IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
KEITH WILLIAM SULLIVAN, No. 78567
Appellant,
vs. F
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. NOV 4 2020
BRVAIN
-vE r'OURT
DEPUTY CLERK
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
jury verdict, of grand larceny of an auto, value $3,500 or greater, and
burglary, second offense. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County;
Barry L. Breslow, Judge.
Appellant Keith William Sullivan took a vehicle from an
automobile dealership lot. Police officers found him in that vehicle five days
later. The State charged him with (1) burglary, NRS 205.060(1), for
unlawfully entering the vehicle five days after taking it with the intent to
possess it—a felony, (2) grand larceny of a motor vehicle, NRS 205.228(1),
for taking the vehicle from the dealer, and (3) possession of a stolen vehicle,
NRS 205.273(1)(b), for possessing the vehicle five days after taking it. The
'The Legislature amended NRS 205.060, NRS 205.228, and NRS
205.273 effective July 1, 2020. See 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 633, § 55, at 4425-
27; id., § 63, at 4430-31; id., § 68, at 4432-33; id., § 137, at 4488. Sullivan
committed these offenses between December 2017 and January 2018. Thus,
we apply the statutes in effect at the time Sullivan committed these
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jury found him guilty on all charges. The parties stipulated to dismissing
the possession-of-a-stolen-vehicle charge. See Stowe v. State,
(1993) (holding that a defendant cannot be convicted of
both larceny and possession of stolen property for taking the same
property).
Sullivan argues that it was legally impossible for him to burgle
the vehicle with the specific intent to possess it because he took it five days
before the burglary and never dispossessed it. We disagree.
We review questions of law de novo. Bailey v. State,
(1981); see also NRS 205.060(1) (prohibiting
burglary of a motor vehicle). A defendant commits burglary "at the point of
[unlawful] entry regardless of whether the underlying intended felony is
ever completed." Swaynie v. State,
(Ind. 2002).
We reject Sullivan's argument that he lacked the specific intent
for burglary. Burglary is complete upon unlawful entry with the intent to
commit a felony, and the jury found that Sullivan unlawfully entered the
vehicle with felonious intent (i.e., to possess stolen property). The
subsequent dismissal of the possession-of-a-stolen-vehicle charge did not
negate the specific intent for burglary because a burglary conviction does
offenses. See State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin),
(2008).
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•.•
not require completion of the underlying felony.2 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
Parraguirre
J.
Hardesty
-
W 1 J.
Cadish
cc: Hon. Barry L. Breslow, District Judge
Washoe County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
2Sullivan also argues that the State committed misconduct by twice
telling the jury that he conceded to taking the vehicle. We conclude that
Sullivan is estopped from raising this argument because he first asked the
jury in his closing argument to find him guilty of the lesser-included offense
of unlawful taking of a vehicle. See NRS 205.2715(1) (prohibiting the taking
of a vehicle without the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
vehicle); see also Carter v. State,
(2005)
(A party who participates in an alleged error is estopped from raising any
objection on appeal."). Simply put, Sullivan asked the jury to find him guilty
of taking a motor vehicle before the State's comments.
3
