Volume 203 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiff filed a civil action against Rhode Island College and several professors and administrators, alleging that their conduct toward him when he was a student in the School of Social Work pursuing a Master of Social Work degree had violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A hearing justice of the Superior Court resolved the case on the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice had abused her discretion by considering the defendants' successive motion for summary judgment, erred by entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims, and erred by granting the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The plaintiff also argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity would not bar his suit against the defendants moving forward. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion by considering the renewed motion for summary judgment because the seven years that elapsed between the filing of the two motions yielded a significantly expanded record upon which to consider the presence or absence of genuine issues of material fact. After reviewing the summary judgment record de novo, the Supreme Court held there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a factfinder with respect to whether the defendants' conduct: (1) infringed upon the plaintiff's right to freedom of expression (2) constituted impermissible retaliatory actions in response to the plaintiff's exercise of his right to freedom of expression (3) impermissibly compelled speech and/or (4) violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. With respect to the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Supreme Court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's equal protection claim and the plaintiff's procedural due process claims. With respect to the plaintiff's conspiracy claim, the Supreme Court held that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff had not alleged that he was a member of a cognizable class entitled to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Supreme Court also held that it would not consider in the first instance whether the doctrine of qualified immunity barred the plaintiff's constitutional claims against the defendants because while this issue had been repeatedly briefed and argued before the hearing justice, the hearing justice had not made any findings or conclusions on this issue. Finally, the Supreme Court considered de novo the punitive damages issue and held that the plaintiff had not demonstrated the required prima facie case to survive the defendants' motion to strike the claim for punitive \ Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for due process and equal protection violations and his conspiracy claim. The Supreme Court also affirmed the order striking the plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment with respect to most of the plaintiff's First Amendment claims, remanding the case to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent therewith

The plaintiffs appealed from an April 9, 2018 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants in a case involving claims of negligence and nuisance with respect to water damage allegedly caused to a portion of plaintiffs' property by the effluent from a pipe running from defendants' land. The plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred in ruling for defendants, pointing to several errors that the trial justice purportedly made in rendering his decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not clearly err when making his findings of fact after the bench trial and in concluding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing damages under either their negligence or their nuisance claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This matter arises from a claim by plaintiff, Richard P. Sullivan, that he was entitled to pension benefits based on his tenure in various positions with the Town of Coventry. The plaintiff appealed a Kent County Superior Court judgment granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the grant of defendants' alternative motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the Superior Court erred in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review his claims and further argued that the hearing justice erred in reviewing and affirming the plan administrator's decision that denied plaintiff pension benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing justice's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and thus did not reach the Superior Court's alternative grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reinstated plaintiff's prior petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court had previously denied, without prejudice, and consolidated it with the present appeal. The Court reviewed the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits and concluded that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court regarding its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and affirmed the decision of the plan administrator denying plaintiff pension benefits.

The plaintiff, The Rhode Island Industrial-Recreational Building Authority (IRBA), appeals from an April 27, 2017 judgment in Providence County Superior Court entering judgment for Feeley & Driscoll, P.C. (Feeley) on all claims by IRBA and reflecting the previous grant of summary judgment in favor of Feeley by that court. IRBA averred before the Supreme Court that the hearing justice erred in holding that Feeley did not, under the law of negligence, owe a duty of care to IRBA as a third-party. The Supreme Court, in assessing the liability of an accountant/auditor to a third party for negligence, adopted the rule provided for in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 (1977). It then held, contrary to IRBA's contentions on appeal, as follows: (1) Feeley did not have knowledge, when it produced the report at issue, that it would be used by IRBA for the term of the credit transaction at issue (2) the transactions at issue were not substantially similar and (3) Feeley did not authorize the use of the report in the later transaction that was at issue in the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Feeley did not owe IRBA a duty as a matter of law. For that reason, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Julio Morais, was convicted of four counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault after a bench trial in Providence County Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice lacked jurisdiction over the trial because the defendant's jury-trial waiver was invalid pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the defendant argued that his waiver of a jury trial was invalid because he signed the jury-waiver form outside the presence of the trial justice. Furthermore, the defendant contends that the trial justice's colloquy with the defendant was inadequate to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to a trial by jury. The Supreme Court held that the language of Rule 23(a) does not require that a defendant sign a jury-waiver form in open court rather, the jury-waiver form must be in writing and approved by the trial justice prior to the commencement of the bench trial. Moreover, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice's colloquy with the defendant in this case was adequate to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant's right to a jury trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Daniel Lastarza, appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred (1) when she failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and (2) when she refused to grant a mistrial based on alleged improper comments made by the state during closing argument. The Supreme Court first held that, under its longstanding raise-or-waive rule, the defendant waived his argument with respect to the jury instructions because he failed to object below. Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not err when she refused to grant a mistrial, because the prosecutor's statements during closing argument were based upon the evidence and testimony adduced at trial. Finally, the Court held that any possible prejudice caused by the prosecutor's statements during closing argument was cured by the trial justice's cautionary instructions to the jury. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The plaintiff, Austin Yattaw, appealed from the Superior Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of East Providence in his negligence action arising out of an injury the plaintiff sustained while riding his bicycle through Glenlyon Park, located in the city, when he was thrown from his bicycle after his tire became wedged in a crack in a concrete retaining wall located on a grassy slope to the side of a stairway. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in granting the city's motion for summary judgment. According to the plaintiff, there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the exception to the Recreational Use Statute, G.L. 1956 § 32-6-5(a)(1), applied in this case because, under the doctrine of spoliation of evidence, the city's alleged destruction of documents gave rise to an adverse inference—namely, that the city knew about the defective condition of the retaining wall and failed to guard or warn against it. The Supreme Court held that the spoliation doctrine did not apply in this case because there was no evidence that the city acted deliberately, negligently, or in bad faith with regard to the documents. The Court also held that the exception to the RUS in § 32-6-5(a)(1) is inapplicable because there was no evidence that the city willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against the alleged dangerous condition of the retaining wall. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.