Volume 202 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiffs, Thomas Shannahan, Thomas Wilson, Donald D. Twohig, and the Estate of Donald P. Twohig, appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, The Rhode Island Interlocal Risk Management Trust. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that: (1) the hearing justice should not have considered the Trust's summary-judgment motion due to the complexity of the case (2) the hearing justice rendered a decision while biased and (3) summary judgment was not appropriately granted on their claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contract/economic advantage, intrusion upon seclusion, civil conspiracy, and conversion. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' complexity argument was without merit and that they had waived their bias argument by not presenting the argument in the trial court. Next, the Court held that the claims of Donald P. and Donald D., including Donald P.'s claim for conversion, were barred by res judicata. The Court also held that the claims of Wilson and Shannahan for intentional interference with contract/economic advantage, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy were barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-25. With respect to the claims of emotional distress, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to present any evidence of the necessary elements for the claims and that summary judgment was properly granted. Turning to the claims for invasion of privacy, the Court held that the plaintiffs had merely relied on allegations in their pleadings and that summary judgment was appropriately granted on those counts. Finally, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to point to specific evidence in their discovery materials to counter the Trust's motion for summary judgment, and that summary judgment was appropriate on the claims for defamation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff appealed from an order of the Family Court denying her miscellaneous petition for grandparent visitation with the two children of her deceased daughter and the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Family Court's decision contradicted the evidence presented at the hearing because many of the facts that the hearing justice relied upon were dependent upon the defendant's opinion. She further contended that she proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant's decision to deny her grandparent visitation was unreasonable. She also argued that she presented evidence that she was a fit and proper person to have visitation. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff's petition for grandparent visitation. The Court noted that the hearing justice had reviewed the testimony of all three witnesses and considered a Family Court investigator's recommendation that the plaintiff have no further visitation with the children. The Court also noted that the hearing justice considered the testimony concerning the detrimental impact that the visits had on the children, as well as how the children's behavior and health improved when the visits with plaintiff came to an end. Moreover, the Court emphasized the presumption that honors a fit custodial parent's determination not to allow visitation with a third person, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). That presumption, when combined with the findings by the hearing justice, led the Court to conclude that the hearing justice was correct when he denied grandparent visitation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court's order denying the plaintiff's petition for grandparent visitation.

The defendant appealed from an order of the Superior Court denying a stay of litigation pending arbitration proceedings. After construction of a planned Center for Hellenic Studies on the campus of the University of Rhode Island was halted for several years, the plaintiffs brought suit in Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant had breached the terms of the lease between plaintiffs and defendant and an equitable order requiring defendant to restore the land to its pre-construction state. The defendant motioned for a stay of litigation pending arbitration proceedings pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10 3 3. The hearing justice denied the order, reasoning that the language of the arbitration provision did not require arbitration for alleged breaches of the lease. The Supreme Court held that defendant's appeal was properly before the Court pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-3-19 and that the lease's arbitration provision mandated arbitration of any controversy, claim, or dispute arising out of the lease, including claims of alleged breaches. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of an order staying litigation pending arbitration pursuant to § 10 3 3.

The plaintiff, Dawn Parrillo, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel Santos, appealed from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Shea Gregg, M.D. In 2012, Daniel Santos's automobile struck a utility pole and he was transported to Rhode Island Hospital where he died several days later. In 2014, Parrillo brought a wrongful death action against Rhode Island Hospital, on behalf of the estate. Two years later, she discovered that Dr. Gregg was an attending physician during the decedent's hospital stay, and she amended her complaint to add Dr. Gregg as a defendant. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Dr. Gregg because the three-year statute of limitations in G.L. 1956 § 10-7-2 had expired. Before this Court, Parrillo argued that the limitations period in § 10 7 2 should be tolled until the time she discovered Dr. Gregg's involvement. The Supreme Court did not agree, and held that § 10-7-2 begins to run when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the wrongful conduct that is the basis of his or her claim, not the identity of the alleged tortfeasor. Therefore, the statutory period to file a claim against Dr. Gregg expired, at the latest, three years after Parrillo received the decedent's medical records in August 2012. Parrillo's claim against Dr. Gregg was thus time barred, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment.