, he stated, ‘And
   then we—when we write our reports, we have to submit
   it to the District Attorney’s Office … for them to review.
   And I want to make sure that you guys get the help you need
   if … there is something like that going on.’ (Emphasis
   added.)

       “Read in context, the detective indicated that he could
   influence DHS’s involvement and the type of help defendant’s family would receive through his report to the district attorney. And then, compounding that implication,
672                                              State v. Didlot

   the detective suggested that DHS involvement might be an
   alternative path to prosecution.”
Id. at 534-35 (ellipses in original).
         At one point during the questioning, the lieutenant
told the defendant that he wanted to help families and that
they (the police) were there because they “want to help.”
Id. at 524. He then differentiated between good people and
bad people and said that bad people lie and that “no one
should give them any leniency or any type of help.” Id. We
stated that the “obvious implication” from that part of the
interrogation was that “the detective was in a position to
influence the leniency or help that families might get.” Id. at
535. Ultimately, we concluded that “[t]he officers held out a
thin hope that defendant might avoid the full weight of the
state’s prosecution and instead receive ‘leniency’—perhaps
in the form of DHS involvement and parenting classes in
lieu of prosecution—if he were to confess.” Id.
         In contrast to Rodriguez-Aquino, we recently held
in Pryor, 

, a case involving the sexual
abuse of a child, that a detective’s statements referring to
“help,” in context of the overall exchange between the detective and the defendant, did not amount to an unlawful
inducement. There, the detective told the “defendant that he
would be a ‘lost cause’ until he admitted what had happened
and got help.” 

. He stated, in part, “No one can help
you. You will never get help. You will be the monster that
people think you are … [b]ecause no one’s going to get help
unless they can admit to what they did wrong or admit that
they had a problem or had a lapse in judgment.” 

.
The detective also stated that he had been working with
kids and people for 25 years and that “the only people [he]
ever see[s] get help are people that can talk about it. They
admit what happened and help us understand.” 

.
The detective also told the defendant that he was going to be
able to “go home today.” 

 We concluded that
   “the statements did not communicate that a quid pro quo
   was on the table—that [the detective] was offering freedom
   and access to help to defendant in exchange for his confession. Rather, [the detective’s] statements, in context, communicated that defendant would be going home at the end of
Cite as 

 (2022)                                                673

    the day one way or another, and that, in his experience, people who confessed were the ones who were able to get help.”
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
         Although some of the circumstances here are similar to those in Rodriguez-Aquino—both involve a situation in which the defendant is being interrogated about
the abuse of his child, which could include involvement by
DHS, and both defendants are offered “help” during police
questioning—the cases are distinguishable. In Rodriguez-Aquino, we concluded that the detective had indicated to the
defendant that DHS was “obviously involved” and that he
could influence DHS’s involvement and the type of help the
family would receive through his report to the district attorney. Id. at 534-35. The detective also suggested that DHS
involvement might be an alternative to prosecution. Id. at
535. Here, Murray made general, somewhat vague offers of
help. Murray did not mention an existing DHS proceeding
or investigation, nor did he mention the district attorney.
Unlike in Rodriguez-Aquino, there was no offer of help here
that was tied to a particular benefit in a way that it might
induce a confession. Although Murray’s statements regarding help are not identical to those made by the detective in
Pryor, they are closer, in context, to the kind of statements
made in Pryor to the extent that they similarly do not offer
any quid pro quo or suggest any temporal benefit for defendant’s confession.
         We turn to the specific arguments of the parties.
Defendant contends that by continuously promising to get
defendant help and telling defendant that they were not
talking about jail right now, Murray led defendant to believe
that if he admitted that the things his daughter said were
true, he would get help instead of jail. Defendant essentially
argues that the key statement of the interview was when he
stated that his “biggest worry is jail” and Murray replied,
“Oh. Don’t—we’re not even talking about that right now. I
want—I want to get people help is what I’m trying to do.”6
    6
      For the remainder of this opinion, we quote from the transcript of the interview, which was admitted as a defense exhibit. As noted above, the trial court’s
findings contained its understanding of the conversation after viewing the video
and comparing it with the transcript, and those differences do not affect the substance of our analysis.
674                                                 State v. Didlot

According to defendant, that exchange was essentially telling defendant that if he confessed, he would not go to jail
and instead he would get help. And, in defendant’s view,
considering that exchange in the context of the whole interview, including the offers of help Murray made leading up to
that exchange and defendant’s question after his confession
about whether he would be going to jail, leads to the conclusion that defendant’s statements were involuntary.
         The state argues that Murray’s references to help,
viewed individually or taken as a whole, are not reasonably
construed as implied promises of leniency, nor did those
statements induce defendant’s admissions. According to
the state, none of Murray’s offers of help leading up to the
exchange in which defendant referred to jail were offers
of help in lieu of prosecution or jail. The first reference to
help, when Murray stated that he “like[s] to get people help
because it’s—part of it’s a sickness,” was near the beginning
of the interview when Murray was trying to establish a rapport with defendant; the state asserts that the implication
that help or treatment may generally be available for defendant said nothing about whether defendant would also face
prosecution or incarceration should he confess to sexually
abusing his daughter. We agree with that assessment. See
State v. Neblock, 

, 

 (1985)
(“Advising defendant that treatment is an option, or that
confession is a prerequisite to treatment, is not the same as
promising him immunity from prosecution.”).
       The second and third references to “help” by Murray
are when he states,
   “I’m trying to help you out today by giving you this opportunity just to be honest, because, like I said, I don’t—I don’t
   see where kids in this particular setting make false accusations. So I think something happened between the two
   of you, and that’s why I’m trying to get just down to the
   bottom of it.
      “You know, I’m wanting to get everybody help involved,
   including [the child] if she needs the proper counseling,
   stuff like that, which—”
Here, the offer of “help” by way of giving defendant the
opportunity to be honest was just that—asking defendant to
Cite as 

 (2022)                                  675

tell the truth. See Jackson, 

 (citing State v. Linn,

, 

 (1946) (noting the difference
between a “mere adjuration” to tell the truth and “adjuration accompanied by inducement” to confess)). And the statement of wanting “to get everybody help involved, including
[the child],” considered in context, is Murray explaining
that part of his goal is to get help for others—including the
victim—not just for defendant. That reference to help was
not an offer to defendant in lieu of jail or prosecution. Nor
was that vague promise to “get everybody help” one that
could be reasonably viewed as offering defendant a benefit
that he would receive by confessing “regardless of the truth
or falsity of the confession.” Center, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
         Before we turn to the final exchange that the parties agree contains the key statement for purposes of this
analysis, we note that up until this point in the interview,
Murray and defendant had not discussed possible criminal charges, how charges would move through the criminal justice system, or penalties that could result from those
possible charges. Defendant is the first person to mention
“jail.” During the interview, Murray raised the possibility
of defendant taking a polygraph; after that, the following
exchange occurred.
        “MURRAY: … And because your daughter said it
   happened, I—I got to do everything in my power to—so
   it’s like I’m saying, some part of your body, [defendant], is
   telling me there’s something you’re leaving out, and I don’t
   know exactly what it is. I just—I’m looking for you to be
   honest.
      “What happened, man?
      “[DEFENDANT]: (No audible response.)
      “MURRAY: Go ahead. You know, I’m going to—I’m
   going to—I’m going to support you.
      “[DEFENDANT]: I just—
       “MURRAY: I know it’s tough to say sometimes, but
   sometimes getting it off your chest and off your shoulders
   is a huge relief.
      “[DEFENDANT]: My biggest worry is jail.
676                                                State v. Didlot

      “MURRAY: Oh. Don’t—we’re not even talking about
   that right now. I want—I want to get people help is what
   I’m trying to do.
      “So, if you did something—
      “Look at me, [defendant]. Did you have sex with her?
      “[DEFENDANT]: No.”
Shortly thereafter, defendant began to make admissions.
         Defendant contends that Murray’s tactic—his implied
promise that defendant would get help rather than go to
jail—was successful in inducing defendant to confess. The
trial court and the state view the exchange differently than
defendant. The trial court concluded that
   “[e]ven Defendant’s own volunteered statements about his
   concern regarding jail, before and after his admissions,
   evidence his recognition that any ‘help’ was not instead of
   or in lieu of prosecution or jail. The defendant’s affirmative
   inquiries about jail demonstrate his awareness of jail as a
   potential consequence.”
(Emphases in trial court’s order.) And the state asserts
that Murray’s statement that they were not talking about
jail “right now” could reasonably be interpreted as Murray
communicating, accurately, that those conversations would
occur later. At a minimum, the detective’s statement that
they were not talking about jail “right now” cannot reasonably be understood as an offer that defendant was being
offered help instead of jail and, in fact, kept the possibility of jail remaining. See, e.g., State v. Spieler, 

, 

 (2015) (detective’s statements presumed there would be a prosecution and pertained to effect
of the defendant’s conduct on that prosecution rather than
suggesting that no prosecution would be commenced if the
defendant made an admission).
        Further, toward the end of the interview, Murray
asked defendant if he had left anything out, and then the
following exchange occurred:
      “[DEFENDANT]: I—I told you all the truth.
      “MURRAY: Okay.
Cite as 

 (2022)                                677

      “[DEFENDANT]: My curiosity is—am I going to jail
   after this? Is my mom and brother going to find out, and my
   fiancée going to find out about this?
      “MURRAY: Let me ask you. What—what do you think
   should happen to somebody in your situation?
      “[DEFENDANT]: Help.
      “MURRAY: Just help?
      “[DEFENDANT]: Get as much help as possible.
     “MURRAY: And what—what would be help in your
   mind?
      “[DEFENDANT]: I don’t know. You guys are experts
   on what—what’s—what’s a good—
      “MURRAY: I know, but everybody’s got their own
   opinion. They can—
       “[DEFENDANT]: Well, I’ve already thought about
   it. She’s been fighting me on this whole custody thing the
   whole time, and that’s what she wants to do is take [the
   child] away.
      “MURRAY: Yeah.
      “[DEFENDANT]: I’m half tempted to just give her.
      “MURRAY: Just want to give it up?
      “[DEFENDANT]: Because—
      “MURRAY: Do you think what you did is wrong?
       “[DEFENDANT]: I know what I did was wrong. I just
   feel so guilty.”
         A reasonable understanding of that exchange is
that defendant did not expect that he would avoid going to
jail by confessing, nor did he have an expectation of a particular kind of help that would be available to him. When
asked about what defendant meant by getting help, he
shifted the conversation to giving up custody of his daughter
to her mother and expressed guilt over what he had done.
Viewing the interview as a whole, we conclude that defendant himself did not interpret Murray’s references to help
as an implied promise of leniency in return for a confession;
nor did those references to help convey any specific offer that
induced defendant to confess.
678                                           State v. Didlot

         As noted, we described Rodriguez-Aquino as a close
case but ultimately concluded that the nature of the offer
of help that specifically suggested an ability to influence
leniency with the District Attorney and also affect DHS’s
involvement crossed the line. 

. The
offer to help here is far more generic and, we conclude, falls
on the other side of that line. The trial court was correct to
conclude that defendant’s statements were made voluntarily.
          Our analysis does not end there. Under Jackson,
“we must look to the totality of the circumstances in reaching a legal conclusion about the voluntariness of defendant’s
statements.” 

. That inquiry requires us to “consider[ ] additional evidence about whether defendant confessed voluntarily or whether his will was overborne.” 

. As noted above, the trial court made findings about
the nature of the interview itself, and defendant does not
dispute any of those findings, nor does defendant assert that
anything about the interview other than Murray’s statements led defendant to involuntarily confess. Rather, defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances show that
defendant was induced to make admissions by Murray’s
promises of help and the implication that he would not go
to jail. We understand defendant’s argument in that regard
to be that Murray’s statements in the context of the entire
interview led defendant to make involuntary statements.
We have already addressed that argument above.
         Defendant came to the police station voluntarily
after Murray called him and asked him to come in. Murray
understood that the victim’s mother had already told defendant about the allegations that their daughter had made.
Murray was dressed in plain clothes with a visible gun and
handcuffs on his belt, and he greeted defendant and his
fiancée in the lobby of the police station.
        The total time of the interview was relatively
short—approximately 90 minutes—and the time Murray
spent interacting with defendant was a little over an hour.
Before any questioning began, Murray advised defendant
of his Miranda rights, which defendant indicated that he
understood. Murray did not notice any signs of impairment
or cognitive defect on the part of defendant; the trial court
Cite as 

 (2022)                               679

specifically found that “defendant followed the conversation with ease and did not exhibit any difficulty in tracking
the conversation.” Murray and defendant were cordial with
each other, their voices were calm, and their body language
did not indicate posturing by either of them that could be
viewed as intimidating, threatening, or coercive. At one
point, Murray offered defendant water and provided coffee
to defendant when he asked for that instead. On the whole,
the entire interview indicated that defendant’s responses
were voluntary, and his will was not overborne.
         In addition, after defendant admitted what he did
and before he wrote an apology to his daughter, he expressed
some remorse, stating, “I know what I did was wrong. I just
feel so guilty.”
          For all of the reasons stated above, we conclude
that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation, the state met its burden in the trial court to show
that defendant’s statements to the detective were made by
his own choice and his will was not overborne. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
suppress.
         Affirmed.