Hooker v. Knapp

¶1APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE. COURT.

¶2Decided on authority of Procter & Gamble v. United States, ante, p. 282. 188 Fed. Rep. 242, 256, reversed.

¶3The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the United States Commerce Court, are stated in the opinion.

¶4Mr. Francis B. James for appellants:

¶5A shipper has equal right with a railroad corporation to bring a bill in equity to annul an order of the Commission. This right exists independent of and does not arise from statute. Peavey v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 176 Fed. Rep. 409; Int. Com. Comm. v. Differibaugh, 222 U. S: 42, 49.

¶6United State Circuit Court and. Commerce Court are both given jurisdiction of such action. Section 16, Act to Regulate Commerce, amended March 2, 1889, June 29, 1906, and June 18, 1910, and act creating Commerce Court, June 18, 1910.

¶7“Against” means “in reference to,”' “concerning” or “touching” a carrier. Silver v. Ladd (1869), 7 Wall.. 219; *303Seábright v. Seabright, 28 W. Ya. 412, 465. The statute defines venue and confirms jurisdiction.

¶8The case at bar is within the express language of statute and the order assailed is not a negative one.

¶9Mr. Assistant Attorney General Denison, with whom Mr. Jesse C. Adkins and Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistants to the Attorney General,.were on the brief, for the United States:

¶10No principle of law required the Commission to determine the reasonableness of rates exclusively with reference to the cost of transportation by the shorter route. On the contrary, this court has held that it is the duty of the Commission not to exclude other things from its consideration. ■ Texas & Pacific Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, 199: I. C. C. v. G., R. I. & P. Ry., 218 U. S. 103.

¶11In this particular case the Commission had to consider not only the supposed interests of the individual petitioning shippers, but the interests of Cincinnati, of Chattanooga, of the intervening points, the relation of through .rates, the rates on other lines in similar conditions, the growth and commercial needs of the country served, the value of the transportation to the shippers (which includes the possibility of their reaching the market at a profit), the commercial conditions, the effect on the communications of Cincinnati, Chattanooga, and intervening points with the West, and with.the East, and many other details, of fact and policy.

¶12The question whether the Commission in determining the reasonableness of rates, shall, adopt the policy of limiting its cognizance to the bee line, is a legislative and not a,legal question.- Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 224; J. C.. C. v. C., N. 0. & T. R. Ry. Co., .167 U. S. 479, '499, 500, 505; San Diego Land &c. Co. v. Jasyer, 189 U. S. 439, 440; Burnham, Hanna, Manger Co. Case, 218 U. S. 88, 103.

¶13*304The long continued practice of the Commission on this point has been left undisturbed by Congress and should not now be disturbed by the courts See 3 Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, 502; 4 Ibid., 130, Food Products Investigation, 15 I. C. C. 376; Kindel Case, 15 I.- C. C. 392; Spokane Case, 16 I. C. C. 595.

¶14It is not a case of an application for leave to create a new, expensive route and for leave to foster that artificially by raising the rates on the prior and cheaper line. On the contrary, the question, was whether the Commission should exclude an old established trade route, now carrying one-half the traffic; and this without any intimation as to whether the short line had equipment or capacity to. carry the entire traffic, or had capital within reach to obtain such equipment or capacity.

¶15Neither was it a case in which the longer route was an unreasonably roundabout line of communication between the two points.

¶16Under the conditions of this record the conclusion of the Commission in determining the reasonable maximum rate is a pure conclusion of fact and is not reviewable; as has been held by this court again and again. •.

¶17The Commerce Court had no jurisdiction of the petition, because the Commerce Court act did not include among the orders of the Commission which the Commerce Court might set aside, annul or suspend, orders' of merely negative effect. This appears, from the context and history. The context and other provision^ of the act show that only enforceable affirmative orders were intended to be set aside: This also appears' from the fact that no process is authorized appropriate to any relief against a • non-active order. The Commerce Court is a court of original jurisdiction and not ah appellate court which receives a record from a tribunal below. There is no line along which a mandate from the Commerce Court" could move to the Commission directing it to reopen a case and *305give affirmative relief; nor is there any provision for mandamus in such a situation. It is not probable that Congress, if it had intended to give the Commerce Court this jurisdiction, would, have left that court without any means of bringing itself to bear and thus made its judgment mere brutum fulmen.

¶18Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission. '

¶19Mr„ R. Walton Moore for Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company.