Volume 159 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, and the defendant, Paul Doucette, the Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie, Jr., cross-appealed from a Superior Court judgment awarding the plaintiff the sum of $2,000,000 under the provisions of the last Will and Testament of Donelson C. Glassie, Jr. (testator), less $437,861.59 in life insurance proceeds the plaintiff had received upon the testator's death. In addition, the defendant also appealed from the trial justice's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff appealed from the trial justice's denial of prejudgment interest. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that there was ambiguity in the will and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply to the claims. In addition, the Supreme Court also held that the trial justice erred in linking the life insurance policy to the $2,000,000 bequest and in awarding attorney's fees. Further, the Court found no error in the trial justice's finding that prejudgment interest was inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court, therefore, remanded the matter for further proceedings and returned the record to the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Jeanne Jackson (plaintiff), as Executrix of the Estate of Anthony J. Esposito, Jr. (decedent), appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Company (defendant or Quincy Mutual), in this uninsured motorist claim case. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Quincy Mutual after concluding that the decedent was "occupying" his owned-but-not-insured motorcycle at the time of the fatal injury, and therefore, was precluded from recovery under the terms of an automobile policy issued by the defendant. This case was the first occasion on which the Supreme Court interpreted the terms of an automobile policy provision that is designed to exclude an owner from the protections of his policy. In addition, this case was the first occasion on which the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the policy term "occupying" in the context of two collisions. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was erroneous because the record evinced genuine issues of material fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, 1112 Charles, L.P., appealed to the Supreme Court following the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Fornel Entertainment, Inc. and its president, Anthony Lancellotta. The matter involved a parking lease between Fornel, the owner of property at 1113 Charles Street in North Providence, Rhode Island, and the then-owner of property across the street at 1112 Charles Street. The plaintiff, as current owner of the 1112 Charles Street property, brought suit against the defendants to void the lease and alleged, in part, that Lancellotta fraudulently procured the lease. A Superior Court justice granted the defendants' summary-judgment motion on the ground that the plaintiff was not in privity of contract with the defendants because it was not a party to the original lease or any of its subsequent amendments. Therefore, the justice held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the lease. On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that an attornment agreement executed by the defendants and a prior owner of the 1112 Charles Street property created privity of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment and rejected the plaintiff's unsupported contention that the attornment agreement created privity of contract between it and the defendants. Without privity of contract, the Court concluded, the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the lease. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate.