Justice v. Vercher

                                      439

      Argued and submitted September 2, 2020, affirmed August 31, 2022


                            JUSTICE,
                   an American Quarter Horse,
                  by and through his Guardian,
                          Kim Mosiman,
                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.
                     Gwendolyn VERCHER,
                      Defendant-Respondent.
                 Washington County Circuit Court
                      18CV17601; A169933
                                   

    In this case of first impression, Kim Mosiman, Executive Director of Sound
Equine Options, filed a complaint naming a horse (Justice) as plaintiff, alleging
Mosiman’s legal authority to act as the horse’s guardian, and claiming negligence
against the horse’s former owner, defendant Vercher. The trial court concluded
that the named plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, Mosiman challenges the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Held: Under Oregon common law, only human beings and legislatively created
legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue. The named plaintiff is neither
a human being nor a legal entity and therefore lacks capacity to sue to vindicate
ostensible rights in an Oregon court. The trial court did not err when it dismissed
the complaint with prejudice.
    Affirmed.



    John S. Knowles, Judge pro tempore.
   Matthew Liebman, Animal Legal Defense Fund, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Also on the
briefs were Christopher A. Berry, Animal Legal Defense
Fund; Margaret H. Leek Leiberan, Jensen and Leiberan;
Matthew Hamity, Law Office of Matthew Hamity; and
Sarah Hanneken.
   Geordie Duckler argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Geordie Duckler, P.C.
   Lindsey Stallings and Conway Law filed the brief amicus
curiae for Animal Law Professors.
    Richard L. Cupp, Jr., filed the brief amicus curiae pro se.
440                                       Justice v. Vercher

  Julia E. Markley, Sasha A. Petrova, and Perkins Coie
LLP filed the brief amici curiae for Robin L. Foster, Ph.D.,
CAAB, CHBC; Antonia J. Z. Henderson, Ph.D.; Tammy M.
Donaldson, MS, Ph.D., CAAB; Nina Ekholm Fry, MSSC;
Shawna Karrasch; Katherine Houpt, VMD, Ph.D., DACVB;
Sharon Madere, CHBC; and Andrew McLean, Ph.D.
    Samantha J. Bayer and Mary Anne Cooper; and T. Beau
Ellis and Vial Fotheringham LLP, filed the brief amici curiae
for Oregon Farm Bureau Federation; and Oregon Cattlemen’s
Association and Oregon Dairy Farmers Association.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Affirmed.
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         ORTEGA, P. J.
         As a matter of first impression, this case requires us
to determine whether a horse has the legal capacity to sue in
an Oregon court. Kim Mosiman, Executive Director of Sound
Equine Options (SEO), filed a complaint naming a horse,
Justice, as plaintiff, alleging Mosiman’s legal authority to
act as his guardian, and claiming negligence against his
former owner, defendant Vercher.1 In this appeal, Mosiman
challenges the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss. We conclude that only human beings and legislatively
created legal entities are persons with the capacity to sue
under Oregon common law. Justice, a horse, is neither a
human being nor a legal entity and therefore lacks capacity to sue to vindicate ostensible rights in an Oregon court.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing
the complaint with prejudice.
         In reviewing a motion to dismiss, “we recite the
material facts as alleged in the complaint, drawing any
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and review the trial court’s decision for legal error.”
Greenleaf Auto Repair v. Ideal Auto Works, 

, 

 (2022).
         In March 2017, defendant’s neighbor contacted
Oregon Horse Rescue to report concerns that defendant’s
horse, who defendant called Shadow but has since been
renamed Justice, was underfed and emaciated. The neighbor persuaded defendant to seek veterinary care for her
horse. The veterinarian who examined him concluded that
he was emaciated and would need to be either housed in
a stall or rehomed. Defendant voluntarily surrendered custody of her horse to SEO, and Mosiman transported him to
an equine hospital for urgent care.
         Justice was 300 pounds underweight, lethargic,
weak, and had significant difficulty walking. His condition
    1
       Although Justice is the named party-plaintiff in this matter, we refer to
the arguments presented on his behalf as made by Mosiman with the assistance
of counsel. As we will explain further below, 321 Or App at 444-48, we doubt
Mosiman’s legal authority to act on behalf of the named plaintiff. However, defendant does not challenge Mosiman’s authority to bring this appeal, and we are
satisfied that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and that we
have jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
442                                                       Justice v. Vercher

and course of recovery suggest that he had been malnourished for several months. He was placed on a refeeding protocol and treated for lice, rain rot, and a penile infection
caused by prolapse and frostbite. Over the next several
months in Mosiman’s care, his physical condition improved,
but he continued to exhibit behavioral distress. His penis
remains prolapsed and will likely require partial amputation. As a result of his injuries, Justice will require special
and costly care that he otherwise would not need, including unique sheltering needs, medications, and socialization
training. The additional costs involved in caring for him will
make finding a permanent home for him more difficult.
          In July 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to firstdegree animal neglect, ORS 167.330.2 Pursuant to her plea
agreement, defendant agreed to pay restitution to SEO for
the costs of Justice’s care prior to July 6, 2017.3
          In August 2017, Mosiman created the Justice
Equine Trust to provide for Justice’s care for the remainder
of his life. See ORS 130.185 (authorizing a settlor to create
a trust to provide for the care of an animal that is enforced
by a person appointed by the terms of the trust or by the
court). Justice continues to reside at SEO’s training barn,
and Mosiman remains responsible for his care.4
          In May 2018, Mosiman filed a complaint that
named “Justice, an American Quarter Horse,” as plaintiff

    2
      ORS 167.330 provides, in relevant part:
        “(1) A person commits the crime of animal neglect in the first degree if,
    except as otherwise authorized by law, the person intentionally, knowingly,
    recklessly or with criminal negligence:
        “(a) Fails to provide minimum care for an animal in the person’s custody
    or control and the failure to provide care results in serious physical injury or
    death to the animal.”
    3
      At the time defendant was sentenced, the trial court was authorized to
require defendant to “forfeit any rights of the defendant in the animal subjected
to the violation, and to repay the reasonable costs incurred by any person or
agency prior to judgment in caring for each animal subjected to the violation.”
ORS 167.350(1) (2017), amended by Or Laws 2017, ch 677, § 4. The trial court
was also authorized to “order the owner or person having custody of an animal
to repay the reasonable costs incurred by any person or agency in providing minimum care to the animal.” ORS 167.350(3) (2017), amended by Or Laws 2017,
ch 677, § 4.
    4
      The complaint does not say whether SEO or Mosiman is Justice’s current
owner.
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and contained a single claim of relief for negligence per se.
Tracking the elements of negligence per se, the complaint
alleged that defendant violated ORS 167.330(1) by failing to
provide minimum care5 for Justice, that he was injured as a
result of that violation, that he is a member of the “class of
persons” that ORS 167.330 was enacted to protect, and that
his injuries are the type that ORS 167.330 was enacted to
prevent. See Scheffel v. Oregon Beta Chapter of Phi Kappa
Psi, 

, 

 (2015) (setting out elements of negligence per se). The complaint sought economic
damages for costs of past and future care for Justice after
July 6, 2017, along with noneconomic damages for his pain
and suffering and reasonable attorney fees.
          Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that a horse lacks legal capacity to sue, former ORCP 21 A(4) (2018), renumbered as ORCP 21 A(1)(d)
(2022), and that the complaint failed to state a claim, former
ORCP 21 A(8) (2018), renumbered as ORCP 21 A(1)(h) (2022).
Defendant argued that Justice is an animal and not a person or legal entity who may pursue a cause of action in court
at all, let alone state a claim for negligence per se.
         The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. In a written opinion, the court concluded that “a non-human animal such as Justice lacks the
legal status or qualifications necessary for the assertion of
legal rights and duties in a court of law” and observed that
“[t]here are profound implications of a judicial finding that
a horse, or any non-human animal for that matter, is a legal
entity that has the right to assert a claim in a court of law.”
The court posited that an appellate court could come to a
different conclusion if it “wades into this public policy debate
involving the evolution of animal rights,” or the legislature

    5
      ORS 167.310(9) defines “minimum care,” in relevant part, as “care sufficient to preserve the health and well-being of an animal and, except for emergencies or circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the owner, includes, but is
not limited to, the following requirements:
         “(a) Food of sufficient quantity and quality to allow for normal growth or
    maintenance of body weight.
         “…
         “(d) Veterinary care deemed necessary by a reasonably prudent person
    to relieve distress from injury, neglect or disease.”
444                                                       Justice v. Vercher

could “balance the public policy implications of the relief
sought by Justice and craft legislation that would grant an
animal the right to sue in its name for specified damages
in specific circumstances.” The trial court, however, was
“unable to take that leap.”
         On appeal, Mosiman continues to assert legal
authority to act on behalf of the named plaintiff and asks
this court to hold that he is a juridical person who may
bring a common-law tort claim to recover economic and noneconomic damages. Mosiman contends that granting her
request is within our power to modify the common law and
is compelled by Oregon law, which, in her view, recognizes
the substantive legal right of certain animals to be free from
abuse and neglect, and the procedural legal right of those
animals who have been abused or neglected to sue their
offender as crime victims. Mosiman further contends that
such a holding would be limited, because it would apply only
to those animals who must be afforded minimum care under
Oregon’s animal welfare statutes, ORS 167.305 to 167.390.
         We first address Mosiman’s authority to sue on
behalf of the named plaintiff in this case. The complaint
alleges that Mosiman is acting on behalf of Justice as
his “guardian” because she is “the person responsible for
Justice’s care and well-being” and that she therefore represents his interests in this case pursuant to ORCP 27 A.6
Defendant contested Mosiman’s status as a horse’s guardian
and the applicability of ORCP 27, but not as a basis for her
motion to dismiss. Rather, defendant raised the issue in support of her request for attorney fees upon prevailing on the
motion to dismiss. See ORS 20.105 (requiring a trial court to
award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party upon
a finding that there was no objectively reasonable basis for
asserting the claim, defense, or ground for appeal against
the party).
         In response, Mosiman conceded that, as a horse,
Justice lacks the legal capacity to sue independently, but
    6
      ORCP 27 A provides, in relevant part: “In any action, a party who has a
guardian … shall appear in that action … through their guardian[.]” Although
that rule has been amended since the proceedings in the trial court, the amendments do not affect our analysis and we cite to the current version throughout
this opinion.
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argued that she is his de facto guardian7 and that, had the
trial court disagreed, it could have appointed Mosiman as
his guardian ad litem or fashioned another procedure for
appointing Mosiman to represent his interests in this case.
         The trial court concluded that there was “no objectively reasonable basis for naming … Mosiman as the
[g]uardian of Justice in this matter” and imposed attorney
fees on that basis. Mosiman does not assign error to that
ruling on appeal, and defendant does not ask us to affirm
the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss on the alternative basis that Mosiman lacks capacity to sue on behalf of
the named plaintiff. In Mosiman’s view, the guardianship
issue is “a red herring not properly at issue in this appeal
and, if necessary, should be handled only on remand.”
         It is true that Mosiman’s apparent lack of capacity to sue on the named plaintiff’s behalf is not an impediment to reaching the merits of the trial court’s ruling on the
motion to dismiss. See Bobell v. Wagenaar, 

,

 (1922) (a presumed incapacitated party’s appearance without a duly appointed guardian does not deprive
a court of jurisdiction); see also Christman v. Scott, 

, 

 (1948) (a plaintiff need not allege
(1) that a guardian is “duly appointed” or (2) facts regarding
appointment; a defendant bears the burden of objecting to
any defect in the appointment of a plaintiff’s guardian). And
we generally will not consider an alternative basis to affirm
when a party has not asked us to do so. State v. Shields, 

, 

 (2021).
         However, we disagree that the issue is wholly irrelevant to the question before this court. As the Ninth Circuit
has observed, “It is obvious that an animal cannot function
as a plaintiff in the same manner as a juridically competent human being.” Cetacean Community v. Bush, 

 (9th Cir 2004). Yet a procedural mechanism does
not appear to exist under Oregon law for a person to sue on
behalf of an animal. ORCP 27 applies to a “party,” a term
used elsewhere in the ORCPs to refer to natural or artificial persons. Dahlton v. Kyser, 

, 

     7
       Mosiman cited no authority under Oregon law, and we are aware of none,
for a person to legally act on behalf of another as a de facto guardian.
446                                          Justice v. Vercher

(2022) (holding that the term “party” in ORCP 44 is used
in the technical sense defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as
“the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one
or more individuals, and whether natural or legal persons”).
Even if the legislature intended a “party” in ORCP 27 to
include an animal, which is doubtful, there is no statutory
authority for a court to appoint a guardian for an animal.
See, e.g., ORS chapter 125 (providing for protective proceedings, including guardianships, for adult, vulnerable youth,
and minor persons).
          It is also doubtful that a court could exercise discretion, on its own motion, to appoint a guardian ad litem to act
on behalf of an animal in a legal action. ORCP 27 A defines
guardian ad litem as “a competent adult who acts in the party’s interests in and for the purposes of the action,” which,
in this context, begs the question: What are the interests of
an animal in a negligence action, or any action at law? An
animal such as a horse inherently lacks self-determination
and the ability to express its wishes in a manner that the
legal system would recognize. That incapacity exists in perpetuity such that it would be difficult to say that a court—or
any human being—may actually discern the animal’s own
interests in pursuing a legal action. A person purporting
to represent the interest of an animal in court necessarily
projects an assumed interest onto the animal and therefore
acts upon a legal fiction. That then raises the question: Who
is the appropriate agent to make an assumption on behalf
of an animal, to create that legal fiction? Because of an animal’s distinctive incapacity, analogies to persons with legal
disabilities (such as unemancipated minors, incapacitated
or financially incapable persons, or persons with a cognitive disability) do not adequately shed light on the correct
answer to that question.
         The Ninth Circuit articulated similar concerns in
a case where an animal rights organization, People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), sued on behalf of a
monkey named Naruto for copyright infringement in federal court. Naruto v. Slater, 

 (9th Cir 2018). In
Naruto, PETA asserted “next friend” status under FRCP
17(c) to bring claims on behalf of the monkey. 

.
FRCP 17(c) does not require a court to appoint a next friend;
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rather, a putative next friend must show that the next friend
“has some significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of,” the named plaintiff. Id. at 421.
The court “gravely doubt[ed]” that PETA could validly assert
next-friend status to represent claims made for Naruto,
both because PETA “failed to allege any facts to establish
the required significant relationship between a next friend
and a real party in interest” and because “an animal cannot
be represented by a next friend” under federal law. Id. PETA
did not claim to have a relationship with Naruto any more
significant than its relationship with any other animal. Id.
And, following guidance in Lenhard v. Wolff, 

, 

, 

 (1979), about “the dangers
inherent in any third-party standing doctrine,” the court
declined to expand next-friend standing beyond the text of
FRCP 17(c), which authorizes next-friend lawsuits on behalf
of a “minor or incompetent person,” but not on behalf of animals. Naruto, 

.
         The concurrence emphasized that next-friend standing should be narrowly tailored in light of public policy
concerns associated with expanding the doctrine because,
“however worthy and high minded the motives of ‘next
friends’ may be, they inevitably run the risk of making the
actual [party] a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard
larger than his own case.” 

 (Smith, J., concurring)
(quoting Lenhard, 

). In the concurrence’s
view:
       “Animal-next-friend standing is particularly susceptible to abuse. Allowing next-friend standing on behalf of
   animals allows lawyers (as in Cetacean) and various interest groups (as here) to bring suit on behalf of those animals or objects with no means or manner to ensure the animals’ interests are truly being expressed or advanced. Such
   a change would fundamentally alter the litigation landscape. Institutional actors could simply claim some form
   of relationship to the animal or object to obtain standing
   and use it to advance their own institutional goals with no
   means to curtail those actions. We have no idea whether
   animals or objects wish to own copyrights or open bank
   accounts to hold their royalties from sales of pictures. To
   some extent, as humans, we have a general understanding of the similar interests of other humans. In the habeas
448                                                      Justice v. Vercher

    corpus context, we presume other humans desire liberty.
    Similarly, in actions on behalf of infants, for example, we
    presume the infant would want to retain ownership of the
    property she inherited. But the interests of animals? We
    are really asking what another species desires. Do animals
    want to own property, such as copyrights? Are animals
    willing to assume the duties associated with the rights
    PETA seems to be advancing on their behalf? Animal-next-friend standing is materially different from a competent person representing an incompetent person. We have
    millennia of experience understanding the interests and
    desire of humankind. This is not necessarily true for animals. Because the ‘real party in interest’ can never credibly articulate its interests or goals, next-friend standing for
    animals is left at the mercy of the institutional actor to
    advance its own interests, which it imputes to the animal
    or object with no accountability. This literally creates an
    avenue for what Chief Justice Rehnquist feared: making
    the actual party in interest ‘a pawn to be manipulated on a
    chessboard larger than his own case.’ ”
Id. at 432 (Smith, J., concurring) (quoting Lenhard, 

 (emphases in original; footnotes omitted)).
         Thus, that a trial court could simply fashion a procedure to appoint Mosiman to represent Justice’s interests
in this case—or a human to represent such an animal in
any case—is not as simple as Mosiman suggests. Mosiman
and SEO may not be alone in claiming an interest in the
welfare of the named plaintiff. And while it is reasonable
to presume that a horse like Justice—or any animal that is
dependent on a human to meet its basic needs—wants to be
afforded minimum care, it does not necessarily follow that
a neglected horse would want to achieve that goal by suing
his former owner for damages in tort.8 Indeed, the concerns
the Naruto court expressed regarding next-friend standing
for an animal would be present in any ad hoc procedure that
a court attempted to fashion without legislative guidance
such as that found in ORCP 27.
         We turn to the question of whether an animal is or
may be a legal person with the capacity to hold and assert
    8
      The possibility that the named plaintiff’s lack of self-determination may
be wielded to particular human or institutional goals is apparent in the choice to
rename him Justice.
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individual rights under Oregon common law. We begin with
the pertinent legal background.
         Under the English common law, only human beings
and legal entities created by human beings were considered
“persons” capable of holding and asserting legal rights. In the
first chapter (“Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals”) of the
first book (“Of the Rights of Persons”) of his Commentaries,
William Blackstone defined persons as follows:
       “Persons also are divided by the law into either natural
   persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God
   of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and
   devised by human laws for the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.”
William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England
123 (1771). Blackstone observed that “rights” are “commanded … by the laws” and fall into one of two categories:
“rights of persons” (“those which concern and are annexed
to the persons of men”) and “rights of things” (“such as a
man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his person”). Id. at 122. Rights of persons were
further categorized under the English common law as either
“absolute” or “relative.” Id. at 123. Absolute rights were
those that “appertain and belong to particular men, merely
as individuals or single persons,” “such as would belong to
their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every
man is intitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.” Id.
Relative rights were those “incident to [men] as members
of society, and standing in various relations to each other.”
Id. Blackstone described infringements of personal rights
as “private wrongs” or “civil injuries” with corresponding
“means of redressing them by law” through bringing suit in
court. Id. at 122.
        In accordance with that understanding of persons
and rights under the English common law, it has long been
the rule that only a natural or artificial person may bring
a legal action to redress violation of rights. William M.
McKinney, 15 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice under
the Codes and Practice Acts, at Common Law, in Equity and
in Criminal Cases 467-68 (1895-1902) (“As a general rule, all
persons, whether natural or artificial, sui juris or otherwise,
450                                         Justice v. Vercher

are entitled to sue, and conversely are liable to be sued.”);
Parties, 67A CJS § 1 (2022) (“The word ‘party,’ with reference to judicial proceedings, is generally used as meaning
one of two opposing litigants, the plaintiff or the defendant;
but in a larger legal sense, the term ‘parties’ means all persons who have a right to control the proceedings, to make
defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to
appeal from the decision if an appeal lies.”); Parties, 59 Am
Jur 2d § 1 (2022) (“By its very terms, an action at law implies
the existence of legal parties. Such an action requires a person or entity that has the right to bring the action and a person or entity against which the action can be maintained.”);
cf. Dahlton, 

 (“Throughout ORCP 44, ‘party’
means a person with the authority to control the litigation.”).
          Under Oregon law, a person with the right to sue to
redress a violation of rights is and always has been a human
being or an entity created by human law. That understanding is reflected in dictionary definitions of ordinary and legal
usage. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1686
(unabridged ed 2002) (defining “person” as “an individual
human being,” “a human being as distinguished from an
animal or thing,” and “a human being, a body of persons,
or a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity that is
recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties”); Noah
Webster, 2 An American Dictionary of the English Language
(unpaginated) (1828) (defining “person” as “[a]n individual
human being consisting of body and soul,” “[a] man, woman,
or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from
them,” and “[i]n law, an artificial person is a corporation
or body politic”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1378-79 (11th ed
2019) (defining “person” as “[a] human being” and “artificial person” as “[a]n entity, such as a corporation, created
by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human
being”); Black’s Law Dictionary 892 (1st ed 1891) (defining
“person” as “[a] human being considered as capable of having rights and of being charged with duties; while a ‘thing’
is the object over which rights may be exercised” and citing
to Blackstone’s definition of natural and artificial persons).
The Oregon Criminal Code also reflects that understanding
of a person as a human being or legal entity. ORS 161.015
(for purposes of the Oregon Criminal Code “person” means
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“a human being and, where appropriate, a public or private
corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership,
a government or a governmental instrumentality”); former
ORS 161.010(11), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (as
used in statutes relating to crimes and criminal procedure
“person” “includes corporations as well as natural persons”
and where it is “used to designate the party whose property may be the subject of a crime, it includes this state, any
other state, government or country which may lawfully own
any property in this state, and all municipal, public, or private corporations, as well as individuals”); General Laws of
Oregon, Crim Code, ch LIII, § 724, p 577 (

-1864)
(same). And the default definition of “person” for all Oregon
Revised Statutes also reflects that understanding. ORS
174.100(7) (“As used in the statute laws of this state, unless
the context or a specially applicable definition requires
otherwise … ‘[p]erson’ includes individuals, corporations,
associations, firms, partnerships, limited liability companies
and joint stock companies.”); see also ORS 174.100(3) (1953)
(same, except not including limited liability companies).
        Animals have so far not been considered persons—
either natural or artificial—capable of holding and asserting rights under the law. In the second book (“Of the Rights
of Things”) of his Commentaries, Blackstone regarded animals as property to which persons had an “absolute” rather
than “qualified” right in possession:
       “But with regard to animals which have in themselves
   a principle and power of motion, and (unless particularly
   confined) can convey themselves from one part of the world
   to another, there is a great difference made with respect to
   their several classes, not only in our law, but in the law of
   nature and of all civilized nations. They are distinguished
   into such as are domitae, and such as are ferae naturae:
   some being of a tame and others of a wild disposition. In
   such as are of a nature tame and domestic (as horses, kine,
   sheep, poultry, and the like), a man may have as absolute a
   property as in any inanimate beings.”
Blackstone, 2 Commentaries at 313-14 (emphases in original).
        Oregon law similarly regards animals as personal
property, even as it recognizes that animals that are owned
452                                         Justice v. Vercher

or possessed by humans are a special form of property that
may not be treated in the same absolute manner as inanimate personal property. ORS 498.002(1) (“Wildlife is the
property of the state.”); ORS 609.020 (“Dogs are hereby
declared to be personal property.”); ORS 167.310(9) (excepting “emergencies or circumstances beyond the reasonable
control of the owner” from the duty to provide minimum
care to an animal); State v. Newcomb, 

,

 (2016) (“Oregon law prohibits humans from
treating animals in ways that humans are free to treat
other forms of property” and “places affirmative obligations on those who have custody of an animal to ensure that
animal’s basic welfare” with “no analogue [obligations] for
inanimate property.”); State v. Nix, 

, 

 (2014), vac’d on other grounds, 

, 

 (2015) (“To be sure, Oregon law regards animals as the
property of their owners.”); State v. Fessenden / Dicke, 

, 

 (2014) (Fessenden II) (“Although
Oregon’s animal welfare statutes impose one of the nation’s
most protective statutory schemes, defendants are correct
that Oregon law still considers animals to be property.”
(Footnote omitted.)); McCallister v. Sappingfield, 

, 

 (1914) (statute declaring dogs to be personal
property is a “legislative declaration of the present-day common law” as “the natural evolution of the status of the dog
as known at common law which considered the animal to
be property, yet of an inferior sort”); State v. Hume, 

, 

 (1908) (recognizing the principle that wildlife,
“animals ferae naturae,” is property of the state held in trust
for all its citizens); State v. Hess, 

, 

 (2015), rev den, 

 (2016) (adopting the court’s
reasoning in Nix). Accordingly, legal disputes involving animals generally turn on the property or privacy rights of persons. State/Klamath County v. Hershey, 

, 

 (2022) (an owner does not have an Article I, section 17,
right to a jury trial on a petition to forfeit an animal under
ORS 167.347); Newcomb, 

 (a person has no
cognizable Article I, section 9, property or privacy right in a
lawfully-seized animal); Bowden v. Davis et al, 

, 

 (1955) (a statute authorizing round
up and summary sale or destruction of private horses found
grazing on public range deprives persons of property without
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due process); Hofer v. Carson et al., 

, 

 (1922) (an ordinance authorizing summary destruction
of dogs kept in violation of law does not violate due process
despite depriving the owner of property without notice or a
hearing); State v. Schuman, 

, 

 (1899) (a
statute prohibiting sale of trout does not deprive a person
of property without due process, “but qualifies or limits the
rights appurtenant thereto”).

        Against that legal backdrop, it is not surprising that
our examination of Oregon common law reveals no instance
in which an animal, or a representative for that animal, has
been permitted to bring a lawsuit to vindicate the animal’s
own ostensible rights. For her part, Mosiman acknowledges
the lack of legal precedent for her position, but insists that
there is no impediment to this court recognizing Justice
the horse as a legal person. She contends that a “person”
under the law is “any entity with legally protected rights to
whom others owe a duty of care.” In Mosiman’s view, Justice
and other animals qualify as legal “persons” because they
are “entities who individually bear legally protected rights
under Oregon’s animal cruelty law.” Mosiman reasons that
Justice and other animals are owed a duty of “minimum
care,” ORS 167.310(9), and therefore have the right to be free
from abuse and neglect. She further asserts that this court
and the Oregon Supreme Court have recognized “that animals have legal rights and elevated legal status by virtue
of the protections they receive” under the animal welfare
statutes which “confer on animals a limited form of legal
personhood.”

        We reject that argument. First, as explained above,
only human beings and legal entities created by human
beings are persons under Oregon common law. Animals are
neither natural nor artificial persons. For purposes of the
animal welfare statutes, an “animal” is “any nonhuman
mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian or fish.” ORS 167.310(3).
The legislature did not create a legal entity called an “animal” with that definition, but rather identified a category
of nonhuman beings. And nothing in the animal welfare
statutes suggests that an animal is a legal entity capable of
bearing and exercising its own rights.
454                                         Justice v. Vercher

          Second, while we agree that Oregon’s animal welfare statutes—“one of the nation’s most protective statutory
schemes,” Fessenden II, 355 Or at 767—protect animals by
imposing duties on persons to provide minimum care to
an animal in the person’s custody or control, we disagree
that that statutory scheme confers legal rights on animals.
Rather, those statutory duties qualify a person’s right to
exercise otherwise absolute dominion over personal property. It is true that Oregon law admirably recognizes that
animals are sentient beings capable of experiencing pain,
stress, and fear, ORS 167.305(1), and should be cared for
in ways that minimize pain, stress, fear, and suffering,
ORS 167.305(2). But insofar as Oregon law holds animals
in higher esteem than other forms of property and imposes
duties on persons intended to protect animals from suffering, it does so by qualifying individual rights of persons—
that is, by “prohibit[ing] humans from treating animals in
ways that humans are free to treat other forms of property.”
Newcomb, 

 (footnote omitted).
         We also emphasize that neither this court nor the
Oregon Supreme Court has suggested that an animal is a
legal person with substantive or procedural rights. Although
Nix ultimately was vacated, we adopted its reasoning in
Hess. The court stated in Nix that, as a matter of statutory
construction, an animal is a “victim” for purposes of the
antimerger statute, ORS 161.067(2). 355 Or at 798; see also
Hess, 

. The court acknowledged that “the
principal purpose of adopting the legislation that became
[the animal welfare statutes] was to prevent the suffering of
animals.” Nix, 

. But the court underscored that
its holding was limited:
       “In concluding that animals are ‘victims’ for the purposes of ORS 161.067(2), we emphasize that our decision
   is not one of policy about whether animals are deserving
   of such treatment under the law. That is a matter for the
   legislature.”

. Significant to this case, Nix and Hess did not conclude that animals are crime victims afforded substantive
or procedural rights under Article I, sections 42 and 43,
of the Oregon Constitution or within the meaning of ORS
131.007 (defining “victim” as “the person or persons who have
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suffered financial, social, psychological or physical harm as
a result of a crime and includes, in the case of a homicide or
abuse of corpse in any degree, a member of the immediate
family of the decedent and, in the case of a minor victim, the
legal guardian of the minor”). Cf. State v. Teixeira, 

, 

 (2013) (concluding that ORS
131.007 and ORS 161.067 were not sufficiently related to or
in pari materia with the sentencing guidelines so as to suggest a common meaning of the term “victim”).
         We briefly clarify the holdings of two other cases
that involved Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution9
in the context of animal abuse and neglect crimes. First,
in State v. Fessenden, 

, 

 (2013)
(Fessenden I), aff’d, 

 (2014) (Fessenden II), we held
that the emergency aid exception to the Article I, section 9,
warrant requirement permitted an officer to enter the defendant’s property and seize a horse without a warrant:
    “[A] warrantless search or seizure is justified when law
    enforcement officers have an objectively reasonable belief,
    based on articulable facts, that the search or seizure is
    necessary to render immediate aid or assistance to animals that have suffered, or which are imminently threatened with suffering, serious physical injury or cruel death,
    unless that injury or death is being inflicted lawfully.”

. We reasoned that the strong societal
interest in animal protection reflected in Oregon’s animal
welfare statutes rendered warrantless state intrusion reasonable in such circumstances. 

.
          On review, the Supreme Court affirmed our decision on the grounds that a different Article I, section 9, warrant exception for exigent circumstances justified the warrantless state intrusion. Fessenden II, 355 Or at 765-66. The
court reasoned that “when an officer has probable cause to
believe that a person is violating [the animal welfare] statutes, the officer acts according to statutory standards and
legislative policy, rather than the officer’s own beliefs, in
determining that a specific animal deserves and is in need
of aid or protection.” Id. at 772-74. Again, as in Nix, the court
    9
      Article I, section 9, protects the right of “the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure.”
456                                             Justice v. Vercher

emphasized the “narrow confines” of its holding that did
“not extend the exigent circumstances exception.” Id. at 774.
The court did not hold, implicitly or otherwise, that animals
are “persons” for purposes of Article I, section 9.
        Second, in Newcomb, the Supreme Court concluded
that a medical blood draw of a lawfully seized animal is not a
“search” for purposes of Article I, section 9. 

.
The court reasoned that a person has no protected property
or privacy interest in a lawfully seized animal:
       “A dog is personal property under Oregon law, a status
   that gives a dog owner rights of dominion and control over
   the dog. But Oregon law simultaneously limits ownership
   and possessory rights in ways that it does not for inanimate
   property. Those limitations, too, are reflections of legal and
   social norms. Live animals under Oregon law are subject to
   statutory welfare protections that ensure their basic minimum care, including veterinary treatment. The obligation
   to provide that minimum care falls on any person who has
   custody and control of a dog or other animal. A dog owner
   simply has no cognizable right, in the name of her privacy, to
   countermand that obligation. That conclusion follows with
   equal or greater force when, as here, the dog is in the state’s
   lawful protective custody on probable cause that the dog is
   suffering injury as a result of neglect, at which point the
   owner has lost her property rights of dominion and control
   over the dog. An examination of the dog’s physical health
   and condition in that circumstance, pursuant to a medical
   judgment of what is appropriate for diagnosis and treatment, is not a form of governmental scrutiny that, under
   legal and social norms and conventions, invades a dog owner’s protected privacy rights under Article I, section 9.”

 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
         To summarize, Nix, Fessenden, and Newcomb
make clear that Oregon law continues to regard animals as
property—even as legal and social norms for the care and
welfare of animals continue to evolve—and that the legislature is the proper forum to determine, as a matter of policy,
how the law should treat animals. Those cases also make
clear that the statutory protections Oregon affords to animals do not confer substantive or procedural legal rights on
animals; rather, they qualify a person’s right to own and
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possess animals—and they further qualify a person’s rights
under Article I, section 9, to be free from governmental scrutiny when there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that the person has violated the statutory duty to provide
minimum care to an animal.
         Finally, we acknowledge that the common law is not
“static or unchanging” and that it “has continued to evolve
as the premises on which it rests have changed.” Horton v.
OHSU, 

, 

 (2016). To that end,
we may reconsider a common-law rule or doctrine10 when
(1) “an earlier case was inadequately considered or wrong
when it was decided,” (2) “surrounding statutory law or regulations have altered some essential legal element assumed
in the earlier case,” or (3) “the earlier rule was grounded in
and tailored to specific factual conditions and some essential factual assumptions of the rule have changed.” G. L. v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 

, 

 (1988). But “[w]ithout some such premise, the court
has no grounds to reverse a well-established rule besides
judicial fashion or personal policy preference, which are not
sufficient grounds for such a change.” 

         Considering those factors, we see no reason to
depart from the well-settled common-law doctrine regarding who is a person with the capacity to sue to vindicate
personal rights in an Oregon court. Although Oregon law
has evolved beyond Blackstone’s understanding of animals
as personal property over which persons may exercise absolute rights of dominion and control, Oregon’s animal welfare statutes have not altered the essential legal element
assumed in our common law: that animals are not “persons”
capable of bearing rights, but “things” over which persons
may exercise qualified rights. We agree with the trial court
that holding that the named plaintiff is a legal person with
    10
        We assume without deciding that it is within our judicial power to modify
the common law to recognize an entirely new class of persons with rights and
the capacity to redress violations of rights in court. However, we are not aware of
any case in which an Oregon court has recognized a new class of persons solely
under the common law, rather than under a statute or constitutional provision.
See, e.g., Mallison v. Pomeroy, 

, 

 (1955) (holding that
a “viable” unborn child is a “person” for purposes of Article I, section 10, of the
Oregon Constitution and recognizing an action for wrongful death of a stillborn
child).
458                                                       Justice v. Vercher

the capacity to sue for damages in tort would have profound
implications. We, too, are unable to take that leap.
         In sum, only human beings and human-created
legal entities are persons with rights and the capacity to
sue under Oregon law. Justice the horse is neither a human
being nor a legal entity and therefore does not have legal
rights or the capacity to sue to vindicate ostensible rights in
an Oregon court. Under Oregon law, animals are property,
albeit of a unique kind. The statutory duty to provide minimum care to an animal in the custody and control of a person does not confer substantive or procedural legal rights on
the animal; rather, such duties qualify a person’s right over
a special form of property—one that is sentient and capable of experiencing pain, stress, fear, and suffering. That
the legislature intended to protect animals from needless
suffering does not change that legal reality, and neither we
nor the Oregon Supreme Court has suggested otherwise.
Assuming without deciding that we have authority to modify the common law to recognize an entirely new class of
persons capable of bearing and asserting rights, we decline
to do so here.
         We emphasize that our decision does not foreclose
Oregon law from ever recognizing an animal as a person or
a legal entity,11 but also that the courts are not the proper
forum to achieve that goal. We affirm for now the sentiments
the court articulated in Fessenden II:
        “As we continue to learn more about the interrelated
    nature of all life, the day may come when humans perceive
    less separation between themselves and other living beings
    than the law now reflects. However, we do not need a mirror to the past or a telescope to the future to recognize that
    the legal status of animals has changed and is changing
    still, or to agree with defendants that, at this moment in
    time, Oregon law does not protect animal life to the same
    extent or in the same way that it protects human life.”
    11
       Nor do we foreclose the possibility that, as the trial court aptly observed,
the legislature could create a limited statutory cause of action allowing a person
to sue on behalf of an animal for specified damages in specific instances. See
Deckard v. Bunch, 

, 

 (2016) (“Statutory liability ‘arises
when a statute either expressly or impliedly creates a private right of action for
the violation of a statutory duty.’ ” (Quoting Doyle v. City of Medford, 

, 

 (2014).)).
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355 Or at 769-70. Although Oregon law recognizes an animal’s sentience and ability to experience pain, stress, fear,
and suffering, it does not currently recognize an animal’s
legal capacity to hold rights and assert them in court.
        Affirmed.