Volume 58 — California Appellate Reports

<p>The facts are stated in the opinion' of the court.</p>

<p>[1] Fraud — Value of Land — Misrepresentations. —- Misrepresentations concerning the value of land made by a party to a real estate trade are alone sufficient to constitute fraud where the party to whom the representations are made is not acquainted with conditions and land values in the locality where the land is situated, has not sufficient opportunity to investigate, and relies on the statements made.</p> <p>[2] Id.-—Exchange of Real Estate—False Representations—Measure of Damages.—In an action for damages for false representations sustained in connection with a real estate trade into which plaintiff was induced to enter through the fraudulent representations of the defendant, it was not necessary to find the value of the land exchanged by the plaintiff, since his measure of damage was the difference between the actual value of the property received and its value had the property been as represented.</p> <p>[3] Id.—Ratification of Exchange—Finding.—Where in such action it was alleged as an affirmative defense that the plaintiff ratified the exchange in various ways, and the court found that there was no ratification, it was unnecessary to further find on each reason upon which the defendant claimed the ratification was predicated.</p> <p>[4] Id. — Essentials of Fraud — Conflict of Evidence—-Finding—■ Appeal.—Where in such action the evidence on the essential elements constituting the fraud was conflicting, the decision of the trial court thereon must prevail.</p> <p>[5] Id.'—'Value of Defendant’s Land—-Evidence—Finding.—Where in such action the defendant conceded its land to be worth no more than sixteen dollars per acre, and the evidence showed that it was worth no more than five dollars per acre, it was not in a position to complain of a valuation of twenty-eight dollars and seventy five cents per acre fixed by the court.</p> <p>2. Measure of damages for false representations inducing exchange of property, note, 15 Ann. Gas. 458.</p>

<p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>[1] Negligence—Personal Injuries—Action for Damages—Collision Between Autotruck and Bicycle at Street Intersection—Verdict—Evidence.-—In an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when the right fender of an autotruck, which, like the bicycle on which plaintiff was riding, had been traveling along the westerly side of a street in a southerly direction, struck the rear of the bicycle at a place very close to the center of the intersection of said street and another street when plaintiff turned at right angles toward the left intending to proceed in an easterly direction, the jury was justified in concluding that the driver of the truck was attempting unlawfully to pass the plaintiff on a street intersection.</p> <p>Liability for collision of automobile with bicycle, notes, 21 Ann. Cas. 656; Ann. Cas. 1916E, 675; 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 944.</p> <p>Excessiveness of verdicts in actions for personal injuries other than death, notes, 16 Ann. Cas. 8; Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1361; Ann, Cas. 1915D, 488; Ann. Cas. 19160, 916; L. R. A. 1915E, 30.</p> <p>[2] Id. — Verdict not Excessive — Nonexcessiveness of. — In such action, a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of three thousand dollars was not excessive, where in addition to other injuries plaintiff’s skull was fractured and some permanent injuries seem to have resulted therefrom.</p>

<p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>[1] Appeal—Weight op Evidence—Review.—Where in an action for injuries to an automobile resulting from a collision with another automobile at a street intersection there was some substantial evidence tending to establish negligence on the. part of the driver of defendant’s ear under the Motor Vehicle Act, the weight of such evidence cannot be reviewed on appeal.</p> <p>[2] Motor Vehicle Act—Change op Ownership op Automobile— Failure to Comply With Act—Maintenance op Action por Injuries.—Where a son purchased an automobile with his mother’s funds but registered it in his own name, and later it was agreed between them that the son should be considered the owner, but no compliance was had with the provision of the Motor Vehicle Act relating to change of ownership, the son was not by reason of such omission deprived of the right to maintain an action for injuries to the automobile.</p> <p>[3] Bailment—Injury to Property—Right op Action by Bailee.— A bailee has the right to sue for damages for injuries caused to the property by a third person.</p> <p>[4] Id. — Operator’s License — Indorsement by Parent op Minor — Presumption.—"Where in an action for injuries to an automobile resulting from a collision with an automobile driven by defendant’s minor son the evidence showed that the defendant owned the machine and that the son lived with him, the court was warranted in assuming, in view of the presumptions of subdivisions 15 and 33 of section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the father indorsed the son’s application for an operator’s license.</p> <p>4. Liability where automobile is being used by a member of owner’s family, notes," Ann. Oas. 1914C, 1091; Ann. Cas. 1916A, 661; Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1002; 41 L. B. A. (N. S.) 775; 50 L. B. A. (N. S.) 59; L. B. A. 1917F, 365; I». B. A. 1918F, 297.</p> <p>Liability of owner under “family purpose” doctrine for injuries by automobile while being used by members of his family, notes, 5 A. L. B. 226; 10 A. L. B. 1449; 14 A. L. B. 1087.</p>

PROCEEDING in Mandamus to require the levy and collection of a tax sufficient to pay a judgment against a municipality. Writ granted. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>[2] New Trial—Excessive Damages—Statement in Order—Effect of.—The statement in an order granting a new trial that the motion is granted on the ground of “excessive damages” is tantamount to a specification that the motion is granted on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, regardless of whether the order is made under subdivision 5 or 6 of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>[3] Negligence — Action for Death — Excessive Damages — New Trial.—A trial judge has the right to grant a new trial in an action for damages for death brought under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure when he deems the damages awarded by the jury to be excessive, notwithstanding the declaration in the section that such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the ease may be just.</p> <p>[4] Appeal—Order Granting New Trial—Excessive Damages—Reversal of Judgment. — When the action of the trial judge in granting a new trial on the ground of excessive damages comes before an appellate court, the order will not be reversed unless it plainly appears that the trial judge abused his discretion.</p> <p>[5] Negligence—Action for Death—Damages—Pecuniary Loss.— In an action for damages for death brought under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the damages must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries caused by the wrongful death.</p> <p>[6] Id.—Nature of Pecuniary Loss.—The pecuniary loss to which ■beneficiaries are limited in actions for wrongful death may be a loss arising from a deprivation of something to which the statutory beneficiaries would have been legally entitled if the person had lived, or it may be a pecuniary loss arising from the deprivation of something which, from all the circumstances of the particular ease, it could reasonably be expected such beneficiary would have received from the deceased had his life been taken, even though the obligation resting on the deceased to bestow such benefit may have been but a moral obligation.</p> <p>[7] Id.—Death of Adult Child—Damages—Evidence.—In an action by a parent for the death of an adult child, the measure of damages is the reasonable expectation of the parent of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the life of the child, and the expectation must be based upon some fact or facts aside from the relationship, and there must be some evidence tending to show the competency and disposition on the part of the child to render service to the parent or to contribute to his aid.</p> <p>[8] Id.—Estimation of Damages—Expectancy of Life of Parent.— Although one of the elements of damage which may be suffered by the parent of an adult child for his wrongful death is the present value of such future financial assistance as the parent might reasonably expect from a continuance of the child’s life, or the present value of such future services as the parent could reasonably expect to have received had the child lived, nevertheless, in estimating the amount of such damages, it is the expectancy of the life of the parent, not the life of the child, which is to be taken into consideration.</p> <p>[9] Id.—Loss of Society—Limitation of Recovery—Pecuniary Loss. While loss of society, comfort, and protection may be an element of the injury sustained by statutory beneficiaries from the wrongful death of another, it is only the pecuniary, and not the sentimental, value of such loss which may be taken into consideration in the assessment of damages, since nothing can be recovered as a solatium for wounded feelings.</p> <p>[10] Id.—Excessive Damages—New Trial—Discretion not Abused. In this action brought under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the surviving husband and the father and mother of a deceased person to recover damages for his wrongful death, there was no abuse of discretion in .granting a new trial on the ground of excessive damages based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict as to the amount awarded to the parents.</p> <p>[11] Id.—Verdict—'Awards to Different Beneficiarles—Excessive Amounts—New Trial.—A verdict in an action for wrongful death brought under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure must bo for a single lump sum, the heirs having but a single joint cause of action, and the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted whenever it can be seen from answers to special interrogatories that the jury has made an excessive award of damages in their assessment of the loss sustained by any one or more of the statutory beneficiaries.</p> <p>7. Statutory right of parent to recover for death of adult child, note, L. R. A. 1916E, 190.</p>

<p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>PROCEEDING in Mandamus to compel the issuance of a certificate of election as director of an irrigation district. Writ denied.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

PROCEEDING- in Mandamus to require the levy and collection of a tax sufficient to pay a judgment against a municipality. Writ granted. The facts are the same as those stated in the opinion of Oscar Heyman <& Brother {a Corporation) v. Edwin C. Bath et al., ante, p. 499.

PROCEEDING in Mandamus to require the levy and collection of a tax sufficient to pay a judgment against a municipality. Writ granted. The facts are the same as those stated in the opinion in Oscar Reyman <6 Brother (a Corporation) v. Edwin C. Bath et al., ante, p. 499.

PBOCEEDING in Mandamus to require the levy and collection of a tax sufficient to pay a judgment against a municipality. Writ granted. The facts are the same as those stated in the opinion in Oscar Heyman & Brother (a Corporation) v. Eckwin C. Bath et al., ante, p. 499.

PROCEEDING in Mandamus to require the levy and collection of a tax. sufficient to pay a judgment against a municipality. Writ granted. The facts are the same as those stated in the opinion in Oscar Hey man & Brother (a Corporation) v. Edwin C. Bath et al., ante, p. 499.