Volume 205 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

This case stems from the tragic death of a four-year-old who drowned in a swimming pool sold to his grandmother by the defendant, NAMCO. The child's parents, the plaintiffs Raymond Oliver and Tiffany Gear, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant following the grant of NAMCO's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether: (1) NAMCO negligently failed to warn the child's grandmother about safety features of a pool ladder (2) an agency relationship existed between NAMCO and the pool installer and (3) NAMCO negligently failed to properly vet and supervise pool installers included on a list distributed to customers. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a failure-to-warn claim. Next, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact as to whether NAMCO had an agency relationship with the pool installer. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that threshold issues of fact precluded summary judgment as to whether NAMCO had a duty to vet and supervise pool installers on the list. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Joshua Mello, appeals from a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Sean Killeavy, based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, despite the limitation on remedies contained in the exclusivity provision, G.L. 1956 § 28-35-58, which governs the liability of thirds persons when an employee is injured, allowed him to bring a claim against his fellow employee for tortious acts of the coemployee that were outside the scope of employment, even after Mello had collected workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court held, after surveying cases considering purported exceptions to the exclusivity provision, that there was no exception to that statute's exclusive remedies for acts of coemployees, even acts that could be considered outside of the scope of the coemployee's employment. The Court concluded that, by accepting workers' compensation benefits and not retaining his common-law rights pursuant to § 28-29-17, the plaintiff was bound by the remedies in the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.