United States v. Pomponio

¶6FIELD, Circuit Judge:

¶7The principal question on these appeals is the sufficiency of an indictment returned by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia against Louis J. Pomponio, Jr., along with his brothers, Peter and Paul Pomponio, and their attorney, Charles J. Piluso, charging them with violating and conspiring to violate the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.1 The *955charges in the indictment stemmed from payments totaling over $300,000 allegedly made by the defendants to Sidney M. Zneimer, a Vice President of the Royal National Bank in New York City, for the purpose of influencing his conduct relative to a number of loans made by the bank to corporations owned or controlled by the Pomponios.

¶8The indictment tracks the language of the statute charging that the defendants “did willfully travel from the State of Virginia to the State of New York, with the intent to promote, manage, carry on, and facilitate the promoting, managing, establishing and carrying on of an unlawful activity, said unlawful activity being the crime of bribery, in violation of the laws of the State of New York (New York Penal Law, McKinney’s Con-sol.Law, c. 40, Article 180)2 and of the United States (Title 18, United States Code, Section 215)3; the said unlawful activity relating to the efforts of LOUIS J. POMPONIO, JR., CHARLES J. PILUSO and PAUL POMPONIO to influence Sidney M. Zneimer in the performance of his duties at the Royal National Bank by giving the said Sidney M. Zneimer checks, as detailed in the table below … » 4

¶9[i] Prior to trial the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that neither commercial bribery under the New York statute nor the receipt of commissions or gifts by a bank official proscribed by section 215 of the federal code constitute “unlawful activity” within the purview of section 1952. Judge Oren R. Lewis declined to grant the motion and set the case for trial. However, Louis J. Pomponio, Jr., was hospitalized because of illness and the trial proceeded against the other three defendants. The court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal of Peter Pomponio and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty with- respect to his brother *956Paul. Charles J. Piluso was found guilty-on all three counts and has appealed his conviction in Case No. 74^-1668. Thereafter, Louis J. Pomponio, Jr., was tried before Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., and was found guilty by the jury. During the course of that trial, Pomponio’s counsel challenged the sufficiency of the indictment in a motion for judgment of acquittal. Judge Bryan, understandably, felt bound by the earlier ruling of Judge Lewis and denied the motion. However, Judge Bryan granted Pomponio’s post-trial motion for arrest of judgment, holding that “Section 215 of Title 18 of the U.S.Code and the New York Penal Code, in my view do not come within the unlawful activity definition of Section 1952 of Title 18.” The government has appealed this action in Case No. 74 — 1667.5

¶10Primarily, the defendants contend that the word “bribery” as used in the Travel Act is intended to mean bribery in the classic sense of the common law which was limited to the corruption of public officials in the administration of their public trust and does not extend to such conduct by private individuals. Concededly, the crime of bribery was originally limited to cases involving the corruption of those in the public service,6 and some statements in the limited legislative history of the Act might appear to support the position of the defendants.7 However, while the states and the federal government have enacted statutes dealing with the corruption of public officials, they have also extended the concept of bribery into areas of private conduct which we think appropriately fall within the ambit of the Travel Act.8 “There can be no question but that any crime of bribery involves moral turpitude,” 9 and we discern no reason why the Congress, in using the term “bribery,” intended that it be limited to the corruption of public officials.10 We find the answer to this contention of the defendants in United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292-293, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), where a similar argument with respect to the meaning of the word “extortion” in the Act was urged upon the Court. In rejecting this argument the Court stated:

“Appellees suggest, however, that Congress intended that the common-law meaning of extortion — corrupt acts by a public official — be retained. If Congress so intended, then § 1952 would cover extortionate acts only when the extortionist was also a public official. Not only would such a construction conflict with the congressional desire to curb the activities of organized crime rather than merely organized criminals who were also public officials, but also § 1952 imposes penalties upon any individual crossing state lines or using interstate facilities for any of the statutorily enumerated offenses. The language of the Travel Act, ‘whoever’ crosses state lines or uses interstate facilities, includes private persons as well as public officials.”

¶11*957Paraphrasing the language of the Court in Nardello, “[i]n light of the scope of the congressional purpose we decline to give the term [bribery] an unnaturally narrow reading … and thus conclude that the acts for which [defendants] have been indicted fall within the generic term [bribery] as used in the Travel Act.” 393 U.S. at 296, 89 S.Ct. at 539.

¶12The defendants further contend that since 18 U.S.C. § 215 criminalizes only the act of the bank officer who receives the proscribed thing of value, they as payors could not be convicted of an offense under that statute11 and, accordingly, it was improperly designated as an “unlawful activity” in the indictment.12 As pointed out in United States v. Wechsler, 392 F.2d 344 (4 Cir. 1968), the fallacy in such an argument lies in a too heavy reliance on the role played by section 215 in the indictment, and elides the fact that it serves “only as a background identification of the unlawful activities.” 13 The “unlawful activity” specified in the Act may be bribery under either state or federal law and reference to such law is necessary only to identify the type of “unlawful activity” in which the defendants intended to engage. Proof that the unlawful objective was accomplished or that the referenced law has actually been violated is not a necessary element of the offense defined in section 1952. See United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71 (7 Cir. 1969); McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274 (8 Cir. 1967). Accordingly, we find it sufficient that the indictment charged the defendants with interstate travel with the intent, inter alia, to facilitate the violation of the federal statute by Zneimer. Finally, the defendants argue that our construction of the Act improperly escalates these underlying misdemeanors to federal felonies, but such a contention has been summarily rejected by the courts. United States v. Karigiannis, 430 F.2d 148 (7 Cir. 1970); United States v. Brennan, 394 F.2d 151 (2 Cir. 1968).

¶13We have considered the other points raised on Piluso’s appeal and find no reversible error. Accordingly, the conviction in No. 74 — 1668 is affirmed. The order of the district court granting Pomponio’s motion in arrest of judgment in No. 74 — 1667 is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶14Affirmed in case No. 74 — 1668.

¶15Reversed and remanded in case No. 74-1667.