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269 U.S. 114

Davis v. Alexander

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 12,1925.

Decided November 16, 1925.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1925-11-16

Davis v Alexander, 269 U.S. 114 (1925), is a US corporate law case, concerning the duties of parent corporations for actions of subsidiaries.

Source: Wikipedia ↗

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““ * * * Where one railroad company actually controls another and operates both as a single system, the dominant company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary company. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Dupont, 2 Cir., 128 F. 840 ; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Delachesa, 2 Cir., 145 F. 617 ; Wichita Falls & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 53 Okl. 463 , 157 P. 112 .””

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Barnes v. Liebig, Makeever v. Georgia Southern & Florida Railway Co.

Relies on Davis v. Donovan · Wichita Falls & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Puckett · Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Dupont

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 9–0 · Decided 1925-11-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 96 later decisions (5 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2003 · most notably Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois (1941), Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co. (1926)

33 federal appellate · 3 district · 34 state decisions

280192519301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1CEETIOEABI TO THE STJPEEME COTTET OP OKLAHOMA.

¶21. The Director General of Railroads was not suable generally as operator of all railroads under federal control, but only with reference to the particular transportation system or carrier out of *115whose operations the liability in question arose. Davis v. Donovan, 265 U'. S. 257. P. 116.

¶32. Where one railroad company actually controlled another and operated both as a single system, and the Director General, after taking them over, pursued the same practice, damages to freight shipped over the system during federal control and occurring on . the subsidiary line, are recoverable in an action against the Federal Agent whén sued and served as in charge of the dominant carrier. P. 117.

¶493 Okla, 159, affirmed.

¶5Certiorari to a judgment Of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which . affirmed a recovery of damages for negligent injury to live stock, in an action against the Agent appointed under § 206a of the Transportation Act, 1920.

¶6Mr. William F. Collins, with whom Messrs. C. O. Blake and W. R. Bleakmore were on the brief, for petitioner.

¶7Mr. Fred E. Suits, with whom Mr. C. E. Hall was on the brief, for respondents.

¶8Mr. Justice Brandeis

¶9delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶10Cattle shipped during federal control over the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific System from stations in New Mexico through Texas to Oklahoma City were negligently injured in transit. To recover the damages suffered this suit was brought in a state court of Oklahoma against James C. Davis, as Agent designated by the President, pursuant to § 206a of Transportation Act, 1920, February 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461. The injury was inflicted partly in New Mexico, partly in Texas, and partly in-Oklahoma. The main controversy was whether plaintiffs could recover for the injury suffered in Texas. The jury returned a verdict for the entire damages. Judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the highest court of the *116State. 93 Okla. 159. A petition for a writ of certiorari was granted under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended. 265 U. S. 577.

¶11The lines of the Rock Island in Texas were owned by a subsidiary — the Chicago, Rock Island and Gulf Railway Company, a Texas corporation. The petition described Davis as Agent, United States Railroad Administration, in charge of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad and Chicago, Rock Island and Gulf Railroad. In the trial court it was assumed that effective service of the summons pursuant to § 2065 was made only upon Davis as Agent in charge of the Pacific. There, the shippers sought to recover against him as such on the ground that the transportation service undertaken was for the system; that, under federal control as before, the Pacific was the dominant carrier and. operated, either alone or jointly with the Gulf, the whole system^ including the Gulf lines; and that recovery for all damages suffered could, therefore, be had against Davis 'as Agent in charge of the Pacific. The defendant insisted that the Director General had operated the Pacific and the Gulf, not as parts of a single system, but as individual and distinct entities. The shippers introduced substantial evidence in support of their allegations. The case was submitted to the jury under instructions which made it clear that the verdict must be limited' to the damage suffered on lines owned by the Pacific, unless the jury should find that the Gulf lines were being operated with the other Rock Island lines as parts of a single' system..

¶12To these instructions exceptions were duly taken, but. the Supreme Court of Oklahoma deemed it unnecessary to pass upon their correctness. It affirmed the judgment on the ground that the Director General operated all the railroads of which the President took control as a single-national system, not as separate companies or systems; that the Director. General was liable in damages for *117negligent operation regardless of the relation of the different lines to one another; and that under section 206b service of process on the service agent for any railroad gave jurisdiction over the Agent of the President in respect to all railroads under federal control in the operation of which the damages complained of resulted. Its opinion was.delivered November 6, 1923. Later, this Court held in Davis v. Donovan, 265 U. S. 257, that under § 10 of the Federal Control Act and General Order 50-A -the Director General was not suable generally as the operator of all the railroads, but only with reference to the particular transportation system or carrier out of whose operations the liability in question arose. The rule declared in the Donovan case has' been applied in suits brought under Transportation Act, 1920, against the Agent of the President on causes of action arising during federal control. Manbar Coal Co. v. Davis, 297 Fed. 24. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reached the same conclusion in Davis, Federal Agent v. Benson, 105 Okla. 41, overruling its decision in the case at bar.

¶13While the ground on which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rested its decision was thus unsound, the judgment of affirmance was right. Where one railroad company actually controls another and operates both as a single system, the dominant company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the subsidiary company. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617; Wichita Falls & Northwestern Ry Co. v. Puckett, 53 Okla. 463. There was no error in the instructions excepted to.

¶14Affirmed.

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