¶1*379Samuel Perman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was George H. Mason.
¶2Francis M. Shea argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Warner W. Gardner.
¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.
¶5This is the companion case to Sherrer v. Sherrer, ante, p. 343. We granted certiorari to consider the contention of petitioner that the courts of Massachusetts have failed to accord full faith and credit to a decree of divorce rendered by a court of the State of Nevada.
¶6Petitioner, Martin V. B. Coe, and the respondent, Katherine C. Coe, were married in New York in 1934, and thereafter resided as husband and wife in Worcester, Massachusetts.1 Discord developed between the parties, and on January 13, 1942, respondent filed a petition for separate support in the Probate Court for the County of Worcester. Petitioner answered and filed a libel for *380divorce. Following a hearing, the petition for separate support was granted and the libel for divorce was dismissed.2 The decree of the Probate Court was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on February 23,1943.3
¶7Petitioner left Worcester in May, 1942, and arrived in Reno, Nevada, on June 10, accompanied by his secretary, one Dawn Allen, and her mother. On July 24, 1942, petitioner, through his attorney, instituted divorce proceedings by filing a complaint in the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. The complaint alleged that petitioner was a bona fide resident of the State of Nevada4 and charged respondent with desertion and extreme cruelty. Respondent received notice of the proceedings while in Massachusetts. She arrived in Nevada in August, 1942, and thereafter, through attorneys, filed an answer to petitioner’s complaint together with a cross-complaint for divorce alleging extreme cruelty on the part of petitioner as grounds for her suit. Respondent’s answer admitted as true the allegations of petitioner’s complaint relating to petitioner’s Nevada residence.
¶8At the hearing in the divorce, proceedings, petitioner and respondent appeared personally. Both parties were represented by counsel. Petitioner testified that he had come to Nevada with the intention of making that State *381his home and that such was his present intention. Respondent gave testimony with respect to specific acts of cruelty, but raised no question in relation to petitioner’s domicile. On September 19, 1942, the Nevada court, after finding that it had “jurisdiction of the plaintiff and defendant and of the subject matter involved,”5 entered a decree granting respondent a divorce as prayed for in her cross-complaint.6 Neither party challenged the decree by appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.7
¶9Following the entry of the divorce decree, petitioner and Dawn Allen were married in Nevada. Shortly thereafter, they returned to Worcester, Massachusetts, as husband and wife. In May or June, 1943, they left Massachusetts for Nevada where they remained until August of that year.
¶10On May 22, 1943, respondent filed a petition in the Probate Court for the County of Worcester, praying that petitioner be adjudged in contempt of court for failing to abide by the terms of the decree for separate support which had been entered by the Massachusetts court in the previous year.8 Subsequently, respondent also moved that the decree for separate support be modified so as *382to award her a larger allowance. Petitioner in his answer» denied that the decree for separate support was still in effect and set up the Nevada divorce decree as a bar to respondent’s action.
¶11In the hearings which followed, petitioner introduced in evidence an exemplified copy of the Nevada court proceeding. The presiding judge refused to allow the introduction of evidence placing in issue petitioner’s Nevada domicile and thereby the jurisdiction of the Nevada court, on the ground that permitting such collateral attack was not consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit. Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the action was, accordingly, allowed.
¶12The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed on appeal, holding that the Probate Court had erred in excluding the evidence placing in issue petitioner’s Nevada domicile and the jurisdiction of the Nevada court.9 In conformity with that judgment, the Probate Court held an extended hearing on those questions.10 The court concluded that petitioner went to Nevada to seek a divorce; that neither petitioner nor respondent had a bona fide residence in that State; that the Nevada court did not have jurisdiction of either party; and that the divorce was in violation of the provisions of the appli*383cable Massachusetts statute.11 The Probate Court dismissed petitioner’s motion for revocation of the decree for separate support and modified that decree so as to award respondent a substantially larger allowance. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the Probate Court dismissing petitioner’s motion to revoke the decree for separate support, on the ground that the evidence supported the conclusion that petitioner was never domiciled in Nevada and that the Nevada courts lacked jurisdiction to enter the decree of divorce. The order of the Probate Court modifying the decree for separate support was reversed, apparently for further hearings on petitioner’s financial condition.12 There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court that petitioner, under state law, could be held to the obligations imposed by the decree for separate support if it be conceded that the Nevada decree of divorce is valid.13
¶13It is clear that the decree of divorce in question is valid and final in the State in which it was rendered and, under the law of Nevada, may not be subjected to the collateral attack permitted in this case in the Massachusetts courts.14 Respondent does not urge the contrary.
¶14*384Nor has it been suggested that the proceedings before the Nevada court were in any degree violative of the requirements of procedural due process or that respondent was denied a full opportunity to contest the issue of petitioner’s Nevada domicile.
¶15It is abundantly clear that respondent participated in the Nevada divorce proceedings. She appeared personally and gave testimony at the hearing. Through her attorneys she filed pleadings in answer to petitioner’s complaint and successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the Nevada court to obtain the decree of divorce which she subsequently subjected to attack as invalid in the Massachusetts courts.
¶16Thus, here, as in the Sherrer case, the decree of divorce is one which was entered after proceedings in which there was participation by both plaintiff and defendant and in which both parties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues. It is a decree not susceptible to collateral attack in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. In the Sherrer case, we concluded that the requirements of full faith and credit preclude the courts of a sister State from subjecting such a decree to collateral attack by readjudicating the existence of jurisdictional facts. That principle is no less applicable where, as here, the party initiating the collateral attack is the party in whose favor the decree was entered. For reasons stated at length in the Sherrer case, we hold that the Massachusetts courts erred in permitting the Nevada divorce decree to be subjected to attack on the ground that petitioner was not domiciled in Nevada at the time the decree was entered.
¶17Reversed.
¶18[For dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., concurred in by Murphy, J., see ante, p. 356.]