Volume 206 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Francisco Guerrero, was before the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, seeking review of a December 1, 2015 judgment of conviction of: (1) felony assault and (2) possession of a weapon not a firearm. After the jury convicted him of those charges, the defendant moved for a new trial, which motion was denied. The defendant contended on certiorari that the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. After having considered the arguments of both the defendant and the state, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice had engaged in the appropriate analysis with respect to a motion for a new trial and that the Court could perceive no reversible error on the trial justice's part. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the motion for a new trial.

The defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on two counts of first degree robbery and one count of conspiracy. Although the appeal was not timely filed, the Supreme Court reviewed this case as though defendant had filed a common law petition for writ of certiorari so as to avoid depriving defendant of the chance to seek review of his criminal conviction. The sole issue before the Court was whether or not defendant's rights of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution were violated by the introduction of an alleged coconspirator's out-of-court statement that defendant had wielded a firearm during the robbery. Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant had properly preserved that argument for review, the Supreme Court held that any error resulting from the introduction of the alleged coconspirator's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statement was relatively unimportant and was wholly cumulative of the overwhelming evidence presented by the state during defendant's trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Mary Ryan, appealed pro se from an April 26, 2013 final judgment of the Providence County Superior Court and a June 5, 2013 order of the same court. The April 26, 2013 judgment denied and dismissed Ms. Ryan's probate appeal and prohibited Ms. Ryan, with significant exceptions, from "filing pleadings or other documents" in Superior Court unless they have been signed by a Rhode Island licensed attorney. The June 5, 2013 order denied Ms. Ryan's motions to vacate which were filed pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Ryan also raised the issue of the attorneys' fees awarded to opposing counsel in an April 22, 2013 order of the Superior Court. Ms. Ryan made numerous contentions of error on appeal. The Supreme Court held that Ms. Ryan failed to provide the necessary Superior Court transcripts for the Supreme Court to be in a position to review many of her contentions on appeal. However, based on the record before it, the Court instructed the Superior Court to moderately reduce the amount of attorneys' fees awarded to opposing counsel in the case and to limit the duration of the sanctions against Ms. Ryan with respect to filing pro se in Superior Court. With respect to the remaining contentions that were reviewable, the Court was unable to detect any reversible error on the part of the trial justice. Accordingly, the Court remanded with directions to modify the April 22, 2013 attorneys' fees order, affirmed in part and vacated in part the April 26, 2013 judgment, and affirmed the June 5, 2013 order of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Javier Merida, appeals pro se from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion to correct sentence, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the defendant argued that: (1) the trial justice erred in interpreting case precedent, specifically the Court's opinion in State v. Quattrocchi, 687 A.2d 78 (R.I. 1996), arguing that her interpretation was inconsistent with the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 12-19-2(a) (2) the defendant's equal-protection rights were violated and (3) the trial justice erred in not providing counsel to the defendant, given the complexity of the legal issues and the fact that English is the defendant's second language. The Supreme Court first held that, through application of G.L. 1956 § 42-56-20.2, the defendant was not entitled to credit for the time he spent on home confinement as a condition of making bail. Next, the Court held that the defendant had waived his equal-protection argument by not raising it before the trial justice. Finally, the Court held that the trial justice had not erred in refusing to appoint counsel for the defendant, because a Rule 35 motion is not a "critical stage" of the proceedings against a criminal defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

In this action challenging the assessment of alleged illegal taxes, the plaintiff, Bluedog Capital Partners, LLC, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, because it had brought an action under the Declaratory Judgments Act for the assessment of illegal taxes, the exclusive procedures set forth in G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-26 and 44-5-27, including the three-month statute of limitations in § 44-5-27, did not apply. The Supreme Court held that §§ 44-5-26 and 44-5-27 set forth the exclusive procedures for challenging an overassessment of taxes or an illegal tax, and that any claimant who does not follow the procedures set forth in § 44-5-26 must bring an action pursuant to § 44-5-27. The Court further held that, because the plaintiff had not filed its complaint until after the three-month statute of limitations provided for in § 44-5-27 had run, the plaintiff's complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The petitioner, Wanda I. Trinidad, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of a decision by the Retirement Board of the Employee Retirement System of Providence denying her application for accidental-disability benefits, and we granted her petition. The petitioner contends that the medical examinations establish that she qualifies for accidental-disability benefits instead of ordinary-disability benefits. Moreover, petitioner argues that the board erred in placing more weight on one doctor's opinion than those of two others and therefore erred in denying her application for accidental-disability benefits. The Supreme Court reviewed the board's decision and concluded that, on the facts of this case, the decision was supported by legally competent evidence and that the board was entitled to weigh the opinion of one doctor more heavily than others. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the board denying petitioner accidental-disability retirement benefits.