Volume 204 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

In this negligence action, the plaintiffs, Claire Letizio and Christopher Letizio, appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion for a new trial after a jury found in favor of the defendants, Natale J. Ritacco and Margaret H. Ritacco. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial judge misconceived material evidence in his role under Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, because no reasonable juror could have determined that the defendants lacked constructive notice of a dangerous icy condition on their driveway. The plaintiffs also argued that the trial justice should have recognized that the jury had not been apprised of the defendants' duty as landowners to warn of the icy condition of their driveway. The Supreme Court held that the evidence in the case on the issue of constructive notice was evenly balanced and, thus, the trial justice had not erred in refusing to disturb the jury's verdict. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, without some form of notice of a dangerous condition, a landowner has no duty to warn an invitee of that condition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The respondent mother, Anna Brugeman (Anna), appealed from a Family Court decree finding that she abused and neglected her infant daughter, Sophia M. On appeal, Anna argued that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived relevant law and evidence, and that she ignored evidence contradicting her findings. Specifically, Anna contended that the trial justice erroneously relied on two prior cases that she argued were distinguishable from the case at bar. She further argued that the trial justice misconstrued expert testimony from one of Sophia's treating physicians regarding the number of incidents of abuse. Finally, Anna asserted that the trial justice's findings were based on an impermissible pyramid of inferences and that the only reasonable inference was that Sophia's father alone had caused her injuries. The Supreme Court held, after careful review, that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to support the trial justice's finding of abuse and neglect as to Anna. Accordingly, the Court vacated the decree of the Family Court as it pertains to Anna Brugeman.

Kevin Hunt, as an interested party in this receivership case, appealed from a Superior Court order that authorized the receiver's recommendation on the distribution of proceeds from the sale of his marital domicile, 25 Burnside Avenue in Narragansett. On appeal, Kevin argued that the Superior Court justice erred by (1) misreading and misapplying the provisions of a marital settlement agreement in distributing the proceeds from the sale of the property equally with his former wife, petitioner Allie Hunt (2) attributing the entire balance of an outstanding mortgage to Kevin's share of the proceeds and (3) ordering Kevin to pay rent retroactively. The Supreme Court first held that the marital settlement agreement clearly required that the property's proceeds be divided equally between Allie and Kevin if Kevin failed to make, among other payments, a payment equal to 38 percent of the property's net equity value as of December 31, 2009. Next, the Supreme Court vacated paragraph two of the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for a recalculation so that the principal on the outstanding mortgage be attributed equally to the parties, with any late fees, penalties, and costs attributed solely to Kevin's share of the proceeds. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court did not err in requiring Kevin to pay past-due rent to the receivership estate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the order of the Superior Court.

Christy's Auto Rentals, Inc. (Christy's) appealed to the Supreme Court seeking review of a January 25, 2016 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company (Homeland) in this declaratory judgment action. On November 7, 2018, the Court heard oral argument in the case. Christy's contended before the Court that the hearing justice erred in granting Homeland's motion for summary judgment because he erroneously found that: (1) Homeland did not waive Christy's lack of standing by asserting it first in its motion for summary judgment (2) Christy's lacked standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action (3) Homeland's insurance policy with its insured did not cover the accident and (4) coverage was not mandated by G.L. 1956 § 27-7-6. The Supreme Court held that Homeland properly raised the standing issue before the trial justice in its motion for summary judgment that Christy's indeed lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment regarding a contract to which it was not a party and that the hearing justice's determination of the insurance policy's coverage of the accident at issue and the applicability of the statute constituted nonbinding dicta. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the January 25, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court.

On January 12, 2016, Mark Powers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review a Final Decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court, which was issued on December 23, 2015. That decree denied and dismissed Mr. Powers's appeal, in accordance with a written decision of the Appellate Division on December 16, 2015. This Court granted Mr. Powers's petition for a writ of certiorari. Before the Supreme Court, Mr. Powers contended that: (1) he "should not be estopped from arguing that he was a full-time employee working part-time hours simply because a stipulation was entered in the Workers' Compensation Court stating that he was a part-time employee" and (2) "the average weekly wage, as calculated pursuant to [G.L. 1956] § 28-33-20 for the purpose of determining workers' compensation benefits, must include monies received by an employee from the state for hours not worked, pursuant to an approved work-sharing program under [G.L. 1956] § 28-44-69." The Supreme Court held that Mr. Powers was bound by any factual statements contained in the stipulation filed with the Workers' Compensation Court but was not bound by any legal conclusion set forth in the stipulation. The Court further held that monies received pursuant to the work-sharing benefit provisions of § 28-44-69 should not be included in calculating an employee's average weekly wage for the purpose of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to § 28-33-20. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court.

The plaintiff, Family Dollar Stores of Rhode Island, Inc. (Family Dollar), appealed from a September 20, 2016 judgment entered in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Justin B. Araujo and the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the Commission), following an August 16, 2016 bench decision dismissing Family Dollar's action without prejudice. Family Dollar contended on appeal that the hearing justice erred in dismissing its case due to the fact that "the dispute involved declaratory relief related to the enforcement of a contract" and, consequently, rather than proceeding before the Commission, "the Superior Court was the correct forum for the dispute." The defendants cross-appealed from a November 9, 2016 order granting Family Dollar's emergency motion for a thirty-day extension of time within which to file its notice of appeal. The defendants contended on appeal that "the Superior Court erred in granting Family Dollar's motion for extension of time" for the following reasons: (1) "Family Dollar did not make the requisite showing of excusable neglect" and (2) "the equities did not favor granting Family Dollar's motion for extension because Family Dollar would not suffer prejudice by a denial of [that motion]." The Supreme Court held, as to the November 9, 2016 order challenged in the cross-appeal, that the hearing justice did not err in determining that there was excusable neglect. The Court then proceeded to conclude that the hearing justice did err with respect to his September 20, 2016 judgment dismissing Family Dollar's complaint. For those reasons, the Supreme Court vacated the September 20, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court, but it affirmed the November 9, 2016 order of the Superior Court.

The parties to this appeal are former spouses who, in the written terms of their divorce, had agreed that the plaintiff would have full ownership and control of the two dogs they had acquired during their marriage, but that the dogs would spend two days each week (Tuesday to Thursday) with the defendant. After a few months, the plaintiff withheld the dogs from their weekly visitations with the defendant, and the defendant sought a court order to enforce the agreed-upon schedule. The plaintiff also filed a motion for relief, claiming that the defendant had not been properly caring for the dogs while they were in his control she requested that the Family Court find the relevant term of the Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) to be inequitable and restrain the defendant from having any further time with the dogs. After a daylong hearing, the Family Court justice found that both parties loved the dogs and wanted to care for them and that the defendant had always acted in good faith with respect to the dogs. The Family Court justice granted the defendant's motion for relief and ordered the parties to continue with the schedule set out in the MSA. The plaintiff appealed from the order, arguing that the Family Court justice had misconceived material evidence before her, was clearly wrong to conclude that the defendant had acted in good faith, was clearly wrong to conclude that the MSA was not inequitable as written, and that she erred by not reforming the MSA. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court justice neither misconceived the evidence nor was clearly wrong in her findings of fact. The Court also held that it was not inequitable to enforce the visitation term in the MSA as written, and, therefore, affirmed the order of the Family Court.