Volume 332 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiffs, the maternal grandparents of the defendant father's minor child, B, filed, in the trial court, a petition for visitation with B pursuant to statute (§ 46b-59). The defendant had been granted custody of B following the death of B's mother, before which the plaintiffs enjoyed a significant relationship with B and contributed meaningfully to his care. The defendant unilaterally terminated visitation shortly after the mother's death, contending that the plaintiffs did not abide by his wishes with respect to B's care during B's time with them, and also because he believed that the plaintiffs were seeking to have him incarcerated so that they could be awarded custody of B. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' petition, finding that the plaintiffs had a parent-like relationship with B and that the denial of visitation would cause B real and significant harm, and the defendant appealed. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion seeking a no contact order between B and his maternal aunt, R, who was living with B's maternal grandmother at the time. The court denied the motion, and the defendant, upon certification by the Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) that a matter of substantial public interest was involved, filed an appeal from the denial of the motion, which was consolidated with his direct appeal. While the defendant's consolidated appeals were pending, the defendant offered the plaintiffs visitation with B in an amount that was substantially less than what the trial court had pre- viously ordered in conjunction with the plaintiffs' petition. In conjunc- tion with his offer, the defendant filed a motion to open and to terminate visitation, contending that the trial court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction in light of his offer, which the trial court denied. Meanwhile, the defendant discontinued B's visitation with the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs moved for contempt.. The court found the defendant in wilful contempt for failure to comply with its visitation order. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for contempt on the basis of the defendant's continued refusal to comply with the trial court's orders, which the trial court granted, and the defendant filed an amended appeal. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court's order of visitation violated the implicit requirements of § 46b-59 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States consti- tution because it did not include a provision directing the plaintiffs to abide by the defendant's decisions regarding B's care while B was visiting with the plaintiffs and that the court's order violated the defendant's fundamental parental rights because the amount of visitation ordered was more than was necessary to further the state's compelling interest in sustaining B's relationship with the plaintiffs. Held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that it was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the defendant's postjudgment offer of visitation to the plaintiffs and, therefore, properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action: the defendant's postjudgment offer of visitation did not render the action moot because, even if a controversy involving an existing order of third-party visitation could be rendered moot due to a custodial parent's voluntary offer of meaningful visitation with the third party, the defendant failed to establish that his particular offer of visitation was made in good faith and with the inten- tion of allowing visitation rather than of avoiding or undermining the existing visitation order, particularly given that the defendant had consis- tently and vehemently opposed the plaintiffs' visitation and twice had been held in contempt for his refusal to comply with the court-ordered visitation; moreover, this court concluded that, in light of its determina- tion that the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the defendant's postjudgment offer of visitation, that court also properly rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court's contempt order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court's visitation order violated the implicit requirements of § 46b-59 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment insofar as it failed to include a provision directing the plaintiffs to abide by his decisions, as a fit parent, regarding fundamental aspects of B's care during B's visitation with the plaintiffs: a. There was no implicit requirement in § 46b-59 that the trial court include a provision directing a third party to abide by a fit parent's decisions regarding the child's care during visitation with the third party, as subsection (e) of that statute simply authorizes the trial court to craft the terms and conditions of third-party visitation and provides that those terms and conditions are to be guided by the best interest of the child. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the due process clause compels a trial court ordering third-party visitation to include a provision requiring the third party to abide by all of a fit parent's deci- sions regarding the child's care during visitation and that § 46b-59 was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the present case insofar as the order of visitation allowed the plaintiffs to override the defendant's exercise of his fundamental parental right to make decisions regarding B's care: constitutional and statutory principles governing third-party visitation do not confer on a parent the absolute right to dictate the terms and conditions governing third-party visitation, and the fundamental purpose of the statute, to sustain the deep, emotional bond between the child and the third party, would be thwarted if a parent opposing third-party visitation were given unfettered authority to micromanage the visitation and to supplant the third party's caregiving choices during the period of visitation with his or her own; nevertheless, a court, in assessing what terms may be in the best interest of the minor child, must accord special weight to a fit parent's preferences when those preferences pertain to the most fundamental aspects of a child's life, such as the child's education, health, religion, and association, but the court should satisfy itself that the parental request concerning such preferences is made in good faith before according those preferences special weight; moreover, a custodial parent seeking to impose terms and conditions on a court's visitation order must make a specific and timely request that includes an explanation as to how the requested terms and conditions further the best interest of the child, and, if the parent believes that the requested terms and conditions are necessary to protect his or her fundamental parental rights, he or she must specify the alleged constitutional nature of the request and the right asserted; furthermore, in the present case, the defendant's request was neither timely, as it was filed after the close of evidence, after the issuance of the visitation order, and despite the defendant's knowledge that R was living with D at the time of the evidentiary hearing, nor specific, as it was unaccompanied by any explanation as to why his requested no contact order between B and R was desired or necessary. 3. This court declined to review, under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim that the amount of visitation ordered by the trial court violated his fundamental parental rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the record having been inadequate for such review: although the defendant filed various postjudgment motions in the trial court challenging its visitation order, he did not ask that court to reconsider the amount of visitation or to articulate the basis for that amount, or otherwise bring before the court the due process claim he raised on appeal, and, because the trial court never had the opportunity to rule on that issue, it was not preserved for review; moreover, given the inherently fact bound nature of how the trial court's visitation order should be implemented, the defendant's failure to request that the trial court make particularized findings as to the amount of visitation necessary to sustain the plaintiffs' relationship with B would render any decision by this court concerning the defendant's claim entirely speculative. Argued September 10, 2018—officially released July 2, 2019

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n [a] [2] [B]) and the common law of this state, respectively, municipalities and their employees enjoy qualified immunity from liability for their negligent acts or omissions in the perfor- mance of duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. The plaintiffs, who reside in the borough of Naugatuck on a particular parcel of property that is prone to flooding, appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, the borough and several of its officials, which was rendered on the basis of govern- mental immunity. The plaintiffs had alleged, inter alia, that the defen- dants' negligence caused their property to be inundated by water on eight separate occasions. Specifically, the plaintiffs had alleged that a nearby municipally owned catch basin in the area routinely became clogged or otherwise inadequately redirected storm water away from their property. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by governmental immunity because they involved acts or omissions that required the exercise of judgment or discretion. In granting that motion, the trial court concluded that, because the municipal ordinance setting forth the general duties of the relevant municipal department did not contain specific directions or mandates as to how those duties should be discharged, the plaintiffs' claims necessarily pertained to discretion- ary acts or omissions. The trial court acknowledged this court's decision in Spitzer v. Waterbury (113 Conn. 84), which held that the repair and maintenance of municipally owned drainage systems are ministerial functions, but concluded that, under more recent case law, the duty to repair and maintain drainage systems is discretionary unless an ordi- nance prescribes the particular manner in which that duty is to be discharged. The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants to the Appellate Court, which distin- guished the facts of Spitzer and ultimately agreed that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the allegedly negligent omissions in the present case were discretionary in nature. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, this court having concluded that the borough's duty to maintain and repair its drainage system was discretionary rather than ministerial in nature and, therefore, subject to governmental immunity: neither the question of whether the duty to repair and maintain the drainage system was imposed by statute or voluntarily assumed, nor the distinction between construction and repair, was relevant to consideration of the nature of the defendants' duty, because, under modern principles of governmental immunity, the salient consideration in determining whether that duty was discretionary or ministerial is whether any statute, charter provision, ordinance, regu- lation, rule, policy, or any other directive required the defendants to act in a prescribed manner, and, accordingly, the defendants could be held liable to the plaintiffs only if there was some legal directive prescribing the specific manner in which the defendants were required to maintain and repair the borough's storm drainage system; moreover, the plaintiffs did not challenge the Appellate Court's conclusion that the language of the relevant municipal ordinance did not, in and of itself, create a ministerial duty to repair and maintain the drainage system, and, even if this court were to assume that a policy or rule from a municipal agency could give rise to a ministerial duty, deposition testimony from the borough's superintendent of streets evincing an annual maintenance schedule and a general policy of attempting to respond to public com- plaints about clogged storm drains was insufficient to establish the existence of such a policy or rule that could convert the borough's discretionary duty mandated by ordinance into a ministerial duty, as a contrary conclusion would disincentivize municipalities from making virtually any attempt to ensure that their discretionary duties are regu- larly and properly carried out; furthermore, this court could not conclude that the defendants had breached a ministerial duty by failing to conduct any maintenance on the basin at issue because the plaintiffs cited no evidence that would support such a finding, and, even if they had, a general duty to maintain and repair the drainage system as a whole would not encompass a judicially enforceable duty to maintain and repair each individual component of that system. Spitzer v. Waterbury (113 Conn. 84), to the extent it concluded that munici- pal duties with respect to the maintenance and repair of drains and sewers are ministerial in nature, overruled. (One justice dissenting) Argued October 16, 2018—officially released July 2, 2019

The plaintiff corporation sought to recover from the defendants for unjust enrichment in connection with the alleged overpayment of funds to them by the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, V Co., a Delaware limited partnership in which the defendants had invested pursuant to a limited partnership agreement. In early 2008, the defendants, who are Connecti- cut residents, each redeemed approximately 90 percent of the funds from their capital accounts in V Co. and thereafter withdrew from the partnership. The plaintiff alleged that, when the defendants redeemed their investments, V Co. had miscalculated the net value of the partner- ship's assets, and, consequently, the net values of the defendants' inter- ests had been overstated, resulting in overpayments to the defendants. After the plaintiff filed its action in 2013, the defendants raised various special defenses, including, inter alia, that the plaintiff's unjust enrich- ment claims were time barred by either Delaware's three year limitation period (§ 17-607 [c]) in the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partner- ship Act or Connecticut's statutory (§ 52-577) three year limitation period generally applicable to tort actions, or were barred by the doctrine of laches. The plaintiff and the defendants each moved for summary judgment on certain of the defendants' special defenses. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defen- dants' motion as to their special defense that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the three year limitation period set forth in § 17-607 (c) and rendered judgment for the defendants. The trial court reasoned that the choice of law provision in the limited partnership agreement, which provided that the rights and liabilities of the parties were to be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Delaware, reflected an intent that both the substantive and procedural law of Delaware would govern the relationship between the parties and concluded that the plaintiff's claims were time barred by Delaware's three year limitation period because the plaintiff commenced its action more than three years after V Co. dispensed the funds to the defendants. The trial court also explicitly rejected the plaintiff's contention that the choice of law provi- sion governed only substantive law and not procedural issues such as the statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the procedural law of Connecticut, rather than that of Delaware, governed its unjust enrichment claims, under Connecticut procedural law, an equitable action for unjust enrichment was not sub- ject to any statutory limitation period or, in the alternative, is subject to the six year statutory (§ 52-576 [a]) limitation period applicable to contracts, and that its action, therefore, was timely filed. Held: 1. The trial court incorrectly determined that Delaware law, rather than Connecticut law, governed the issue of whether the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were time barred: in a choice of law scenario, the forum state generally will apply the substantive law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their rights and duties under a contractual agreement but will apply its own law to matters of judicial administration and procedure, and, in Connecticut, whether a statute of limitations properly is characterized as substantive or procedural depends on the nature of the underlying right that forms the basis of the cause of action; in the present case, the choice of law provision in the limited partnership agreement was clear that the parties had agreed that Delaware law controlled the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties, and, there- fore, Delaware substantive law governed the plaintiff's unjust enrich- ment claims; because, however, the plaintiff's claims for unjust enrich- ment were claims for restitution that derived from equitable principles under Delaware's common law, the limitation period applicable to those claims properly was characterized as procedural, as that limitation period functioned only as a qualification on the remedy to enforce a preexisting common-law right, and, accordingly, Connecticut law gov- erned the timeliness issue; moreover, the fact that § 17-607 (c) properly is classified as a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations, had no bearing on whether that provision was deemed substantive or procedural for choice of law purposes, and the limited partnership agreement did not expressly incorporate that Delaware provision or otherwise indicate an intent that Delaware's procedural law would apply. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim, as an alternative ground for affirming the trial court's judgment, that the plaintiff's unjust enrich- ment claims were barred under Connecticut law by the three year limita- tion period generally applicable to tort actions, because the plaintiff's claims were equitable claims for relief and, thus, were not subject to any statute of limitations; furthermore, this court declined to address the issue of whether the defendants could prevail on their affirmative defense of laches, as the trial court made no factual findings with respect to that affirmative defense, and, accordingly, the case was remanded for the trial court's consideration of that defense, as well as any remaining grounds for summary judgment that the defendants raised in their sum- mary judgment motion. Argued November 7, 2018—officially released August 6, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of certain crimes in connection with a robbery, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present alibi testimony from the petitioner's aunt, G. The robbery occurred at a restaurant located less than one mile from the petitioner's house. The petitioner's cousin, B, who worked at the restaurant, informed the police that, before she went to work one day, the petitioner and another cousin had told her to leave a side door unlocked after closing so that they could rob the restaurant. B complied, and the restaurant was later robbed by three men wearing sweatshirts and ski masks. During the petitioner's criminal trial, the state introduced evidence that the police had searched the petitioner's home and seized, inter alia, sweatshirts and ski masks that purportedly had been used during the robbery and cash register drawers from the restaurant. In order to establish an alibi, trial counsel presented testimony from the petitioner's girlfriend, D, indicating that the two had spent the entire day and night in question together at the petitioner's house. The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding the petitioner guilty of first degree robbery and larceny, as well as conspiracy to commit first degree robbery and larceny, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. During the habeas trial, G testified that she lived in the same house as the petitioner and that she had seen him there periodically throughout the day in question. The petitioner's trial counsel testified during the habeas trial that he had interviewed a number of relatives, including G, in preparing an alibi defense and that, in his judgment, D was the strongest witness because she could testify that she and the petitioner were together in bed when the robbery occurred. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and thereafter denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. The petitioner then appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal. On the granting of certifi- cation, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the habeas court did not abuse its discre- tion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, this court having concluded that the petitioner's claim that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call G as an alibi witness was not debatable among jurists of reason; trial counsel's strategic decision to present an alibi defense only through D's testimony, which was entitled to deference, did not constitute deficient performance because G would not have been able to account sufficiently for the petitioner's whereabouts for the entire day and evening in question, as G was able to provide only general testimony that the petitioner had been home at various points during the relevant time periods, and, given the close proximity of the restaurant, G may not have noticed the petitioner leaving the house to confront B about leaving a door unlocked or to participate in the robbery, whereas D's testimony, if credited, would have provided a complete alibi for the petitioner at the time of both of those events. Argued February 20—officially released August 6, 2019

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-142d), whenever a person has been convicted of an offense in this state and such offense has been decriminalized subsequent to the date of conviction, such person may file a petition with the Superior Court for an order of erasure, ''and the Superior Court or records center of the Judicial Department shall direct all police and court records and records of the state's or prosecuting attorney pertaining to such case to be physically destroyed.'' The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his petition, filed pursuant to § 54-142d, to erase the records related to its finding that he had violated his probation. The defendant had been charged in 2010 with the possession and sale of a controlled substance and, in 2012, was convicted on a plea of guilty to possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. At the time of the defendant's conduct that led to his 2012 conviction, the defendant was on probation as a result of a prior narcotics conviction, the terms of which required that the defendant not violate any federal or state criminal law. During the 2012 plea pro- ceedings, the defendant admitted that he had violated his probation. Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant's petition to erase the records related to the 2012 conviction in light of the legislature's enactment of a statute (§ 21a-279a) in 2011 that decriminalized the pos- session of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. The trial court con- cluded, with respect to the defendant's separate petition to erase the records pertaining to his probation violation, that the defendant was not entitled to erasure of those records because a conviction was not necessary in order to find that he had violated his probation. On appeal from the trial court's denial of that petition, the defendant claimed that he was entitled to erasure because, among other reasons, the probation violation was premised on his 2012 conviction for conduct that has since been decriminalized, and, therefore, it could no longer serve as a basis for the violation of probation finding. Held that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant was not entitled to erasure of the records pertaining to the violation of probation finding: § 54-142d applies only to records pertaining to a criminal case in which a defendant has been convicted of an offense that subsequently was decriminalized, and, because the defendant's probation violation proceeding was not a crimi- nal proceeding but constituted a separate civil proceeding, and thus a violation of probation cannot be ''decriminalized,'' as that term is used in § 54-142d, that statute did not apply to the records pertaining to the defendant's probation violation proceeding; moreover, the legislative history of the marijuana decriminalization statute, § 21a-279a, made clear that, although possession of a small amount of marijuana would be decriminalized, it would still remain illegal, and indicated that the legisla- ture recognized that the state may retain public records of illegal con- duct, even if there was no criminal record of such conduct; furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that § 54-142d clearly requires the erasure of any record containing a reference to his convic- tion for an offense that subsequently was decriminalized because, in the absence of such conviction, nothing in the record could support the probation violation finding, as the defendant's conduct of possessing marijuana, rather than his conviction based on that conduct, supported the probation violation finding, and, even without evidence of the defen- dant's conviction, his general admission during the plea proceedings that he had violated the terms of his probation was sufficient to support that finding. Argued January 24—officially released August 6, 2019

The plaintiff bank, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by, among others, the defendant P. Following P's default on the mortgage, the plaintiff, through its loan servicing agent, initiated loan modification negotiations with P, but the parties were unable to agree on a binding modification. P then contacted the state Department of Banking, which intervened on his behalf and initiated a modification, but the plaintiff shortly thereafter increased P's monthly mortgage payment. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action, and the parties participated in mediation but were unable to reach an agreement. P then asserted special defenses sounding in equitable estoppel and unclean hands, as well as certain counterclaims, contending that the plaintiff engaged in conduct after the note had been executed that wrongfully and substantially increased P's overall indebtedness, caused P to incur costs that impeded his ability to cure the default, and reneged on loan modifications. The plaintiff moved to strike the special defenses and counterclaims, contending that they were legally insuffi- cient because they were not related to the making, validity or enforce- ment of the note or mortgage and were otherwise insufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion to strike, concluding that the counterclaims did not have a reasonable nexus to the making, validity or enforcement of the note because the misconduct alleged related to activities that occurred subse- quent to the execution of the note or mortgage. The court did not reach the issue of whether P's allegations were otherwise legally sufficient to support the counterclaims. The trial court found that P had alleged sufficient facts to support his special defenses of equitable estoppel and unclean hands, but, because P did not allege that the parties had agreed to a modification of the loan postforeclosure and could not rely on postforeclosure conduct to support his special defenses, they were legally insufficient, as they did not directly relate to the making, validity or enforcement of the note or mortgage. The trial court rendered judg- ment of strict foreclosure, from which P appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court rejected P's request to abandon the making, validity or enforcement test in favor of the transactional test, set forth in the rules of practice (§ 10-10), that requires that counterclaims must arise out of the transaction that is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and P, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that P's allegations, made in connection with his special defenses and counterclaims, did not provide a legally sufficient basis for those defenses and counterclaims, as P's allegations involved the types of misconduct that bore a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the note or the mortgage, and to the extent that the pleadings could be construed to allege that the intervention by the Department of Banking resulted in a binding loan modification, the breach of such an agreement also provided a sufficient basis to withstand a motion to strike in a foreclosure action; accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the case was remanded with direction to reverse the judgment of strict foreclosure and for further pro- ceedings. Argued December 11, 2018—officially released August 13, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in connection with the shoot- ing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that his federal constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him had been violated by the admission of certain evidence connecting him to the shooting. At trial, a supervisory forensic analyst employed by the state, D, testified that the defendant was a major contributor to the DNA on a bandana that had been found at the crime scene and that allegedly had been worn by the person who shot the victim. In conjunction with D's testimony, the state also introduced into evidence a written report signed by D containing specific numerical DNA profiles from the bandana and a postarrest buccal swab of the defendant's mouth that had previously been conducted pursuant to a court order. D testified that, although she analyzed the DNA on the bandana and conducted the ultimate comparison, the numerical DNA profile from the defendant's buccal swab had been generated by another forensic analyst or analysts. Although D had neither participated in nor observed the analysis of the defendant's buccal swab, D testified that she had received paperwork showing that standard laboratory proce- dures had been followed and explicitly swore to the accuracy of the resulting numerical DNA profile. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the evidence regarding the numerical DNA profile that had been presented through D contained testimonial hearsay and that he had been deprived of his right to confrontation because the state had failed to call a witness with personal knowledge of the testing of the buccal swab. The Appellate Court rejected that claim, concluding that, because D had conducted the ultimate analysis and made the resulting findings that connected the defendant's DNA to the bandana, and because D testified and was subjected to cross-examination at trial, the defendant's right to confrontation had not been violated. Although the Appellate Court vacated the defendant's manslaughter conviction on a separate ground, it affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the introduction of evidence concerning his numerical DNA profile through D's testimony violated his right to con- frontation. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the admission of D's testimony concerning the numerical DNA profile from the defendant's buccal swab did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation, and, because the state did not advance a claim of harmless error, the defendant was entitled to a new trial: D's testimony, which did not consist merely of her own independent opinion, introduced to the jury the other analyst's or analysts' out-of-court statements about the defendant's numerical DNA profile, as D had explicitly referred to, relied on, and vouched for the accuracy of work by the other analyst or analysts that she did not perform or otherwise observe, and such evidence constituted hearsay in light of the state's concession that it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; moreover, the evidence relating to the defendant's numerical DNA profile was testimo- nial in nature because it was created for the primary purpose of establish- ing the defendant's guilt at trial, as the buccal swab was performed after the defendant had been arrested and charged with various crimes, was obtained by court order for comparison with any DNA found on the bandana discovered at the crime scene, and was processed in such a way that the evidentiary purpose of the buccal swab analysis would have been readily apparent to the analyst or analysts who conducted it; furthermore, although all analysts who participate in the process of generating a DNA profile need not testify, the state must call as a witness an analyst with personal knowledge concerning the accuracy of a numerical DNA profile, and, because D simply relayed to the jury the DNA profile that had been provided to her by the analyst or analysts and did not possess such knowledge with respect to the processing of the defendant's buccal swab, D was not a sufficient substitute witness for purposes of the right to confrontation. Argued January 23—officially released August 13, 2019

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-39g [a]) ''[u]pon notification . . . that any taxes . . . are (1) due to the state from any person and unpaid . . . and (2) are not the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal . . . the Comptroller shall withhold any . . . payment of any amount payable by the state to such person unless the amount so payable is reduced by the amount of such taxes, penalties and interest . . . .'' The defendant contractor, W Co., which had obtained a judgment against the plaintiff Department of Transportation awarding money damages but subsequently received a payment that had been reduced by the comptroller pursuant to § 12-39g, appealed from the trial court's denial of its postjudgment motion seeking a determination as to whether that judgment had been fully satisfied. Specifically, W Co. claimed that the comptroller was collaterally estopped from withholding the taxes owed to the state in the present case because the plaintiff had failed to prove a claim it had made relating to the existence of the same tax debt in a separate arbitration proceeding. The trial court denied W Co.'s motion, concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude a reduction pursuant to § 12-39g because that issue had never been fully and fairly litigated. The trial court further concluded that § 12-39g imposed a separate statutory obligation on the comptroller to reduce the payment to W Co. by the amount of taxes it owed. On appeal, W Co. claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that the comptroller's reduction pursuant to § 12-39g was proper. Held that the trial court properly denied W Co.'s motion seeking a determination as to whether that judgment had been fully satisfied, the comptroller having properly exercised his statutorily created obligation to reduce the payment to W Co. by the amount of taxes owed: pursuant to the plain language of § 12-39g, the comptroller had a mandatory obligation to reduce the payment by the amount of taxes owed, unless they were the subject of a timely filed administrative appeal, and because the comptroller's obligation pursuant to § 12-39g is part of a comprehensive scheme for the collection of taxes that allowed W Co. to file a timely administrative appeal to challenge those taxes, which W Co. failed to do, the comptroller was required to reduce the payment by the amount of taxes owed; moreover, W Co.'s claim that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the comptroller from reducing the payment by the amount of taxes owed was unavailing, as that doctrine was not applicable to the present case, where W Co. could have filed a timely administrative appeal to challenge those taxes but did not avail itself of that opportunity, and to allow W Co. to avoid the payment of those taxes through a mechanical application of collateral estoppel would frustrate the well recognized social policy underlying this state's system of tax collection. Argued November 8, 2018—officially released August 20, 2019

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the statute (§ 52-190a [a]) that requires a complaint sounding in medical malpractice to be accompanied by a good faith certificate and a letter authored by a similar health care provider opining that there appeared to be evidence of medical negligence. In 2006, following the suicide of his wife, the plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action against his wife's treating psychiatrist, A, and his employer, C Co., but failed to append to the complaint the good faith certificate and opinion letter required by § 52-190a (a). Although the plaintiff subsequently obtained an opinion letter and amended his complaint, the trial court dismissed the counts of the amended complaint sounding in medical negligence on the ground that the original complaint failed to comply with § 52- 190a (a). The trial court subsequently rendered judgment for A and C Co. on the remaining counts. Thereafter, in 2011, the plaintiff com- menced two additional actions against A and C Co., their telephone answering service, T Co., and its owners, and other governmental offi- cials, employees and entities, among others, in which he challenged the dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Those actions, both of which included the claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, ultimately were resolved against the plaintiff. In 2016, the plaintiff, representing himself, commenced the present action against A, C Co., T Co. and its owners, the state, the Appellate Court, and five Superior Court judges. Thereafter, the trial court granted A and C Co.'s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claims directed against them were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the plaintiff previously had or could have raised and litigated those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by T Co. and its owners, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the prior pending action doctrine, the plaintiff previously having raised those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court also granted the motion to dismiss filed by the state, the Appellate Court and the Superior Court judges, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief were barred by sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel, and that the claims against the judges were barred by absolute judicial immunity. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defen- dants, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that § 52-190a is unconstitu- tional because it imposes a financial burden and other obstacles on plaintiffs seeking to bring medical malpractice claims and, therefore, violated his rights to due process, equal protection, and access to the courts. Held that this court could not review the plaintiff's claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, as the plaintiff failed to address in his brief to this court any of the issues that provided the basis for the trial court's resolution of the plaintiff's action in favor of the defendants: the plaintiff's failure to challenge in his appellate brief the trial court's independent, alternative conclusions that the claims against the defen- dants were barred by, inter alia, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the prior pending action doctrine operated as an abandonment of any challenge to the trial court's conclusions and thus effectively rendered the appeal moot because, even if this court were to agree that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, the trial court's conclusions would stand; moreover, the policy of this state's courts to be solicitous of self-represented liti- gants could not excuse the plaintiff's complete failure to challenge in his brief to this court the trial court's threshold conclusions. Argued December 13, 2018—officially released August 27, 2019

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's award of appellate attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Following the dissolution of the parties' marriage, the defendant filed a motion to open the dissolution judgment, which the trial court denied. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which upheld the denial of the motion. In his appeal from the denial of the motion to open, the defendant claimed that the trial court conducted part of the hearing on the motion to open in chambers and off the record and improperly denied the motion without hearing testimony or taking evidence. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for attorney's fees incurred in defending that appeal. The trial court, finding that the defen- dant's appeal from the denial of the motion to open was taken in bad faith and was entirely without color, awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American rule that a prevailing party may not recover attorney's fees from the opposing party in the absence of a statutory exception or certain exceptional circumstances. On appeal from the trial court's award of attorney's fees, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff on the basis of the bad faith exception because its decision lacked the requisite high degree of specificity as to its finding that the defendant's appeal from the denial of the motion to open was entirely without color. Subsequently, the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff under the bad faith exception to the American rule, the trial court's subordinate find- ings having been sufficiently specific to support its ultimate findings that the defendant acted in bad faith in knowingly bringing appellate claims that were entirely lacking in color; the trial court's findings that there was no evidence in the record to support the defendant's claim that part of the hearing on the motion to open was conducted in chambers and off the record, that the defendant was physically present at all court proceedings and did not object on the ground that the court was holding part of the hearing in chambers and off the record, and that the parties expressly agreed in open court to a bifurcated process by which the trial court would hear evidence only if it made a certain legal conclusion that it ultimately did not make established the defendant's firsthand knowledge regarding the basis of his appellate claims and supported the ultimate finding that the defendant knew that his claims lacked merit and, therefore, acted in bad faith in pursuing those claims on appeal. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an award of attorney's fees was warranted under the bad faith exception to the American rule, the amount of the award was unreasonable and excessive: the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $30,000 in attorney's fees, the evidence from the record of the multiday hearing having indi- cated that the court, in awarding the plaintiff less than one half of the fees requested, considered the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney regarding his fee affidavit, the fee affidavit itself, the relative rates charged by the attorneys for the parties, and the challenges raised by the defendant regarding certain charges; moreover, a reasonable reading of the transcripts and the fee affidavit supported the conclusion that the trial court had discounted all but the fees for the services rendered by the plaintiff's attorney himself. Argued January 24—officially released August 27, 2019