Volume 200 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Michael Stokes, appealed from a judgment of conviction on three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, three counts of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence, and one count of carrying a pistol without a license. On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the state violated Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure when it untimely disclosed the participation of two witnesses in the witness protection program (2) the trial justice erred when he admitted both written and recorded prior inconsistent statements of one witness's identification of the defendant, violating Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(5) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence and (3) the trial justice erred when he denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. In its decision, the Supreme Court first held that the defendant had waived his Rule 16 argument he raised no objection to the trial justice when the disclosure was filed, nor did he raise any argument before the trial justice that the state's late response was untimely or prejudicial to him. The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the prior inconsistent statements because the defendant had cross-examined the witness, which allowed the jury to determine for itself which statement was credible. Consequently, the Supreme Court did not reach the defendant's Rule 803(5) argument. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice's decision to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc., appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, following the grant of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the hearing justice erred in finding that the defendant's mortgage had been discharged under the ancient mortgages statute, G.L. 1956 § 34-26-7. Specifically, the defendant argued that a 1997 amendment to the original 1992 mortgage extended the mortgage validity period by thirty-five years from the date of the recorded amendment, pursuant to § 34-26-7, because the amendment did not state a term of years or maturity date. The Supreme Court determined that the 1997 amendment failed to extend the terms of the original mortgage for the purposes of § 34-26-7, and, further, that the amendment did not extend the period of validity for the defendant by thirty-five years because it was not a newly-executed mortgage lacking a term or maturity date. The Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was proper because the defendant's mortgage was discharged, pursuant to § 34-26-7, years prior to the defendant's commencement of foreclosure proceedings in 2017. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Sandy Point Farms, Inc., filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking review of a Superior Court order denying its motion for a protective order concerning the deposition of an appraiser who worked on an appraisal report in conjunction with the testifying expert appraiser. The petition was granted, and, before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the appraiser was a nontestifying expert, and thus, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, he could not be deposed absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances." On the other hand, the defendants, Sandy Point Village, LLC Kurt Poulton and Robert J. Kielbasa, contended that the appraiser was not a nontestifying expert, but instead was a relevant witness given the extent of his collaboration on the report with the testifying expert. The Court held that, based on the plain language of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the appraiser was considered to be a nontestifying expert, and therefore a showing of exceptional circumstances was required for his deposition. The Court further held that the hearing justice failed to properly apply Rule 26(b)(4)(B), and, moreover, the defendants had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances as required by Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Accordingly, the Court quashed the order of the Superior Court.

The defendant sought review of Superior Court judgments, entered in 2012, finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. In November 2011, a Providence 7-Eleven was robbed, and defendant, a probationer, was identified as the suspect. A justice of the Superior Court found that defendant had violated the terms of his probation, and ordered that he serve the term of his suspended sentence. Five years later, defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for the issuance of writs of certiorari, which the Court granted and consolidated. The defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgments and, alternatively, that his case should be remanded for reconsideration under amended Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which now requires the state to prove a probation violation by the "fair preponderance of the evidence." The Supreme Court held that the judgments below were final at the time that Rule 32(f) was amended, and therefore no remand was necessary. Additionally, the Court held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation, because such a finding was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Sean Gannon, appealed from orders of the Superior Court relating his motion to vacate an arbitration award issued in connection with the termination of his employment as a firefighter by the defendant, the City of Pawtucket, in November 2013. Following the termination, the local firefighters' union brought a grievance against the city on Gannon's behalf, which was arbitrated pursuant to the firefighters' collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator found in favor of the city, and Gannon, on his own behalf, filed a motion in Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award. A hearing justice denied Gannon's motion to substitute the union as a plaintiff, granted the city's motion to dismiss Gannon's motion to vacate the arbitration award, and awarded the city reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that Gannon did not have standing to challenge the arbitration decision on his own behalf, and that the hearing justice properly denied Gannon's motion to substitute the union as a plaintiff because the motion would not have related back to the original filing and was therefore not timely. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the orders of the Superior Court denying Gannon's motion to amend, dismissing his motion to vacate the arbitration award, and awarding reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.