Volume 336 — United States Reports

This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 336 of the United States Reports:

Held: further, that petitioner is taxable on the gain realized *32 in the purchases from bondholders through the secretary of the bondholders’ committee and the security dealers, under the doctrine of the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 , he being at all times solvent.” 6 T. C. 1048 .

Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), was a case before the United States Supreme Court.

Held: this would ordinarily be a question of Georgia law, we believe that substitution of any other rule of law is erroneous. 6 *139 Not the least of the difficulties with a contrary result is the fact that the Bankruptcy Act gives no clue to what proportion of the lessor’s stockholders must vote to accept the offer if state law is not controlling.

Held: however, that the facts alleged did not show that the accident resulted proxi *209 mately, in whole or in part, from that negligence. We cannot say that the Supreme Court of Alabama erred. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of opinion that this is also a case in which the petition for certiorari should not have been granted. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 , 64 (concurring opinion).

Held: p. 509: “Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand.” Certain ex *242 pressions, set out below, 3 occur in the opinion as to the right to use private property for speech, press and assembly but they must be read in the light of the facts in the Marsh case.

Held: on application of a rule of strict construction of congressional waivers, that Congress’ express waiver of immunity from gross production taxes on oil produced from the specified Indian lands did not extend to petroleum excise taxes.

Held: in determining the amount of earnings and profits available to D Corporation after the liquidation for distribution as dividends, that its deficit should be deducted from the accumulated earnings and profits acquired from its subsidiary.

Held: however, that the income from petitioners’ operations in excess of six per cent of their capital stock was income and property of Aireo. Three judges dissented. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 167 F. 2d 304 .

Held: on an agreed statement of facts, that the forwarder must file its claims within the nine-month period. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that for the purposes of § 1013 alone forwarders are to be considered carriers and as such are entitled to the right-over given by § 20 (12). 166 F. 2d 778 .

H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a New York protectionist law which prohibits licensure to suppliers who are alleged will create “destructive competition” in the local market to violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Held: from which the jury could conclude that there was one continuous and persistent conspiracy to defraud. It is conceivable that the jury might conclude that beginning in 1943 or thereabouts Moncharsh severed himself from the conspiracy and that his subordinates carried it forward on their own.

Held: above, that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review the merits. LeCrone and Payne show that we likewise have no jurisdiction so far as the merits are concerned. But that, of course, does not affect our power to set aside the erroneous action of the Court of Appeals. Our supervisory appellate jurisdiction would be of little value if the injustice caused by the decision below were to stand uncorrected.

Held: upon the Commission to show that that rate as applied was fair and reasonable. We cannot say that the Commission acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in respect to its use of Plan 2 or of the factors used in checking the plan’s results and qualifying them. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, Plan 2 was never intended or accepted by the Commission as furnishing a final and exclusive basis for fixing rates.

Held: was not the kind of “imperious” or “urgent necessity” that came within the recognized exception to the double-jeopardy provision. See Cornero v. United States, 48 F. 2d 69 . We are urged to apply the Cornero interpretation of the “urgent necessity” rule here. We are asked to adopt the Cornero rule under which petitioner contends the absence of witnesses can never justify discontinuance of a trial.

Held: and its reversal was rested on that finding. There was no finding that there was unfairness in the court-martial trial itself. We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure required by Article 70 can properly be construed as an indispensable prerequisite to exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction.

Held: that where Congress have exercised a power over a particular subject given them by the Constitution, it is not competent for state legislation to add to the provisions of Congress upon that subject; for that the will of Congress upon the whole subject is as clearly established by what it had not declared, as by what it has expressed.” Id. at pp. 617-618. 14 The constitutional principle of the supremacy of federal…

Held: however, that “when the grand jury turned out to be illegally constituted and the indictment was dismissed . . . the subpoenas amounted to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” In order to implement a congressional policy to have the grand jury a “truly representative” cross section of *798 the community, we held in the Ballard case, supra, that exclusion of women from the…