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289 U.S. 89

Rossi v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 13, 1933. —

Decided April 10, 1933

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1933-04-10

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The general principle, and we think the correct one, underlying the foregoing decisions, is that it is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could be readily disproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably with in the defendant’s possession or control.””

quoted by 6 later decisions, including United States v. Fleischman, United States v. Jacobs

Relies on Wilson v. United States · Hem v. United States · Mobile Jackson Kansas City Railroad Company v. J a Turnipseed

Cited in Case Law’s definition of “negative averment”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 9–0 · Decided 1933-04-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 202 later decisions (14 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2022 · most notably Holland v. United States (1955), Leary v. United States (1969)

122 federal appellate · 6 district · 31 state decisions

7201933194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. Harry C. Heyl submitted for petitioners.

¶2Mr. Paul D. Miller, with whom Solicitor General Thacker and Mr. John J. Byrne were on the brief, for the United States.

¶3Mr. Justice McReynolds

¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶5■An indictment, five counts, in the United States Dis-' trict Court, Southern District of Illinois, alleged that petitioners had violated the Internal Revenue laws in sundry *90ways. The third count charged them with carrying on the business of a distiller without having given the bond required by § 3260, Rev. Stats.,' U.S.C. Title 26, § 284.1 The fourth charged possession and control of a still not registered as required by § 3258, Rev. Stats., U.S.C. Title 26, § 281“.2 They pleaded not guilty; waived a jury; went to trial before the Judge. He found them guilty under both the third .and fourth counts and imposed appropriate sentence.

¶6The only point presented by the record for our consideration is whether there was adequate evidence to support the conviction.

¶7There was enough to show that the petitioners had custody and control of a still for the manufacture of alcoholic spirits, set up and operating, or ready for operation, in a dwelling house. They did ndt take the stand; no affirmative evidence of failure, to register the still or to give bond as required by the Revised Statutes was presented.

¶8The United States claim that in such circumstances the burden of proof to show execution of the bond and regis*91tration of the still rested upon the petitioners; that having failed to sustain this, the Judge properly declared them guilty as charged. And with this view we ágree.

¶9Section 3266, Rev. Stats., U.S.C. Title 26, ■ § 291, provides:

No person shall use any still ... in any dwell-* ing house, or in any shed, yard, or inclosure connected with any dwelling house . . . j and every person who does any of the acts this section · Case Law">prohibited by this section, or aids or assists therein, . . . shall be fined $1,000 and imprisoned for not less than six months nor more than two years, in the discretion of the court; . . . .”

¶10It was impossible for the petitioners lawfully to register the still or to give the required bond.

¶11The lower federal courts generally have accepted the doctrine that proof of the custody or control of a still for unlawful distillation of . alcoholic spirits is enough to give rise to an inference of lack of registration and failure to give bond which the defendant must overcome by proof. Barton v. United States, 267 Fed. 174, 175; McCurry v. United States, 281 Fed. 532, 533; Goodfriend v. United States, 294 Fed. 148, 150; Giacolone v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 108, 110; Seiden v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 197, 199; Colasurdo v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 934, 935; Cardenti v. United States, 24 F. (2d) 782, 783; Mangiaracina v. United States, 40 F. (2d) 164, 166; Stark v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 946, 949, 950. And see Faraone v. United States, 259 Fed. 507, 509; Sharp v. United States, 280 Fed. 86, 89.

¶12The general principle,, and we think the correct one, underlying the foregoing decisions is that it is not incumbent on the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which if untrue could be readily disproved by the production of doc*92uments or other evidence probably within the defendant’s possession or control. See Chamberlayne’s Modern Law of Evidence, Vol. 2, § 983; Greenleaf on Evidence, 16th ed., Vol. 1, § 79, p. 154; Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 619; Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 502, 503; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185.

¶13The only decision called to our attention which seems in conflict with those cited above is Mansbach v. United States, 11 F. (2d) 221, 223, 224. And with the doctrine there apparently approved, so far as in conflict with the commonly accepted view, we cannot agree.

¶14Affirmed.

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