Volume 1 — United States Reports

<p> Partition. </p> <p>Under the plea of non tenent insimul, the defendants may show that some of them are not tenants of the freehold.</p>

Held: that B. was entitled to retain the goods for the payment of his own debt. Scire eacias against defendant as garnishee.

Held: that he was entitled to recover, it being the intent of the testator, that the first son of I. S. should take. On special verdict. Devise to the first heir male of I. S., when he shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, he paying to A. and B., the daughters of I. S., 401. each : after devisor’s death, I. S. had a son, who attained the age of twenty-one years, and paid his sisters the 401. each. Chew, pro Quer.

Halsey devised real estate in Rhode Island to trustees there, in trust for the benefit of his natural daughter, Maria De Valle, a married woman, during her life, for her separate use; and upon her decease the trustees were directed to convey in fee one-half of the estate to the eldest son of the said daughter living at her decease, if of age, and one-half part to her other children living at her decease, and in default of male issue to her daughters equally.

On a question, whether the original private book of memorandums of the secretary of the land-office, respecting the description of the land originally applied for, should be given in evidence, it was urged that this book, containing the original entries from which the minutes of property are formed is the best evidence, and therefore ought to be admitted.

Indictment for a nuisance. Mr. Dickenson, for the defendant, moved that a prosecutor should be indorsed on the indictment, agreeable to the act of assembly, (c) before the defendant should be put to plead.

Special verdict. The question arose on these words of a will. ‘■‘■Item— My will is, that after my wife Ruth Price’s decease, or if she shall alter her condition and marry, then, in such case, I devise and bequeath unto my loving friends, I. W. and M. K., or to any one of them, in case the other should die, in trust, and for the intent to sell and convey, all that messuage, &c., to any person or persons that shall purchase the same, and the money arising from the sale of the…

Held: that the legacy was vested. Special verdict.

<p> Practice on indictment. </p>

<p> Continuance. </p>

Moved to admit a witness to prove the age of the plaintiff, his brother (about sixty years old), from the hearsay of their father and mother. Opposed, and refused by tbe court. (b) The Votes of Assembly were admitted to prove the time of the notification of the repeal of an act of assembly by the King and Council. But not answering the purpose fully, the Minutes of Council were sent for, and given in evidence without opposition.

Plaintief supported his title by a patent dated in 1762. The defendan produced receipts from the Proprietary’s officers, with a warrant from Mr Peters, secretary of the land-office, several years prior to plaintiff’s patent, and proved upwards of twenty years’ possession; hut the plaintiff contending, that the receipts were only for money paid on account of an adjacent tract and that there was some imposition on the land-officer when the warrant wat granted, the defendant…

This cause came before the Court for a determination on a special verdict, which found, that the defendant’s late wife, Sarah, before her marriage, was seised of the lands in question in fee ; that after her marriage with the defendant, she and her husband joined in a conveyance to two trustees and their heirs, “ habendum to them and the survivor of them, and his heirs for ever, in trust nevertheless to and for the proper use and behoof of the said P. Turner and S., his…

ACTION on the Case for £ 802. The Plaintiffs under a power in the Will of Henry Bolster deceased, had sold at public vendue to the Defendant, a house and lot in the city of Philadelphia for £ 802, and shortly after tendered him a Deed for it, which the Defendant refused to accept, being advised by council that Bolster had no good Title to the Lot.—Upon which the Plaintiffs brought a special Action on the case for the consideration Money.

In 1827, the American brig Caspian was illegally captured by the naval forces of Brazil, and condemned in the prize courts of that country. There being nothing else to be done in the circumstances, her master, one Goodrich, instituted legal proceedings to recover the brig, and gave to Zimmerman, Frazier & Co., an American firm of the country, a power of attorney with right of substitution, to go on with matters.

<p> Dqwtable defence. </p> <p>In Pennsylvania, on the plea of payment, to' debt on bond, the defendant may give in evidence want of consideration.</p>

Plaintipp showed a title in himself to the province of Pennsylvania, and then rested. Defendant showed a deed for one thousand acres of land ; also a warrant to himself and two others to take up three thousand acres of land, which included the lands in controversy ; also a power of attorney to David Lloyd to take care of said land, and an account of the exj>enses of survey.

Ejectment for ground in the city of Philadelphia. Mercy Masters, being seised in fee, married Peter Lloyd. Peter Lloyd and Mercy, his wife, convey to Ralph Asheton, in 1727. Ralph Asheton reconveys to Peter Lloyd, the land in question. ' Afterwards, in 1738, on a judgment against Peter Lloyd, the land in question was taken in execution and sold by the sheriff to the defendant for 1300Í.

The plaintiff, among other evidence, offered a map, made by one Zimmerman, about thirty years ago.

A statute of Indiana passed in 1834, enacted as follows: “ That there shall be and is hereby created and established a State Bank, to be known and styled the ‘ State Bank of Indiana,’ and shall continue as such until the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fifty-nine.” The charter further provided, that all banking powers should cease after the first day of January, 1857, “ except those incidental and necessary to collect and close up its business.” In 1849, the bank…

Held: that an assignee was not bound by an agreement, separate from the bond, but made on the same day, of which he was ignorant, by which the obligee bound himself “not to enter up judgment, nor get it done by anybody else,” 9 S. & R. 137. But a payment made by the obligor to the obligee, before notice of the assignment, is good against the assignee. Bury v. Hartman, 4 S. & R. 175; Brindle v. McIlvaine, 9 Id. 74 .

Under the provisions of a statute of Indiana, passed May 11, 1852, for the incorporation of railroads, the Cincinnati, Cambridge & Chicago Short Line Railway Company — frequently entitled throughout the case, for brevity, “ The Short Line Railway” — was created and made a “ corporation” in that State.* This act contained no provision by which any railroad company incorporated under it could consolidate its stock with the stock of any other corporation.

A Venire had issued, and the jury was summoned: the plaintiff forbade the sheriff to bring the jury to the court. On the day of trial, the plaintiff’s attorney demanded the venire. Defendant’s attorney opposed it, and advised the sheriff to deliver it into court. The jury also attended, upon the application of defendant’s attorney. The court was then moved for their direction.

Held: that evidence of words spoken by him to prove this mistake, and to show his real intention of joining and adhering to the enemy, was not admissible. Evidence may be given of an overt act committed in another county, after an overt act is proved to have been committed in the county where the indictment is laid and tried.

<p> Indictment for treason. </p> <p>Indictment for treason: The overt act laid was taking a commission from the enemy: evidence was admitted to show that the defendant had a power of granting passes into, and out of, the city, then in possession of the enemy.</p> <p>It is sufficient, in such indictment, to lay, that the defendant sent intelligence to the enemy, without setting forth the particular letter or its contents.</p>

<p> Evidence in treason. </p> <p>Under the act of 1 MV, there must be an actual enlistment of the person persuaded, to constitute the oifence of treason.</p> <p>Although the defendant’s confession, proved by two witnesses, is not sufficient to convict him, substantively, yet, where an overt act is proved, the confession maybe given in evidenoe to substantiate it, although of another species of treason.</p>

At a court of Oyer and Terminer, &c., held at Philadelphia, in November 1778, the defendant was indicted for forgery upon two bills. The proceedings were removed by certiorari, returnable into this court, on the 5th day of December following ; and the issues, on not guilty pleaded, were tried before a special jury, on the 14th April 1779, when the defendant was convicted upon both indictments.

The allegation was, that the William Clark sank within fifteen minutes after the collision, and the claim was for a total loss both of the vessel and the cargo. The collision occurred about ten o’clock.in the evening.

THIS was an indictment against the Defendant, a baker employed by the army of the United States, for a cheat, in baking 219 barrells of bread, and marking them as weighing 88 lb. each, whereas they only severally weighed 68 lb. The indictment being originally found at the City Court, in October Sessions 1779, was removed by Certiorari into this Court. contended, that false tokens are only indictable by the St. of 33.

Held: that he took an estate-tail, which was forfeited by the attainder. The ease was this : John Parrock was attainted of High Treason, and his estate seized and advertised for sale. Abel James filed a claim, according to the act of assembly, passed the 6th day of March 1778 (1 Sm.

Held: that the estate in the commonwealth ceased on the death of John Parrock, and that the remainder to Abel James was rested and took effect in possession, on payment of the 300¿. The case is reported in 1 Yeates 332 , by the name of Evans’s Lessee v. Davis. And see the remarks of C. J. McKean upon the foregoing case, in 1 Yeates 338 .

This case, which was an appeal from a decree in the Admiralty, having been elaborately argued on the 6th of May, the President delivered the opinion of the Court.

<p>This case had been argued, on the 3d of July, by Lewis, for the claimant, and Bradford for the estate of Adams. The former cited 2 P. Wms. 157, 154; Pract. Reg.; Barn. 151; 3 Wils. 206; 2 Burr. 1083. The latter cited 10 Mod. 277; 6 Id. 167.</p>

<p> Treason. </p> <p>High treason might have been committed against the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, previous te the meeting of the supreme executive council, in March 1777; .but under the act of 28th of January 1777, it seems, that an inhabitant of Pennsylvania had the privilege of choosing his side in the political contest, until the 11th of February 1777.</p>

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court foi New Hampshire; the case being thus: In September, 1853, Dunn and his partner having bought timber land in New Hampshire, of Goodall, mortgaged it back to him, as security for the payment of the purchase-money; the purchasers having given their notes for the money; and the mortgage being intended to secure their payment.

The Attorney-General filed a suggestion, stating, that Joshua Buffington of the county of Chester, yeoman, being a subject or inhabitant of the state, was by proclamation of the Supreme Executive Council, dated the 2d of October 1780, required, in pursuance of the attainder law, to surrender himself to a justice of the supreme court, &c., on or before the 13th of November 1780, to abide his legal trial for the treasons in the proclamation mentioned, &c. That the said Joshua…

Certain goods of British manufacture being imported into the county of Philadelphia, contrary to the act of assembly, passed the 10th of September 1778, they were attached, and this information filed against them. The owners of the goods exhibited a claim, and the merits of the case were brought to trial, at an adjourned court, on the 10th of January 1782, when the following points of evidence were ruled.

Mrs. Dermott leased to Dexter a hotel, for three years from 1st October, 1855, to be extended to five, at the option of the tenant. The rent-was $3000 a year, payable in monthly sums of $250.

Held: that a confidential clerk or agent might he compelled to testify, and even a person who acquired his knowledge of facts, while he was a student in the office of the attorney of one of the parties, was permitted, in Andrews v. Solomon, 1 Pet. C. C. 359 , to be a witness.

A Deed executed by two persons, with, one wax, and another ink seal, attested by one witness only, and merely proved by him. before a justice, without being recorded, was offered in evidence. It was objected, that by the act of assembly (1 Sm.

The Judiciary Act provides * tbat final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in equity in a Circuit Court, when the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, may he re-examined and reversed or approved in the Supreme Court. With this law in force, Bindley had sued Ryan in assumpsit in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and laid his damages at one thousand dollars.

<p>The case was this: — In the close of the year 1777, one Stephen Back-house arrived at Philadelphia, from Liverpool, the troops of the king of Great Britain being at that time in possession of the city. Backhouse brought with him a large and valuable cargo of salt, which he stored in the warehouse of one Pritchard, and after a short stay in Philadelphia, he went to New York (then likewise in the possession of the British troops), consigning the salt to Messrs. Jones, Backhouse and Foulk, of Philadelphia, with directions that they should sell it for him, at the best price they could get, but not under a dollar per bushel. Backhouse, one of the consignees, was no relation whatever of Backhouse the owner. The consignees, accordingly, sold part of the salt to different persons, and on the 17th of June 1778, they sold the remainder to Wilcox, the plaintiff. On the 18th of June 1778 (the day succeeding the sale), the British troops evacuated Philadelphia. In January 1779, it was seized for the commonwealth, as the property of the enemy. And the question was, whether the salt was the property of Wilcox, the plaintiff; or became forfeited to the state of Pennsylvania, as being the property of a British subject ?</p> <p>It is to be observed, that no money was paid by Wilcox to the consignees, at the time of the sale, though the key of the store was delivered to him. The price of the salt was to be a dollar per bushel; and the agreement, at the sale, was, that if the salt should be in the city, when the American army entered it, then the money should be paid for it within (I think) two or three months; but that if the salt should be destroyed or taken by the British troops, in that event, the contract should be null and void. These conditions were annexed to the agreement, from a general apprehension that the ^ -. British, *on evacuating the city, would either destroy such stores as J they did not want, or take with them those articles which they might stand in need of.</p> <p>These facts, likewise, appeared in evidence, on the trial; that the consignees had been applied to by one of the plaintiffs, five or six days before the evacuation, to purchase the salt; that for three or four weeks before the evacuation, the citizens of Philadelphia supposed it was intended; that the whole of the British army did not finally leave the city until the morning of the 18th, though their shipping, for a fortnight before, had been, from time to time, dropping down the river; that the price of salt at that time was only three shillings per bushel; and that the plaintiffs have since, to wit, in August 1778, paid the full value of the salt, at the rate of a dollar per bushel, to Jones & Co.</p> <p>On behalf of the state of Pennsylvania, three points were made : 1st. That the contract between Wilcox and Jones & Co., was not a complete one, inasmuch as no money was paid, nor any possession delivered of the salt. If, therefore, it was not a complete contract, the salt was the property of a British subject, and consequently, forfeited to the state, by the rules of war, and the law of nations. 2d. That admitting the contract to be complete, yet it was made to defraud the state of the forfeiture, and in eontem-plation of the intended evacuation. 3d. That if it was incomplete, though to be made complete by a subsequent event (to wit, the entry of the American army into the city, and the salt still remaining), yet the right of the state to the salt attached, if not sooner, at least, as soon (to wit, when the American army entered) as the right of the plaintiffs ; and that, therefore, by the rules of law, the right of the state must be preferred to the private claim.</p> <p>1st Point. To the first point, it was argued — that all contracts should be mutual; that each of the contracting parties should have an equal remedy against the other for the performance of the contract, or for damages on the non-performance of it; that, in this case, Backhouse being an alien enemy, was entitled to no action against the plaintiffs, but depended entirely on their liberality and honor for payment of the money, in case the salt should not be destroyed or taken away by the British troops.</p> <p>1st Resp. pro. Quer. At the end of the war, Backhouse will be entitled to his action against the plaintiffs, for recovery of the money due on the contract ; because, though all rights and credits belonging to the subjects of any power at war with another, are, during the war, suspended, as against the subjects of that power, with whom their sovereign is at war, still, on the restoration of peace, those rights and credits are revived, and the subjects of each nation, are in the same situation with respect to debts due to and' from each other, as they were before the war.</p> <p>2d Point. This was argued on both sides, from the various circumstances which appeared in the cause ; the counsel for the state contending, that the nature of the transaction was evidently to trick *the state out p^1 of the forfeiture, and the advocates for the plaintiffs insisted it was *- a bond fide sale.</p> <p>3d Point. Many cases were cited, on behalf of the state, to show the right of the state ought to be preferred to that of an individual, when they both accrue at one and the same time.</p> <p>3d Resp. pro. Quer. The contract was complete, though liable to be defeated by á subsequent event; and the delivery of the salt was also complete, by the delivery of the key of the store in which it was deposited. The price to be paid was, indeed, the object to be effected by the subsequent event, and not the salt itself. The distinction between a condition precedent, and a condition subsequent was taken, to show that the property being once vested in the bargainee, could not be taken out of him, by any condition to be performed afterwards, which was impossible, repugnant or illegal; and it was urged, that although the right of the state would have attached first, if the plaintiffs had not obtained a prior possession by the actual delivery of the salt; yet, that, having a possession before the American army entered, and even before the evacuation of the British, no such right could possibly attach.</p>

Forcible entry. In this case, it was resolved, on solemn argument, that title could not be given in evidence by the defendant, to prevent restitution. 8 Hen. VI, c. 9. 1 Burns’ Just. 411, § 3.(c) And McKean, C. J., ruled, that the wife of the prosecutor might be examined as a witness to prove the force, but only the force; for, otherwise, the statutes might be eluded in some cases, (d) Same Cause.

Litchfield sued the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, for a tract of land in that district. The cause of action was set forth by petition, according to the mode of proceedings prescribed by the code of Iowa. It alleged that the plaintiff had a title in fee, and the right of possession; which land was withheld from him by the defendant, who was in possession.

A conveyance was made to A., in trust for B., and B. brought an ejectment on his own demise. Blair contended that the demise ought to have been laid in the name of A., inasmuch as the legal estate was in him.

This was an indictment against four Italians for the murder of Captain Pickles; and, upon the arraignment of the prisoners, the court assigned Tngersoll and Swift as counsel for them. These gentlemen then challenged the array, and moved for an award of a tales de medietate Ungues; but the Attorney-General controverted the propriety of the motion, and it was twice argued, on the 25th and 29th of September.

This action was commenced returnable to the ensuing term, and now, August 6th, previous to the return of the writ, the plaintiff moved for a special court, under the new act, for granting special courts to plaintiffs (2 Sm. L. 17).

Godfrey sued Eames iu the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, in an action on the case for infringing a patent for a new and useful improvement in boot-trees, of which patent he, Godfrey, was the assignee. The defendant pleaded Not Guilty, and gave notice of special matters of defence. The case was tried by a jury, who found the defendant guilty, and assessed the damages at $2177.50.

Held: in that case, that notice of filing a report of referees might be given to the attorney. But where a rule of court requires notice given to the party, notice to the attorney is not sufficient. Nash v. Gilkeson, 5 S. & R. 352. Even in such case, however, notice to the attorney will be considered good, if he did not expressly object at the time of service. Newlin v. Newlin, 8 S. & R. 41.

Held: that the valuation by the inquest was not conclusive upon the plaintiff, where the land was taken out of his hands by a subsequent execution, before *81 his debt was satisfied, but that he was to account for the real profits, that is, such as he might have made with reasonable care and diligence.

The Gaylords, appellants here, had filed their bill in chancery in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, against the defendants Kelshaw and Butterworth, charging that they had an unsatisfied judgment at law in one of the Indiana courts against Kelshaw, and that some short time before the judgment was recovered, Kelshaw conveyed to Butterworth a valuable piece of real estate without any consideration; and with an intent fraudulently to hinder and delay them, the said…

By act of Assembly, passed in 1852, tbe legislature of Pennsylvania authorized tbe commissioners of Mercer County in that State to subscribe to tbe stock of tbe Pittsburg and Erie Bailroad, wbicb road, if built, would pass through their county and benefit it.

Held: &c.,” and this was holden to be error; 2 Roll.

In this cause, tho defendants offered in evidence an entry made in the books of their testator, of money paid in discharge of a promissory note. This was acknowledged to be the original entry ; but there was no proof by whom it was made, nor whether the person who made it was dead or alive.

Ejectment. On the trial of this cause, in deducing the plaintiff’s title, a sheriff’s deed was produced, but no part of the record therein.

THIS was a seigned issue to try the validity of a will, against the probate of which, a caveat had been entered in the Register’s Office. The plea was insanity in the testator; and evidence was given of habitual drunkenness, old age, weakness of body, shortness of memory, and a few incoherent expressions. The jury however, in a very short time, gave a verdict for the plaintiff in the issue, who was the devisee in the will.

Held: “ as there was reason r.o suppose that the ship was a pirate, though the jury should be satisfied she *106 was not really so, yet the action would not lie.” Afterwards, “ there was a motion for a new trial, which, upon consideration, was denied by the court.” If that cause was cognisable in the prize court, and if that court determines solely by the law of nations and treaties, as is laid down by the judges, how…

Bayne & Morris having differences with each other, agreed to refer them to arbitrators, who besides being authorized to determine the amount to he paid, were authorized to award upon what terms, as to time and security, the payment should be made. On the 23d of January, 1858, the arbitrators made an award, and on the 26th of the same month made a second one.

This was a writ of error, in an action of ejectment, to the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa; the plaintiff in error having been also plaintiff below.

By acts of Congress, of March 3d, 1851,* and of August 31st, 1852,† the District Courts of the United States for California, were authorized, on appeal from the Board of Land Commissioner’s, — which body was empowered to settle any claim to land in California that any person might set up by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, — “ to decide upon the validity of the said claim.” One of the statutes‡ proceeded to enact for “ all claims…

This was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, and was taken under the 25th. section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gives a writ of error here in any case where is drawn in question any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute, or commission, held under the United States, and the decision is against the right, title, privilege or exemption specially set- up or claimed by either party under such clause of the Constitution, treaty,…

Held: that the indorser, who admitted his signature to be good, was not competent to impeach the validity of the note, until he had paid or satisfied the holder. So, on an indictment for uttering a forged indenture, the party injured was ruled to be a competent witness. Respublica v. Wright, 1 Yeates 401 .

Held: that the indorser, who admitted his signature to be good, was not competent to impeach the validity of the note, until he had paid or satisfied the holder. So, on an indictment for uttering a forged indenture, the party injured was ruled to be a competent witness. Respublica v. Wright, 1 Yeates 401 .

<p> International law. </p> <p>A secretary of legation is entitled to ail the immunities of a minister.</p> <p>The law of nations forms part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Punishments must be certain and definite. One who has assaulted a foreign minister cannot bo sentenced to imprisonment, until the foreign sovereign shall declare the reparation satisfactory.</p>

The Judiciary Act (§ 25) provides, that a final deeree in the highest court of equity in a State, “ where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of.....•. any State on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such validity, may be re-examined and reversed” in this court.

The defendants declining in their circumstances, and being much pressed by their creditors, Basse fled, and Soyer was imprisoned at the suit of the plaintiff.

A Deed, attested by two witnesses, one of whom had married the lessor of the plaintiff, the other residing within the county and not produced, was offered in evidence, upon proof of the handwriting of the witnesses.

<p> Confutation of interest. </p>

Oapias, to June 1784. The bail-bond sued to September 1784 ; and December 1784, judgment was signed on the bail-bond suit, nisi special bail filed in thirty days. Default was made in filing special bail, and a fi. fa. issued to June 1785.

Held: that a party may be compelled by attachment to perform a specific act, ordered by the award. And see Blackburn v. Markle, 6 Binn. 174 , and s. c. in 12 S. & R. 143. The Court inclined strongly to be of opinion with Lewis, particularly on the first point; but no judgment was given, that the parties might, if they would, accommodate the matter by a new reference ; and, accordingly, it was afterwards referred de novo.

Held: that a recognisance is not a lien on the lands of special bail, and this on the ground of a general understanding, which was said to have been carried into universal practice. Had this sound lawyer and excellent judge reflected Dut for a moment, on the origin of the lien of recognisances, he would not have put the case on the existence of a custom.”

<p>Scire Facias against the bail, and the judgment removed by writ of error. Upon the issuing of a certiorari to bring up the record, the plaintiffs moved to amend the scire facias by the record, substituting September, 1782, for December 1781. Tbe motion had been argued at tbe last term, and now came on for a second argument.</p>

Held: 1st. That this was a covenant to stand seised to uses: 2d. That A. took only a life-estate. This was an ejectment brought for a messuage and plantation, in Ben-salem township, in Bucks county. A case being stated, it was thrice argued by Sergeant and Bradford, for the plaintiff, and Lewis and Wilcoclcs, for the defendant. The Chief Justice now recapitulated the material points, and delivered the

<p> Insolvent act. </p>

Held: that it was not necessary that the equitable interest should appear on the record. It seems a necessary consequence of this doctrine, that the assignor should be regarded in the light of a third person. Accordingly, it has been held, that where the nominal plaintiff takes no part in the suit, and the transfer has beep ionápde, and before suit brought, he is not liable for the costs. Wistar v. Walker, 2 Bro. 171.

Rule to show cause why the report of referees should not be set aside.

Held: that the commonwealth was not entitled to a preference Thb defendant having absconded, a domestic attachment issued against him, at the suit of the plaintiff, and the auditors, under that process, having advertised that all persons, who had demands, should send in their accounts, in a reasonable time afterwards, made a dividend among the creditors that filed their claims.

Held: that the drawer could not recover back the money paid as damages. A Case was made in this cause for the

<p>Practice. — Def(mlt.</p>

<p>This was an indictment for a nuisance, in erecting a wharf on the public property. • The defendant offered witnesses to prove that the erection of the wharf had been beneficial to the public, and therefore, not to be regarded as a nuisance. But—</p>

This was a bill filed in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to restrain the infringement of a patent for protecting the manufacture of a certain sort of door-locks, called… Held: apparently, from this record, by the court below.

Lazarus Barnet having absconded, several foreign attachments were issued against him ; and afterwards, motions were made to set them aside, respectively, in favor of a domestic attachment, which had likewise issued against him.

<p> Replevin. </p> <p>Practice in the action of replevin, in Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Replevin issues in this state, wherever a plaintiff claims goods in possession of another.</p> <p>Judicial writs, de proprietate probanda, do not issue here ; but where defendant claims property in the goods, he gives security to deliver them, if, on trial, the property shall not be found in him.</p>

A Rule had been obtained, to show cause why the report of referees should not be set aside, on the ground of their having heard a witness interested in the event of the suit; and, after argument, the President pronounced the decision of the court.-

Foreign Attachments. In these cases, rules had been obtained to show cause of action, and why the attachments should not be quashed.

<p>Practice. — Depositions.</p>

Held: in the case cited, that the attorney of the plaintiff, in an action on the case to recover the purchase-money of a tract of land, had no right to enter into an agreement, by which the land was to be taken back, instead of the money.

This was a question on a writ of error, brought to reverse a judgment in the common pleas of Philadelphia county, against the plaintiff in error, when within age. The record of the court below stated, that the defendant (now plaintiff) appeared in person, imparled to the next term, and then appeared and said nothing ; wherefore, &c. The plaintiff attained his full age, before he brought the writ of error.

Easter & Co. brought trover, in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, against Sweeny, Rittenhouse, Eant & Cq., bankers of Washington City, to recover the value of certain negotiable notes belonging to them, the first named persons, and which they had indorsed in blank and placed in the hands of Harris & Sons, bankers of Baltimore, for collection and for no other purpose.

Held: that it was necessary that express orders should be given to this effect, and that it was not sufficient, that such directions might be implied from the instructions to the master.

Held: that a settlement of an administration account, in the orphans’ court, was not conclusive, in an action for a distributive share.

<p> Award. </p> <p>An award, that the defendant pay a certain sum to the executors of A., is sufficiently certain; aa it may be averred that the plaintiffs are the executors.</p>

This, was an application for a special court, founded on the act passed the 10th of April 1782. Kunckel, the petitioner, set forth in his affidavit, that one of the plaintiffs, Boom, with whom he had been in partnership, had dissolved their connection, since the commencement of the action, and that the outstanding debts had been assigned to Kunckel, so as to vest in him the whole interest in the event of the action.

The Constitution of the State of Iowa, adopted in 1846, contains the following provisions, to wit: “ Art. 1. § 6. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” “ Art. 3. § 1. The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which shall be designated the General Assembly of the State of Iowa,” &c. “ Art. 7.

Held: that this was a vested devise in A., and that the estate was to be divided equally among his brothers and sisters. This cause now came before the court on a special verdict, returned *181 upon the trial of an ejectment for a messuage and lands in the township of East Whiteland, in the cóunty of Chester.

Held: that the recovery in the ejectment is conclusive, as to all damages subsequent to the service of the writ of ejectment, but as to the previous profits, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show his own title, and possession by the defendant. See McCredy v. Guardians, 9 S. & R. 101; Osbourn v. Osbourn, 11 Id. 55 .

Held: that parol evidence was admissible, to show that the instalments were to be paid in whatever money was current at the time they became due.

<p>This was an appeal from the Court of Admiralty. (a)</p>

<p> Relation of judgment. </p>

Held: that possession of the bill and protest, was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, without proof of a subsequent indorsee having received the amount. To the same effect was the decision of the circuit court of the United States, in Craig v. Brown, Peters’ C. C. 171.

Held: that as the Note was in its original creation indorsable, it would be so in the hands of the indorsee, though not so expressed in the indorsment. 8 These cases leave no room to doubt what have been the sentiments of the Courts in England upon the subject.

of the decision in James v. Allen, “ A person discharged by a special insolvent act of New Jersey, the act being local in its nature, and local in its lerms, is not thereby protected from his creditors here.” Now, there is nothing in the terms of the act which expressly limits its operation to the state of New Jersey, whatever may be the right of other states so to consider it; and it is certainly not a private act, in the sense in which that expression is usually received ;…

<p> Forfeiture of vessel. </p> <p>Under the act of assembly of 1787, a vessel was liable to forfeiture, in case goods were unladen from her, before due entry, whether the owners were privy to the transaction, or otherwise.</p>

Held: 'that a man's covenant shall not be strained so as to be unreasonable, or that it was improbable to be so intended, without necessary words to make it such; for it is unreasonable to suppose a man should covenant against the tortious acts of strangers, impossible for him to prevent, or probably to attempt preventing.' This was an action brought by the lessee against the lessor, on his covenant for quiet enjoyment.

<p>Usury.— Variance.</p> <p>[f a borrower give his promissory note for more than the sum loaned and legal interest, and make a partial payment, giving a new note for the balance, the offence of usury is complete; so, if he give new notes, and the old one is surrendered, though no money be actually paid.</p> <p>Tn a qui tam. action on the statute against usury, if the declaration set forth a contract with two partners, and the evidence be a note given by one of them aione, the variance is fatal.</p>

Held: that an action could not be maintained, in a court of common law, to recover the value of the vessel. 1 This was a foreign attachment, in which, and in two others against the same defendants, for the same cause, a motion was made to quash the writs. After argument, the President recapitulated the grounds of the motion and delivered the

Held: that an agreement under seal, received as collateral security for a simple contract debt, may be given in evidence, in assumpsit on the original contract, to show the amount due. 1 (b) s. p. Heckert v. Haine, 6 Binn. 16 ; Wishert v. Downey, 15 S. & R. 77. And *221 even if the paper he lost, the subscribing witness, if there be one, must be produced or accounted for.

This suit differed from 80 — the principal one — only in the fact that the bonds of the city, which in this case bore date 1st September, 1855, were issued prior to the passage of the act of 28th January, 1857, specially. authorizing the city to subscribe to the railroads for which the bonds in No. 80 had been subsequently given.

This suit differed both from the principal and from tho preceding case in that it was not upon bonds issued upon tho city, but was upon an instrument of writing by which the mayor and recorder of the city had entered (Feb. 7, 1859) into a contract with the same Gelpcke and others, that if they, Gelpcke and others, would pay or advance the interest due on various bonds already issued by the city (part of the interest then due, and part to become due), and would advance a…

Held: for that reason, that the law, or that feature of it, was unconstitutional and void, as impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Suggestion is made that the ruling of the court in the case of McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat., 209 , decided at the same term, asserts a different doctrine, but we think not, if the facts of the case are properly understood.

Rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered on the bail-piece. The defendant had obtained his discharge under the insolvent law in the state of Maryland, which law was enacted subsequently to the debt in question, and to the institution of this suit!

Held: in the case of the Mechanics’ Bank v. The Bank of Co lumbia, 5 Wheat., 326 , that parol evidence was admissible to show that it was an official act. Signature of the promissor in that case had nothing appended to it to show that he had acted in an official character, and yet it was unhesitatingly held that parol evidence was admissible to show the real character of the transaction.

Held: that B. took only an estate for life. This was a case stated for the opinion of +he court. It was argued, on the 11th instant, by Sergeant, on the one side ; and Lewis and Levy, on the other. This day the President repeated the case, and delivered the

Held: that the plaintiff was not competent to prove the handwriting of a person who made the entries in his book, and who had subsequently died. Karsper v. Smith, 1 Bro. app’x liii.

<p> Opening defcmlt. </p>

Held: that a discharge under the general insolv. ent law of Maryland, entitled the defendant to an exoneretur, in Pennsylvania. Rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered on the bail-piece. The defendant had obtained his discharge under the insolvent law in the state of Maryland, which law was enacted subsequently to the debt in question, and to the institution of this suit!

<p>The.defendant was included in an act of proclamation issued during the late war, and not appearing within the time prescribed, was attainted of treason, for adhering to the king of Great Britain, in consequence of which, his estate was confiscated to the use of the commonwealth, but it had never been taken into possession.</p> <p>He returned, since the peace, to the state of Pennsylvania, and applied to the executive council, representing that he was a minor at the time of the Attainder, and was forcibly prevented by his guardian from joining the American army — for which reasons he prayed a restoration of his estate. The council said, they were ready to grant him a pardon, but that they had it not in their power to restore his estate, which was a matter of legislative jurisdiction. Mr. Gordon, therefore, addressed several members of the general assembly, but he was there answered, that the executive council, or the supreme court of justice, was the proper tribunal to hear and determine the merits of his case. The defendant, by the advice of his counsel, again applied to the executive power, and requested, that, to bring the matter before the judges, the attorney-general might be directed to file a suggestion in the supreme court, of the defendant’s being attainted in the manner above mentioned.</p> <p>This being done accordingly, Mr. Gordon gave bail for his appearance, and two pleas, 1st, infancy, and 2d, duress, were filed, to the suggestion thus made, on the behalf of the commonwealth; to the former of these, the attorney-general demurred, and joined issue on the latter.</p>

This case arose on the petition of Clement L. Vallandigham for a certiorari, to be directed to the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the United States, to send up to this court, for its review, the proceedings of a military commission, by which the said Vallandigham had been tried and sentenced to imprisonment; the facts of the case, as derived from the statement of the learned Justice (Wayne) who delivered the opinion of the court, having been as follows : Major-General…

After some conversation with the Grand Inquest, the Attorney-General informed the court, that a list of eleven persons had been presented to him by the foreman, with a request, that they might be qualified and sent to the jury, as witnesses upon a bill then de]aending before them.

Held: that the plaintiff was not competent to prove the handwriting of a person who made the entries in his book, and who had subsequently died. Karsper v. Smith, 1 Bro. app’x liii.

Held: that an attorney or counsel, is competent to give evidence for his client, although he expects to receive a larger fee, if hie client recover. Miles v. O'Hara, 1 S. & R. 32.

Held: 'in a controversy between the grantees of a first mortgage and the grantees of a second mortgage, that the first took the future acquired property, although the property itself was not in existence at the time the first mortgage was executed.

Held: that the indorser is not discharged, by the holder taking from the maker, a mortgage, of the same date with the note, as collateral security for payment of the note. Ligget v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 7 S. & R. 218. (b) In the case of McCullough v. Houston, post, p. 444. (c) Stat. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9; “The 1st, 3d, 4th and 8th sections of this statuto are in force.” Report of the Judges of the Supreme Court.

Held: that the recognisance bound only the lands of the intestate, taken at the valuation.

It being referred by the court to a commissioner to assess these damages, the owners of the Hector claimed the whole cost of the repairs, and also damages for fourteen days’ demurrage, during which the repairs were getting done.

<p>A foreign attachment issued in Hampshire county, in the state of Massachusetts, against the defendants, to which the sheriff made return, that “ he had attached one blanket, shown to him as the reputed property of the defendants ;” and no appearance being entered, judgment was given for the plaintiff at the second term. An action of debt was afterwards brought here, upon this judgment, and a question stated for the opinion of the court, to wi t, “ whether the judgment was conclusive evidence of the debt.”</p>

Tiie legislature of Pennsylvania incorporated a railway company, b}7 act of Assembly, one section of which enacted that any incorporated city should have authority to subscribe to the stock “ as fully as any individual,” but the act did not give such cities any power to issue bonds in payment of thei r subscriptions.

Von Phul and Gregg entered into articles of agreement on the 6th of December, 1856, by which Von Phul agreed ' to sell and convey to Gregg certain premises in Peoria, which Gregg agreed to purchase, paying Von Phul for them $8550 as follows, to wit: $2800 on the 1st of March, 1857 (which was paid), and the residue in three payments of $1900 each in twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months from the same day.

Held: that the recognisance bound only the lands of the intestate, taken at the valuation.

Held: in that case, that to balance books at the end of each year, and charge interest on the balance of a running account, was illegal. The decision was expressly restricted to the case of running accounts; and Judge Rogers declared, that it was not intended to interfere with the practice of dealing at six months’ credit, which has generally obtained between the merchants of a seaport and those of the country.

<p>This was a feigned issue, to try whether the defendant had a legal authority to use the plaintiff’s name, in the acceptance, drawing and indorsement of bills of exchange, and promissory notes. The case was this : Rudolph Tillier and Clement Biddle entered into articles of agreement, on the 30th of January 1783, by which a special partnership was established between them. The defendant Whitehead was employed as a clerk by Biddle, in his general transactions ; and a memorandum, written and subscribed by Biddle alone, under two firms, that is “ Clement Biddle & Co.,” and also “ Clement Biddle & Co. & Rudolph Tillier,” was lodged in the bank; declaring that Whitehead’s acceptances, indorsements and drafts, under those firms, were good and binding on the parties. It appeared, accordingly, that Whitehead, as well as Biddle, had used the firm of “ Clement Biddle & Co. & Rudolph Tillierand an advertisement, sub scribed and published by Tillier himself, was read, in which notice was given, that “ he had no connection with any other mercantile house, except that known under the firm of ‘ Clement Biddle & Co. & Rudolph Tillier.’ ” There was not any proof, however, that Tillier knew of the authority which had been left by Biddle at the bank ; but a clerk of the bank proved that he had presented notes drawn by Whitehead in the firm of “ Clement Biddle & Co. & Rudolph Tillier,” and that, on such occasions, Tillier referred him to Whitehead for payment. It appeared also, that Whitehead had received the proceeds of some damaged tea, which Tillier had sent to the city auction, giving a receipt in the name of “ Clement Biddle & Co. & Rudolph Tillier that, in consequence of this, Tillier directed his clerk to forbid Whitehead’s meddling wdth any more of his money; and that, sometime afterwards, Tillier desired Whitehead to quit his counting-house, declaring that he had nothing to do with him.</p> <p>Two questions were stated for the plaintiff: 1st. Whether Clement Biddle and Rudolph Tillier were partners generally, or only for certain specific purpose ? and 2d. Whether one partner can devolve over the right of using the firm name, without the knowledge and concurrence of the other ?</p>

This was an appeal by Malarin and another, executors of Pacheco, from the decree of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of California; the case being thus : Pacheco claimed a tract of land in California, known as the Bolsa de San Felipe, or Sack of St. Philip, under a grant alleged to have been issued to him in October, 1840, by Alverado, then Mexican Governor of the department.

Held: that if the party who takes the deposition does not choose to read it at the trial, it cannot be read by the opposite party, without complying with the rule as to subpoenaing the witness; Gordon v . Little, 8 S. & R. 583. But where the witness resides out of the jurisdiction of the court, his deposition may be read, without a subpoena having been taken out.

The suit was brought in the court below against the city of Madison, in Indiana, for moneys due upon coupons attached to certain bonds issued by the city authorities, signed by the mayor and the city clerk, and to which was affixed the seal of the corporation, by which the city acknowledged, that in virtue of an ordinance of the Common Council, passed 2d September, 1852, it owed and promised to pay the president of the Columbus and Shelby Railroad Company, or bearer, $1000,…

Tiffany filed a bill against Miller and wife, in tbe Circuit Court for tbe District of Indiana, to foreclose a mortgage wbicb tbe last-named persons bad given to Palmer, a merchant of New York, and Wallace, an attorney at law of Cleveland, Obio, as assignees of two insolvent firms; wbicb mortgage they, tbe said Palmer and Wallace, bad assigned to bim, tbe complainant.

<p> Pri/oilege from service of process. </p> <p>A member of the state convention, which assembled at Philadelphia to consider the constitution of the United States, was held to be privileged from the service of a summons or arrest, during the session, and for a reasonable period before and after it.</p>

Held: that the right of set-off, under this act, did not extend to cases of unliquidated damages for any matter in nature of a tort, because in such case there is no standard by which the damages can be estimated, yet, he said, “ In the present case, the objection is not so strong; the amount of damages, to be sure, cannot be reduced to a certainty, but the price agreed to be paid for the article purchased, is some rule…

Appeal by the United States from the District Court for the Southern District of California; the case being thus : D’Aguirre, in right of his wife Donna Maria Estadillo, claimed a tract of land in California under a grant from the Mexican Government.

<p>An action of covenant will lie against a lessee, on an express covenant for payment of ground-rent, although after an assignment by him of the term, and although the lessor has accepted rent from the assignee.</p>

The Patent Act of 1836, provides* that on the filing of an application for a patent, “ the commissioner shall make or cause to be made an examination of the alleged new invention or discovery, and if on any such examination it shall not appear to the commissioner that the same had been ... in public use or on sale with the applicant’s consent or allowance prior to the application,... it shall be his duty to issue a patent therefor, but whenever on such examination it shall…

Held: however, that if a freeholder commit a trespass, jointly with one who is not a freeholder, he may be arrested upon a joint capias issued against both. Fife v. Keating, 2 Bro. 135. And see Jack v. Shoemaker, 3 Binn. 280 .

Held: that though he would be chargeable, if there were creditors, and a deficiency of assets to satisfy them, yet, that he was not answerable to the legatees. This was an appeal from the orphans’ court of Philadelphia county, on the following ease: Brown, having received 400?. on account of the estate of his testator, Edgar, paid it over (according to his uniform practice on such occasions) to his co-executor Dougherty.

The deed to Chaves pui-ported to be made on the 18th July, 1845, by Fio Fico, one of the Mexican governors of California; and it recited that “the necessary steps and investigations were previously taken and made in conformity with the requirements of laws and regulations.” On the 8th May, 1846, the “ expediente”* was laid before the Departmental Assembly, and was ordered to be referred to the Committee on Yaeant Lands.

<p>This cause being referred, a report was made in favor of the plaintiff for a considerable amount, to which the following ^exceptions were filed, and argued on the 12th of July, by J. J3. McEean, Lewis and *-</p>

and J. Green and C. and I. Gill filed a bill in Chancery in the District Court of the Territory just mentioned, against one Jones and a certain Brown. It set forth that in March, 1858, the said Greens had obtained judgment in the District Court of the First Judicial District of Nebraska, against Brown, for $1155, and that in October of the same year, the other two complainants, G. and C. Gill, had obtained judgment against him in the same court for $450.

the 10th June, 1852, Congress, by statute,* granted to the State of Missouri, to aid in building railroads from Hannibal to St. Joseph, the right of way through the public lands, and every alternate section designated by even numbers for six sections in width on each side of said roads.

Held: that a publication, attempting to prejudice the public mind on the merits of a suit pending at court, was punishable by attachment; and the defendant in that case was sentenced to fine and imprisonment. The power of the courts to punish in a summary way, for what are called constructive contempts, has since been taken away by the act of 19th April 1809 (5 Sm.

Held: that an indictment would lie, for unlawfully and maliciously “deadening and destroying” a tree, standing on public ground. (b) See Respublica v. Sweers, ante, p. 11.

Lee and Leavit brought assumpsit in the Circuit Court for the Kentucky District, against Watson, declaring on a promissory note for $610, with a count for $1000 money due for goods sold; $1000 money had and received; $1000 money due on account stated, &c. What damages exactly were claimed in the narr. as originally filed, did not clearly appear, but they were obviously less than $2000.

Bloomer, the appellant here, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.

The referees appointed in this cause, applied to the court for ins .ructions on a point of law, in order to guide them in making their report. But—

Held: that an execution could not issue into Bucks county, without z,fi. fa. previously issued and returned in Philadelphia. The venue in this case was laid in Philadelphia, and judgment being entered, an execution was thereupon issued immediately into Bucks county.

Held: that an indictment would lie, for unlawfully and maliciously “deadening and destroying” a tree, standing on public ground. (b) See Respublica v. Sweers, ante, p. 11.

This was an appeal by the United States from a decree of the District Court for tbe Southern District of California, confirming to one Auguisola a tract of land in California.

<p> AocounPrender. </p> <p>In account-render between partners, it is sufficient to charge tbe defendants generally, with the receipt of money to their joint benefit; and if the plaintiff prove a receipt from any one of the persons mentioned in the declaration, he is entitled to a general verdict, on the issue of ne ungues receiver.</p>

Held: that if the value of the moiety of the party-wall he paid to the first builder, by the owner of the adjoining lot, the claim of the former is determined, and a purchaser from him, cannot afterwards recover the amount, when a second building is erected; although he has had no notice of such payment. 1 1 And see Davids v. Harris, 9 Penn.

This was an action on the case for false warranty, and for deceit in the sale of one hundred casks of Dutch madder: and was brought in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The declaration contained seven counts. The first three were for false warranty (without any scienter), 1st. That it was a prime article. 2d. That it. was pure and unadulterated. 3d. That it was good, merchantable Dutch madder.

Held: that the plaintiff might be compelled to perform his part of the award, by attachment. 1 Exceptions were filed to the report of referees in this cause ; which were argued, on the 20th of November, by Wilson and Todd, for the defendant; and Sergeant, for the plaintiff. 1 But see Coleman v. Lukens, 4 Whart. 356 . The President now stated the material circumstances ; and delivered the

Held: that a report might be made to any succeeding term, and toan adjourned court, as part of the term.

Held: that the children of the eldest son of an intestate, who died in the lifetime of the intestate, succeed as well to the priority of choice, which their father would have had, if he had survived the intestate, as to his share of the estate. Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 S. & R. 2. And see Kline v. Grayson, 4 Binn. 225 . (a) Smith v. Scudder, 11 S. & R. 325.

Held: that a debt in suit might be attached in the hands of the defendant in the suit. C. J. McKean, however, in the course of his opinion, recognised the case in the text, as one in which an attachment would not lie. 1 1 So, the proceeds of an execution, in the hands of the sheriff, cannot be attached.

Wrii of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California; the action having been ejectment, by Johnson against Hardy and wife, to recover a parcel of land in the city of Oakland, California. Johnson, in his complaint, as a declaration is there called, alleged a seizin in fee and a right to the possession of the entire demanded premises.

Held: that the agreement did not authorise the issuing an execution, upon a report into office, during vacation; although a term had intervened between the entering the rule, and the appointment of referees. These actions were brought upon three promissory notes, two of which (included in one declaration) had been indorsed to the bank ; and the third was in the possession of Messrs.

Henry Starret, while attending the court as a suitor, was taken by a ca. sa., and Chambers moved that he might be discharged from the arrest, citing 4 Bac. 421; 3 Bl. Com. 289; 2 Str. 1094; 1 Barn. 17.

<p>Tnis was an appeal from the comptroller-general’s decision, on the trial of which, by consent of the attorney-general, Sparhawk was considered as plaintiff. There was a verdict and judgment nisi for the commonwealth, when IngersoU obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.</p> <p>The ease was this : Congress, perceiving that it was the intention of the British army to possess themselves of Philadelphia, and being informed that considerable deposits of provisions, &c., were made in that city, entered into a resolution, on the 11th of April 1777, that “a committee should be appointed to examine into the truth of their information ; and, if it was found true, to take effectual measures, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania board' of war, to prevent such provisions from falling into the hands of the enemy.”</p> <p>On the 13th of the same month, the Pennsylvania boarpl of war, in aid of this resolution, addressed a circular letter to a number of citizens in each ward of the city, requesting them “ to obtain from every family a return of the provisions, &c., then in possession, and the number of persons that composed the families, respectively, in order that proper measures might bo pursued for removing any unnecessary quantity of supplies to a place of security.” At the same time, it was mentioned, that “ this proceeding was not intended to alter or divest the property in the articles removed; but on the contrary, that the same should be, at all times, liable to the order of the respective owners, provided they we^e not exposed to be taken by the enemy.”</p> <p>That no precaution might be omitted upon this occasion, the Pennsylvania board of war, on the succeeding day, desired General Schuyler to prevent the introduction of further supplies, and to adopt the most effectual means for preventing the departure of the wagons which -were then in the city, and for procuring as many more as would *be necessary to trans- r*g5o port, not only the public stores, but also such private effects, as it L might be thought expedient to remove.</p> <p>Several intercepted letters having increased the apprehensions of Congress, on the 16th of April 1777, they resolved, “that it be recommended to the President and members of the executive authority of this state, to request the commanding officer of the continental forces in this city, to take the most effectual’means, that all provisions, and every other article, which, by falling into the hands of the enemy, may aid them in their operations of war against the United States, or the loss of which might distress the continental army, be immediately removed to such places, as shall be deemed most convenient and secure.”</p> <p>This recommendation was transmitted by the executive council to the Pennsylvania hoard of war, who, on the 18th of April, passed an order, that “ houses, barns, stores, &c., should be hired or seized for the reception of such articles as should be sent out of the city, by their direction or that of congress and accordingly, a very considerable quantity of property was soon removed to Chestnut-Hill, and placed under the care of Messrs. Loug-head & Barnhill; who gave receipts to the owners, promising “ to restore what belonged to them, respectively, or to deliver the same to their respective orders.”</p> <p>The enemy not approaching so rapidly as was expected, a considerable part of this property had, accordingly, been re-delivered to the order of the owners, before the city was entered by the British troops ; when, however, the depot at Chestnut-Hill fell, likewise, into their hands, and with it, 227 barrels of flour, belonging to Sparhawk ; being the remainder of 323 barrels that had been originally removed thither, in consequence of the above-mentioned proceedings.</p> <p>For the price of these 227 barrels of flour, with interest from the time of their being taken, Sparhawk exhibited an account, amounting to 919?. 6s. 6cl., against the public ; upon which, the comptroller-general reported to the executive council, that “ neither the principal, the interest, nor any part of either, could be allowed ;” and against this decision, the present appeal was entered.</p> <p>The question, therefore, on the motion for a new trial, was, whether this claim, under all th§ circumstances, ought to be admitted ?</p>

Iasigi & Goddard imported a cargo of wool from the Cape of Good Hope to Boston, which was invoiced, and, on the 16th March, 1860, entered at a price or value at the place of exportation of less than twenty cents per pound, and hence duty free under the act of 8d March, 1857.* Certain packages ' —the “ examination packages,” as they are called — were examined by the appraisers, and the invoice certified “ Eight,” and sent to the collector.

Held: that he was not entitled to be discharged on common bail.

D. 1851, by the legislature of Iowa, and by its charter made “ a body corporate, and invested with all powers and attributes- of a municipal corporation.” “ The legislative authority of the city,” says this charter by its 19th section, “ is vested in a city council;” which council, the charter goes on to declare-, “ is invested with the following powers,” the powers being set forth essentially as follows: “ 1.

This was a foreign attachment, in which judgment was entered at the third term ; and a writ of inquiry being afterwards executed, a motion was made on behalf of the defendant, to quash the return, because the sheriff and inquest had refused to hear his evidence, at the time of executing the writ.

Indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, &c. The defendants pleaded that they were certificated bankrupts, and that the cause of action arose before the bankruptcy ; to which the plaintiff replied, that certificate was unfairly obtained; and on the trial of the cause, offered testimony in support of the four following exceptions, to wit : 1.

Held: * “ that a judgment for taxes-is fatally defective which fails to show the amount of tax for which it was rendered, and that the use of numerals, without some mark indicating for what they stand, is insufficient.” The judgment was therefore void, and the court was right in excluding the evidence from the jury. Judgment is Affirmed with costs. Lawrence v. Fast, 20 Illinois, 340; Lane v. Bommelmann, 21 Id., 147.

On an appeal from the decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, the record disclosed the following facts: On the 5th of April, 1845, Moreno submitted to Pio Pico, then Governor of the Department of California, a petition, wherein he set forth that he had “ denounced, in due form, a square league of land situate between Temecula and the Lagoon called Santa Rosa, to which, after previous judicial investigation,” he prayed “ to…

Bronson along with one Soutter had filed their bill in the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin (the Circuit… Held: at the last term, in a case in which the question arose, that the second section repealed in terms all the Circuit Court powers and jurisdiction of the District Courts.] The second of the two acts referred to was entitled “ An act to enable the District Courts of the United States to issue executions and other final process in…

This was an action of debt, brought upon a bond, bearing date the 24th of April 1769, and conditioned for the payment of 5001. lawful money of Pennsylvania. To the plaintiff’s demand, the defendant pleaded payment, and issue was thereupon joined.

Held: that the action was not maintainable in the courts of this state. The plaintiff and defendant had both been inhabitants of Connecticut, previous to the revolution, when the debt for which this action is brought, *SQ4.1 "^78,8 alleged to be contracted, and continued *so, for some time after J the commencement of the war.

This was an action of indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. The defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and non assumpsit infra sex annos : the issue on the non assumpsit was tried, and a verdict found for the plaintiff. To the plea of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff replied, a writ of summons issued on a particular day, within the six years, which was returned nihil.

This was an appeal by the United States from the decree of the District Court for the Southern District of California. The respondent claimed a tract of land, called La Sierra, situated in the present county of Los Angeles, State of California; and in October, 1852, presented a petition to the Board of Commissioners, created by the act of March 3d, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in California, asking for the confirmation of their title.

Saunders filed a bill in chancery, in the State District Court of Madison County, Ohio, to quiet the title to a tract of land in that commonwealth, in what is called the Virginia Military District, a region north and west of the Ohio, and which, by the act of eession of that territory to the United States and several acts of Congress, was reserved for the Virginia troops upon the Continental establishment of our Revolutionary war.

Held: that the rule for trial, or non-pros., was continued; and that no new notice was necessary. If, therefore, the plaintiff does not go on to trial, the defendant is entitled to a non-pros. (a) (a) s. p. King of Spain v. Oliver, Peters C. C. 217; and see Halhead v. Ross, ante, p. 405.

Held: 1st. That the bequests to B. were not in satisfaction of her dower; 2d. That she was not estopped by the proceedings in partition from recovering her dower in the same land. This was an action of dower in 250 acres of land in Lancaster county, brought by Anne Kennedy, widow, who was the wife of Richard Johnson, deceased, against Thomas Nedrow and Anne, his wife, Catharine Wistar, and Rebecca Martin.

<p>This action was tried at July term, 1788, when, by ccnsent, a verdict was given for the plaintiff, for the sum of 687i., 5s., with six pence costs, subject to the opinion of the court on the following facts : .</p> <p>“ The plaintiff executed and acknowledged a mortgage, on the 3d day of September 1782, which was recorded on the 30th of October 1783. The mortgaged premises being sold by the defendant, then sheriff of the city and county of Philadelphia, the balance, after deducting the sum for which the land had'been sold, was paid to the mortgagee. Afterwards, to wit, on the 16th of July 1785, the plaintiff made an assignment of all his property for the use of all his creditors, and the assignees bring this action, in his name, to recover the money thus paid over to the mortgagee. If the court shall be of opinion with the defendant, on the foregoing case, then judgment shall be entered for him ; otherwise, judgment to stand for the plaintiff for the sum specified in the verdict.”</p> <p>*The question was, whether a mortgage, not recorded within six months, is good against the mortgagor ?</p>

Held: that the bond was not a payment pro tanto, so as to discharge the executors of A. This action being referred by consent, the following report was made : “ The referees, upon full consideration of all the circumstances, are doubtful as to the law upon one point, and have agreed to make their award special, subject to the

Held: that parol evidence of this agreement was admissible. 1 Ejectment for a house and lot in Second street, in the city of Philadelphia. The action was tried by a jury at bar, in January term lfSS, and a verdict given for the plaintiff.

Appeal by the United States from a decree of the District Court for the Northern District of California, approving tho survey of a tract of land claimed under a Mexican grant, confirmed to Folsom, deceased.

Held: that Bonds and Specialties under hand and seal, and Notes in writing, signed by the party who makes the same, whereby such party is obliged, or promises to pay unto any other person, or his order, or assigns, any sum of money therein mentioned, are not by law assignable or indorseable over to any person, so as that the person to whom the said Bonds, Specialties, Note or Notes, is or are assigned or indorsed, may, in…

Held: that the deed from the defendant to the plaintiff, was admissible in evidence to prove the amount paid, &c.; and that to maintain the action, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to prove, that the defendant received the money by mistake, imposition or deceit.

<p> Verdict on replevin-bond. </p> <p>Debt upon a replevin-bond, after judgment de retorno hábendo in the replevin, and thereupon, a return of elongatur.</p>

Replevin. The material question, on the trial of this cause, was, whether the goods of a stranger, being removed from the premises, before a distress, could be pursued and seized, within the thirty days which the act of assembly allows for pursuing and seizing the goods of the tenant ? (See 1 Sm. L. 370.)

Held: that the indorsee of a note took it subject to all equitable considerations, existing between the payee and the maker. This was an action brought by Hugh McCullough, as assignee of Samuel Young, upon a promissory note made by John H. Houston; and on the trial of the cause, a verdict was given for the plaintiff, subject to the

Held: upon a true construction of the policy, that the right belonged to the company. The judgment of the court below was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Held: that the indorsement in blank by the payee of a sealed note, did not make him liable to the holder. See also Elliot v. Miller, Addis. 269; Graham v. Gondy, Id. 55, and the note to Wheeler v. Hughes, ante, p. 23.

This cause came before the court on a case stated, which was, in substance, as follows : — The intestate, John Grseme, in his lifetime, to wit, in December term, 1772, obtained a judgment against the defend am. in a plea of debt, in the county court of common pleas of Philadelphia. He after-wards died, being resident, at the time of his death, in Great Britain, of which kingdom he was a subject.

Held: that the defect was cured by the verdict. Practice of entering verdicts on the issue of non solvit, in debt in the dctinet. A copy of an act of assembly of another state, contained, with other acts( in a pamphlet, printed by the printers of the commonwealth, was held to be good evidence.

This was a foreign attachment, which issued returnable to the present term ; and, on arguing a rule to show cause why the writ should not be quashed, it was proved, that, on the 5th of December, the defendant was at Lancaster, on his way to Fort Pitt, where he intended to proceed to the Spanish settlement below the Natchez, on the Mississippi, but was actually at Fort Pitt, on the 2d of January 1790.

Held: that the purchasers were bound to contribute in aid of the other heirs, whose lands remained unsold, to the payment of the remaining debts of the intestate.

c.; and upon those in schedules C, E, and C, of said act, the du ties oí 24,15, and 8 p. c. respectively, “ with such exceptions as ai e hereinafter made.” The Tariff Act of 1846 had imposed a duty of 40 p. c. upon the articles enumerated in schedule B, among which werealmonds” (by name), “ currants,” “ dates,” “ figs,” “prunes,” “raisins.” It had imposed a duty of 30 p. c. upon those enumerated in schedule C, among which articles were “ grapes,” “nuts, not otherwise…

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District . of Michigan. Held: were or were not adapted to the welding up and re-forming the ends of railroad rails when exfoliated or shattered from unequal wear.

Mr. Roelker, of counsel for the defendant in error- in this case, moved the court to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction : the case being thus: The Judiciary Act of 1789 (§ 25) provides that this court may review the judgment of the highest court of a State in eases “ where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a . . statute of . . the United States, and the decision is against the title, right,.privilege, or exemption…

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin; tbe case in that court having been one of a bill in equity, by which the appellant Wheeler sought to charge Sage as his trustee. The material facts, as set forth in the bill, were these: . On the 12th day of September, 1851, Wheeler, Sage, and Slocum entered into an equal copartnership, to carry on “ a general produce business” in Troy, New York.

The complainant, Burr, as assignee of a patent granted to Henry A. Wells for “ an improvement in the machinery for making hat-bodies, and in the process of their manufacture,hied a bill in the court below against Duryee and others for infringement. The patent to Wells was granted originally April 25, 1846. It was surrendered in 1856, and reissued in two separate patents; one for the improved meochine, the other for the process.

Bill in chancery, by which the complainant charged that the defendants were using a certain machine for the manufacturo of hat-bodies, which' infringed a patent originally granted in 185(> to a certain A. B. Taylor, and subsequently, in 1860, reissued, for hardening the bodies of hats by means of rollers while on the perforated cone upon W'hieh they had been formed, with a contrivance to give them the reciprocating motion required in the operation of being hardened.

This was a case of conflicting land claims in California, and came here on appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Northern District of California, locating, by survey, under the act of Congress of June 14, 1860, a previously confirmed Mexican grant.

The suit was ejectment, brought by a nominal plaintiff, as at common law, against the casual ejector, to recover possession of a tract of land in the State of Indiana. Process was duly served upon the persons in possession; and the corporation defendants were admitted to defend the suit, and, as such defendants, filed the usual consent rule, confessing lease, entry and ouster, and pleaded the general issue.

This was a bill in equity, filed in the Circuit Court for tbe District of Columbia, by S. Spain, guardian of Mrs. McRae, a lunatic, against tbe administrator of tbe late James Hamilton, of South Carolina and Texas, extensively known as “ General James Hamilton,” and against Corcoran and Riggs, Hill, and others; tbe said bill claiming priority in the distribution of a fund in the Treasury of the United States, ori ginally belonging to Hamilton, and arising by the assumption…

In July, 1853, Franklin C. Gray, of California, died in the State of New York, leaving there a widow, Matilda, and an infant daughter, Franklina, and properly held in his name, in California, appraised at $287,000, In January, 1854, administration was granted to J. C. Palmer and C. J. Eaton.

This was an action of ejectment, brought in tbe Circuit Court for the Southern District of Illinois, by Beaver, tbe plaintiff in error, against Taylor et al., to recover premises described in bis declaration. The action wa.s brought on the 17th July, 1854. Tbe date is important.

By the code of Wisconsin, which was adopted in tbe District Court as its rule of proceeding, it was provided that on “ a written undertaking executed by one or more sufficient sureties,” approved, &c., for the prosecution of tbe action for the return of tbe property to tbe defendant, tbe marshal should take tbe same, and deliver it to tbe plaintiff, unless, &e. In tbe replevin suit just mentioned, tbe deputy marshal, one Fuller, took a bond, and delivered tbe property; but…

A decree foreclosing a mortgage and ordering a sale of the road had been obtained in tbe District Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Wisconsin, in a suit by one Bishop and others against The Milwaukee and Chicago Bailroad Company; and tbe road being offered for sale by tbe marshal, under tbe decree, Blossom, tbe appellant in this case, made a bid for tbe property. Tbe sale was suspended at this point, and never actually proceeded further.

This was a question of a survey of a California Mexican grant, of two leagues in quantity, to be located within a larger outboundary, and came by appeal from the District Court for the Southern District of California. The area of the larger tract was about three leagues and a third of a league. It resembled in shape a sack or purse, and the ranch was hence called the Bolsa or Sack de San Cayetano.

The appellant, White, claimed a tract, or rancho of land, known as San Antonio, under a grant alleged to have been made to one Antonio Ortega. The United States, appellees in the suit, claimed it under a grant alleged to have been made by the same authority to a certain Juan Miranda. One question, therefore, was as to the validity of the respective documentary titles thus set up.

Congress, by act of August 80,1852,* provided for the appointment of supervising inspectors of steamers and machinery ; one of the duties of such inspectors being to establish rules and regulations to be observed by all vessels in passing each other, and to assign the limits of territory within which they should be obligatory.

The complainants below, appellants Here, filed a bill as judgment creditors, to set aside conveyances of the properly of one Edward Seagrave, their debtor, and made, as they alleged, to hinder and delay the execution of their judgment. The judgment was recovered in the Circuit Court of the United States, at November Term, 1854, against the said Seagrave, for $60,520.88, and costs, in a suit commenced on the 26th October previous.

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of California, as not having been taken in time, that is to say, within five years; as having been made without citation, and as not founded on a properly certified transcript.

This was a writ of error to the Northern District of California ; the case being thus: ■ By the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, “ to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California,” it is provided, “ that each and every person claiming lands in California, by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, shall present the same to the commissioners,” &c., who are directed to examine into and “ decide upon the validity…

Appeal by tbe United States from tbe decree of tbe District Court for tbe Southern District of California, confirming a claim to land under tbe act of 3d March, 1851, entitled “An act to ascertain and settle tbe private land claims in tbe State of California.”* Tbe act having, by a previous section, enacted that “ each and every person” claiming lands in California under title derived from tbe Spanish or Mexican government, should present them with evidence to a Board of…

An act of Congress of June 14th, I860,* authorizes the District Courts of California, on the application of any party interested, to make an order requiring the survey of any private land claims to be returned into court.

This was an appeal from the District Court for the Northern District of California; the case being thus: On the 28th February, 1853, three brothers, Innocencio, José, and Mariano Romero, presented their petition to the Board of Commissioners, established by the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, for the settlement of private land claims in California, asking a confirmation of a land title.

Appeal by the United States from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District, of California, confirming a decision of the Board of Commissioners appointed by the act of March 3,1851, for the settlement of private land claims in the State just named, by which decision an estate known as the ex-mission of San Gabriel was confirmed to Workman arid Crosby, appellees in the case.

Like the preceding case, this one came before the court upon appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, and arose originally upon a petition for the confirmation of a land claim, before the Board of Commissioners appointed under the act of the 8d March, 1851.